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ABSTRACT 
 
The 2002 National Security Strategy for the United States focused American strategic 
policy around the use, or potential use, of preemptive/preventive strikes, particularly as a 
counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism tool. While preemption and prevention are not new 
strategies, they have never been highlighted to such a degree as is currently the case. These 
activities have been studied in the context of international security, using elements such as spiral 
models and offense-defense theory.  This study seeks to examine if other elements, specifically 
international law and normative issues, such as just war tradition, contribute to our understanding 
of the use, or non-use, of preventive or preemptive actions by states.   
Using both logistic regression and comparative case studies, numerous hypotheses were 
tested to determine if the legal and normative elements influenced or constrained states vis-à-vis 
the use of anticipatory military activities within the context of international crises.  The statistical 
results indicate that the limitations on the use of anticipatory military activities found in 
international law and the just war tradition do not have a significant impact on the likelihood that 
these actions will be used by states.  The case studies, however, seem to indicate that the legal 
and normative elements do have some influence on leaders with respect to the use of anticipatory 
military activities. 
 
 
 vi
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1962, President John F. Kennedy stated, “We no longer live in a world where only the 
actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute 
maximum peril.”1 On April 14, 1986, President Ronald Reagan announced on national television 
that “there should be no place on earth where terrorists can rest and train and practice their 
skills.”  He went on to assert that self-defense “is not only our right, it is our duty.”2   
In  2002, President George W. Bush echoed, and extended, these positions.  The 
September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), mirrored 
Kennedy’s statement, arguing that “We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the 
capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.” The NSS goes on to say that,  
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a 
sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of 
inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if 
necessary, act preemptively.3  
 
The NSS also deals with the problems posed by terrorism.  In this context, President Bush stated, 
 
America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those 
who harbor terrorists—because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization.  The 
United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop 
new home bases.  Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn.4    
 
In what has become known as the Bush Doctrine, President Bush extended and expanded the 
traditional concept of self-defense.   
                                                 
1 Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, (eds.), The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security 
Archive Documents Reader (New York: The New Press, 1998), 161. 
2 Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN 
Charter Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1993), 138. 
3 George W. Bush, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat. Remarks by the President on Iraq, October 7 
2002, Office of the Press Secretary, November 7, 2002 
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/print/20021007-8.html>. 
4 Bush, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat," i-ii. 
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While self-defense is generally viewed as a reactionary policy, the new type of self-
defense advocated in the NSS, namely anticipatory self-defense, is designed to be proactive. 
According to the NSS, the traditional conceptualization of self-defense must be adapted and 
updated in order to deal with today’s world, and today’s threats.  Whereas previous leaders were 
able to see “a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack”, today’s 
leaders do not have this luxury.5  Rather, according to President Bush, “Facing clear evidence of 
peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a 
mushroom cloud.”6  In other words, the NSS put the world on notice that the United States 
would now follow a strategy based upon the possible use of anticipatory military activities.  
It is this policy of anticipatory military activities that is the focus of inquiry.7   The NSS 
focused American strategic policy around the (potential) use of such activities, specifically of 
preemptive or preventive military activity—particularly as a counterproliferation tool.  While the 
concepts of preemption and prevention are not new strategies, they have never been highlighted 
to such an extent.  Vagts asserts that “since at least the eighteenth century, [governments] had 
been forced to exercise great care not to admit preventive motivations when going to war.”8   
In September 1950, President Truman stated, “We do not believe in aggressive or 
preventive war.  Such war is the weapon of dictators, not of free and democratic countries.”9  
                                                 
5 Bush, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat," 15. 
6 George W. Bush, President Delivers State of the Union Address. The President's State of the Union 
Address, January 29 2002, Office of the Press Secretary, April 27, 2003 
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/2002129-11.html>. 
7 It is important to note that this work does not seek to examine the 2002 NSS in depth, but rather one of 
the foundational concepts of the Bush Doctrine, namely anticipatory military activities.  The Bush 
Doctrine, as well as the related issues of the impact of international terrorism on international law, the just 
war tradition, and anticipatory military activities, are discussed in Chapter 9. 
8 Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York: 
King's Crown Press, 1956), 263. 
9 Robert W. Tucker, The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1960), 15. 
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During the same month, Acheson stated that preventive war “is a thoroughly wicked 
thing…immoral and wrong from every point of view.”10 Schlesinger argues a similar point, 
stating that unilateral preventive war “is illegitimate and immoral.”  He goes on to add, “For 
more than 200 years we have not been that kind of country.”11  In this respect, the Bush 
administration’s explicit announcement of an intention to adopt a strategy based upon the ideas 
of preemptive or preventive military action marks a significant shift away from past norms, if not 
state practice. 
In his investigation of preemptive war, Reiter notes that it has rarely been waged and 
finds that there are “two arguments why preemptive war is rarer than might be expected: because 
the political costs of attacking first often prevent preemption, and because the fear of preemption 
can actually serve to facilitate the peaceful resolution of a crisis.”12  His analysis is based on the 
traditional international security concepts of spiral models and offense-defense theory.  Could 
there also be other factors that limit the use of anticipatory military strategies?  Specifically, do 
international law and normative issues, such as the just war tradition, also influence states’ 
decisions with respect to employing a strategy based upon the use of anticipatory military 
activities?   
While Reiter hints at the legal and normative elements as limiting factors vis-à-vis 
preemption, he does not explicitly test these ideas.  Instead, Reiter argues that there are “political 
costs” associated with taking preemptive action, but he does not elaborate on what these “costs” 
entail.  This work seeks to fill part of this gap.  What will be examined here is if the legal and 
normative elements are in fact the component parts of these “political costs.”  
                                                 
10 Tucker, The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine, 15. 
11 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "The Immorality of Preemptive War," NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly 19, no. 
4 (Fall 2002): 42. 
12 Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International 
Security 20, no. 2 (Autumn 1995): 6. 
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Anticipatory Military Activities 
 What constitutes a preemptive or preventive military activity?13  According to the United 
States Department of Defense, a preemptive attack is defined as, “an attack initiated on the basis 
of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.”  A preventive war, on the other 
hand, is “a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and 
that to delay would involve great risk.”14  
Definitions of the concepts have not been limited to the defense establishment.  The 
academic community has also attempted to provide definitions for these concepts. A few 
examples of these definitions are helpful in understanding the concept under investigation.   
Van Evera defines these activities in the following manner: 
A preemptive mobilization or attack is mounted to seize the initiative, in the belief that 
the first mover gains an important advantage and a first move by the opponent is 
imminent.  A preventive attack, in contrast, is mounted to engage an opponent before it 
gains relative strength.  The incentive to preempt is two-sided: both adversaries gain by 
forestalling the other.  The incentive to prevent is one-sided: the declining state wants 
immediate war, while the rising state wants to avert war.15  
 
This, however, is not the only definition of these concepts.  Reiter offers these definitions: 
A war is preemptive if it breaks out primarily because the attacker feels that it will itself 
be the target of a military attack in the short term.  The essence of preemption, then, is 
that it is motivated by fear, not by greed.  This definition is limited to perceptions of 
short-term threats to national security: in contrast, the term preventive war is used for a 
war that begins when a state attacks because it feels that in the longer term (usually in the 
next few years) it will be attacked or will suffer relatively increasing strategic 
inferiority.16  
 
                                                 
13 A full discussion of the varying definitions of preemptive and preventive military activities can be 
found in Chapter 2. 
14  Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military Terms. December 17, 2003, April 5, 2004 
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>. 
15 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), 40. 
16 Reiter, "Preemptive Wars," 6-7. 
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For Reiter, the time element is a crucial distinction.  Harkavy echoes this perspective, arguing 
that preemption “is usually linked to an immediate crisis situation, one with mutual escalating 
fears and threats, in which there is an apparent advantage to striking first.”17 Betts offers a 
similar definition, stating that a “preemptive strike is one made in immediate anticipation of 
enemy attack; a surprise attack against an enemy who is not yet preparing his own attack may be 
preventive, but not preemptive.” Conversely, for Betts, preventive war,  
in its pure form, involves longer-term premeditated behaviour on the part of one 
antagonist, often where striking the first blow may not be perceived as crucial.  What is 
important is the forestalling of a change in the balance of power; premeditated aggression 
is usually impelled by an expectation by one member of a potential conflict pairing that 
the balance of power will shift away from it, and hence, that war now will be more 
favourable than war later.18  
 
Schweller presents a similar description of preventive wars, arguing that they “are motivated by 
the fear that one’s military power and potential are declining relative to that of a rising 
adversary.”19  
In this respect, one of the key differences between preemptive and preventive activities is 
the temporal proximity of the threat.  Walzer argues for a “spectrum of anticipation” with 
preemptive activities, which are “like a reflex action, a throwing up of one’s arms at the very last 
minute” at one end and “preventive war, an attack that responds to a distant danger, a matter of 
foresight and free choice” at the other.20  
                                                 
17 Robert E. Harkavy, Preemption and Two-Front Conventional Warfare: A Comparison of 1967 Israeli 
Strategy with the Pre-World War One German Schlieffen Plan, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems no. 
23 (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1977), 7. 
18 Richard K. Betts, "A Nuclear Golden Age? The Balance Before Parity," International Security 11, no. 3 
(Winter 1986-1987): 19. (emphasis in original) 
19 Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" 
World Politics 44, no. 2 (January 1992): 236. 
20 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Second (New 
York: Basic Books, 1992), 74-75. 
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Preemptive activities seem designed to forestall an imminent threat, while preventive 
activities are directed toward a more distant threat.  What constitutes a “distant” threat, or even 
an “imminent” threat, however, appears to be based primarily on the perceptions and 
interpretation of the potential preemptor/preventor.  In this sense, the difference between 
“preemptive” and “preventive” is in the eye of the beholder.  
The conceptual distinctions between preemption and prevention are clouded, however, by 
the fact that policy makers often use the terms interchangeably.  For example, the policy 
articulated in the NSS clearly fits into the “preventive” rubric as defined above, even though it is 
described as “preemptive” in nature.  By focusing on the type of threat faced and the policies 
adopted to counter such a threat, rather than on the semantically ambiguous terms preemptive or 
preventive, a more meaningful understanding of anticipatory military activities can be fashioned.  
As discussed below, the primary demarcation used in this analysis is the type of threat addressed, 
rather than focusing on the preemptive vs. preventive distinction. 
There are two different types of responses that should be examined.  The first is 
anticipatory uses of military force.  These actions are characterized by the actual use of military 
force in anticipation of an attack or in response to another type of threat.  Examples of this type 
of action include the Israeli attack on Egypt in 1967 and the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear 
facility in 1981. The second type of response is anticipatory military activities that fall short of 
actual uses of force.  In these cases, the anticipator deployed forces in response to a threat, but 
did not engage in actual armed conflict.  An example of this type of activity is the US naval 
quarantine of Cuba in 1962.   
It is important to be clear about what this work will not examine.  Specifically, this work 
does not look at reprisals or other forms of punishments for past wrongs.  These are reactive 
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policies, i.e., in response to an actual attack, and therefore do not fit into the rubric of 
anticipatory activities.  It is important to stress that there is a difference between a policy that is 
in response to a crisis trigger and a policy that is in response to an actual armed attack.  Although 
both could be considered “reactive,” they are not really the same—particularly with respect to 
their standing within international law and the just war tradition.  As will be discussed in more 
depth throughout the remaining chapters, there is no legal or normative problem with states 
acting in self-defense in response to an armed attack.  This type of “reactionary” policy is 
excluded from this study.  The second type of action—a military response to a non-violent crisis 
trigger, or what is termed here an anticipatory military activity—is more contested within the 
legal and normative literature.  It is this type of action will be the primary focus of this work.   
Additionally, this study will not examine targeted assassinations or forcible regime 
change, both of which have often been discussed in conjunction with anticipatory military 
activities, particularly with respect to the Bush Doctrine.  The reason for their exclusion is 
primarily pragmatic, since these actions are not included in the data currently available.  
Anticipatory military activities are defined as actions taken in response to either an 
imminent threat or to counter a more distant threat.  For the purposes of this study, the presence 
of a threat is determined through the context of an international crisis, as determined by the 
International Crisis Behavior project.  More information on this element is presented in Chapters 
2 and 6.  The term “anticipatory military activities,” therefore, includes the traditional concepts 
of both preemption and prevention. The type of threat faced by the state still matters, and the 
analysis will include actions taken to counter both immediate/imminent and more distant threats.  
Additionally, anticipatory military activities are limited to actions that take place within the 
context of an international crisis.  In this respect, anticipatory military activities do not include 
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the proverbial “bolt out of the blue,” but, instead, are intended to deal with a particular, and 
identified, threat posed by another actor.   
Specifically, two different types of threats will be studied. The first type of threat is 
defined by the ICB project as “non-violent military,” which includes activities such as troop 
mobilizations and deployments and is used in this work as representing an “imminent” threat.  
The second type of threat is described as an “external change” which includes the development 
of new weapons technology, or the deployment of a new weapon, and is used to represent the 
more “distant” threats.  Additional information about the operationalizations of the type of 
threats can be found in Chapter 6 and Appendix B.  Chapters 6 through 8 test hypotheses with 
respect to both types of threats and both types of responses. 
A Cautionary Note 
Before discussing the role of anticipatory military activities in both international law and 
the just war tradition, it is important to briefly note a potential problem and pitfall when using 
these evolving concepts to analyze historical events.  Both international law and the just war 
tradition are viewed differently today than they were 50, or even 25, years ago.  This could 
complicate the analysis in that the legal or normative constraints on anticipatory military 
activities that currently exist, or not, as the case may be, might not have been in place when 
decision-makers were faced with crises in the past.  This problem is minimized to a certain 
extent since the analysis is limited to the post-1945 world.  This allows for consistency in terms 
of (formal) international legal institutions, i.e., the United Nations, as well as technological 
consistency, i.e., this period coincides with the atomic age.    
Recently, many scholars have discussed the need to reformulate or reinterpret the just war 
tradition in light of developments within the international system—both with respect to polarity 
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and the new types of threats that states face today.  To be sure, this is an important and vital task.  
Rules and regulations must adapt, lest they be seen as irrelevant and therefore are abandoned as 
being meaningless. 
It would be wrong, however, to look at events outside of the context within which they 
took place.  In this respect, this work will rely on what could be called “traditional” 
interpretations.  The primary rationale for this is to ensure a level of consistency vis-à-vis the 
legal and normative constraints throughout the time period under investigation. 
It is also important to note that much of the debate about the expansion or revision of 
both international law and the just war tradition focuses around activities that lie outside the 
scope of this work, such as humanitarian intervention and the prevention of genocide.  Since this 
work focuses on anticipatory military activities used in self-defense, these other activities are not 
relevant.21   
Additionally, the potential conflict between the “traditional” versus “new” 
conceptualizations of both international law and the just war tradition is dampened in that the 
issue of self-defense, especially distinguishing acts taken in legitimate self-defense from those 
merely using the rhetoric of self-defense as an excuse for aggressive actions, has concerned 
scholars for centuries, both with respect to international law and the just war tradition.  In this 
respect, there is a long history of examining the legal and normative constraints on these actions 
that can be drawn upon for the analysis. 
                                                 
21 Since the actions under investigation are taken in the course of an international crisis, specifically one 
triggered by another actor, and in response to a specific threat, there are at least plausible claims for self-
defense in each of the cases under investigation. The “legality” of the actions, or the claims of self-
defense are not under investigation here.  Rather, what is important to stress is that the actions did take 
place within the context of a crisis. 
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Structure of the Dissertation 
The primary question under investigation is if states are constrained by the legal and 
normative elements with respect to the use of anticipatory military activities.  One of the primary 
goals of international law is the regulation of the use of force, which has taken the form of 
general prohibitions on its use.  Anticipatory military activities, predicated on the idea of self-
defense, however, do not fit neatly into the rubric of modern international law.  The question 
seems simple enough: are anticipatory military activities permitted under international law?  
There is not a clear cut or simple answer, however.  While there is substantial disagreement on 
the legality of anticipatory military activities, the conventional answer is no, with a few 
exceptions.  In other words, under the traditional interpretation of international law, anticipatory 
military activities are allowed only under a very strict set of circumstances. 
Additionally, only some kinds of anticipatory military actions, specifically those designed 
to counter an imminent and actual armed attack are permitted.22  Brown argues that the “right to 
preempt” a threat that is an “unprovoked act of aggression” and is imminent is merely an 
extension of the legitimate right to self-defense.23  However, anticipatory military activities 
designed to prevent a distant or potential attack are not permitted under international law.   
 There also appears to be support for the use of anticipatory military activities within the 
just war tradition, assuming that the threat is imminent.24  Particularly with respect to the issue of 
just cause, some scholars see room for some anticipatory military activities under the umbrella of 
the just war tradition.  Walzer also argues that anticipatory military activities are permitted when 
                                                 
22 This notion of an “imminent” threat complicates the situation, since imminence is hard to quantify and 
often is in the eye of the beholder.  For a discussion on the evolving nature of the idea of imminence, see 
Terence Taylor, "The End of Imminence?" The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 57-72. 
23 Chris Brown, "Self-Defense in an Imperfect World," Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 2. 
24 Tucker, however, agues that even preventive war can be justified since “the ‘anticipatory’ use of force 
remains as an integral feature of the right of self-defense the legitimacy of preventive war is preserved.” 
Tucker, The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine, 121.   
 10
 11
                                                
there is “sufficient threat,” which he describes as consisting of three things: “a manifest intent to 
injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general 
situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk.”25   
 As with international law, there seems to be a clear division between what types of 
anticipatory military activities are permissible and what types are not.  The imminence 
requirement once again proves to be the most salient in terms of distinguishing legitimate from 
illegitimate anticipatory military activities.  In a similar vein to that found in international law, 
anticipatory military activities designed to counter an imminent threat are permitted.  All others, 
whether designed to counter a distant or merely potential threat, are not considered legitimate. 
The question remains, however, if these positions influence or constrain leaders when 
trying to decide whether or not to use anticipatory military activities in response to various crisis 
triggers.  It is this question that this study seeks to answer.  The analysis will be conducted 
through the use of both quantitative analysis, using logistic regression, and case studies 
examining both crises that involved both imminent and distant threats.  The structure of the 
dissertation is as follows.  Chapter 2 discusses the different definitions and conceptualizations of 
“preemptive” and “preventive” activities.  Chapter 3 examines these concepts from the 
perspective of international security.  Chapter 4 focuses on the standing of anticipatory military 
activities within the framework of international law.  Chapter 5 looks at these activities from the 
perspective of the just war tradition.  The quantitative testing of the hypotheses is contained in 
Chapter 6.  Chapter 7 presents case studies where the threat faced was classified as being 
“imminent.”  The case studies in Chapter 8 focus on threats classified as more “distant” in 
nature.  Finally, Chapter 9 presents the conclusions and implications of the study. 
 
25 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Second (New 
York: Basic Books, 1992), 81. 
CHAPTER 2: WHAT ARE ANTICIPATORY MILITARY ACTIVITIES? 
  
Before discussing the conditions that influence states’ decisions vis-à-vis the use of 
anticipatory military activities, it is necessary to establish exactly what is an “anticipatory 
military activity.”  Traditionally, anticipatory military activities have been given two different 
labels: preemption/preemptive attack and prevention/preventive war.1  These terms are 
problematic, in that although they refer to different concepts, they are often used in a haphazard 
manner.  Moore notes that during an interview, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
“[lumped] together ‘preemptive action,’ preventive action,’ ‘anticipatory self-defense,’ and ‘self-
defense,’” implying that “they all meant pretty much the same thing, he said—‘call it what you 
wish.’”2   
Numerous scholars, from a variety of different disciplines, have offered various 
definitions of preemptive and preventive military activities.  While virtually all of the definitions 
are quite similar, there are important nuances that differentiate them.  Specifically, there are four 
different categories that the different definitions can be divided into.  The categorizations of 
                                                 
1 According to Evans, “The English language seems to be unique in having two different words here – 
‘preemption’ to describe responses to imminent threats, and ‘prevention’ for non-imminent ones: that 
luxury, however, cherished though it may be for policy aficionados who happen to be native English 
speakers, seems to have done far more to confuse than clarify the debate for everyone else, who tend to 
use the words, if at all, interchangeably.” Gareth Evans, "When is It Right to Fight?" Survival 46, no. 3 
(Autumn 2004): 65. 
2 Mike Moore, "Truman Got It Right," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 1 (January/February 
2003): 20. It is interesting to note that the Rumsfeld made the statement while discussing Kennedy’s 
decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The remainder of the quotation is as follows: “And he went 
out and blockaded them.  Called it a quarantine but blockaded them and put the world into a very tense, 
dangerous, among the most dangerous of my lifetime, circumstances.  And prevailed because he did take 
preventive action” Donald Rumsfeld, "The Price of Inaction Can Be Truly Catastrophic," The Asahi 
Shimbun (Japan) September 10, 2002: Point of View <http://nuclearno.com/text.asp?3812>.  The 
remainder of the quote actually muddies the conceptual waters even further, since he also uses the terms 
“blockade” and “quarantine” interchangeably.  The lackadaisical manner in which distinct terms are used 
interchangeably complicates any analysis of preemptive and preventive military activities, particularly 
with respect to international law and the just war tradition.  The problems with this conceptual ambiguity 
are discussed in greater length in later chapters. 
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these definitions are not completely clear-cut, as some of the definitions could be placed in 
several different categories.  In these instances, the definition is listed in the category that seems 
to best represent the overall position of the definition.   
It is important to note that not all of the following definitions will be utilized in this 
study.  This survey of the literature is intended to present the entire spectrum of 
conceptualizations of the concepts of preemptive and preventive military activities.  The specific 
definitions and operationalizations used in this work are discussed at the end of the chapter, as 
well as in Chapter 6 and in Appendix B.  
The first group focuses on the temporal aspect, distinguishing between imminent and 
more distant threats.  The second group emphasizes the importance of “windows of opportunity” 
or shifting power differentials between states.  The third group defines preemptive and 
preventive military activities specifically within the context of nuclear weapons or weapons of 
mass destruction.  Finally, the fourth group includes the idea of regime change within the 
conceptualization of preemptive and preventive military activities.  These groupings are not 
mutually exclusive, however, since almost all the definitions include the “imminence” factor, 
and some definitions include elements from more than one group. 
Each of the different groups will be discussed, along with some definitions that deviate 
from the traditional perspectives.  After reviewing the various conceptualizations of preemptive 
and preventive military activities, the “anticipatory military activities” concept, which will be 
used in this work, will be discussed.  Additionally, many of these definitions will be expanded 
upon in later chapters, particularly in Chapter 3, which discusses anticipatory military activities 
from the perspective of international security—the literature from which the vast majority of 
these definitions are drawn. 
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Preemption vs. Prevention: Temporal Distinctions 
 The most often described distinction between preemptive and preventive military 
activities revolves around the proximity of the threat.  For example, according to the United 
States Department of Defense, a preemptive attack is defined as, “an attack initiated on the basis 
of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.”3  A preventive war, on the other 
hand, is “a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and 
that to delay would involve great risk.”4  
Cimbala argues that a “preventive war is one undertaken by a state in anticipation of an 
enemy intent to attack at some future date or in response to an expected power transition in the 
international system which the state considers unacceptable and is willing to go to war to 
prevent.”  Preemption, on the other hand, “is a decision to strike first in the belief that an enemy 
has already decided to attack and is now attempting to implement that decision.”5  Reiter states 
that, 
A war is preemptive if it breaks out primarily because the attacker feels that it will itself 
be the target of a military attack in the short term….This definition is limited to 
perceptions of short-term threats to national security; in contrast, the term preventive war 
is used for a war that begins when a state attacks because it feels that in the longer term 
(usually the next few years) it will be attacked or will suffer relatively increasing strategic 
inferiority.6 
 
For Tucker, “whereas a preventive war initiates the deliberate and premeditated initiation of 
hostilities at the most propitious time, a pre-emptive attack involves an action in which the 
                                                 
3 It is interesting to note that the Department of Defense does not define what constitutes “incontrovertible 
evidence” or what qualifies as “imminent.” 
4  Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military Terms. December 17 2003, April 5, 2004 
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>. 
5 Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 77. 
6 Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International 
Security 20, no. 2 (Autumn 1995): 6-7. 
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attempt is made to seize the initiative from an adversary who has either already resorted to force 
or is certain to initiate hostilities in the immediate future.”7  
Harkavy offers a similar definition of preemption and prevention, stating that: 
Preemption, then, is usually linked to an immediate crisis situation, one with mutual 
escalating fears and threats, in which there is an apparent advantage to striking first.  
Preventive war, on the other hand, and in its pure form, involves longer-term 
premeditated behaviour on the part of one antagonist, often where striking the first blow 
may not be perceived as crucial.8 
 
Kegley and Raymond distinguish between the two activities in the following manner: 
A preemptive military attack entails the use of force to quell or mitigate an impending 
strike by an adversary.  A preventive military attack entails the use of force to eliminate 
any possible future strike, even when there is no reason to believe that aggression is 
planned or the capability to launch such an attack is operational.  Whereas the grounds 
for preemption lie in the evidence of a credible, imminent threat, the basis for prevention 
rests on the suspicion of an incipient, contingent threat.9  
 
Snyder argues that a “state preempts when another state is poised to strike; it prevents another 
state from striking (through disarmament) where the strike is a future, but not immediate, risk.”10 
For Buhite and Hamel, a “preventive war occurs when a state or combination thereof attacks one 
or more opponents on the assumption that doing so will prevent the attackers’ security from 
being compromised at some later date.”11  
 For the authors described above, the key distinction between preemptive and preventive 
military activities lies in the proximity of the threat: is the threat imminent or is it more distant?  
                                                 
7 Robert W. Tucker, The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1960), 142-43.   
8 Robert E. Harkavy, Preemption and Two-Front Conventional Warfare: A Comparison of 1967 Israeli 
Strategy with the Pre-World War One German Schlieffen Plan, Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems no. 
23 (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1977), 7. 
9 Kegley, Charles W. Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, "Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order," 
International Studies Perspectives 4, no. 4 (November 2003): 388. (emphasis in original)  
10 Jack Snyder, "Imperial Temptations," The National Interest Spring 2003: 654.  (emphasis in original)  
11 Russell D. Buhite and Wm. Christopher Hamel, "War for Peace: The Question of an American 
Preventive War Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1955," Diplomatic History 14, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 
368. 
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If the military action is taken to counter an imminent, or immediate, threat, it is considered to be 
“preemptive.”  If, on the other hand, the military action is taken to counter a more distant, or 
even potential, threat, it is considered “preventive.”  These authors do not necessarily discuss the 
underlying reasons for the development of a threat in the future, but merely assert that the 
military activity is designed to counter such a threat.  For the next category, however, more 
emphasis is put on the nature of the “distant” threat, with emphasis placed on the different types 
of “distant” threats. 
Preemption vs. Prevention: Developing Threats 
 In this category, specific attention is placed on the interactions between how and why 
threats might develop in the future and the actions states take to counter these threats.  In this 
respect, many of these definitions of preemptive and preventive military activities focus on not 
only the temporal issue, but also the underlying issues that can lead a state to perceive that there 
is an emerging threat that it needs to address.  In other words, these definitions not only look at 
the temporal aspect, but also provide the rationale for a preventive military action.  Among the 
developments that can induce a preventive military activity are the development of new military 
technology or a shift in the balance of power between the acting state and a rival.  While some 
scholars focus on one or the other of these elements, others include both in their definitions of 
preemptive and preventive military activities. 
 Some scholars explicitly address the issue of the creation of new military technologies in 
their definitions of preemptive and preventive military activities.  Snyder, for example, 
differentiates between a “preventive war, which forestalls the creation of new military assets, and 
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preemptive attack, which forestalls the mobilization and deployment of existing forces.”12  
Gaddis offers the following definitions: 
Preemption implied military action undertaken to forestall an imminent attack from a 
hostile state.  Prevention implied starting a war to keep such a state from building the 
capacity to attack.13 
 
Haass argues that: 
Preventive uses of force are those that seek either to stop another state or party from 
developing a military capability before it becomes threatening or to hobble or destroy it 
thereafter.  For the target country, preventive attacks are the proverbial bolt out of the 
blue….Preemptive uses of force come against a backdrop of tactical intelligence or 
warning indicating imminent military action by an adversary; they may constitute actions 
or attacks before the other side acts or attacks or even after hostilities have begun but the 
target forces have not been introduced into battle.14 
 
Blinken offers these definitions: 
One acts “preemptively” against an adversary whose fist is cocked.  One acts 
“preventively” against an adversary whose fist is not yet even raised, but who has been 
muscling up and might decide to strike you sometime in the future.15 
 
In these conceptualizations, the key motivation for preventive military activities is to act now, 
before the state can be threatened by new military technologies that the adversary/rival state is 
developing. 
 Inherent in many of these definitions is one of the key difficulties with “preventive” 
actions.  How is the decision maker to be certain that an attack will actually occur?  Blinkin’s 
definition highlights this problem.  He states that a preventive action is taken against another 
state that “might decide to strike you sometime in the future.”  “Might” and “sometime in the 
                                                 
12 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 160. 
13 John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 123. 
14 Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 51-52. 
15 Antony J. Blinken, "From Preemption to Engagement," Survival 45, no. 4 (Winter 2003-04): 35. 
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future” are not very reassuring assessments upon which to base decisions to use force.16  At the 
same time, however, the fact that the decision maker feels that there is a real possibility that such 
an action is likely to take place, and the appeal inherent in acting first to avoid significant 
damage and reduce associated costs cannot be ignored or underrated.  This issue will be 
addressed throughout the rest of this study. 
 Other scholars focus on the shifting balance of power between the actor and 
adversarial/rival state.  Vagts, for example, argues that wars “are called preventive when they are 
undertaken in order to keep an enemy, who is preparing or suspected of preparing an attack, from 
striking the first blow at a later date, which threatens to be more unfavorable to one’s own 
side.”17  For Brodie, preventive war refers to “the undertaking to destroy now an already strong 
rival power one fears may grow faster than one’s own.”18  Lemke defines “the preventive 
motive” (i.e., the rational for undertaking preventive military action) “as present when one state 
is declining in power relative to another.”19  
 Schweller argues that the “concept of preventive war refers to those wars that are 
motivated by the fear that one’s military power and potential are declining relative to that of a 
rising adversary.”20  Van Evera offers the following definitions: 
A preemptive mobilization or attack is mounted to seize the initiative, in the belief that 
the first mover gains an important advantage and a first move by the opponent is 
                                                 
16 Additionally, it is perhaps not coincidental that one of the key demarcations between legitimate (i.e., 
legally and normatively permitted) and illegitimate anticipatory military actions is the “imminence” 
factor, whereby “might” and “sometime in the future” are not sufficient to justify the use, or threat of use, 
of force.  Instead, what is necessary in order for the use of force to be legitimate is that it be used to 
forestall an actual threat. 
17 Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York: 
King's Crown Press, 1956), 263. 
18 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973), 25. (emphasis in 
original) 
19 Douglas Lemke, "Investigating the Preventive Motive for War," International Interactions 29, no. 4 
(2003): 278. 
20 Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" 
World Politics 44, no. 2 (January 1992): 236. 
 18
imminent.  A preventive attack, in contrast, is mounted to engage an opponent before it 
gains relative strength.21 
 
In an earlier work, Van Evera argued that a preventive war is undertaken when “one side 
foresees an adverse shift in the balance of power, and attacks to avoid a more difficult fight 
later.”22  According to these arguments, states would use anticipatory military actions in response 
to situations where it fears that it is losing power vis-à-vis a rival, and that it needs to act now, 
while it still can.  Waiting, in this context, would be detrimental, since as its power declines, it 
would be placed at an increasing disadvantage relative to the adversary. 
Organski echoes the importance of changes in the balance of power.  He argues that “a 
preventive war [is] launched by the dominant nation to destroy a competitor before it became 
strong enough to upset the existing international order.”23  Betts argues that a “preventive attack 
is undertaken against a potential and growing threat, lest the target country become too strong to 
defeat at a later date” while a “preemptive attack is spurred by strategic warning, evidence that 
the enemy is already preparing an attack.”24  
 In a later work, Betts argued that “The rational for preventive war is that conflict with the 
adversary is so deep and unremitting that war is ultimately inevitable, on worse terms than at 
present, as the enemy grows stronger over time.”25 Wirtz and Russell provide similar definitions: 
                                                 
21 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), 40. 
22 Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International 
Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 64. 
23 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, Second Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1968), 371. 
24 Richard K. Betts, "Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian 
Realism," in The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order, ed. Victor A. 
Utgoff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 76. In an earlier work, Betts argued that preventive war “is 
designed to engage the enemy before he has improved his capabilities” Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: 
Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982), 145. 
25 Richard K. Betts, "Striking First: A History of Thankfully Lost Opportunities," Ethics & International 
Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 18. 
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Preventive war is based on the concept that war is inevitable, and that it is better to fight 
now while the costs are low rather than later when the costs are high.  It is deliberate 
decision to begin war.  Preemption, by contrast, is nothing more than a quick draw.  Upon 
detecting evidence that an opponent is about to attack, one beats the opponent to the 
punch and attacks first to blunt the impending strike.26 
 
These statements add an interesting element to the concept of preventive war—the idea that war 
is inevitable.  Simply because that the threat might not fully develop until sometime in the future, 
for these scholars, does not mitigate the motivation to act now.  Rather, the fact that the state can 
act now, when its chances of winning are greater, as opposed to waiting for the unknown future, 
provides the motivation for states to engage in preventive military activities.   
 Levy and Gochal discuss the underlying assumptions that influence states’ decisions vis-
à-vis the use of preemptive and preventive military activities.  They state that “Leaders anticipate 
that the failure to preempt will result in an immediate war by the adversary, whereas the failure 
to take preventive action will result in a continued decline in relative military power and 
bargaining strength.”27  Barber’s description of preventive military activities flows from a similar 
perspective: 
Preventive war says: “It is a dangerous world where many potential adversaries may be 
considering aggression against us or our friends, or may be acquiring the weapons that 
would allow them to do so should they wish to: so we will declare war on that someone 
and interdict the possible unfolding of this perilous chain of could-be’s and may-be’s”28  
 
Barber brings up an interesting point about the nature of preventive military activities: they are 
designed to deal with something, i.e., an attack or development of a new weapon, which might 
happen in the future.   
                                                 
26 James J. Wirtz and James A. Russell, "U.S. Policy on Preventive War and Preemption," The 
Nonproliferation Review Spring 2003: 116. 
27 Jack S. Levy and Joseph R. Gochal, "Democracy and Preventive War: Israel and the 1956 Sinai 
Campaign," Security Studies 11, no. 2 (Winter 2001-02): 7. 
28 Benjamin R. Barber, Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2003), 90. 
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The importance of perceptions of threats or dangers raises an important, and potentially 
intractable issue.  How can a leader be sure that the threat is real?  How can he be sure that the 
shift in the balance of power is real?  How are intentions to be measured?  It is difficult to 
quantify perceptions, as well as seemingly amorphous “threats,” particularly when they are seen 
as being distant or merely potential.  While there are no good answer to these questions, for the 
purposes of this study, the analysis will be based upon the data provided in the International 
Conflict Behavior project dataset.  The dataset provides information on various different types of 
threats and actions that precipitated international crises, threats that include both the immediate 
and more distant varieties.  In this respect, the problem of perceptions and threats is somewhat 
mitigated, or at least partially deflected, in that these elements are coded for in the dataset.  There 
is data for the date the crisis was perceived by the various actors, the gravity of the perceived 
threat, as well as the type of threat the precipitated the crisis, or in other words, both perceptions 
and threats are quantified—at least to a certain extent.  Additional information about the data 
used is provided below as well as in Chapter 6 and in Appendix B. 
Some scholars link the acquisition/development of new military technologies and the 
shifting balance of power in their definitions of preemptive and preventive military activities.  
Walzer, for example, argues that,  
The general argument for preventive war is very old; in its classic form it has to do with 
the balance of power.  “Right now,” says the prime minister of country X, “the balance is 
stable, each of the competing states feels that its power is sufficient to deter the others 
from attacking.  But country Y, our historic rival across the river, is actively and urgently 
at work developing new weapons, preparing a mass mobilization; and if this work is 
allowed to continue, the balance will shift, and our deterrent power will no longer be 
effective.  The only solution is to attack now, while we still can.”29 
 
                                                 
29 Michael Walzer, "The Triumph for Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success)," Social Research 
69, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 21. 
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Levy also includes both elements in his definitions.  He argues that “Preventive war is more 
concerned with minimizing one’s losses from future decline than with maximizing one’s gains 
by fight now.”30  He also differentiates between preemptive and preventive military activities by 
stating that a “preemptive attack is designed to forestall the mobilization and deployment of the 
adversary’s existing military forces, where as prevention aims to forestall the creation of new 
military assets.”31  
 In this second grouping of definitions, much of the emphasis is placed on the changing 
power dynamics between two states.  This focus is clearly evident in the definitions of preventive 
military activities, which highlight the mechanisms through which the “distant threat” may 
develop in the future. 
Preemption vs. Prevention: Weapons of Mass Destruction 
This group of definitions places emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons or other 
weapons of mass destruction.  While this group is not very large, it does present an interesting 
deviation from the standard definitions of preemptive and preventive military activities in that it 
focuses solely on the role of one particular aspect of modern warfare.  Influenced by the nuclear 
rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union, the definitions in this group specifically 
address the relationship between nuclear weapons, along with other weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), and preemptive and preventive military activities. 
Brodie uses preventive war “to describe a premeditated attack by one country against 
another, which is unprovoked in the sense that it does not wait upon a specific aggressor or other 
overt action by the target state, and in which the chief and most immediate objective is the 
                                                 
30 Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40, no. 1 
(October 1987): 88. 
31 Ibid., 91. 
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destruction of the latter’s over-all military power and especially its strategic air power.”32  A 
preemptive attack, on the other hand, “envisages a strategic air attack by the United States upon 
the Soviet Union only after the latter has already set in motion its own strategic air attack, but 
before that attack is consummated and preferably before it gets well underway.”33  
Betts also examines the idea of preventive military activities through the nuclear 
framework, arguing: 
A nation might launch a preventive nuclear war if it decided that a continuation of the 
trends inherent in the status quo was certain to be intolerable, and that waiting longer 
before resorting to nuclear force would allow the enemy to inflict greater damage.  The 
motive would be the prospect of eventual, not imminent, defeat or destruction by the 
enemy….In strict meaning, preemption refers to striking first when one believes the 
enemy is about to try to strike—beating an opponent to the draw, not shooting him in the 
back.34 
 
For Litwak, 
Prevention refers to a repertoire of strategies to forestall the acquisition of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) through a variety of means, including, in extreme 
circumstances, the possible use of force….Pre-emption pertains narrowly to military 
action when actual WMD use by an adversary is imminent.35 
 
It is not clear if Litwak intended to limit preemptive and preventive military activities only to 
those times when they were employed against WMD, or merely wanted to highlight this element.  
In one respect, it could be that the increased destructive capability of WMD have reduced the 
applicability of anticipatory military activities to a very narrow set of situations, i.e., those 
described by Litwak.  Or, on the other hand, it could be that these authors were merely 
addressing one particular facet of anticipatory military activities as they pertain to WMD, but did 
                                                 
32 Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," World Politics 11, no. 2 (January 1959): 227. 
33 Ibid., 242. (emphasis in original) 
34 Richard K. Betts, "Surprise Attack and Preemption," in Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for 
Avoiding Nuclear War, Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.) (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1985), 56-57. (emphasis in original) 
35 Robert S. Litwak, "The New Calculus of Pre-Emption," Survival 44, no. 4 (Winter 2002-03): 54. 
(emphasis in original) 
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not intend to limit the scope of the activities to the realm of WMD-related usage.  While it is not 
possible at this time to determine which perspective was intended, it is important to note that, at 
least for some scholars, the existence of WMD affects the calculus—at least to some extent—
with respect to the use of anticipatory military activities. 
 For one scholar, the nature of WMD technology, i.e., the fact that such weapons can be 
rapidly deployed and used with virtually no warning, necessitates a fundamental reassessment of 
the distinctions between preemptive and preventive military activities.  For Boot, the fact that 
“weapons of mass destruction can be used without warning” causes “the distinction between pre-
emptive and preventive to collapse.”36  While this position may be overstating the case to a 
certain extent, it does highlight some of the problems with the “traditional” definitions in the 
context of modern warfare.  This issue will be discussed in more depth in later chapters, but it is 
important to note at this point that the “imminence” threshold may have been reduced by the 
development of modern weapons technology. 
Preemption vs. Prevention: Regime Change 
 One scholar includes the notion of regime change in the definition of preventive military 
activity.  From this perspective simply attacking the adversary is not sufficient.  Rather, 
removing the regime in control of the rival state is a necessary element for any successful 
preventive action.37  Freedman states that 
prevention exploits existing strategic advantages by depriving another state of the 
capability to pose a threat and/or eliminating the state’s motivation to pose a threat 
                                                 
36 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic 
Books, 2002). 
37 An example of a policy based upon such reasoning is the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq where the Bush 
Administration argued that merely destroying Saddam Hussein’s capacity to build WMD was not enough, 
but that the regime needed to be removed in order to completely deal with the threat.  The efficacy of 
such a policy is a contentious issue, and a full discussion of such policies is outside the scope of this 
work. 
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through regime change.  Prevention provides a means of confronting factors that are 
likely to contribute to the development of a threat before it has had a chance to become 
imminent….A pre-emptive war takes place at some point between the moment when an 
enemy decides to attack—or more precisely, is perceived to be about to attack—and the 
attack is actually launched….Prevention is cold-blooded: it intends to deal with a 
problem before it becomes a crisis, while pre-emption is a more desperate strategy 
employed in the heat of crisis.  Prevention can be seen as pre-emption in slow motion, 
more anticipatory or forward thinking, perhaps even looking beyond the target’s current 
intentions to those that might be acquired along with greatly enhanced capabilities.38 
 
From this perspective, an integral and fundamental part of preventive military activities is regime 
change.  Regime change is seen to be vital to the successful prevention of the adversary 
developing a new technology.  Merely destroying the existing capability (or sites where it is 
being developed) is not sufficient, since the leadership, which may be even more determined to 
develop the technology, will merely start again.  Only by removing the regime, it is argued, with 
the technological development really be forestalled and prevented.  
Preemption vs. Prevention: Other Definitions 
 Still other scholars have contributed to the conceptual confusion through their definitions 
of preemptive and preventive military activities.  O’Connell, for example, argues that: 
The term “preemptive self-defense” is used…to refer to cases where a party uses force to 
quell any possibility of future attack by another state, even where there is no reason to 
believe that an attack is planned and where no prior attack has occurred.  Some writers 
also call this “preventive” self-defense or “preventive” war.  It is also to be distinguished 
from “anticipatory” self-defense.  The latter is a narrow doctrine that would authorize 
armed responses to attacks that are on the brink of launch, or where an enemy attack has 
already occurred and the victim learns more attacks are planned.39 
 
O’Connell uses “preemption” to describe “prevention” and “anticipatory self-defense” to 
describe “preemption.”  Van Den Hole also uses the term “anticipatory self-defense,” which he 
defines as “the use of force by a state to repel an attacker before an actual attack has taken place, 
                                                 
38 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 85-86. 
39 Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, ASIL Task Force Papers (Washington, 
DC: The American Society of International Law Task Force on Terrorism, 2002), 1, 
www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf. (emphasis in original) 
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before the army of the enemy has crossed its border, and before the bombs of the enemy fall 
upon its territory.”40  Thus, what would be referred to as “preemption” or even “prevention” 
above, is instead given the label of “anticipatory self-defense.” 
 Heisbourg also presents interesting definitions of preemption and prevention, which do 
not seem to match those discussed above: 
Until recently, “prevention” was widely used in strategic discourse to refer to crisis 
prevention or preventive deployment—as an alternative to the use of lethal force…. 
“Preemptive” has been taken to mean “marked by the seizing of the initiative: initiated by 
oneself” (as in, preemptive attack).  This broad interpretation has allowed prevention and 
preemption to be used interchangeably in numerous strategic situations…”41  
 
It is not clear why “prevention” is described as being used to designate “non-violent” strategies, 
as there is a clear history of the term being used in a military context.  However, Heisbourg is 
correct in pointing out that the definitions of preemptive and preventive military activities are so 
vague that they permit multiple interpretations. 
These varying definitions only serve to complicate the situation, as it becomes difficult to 
compare scholarly works on these concepts.  Are the authors talking about the same things?  This 
problem becomes particularly acute when trying to understand particular policies. An example of 
this semantic ambiguity is found in the 2002 NSS.  The policy articulated in the NSS clearly fits 
into the “preventive” rubric as defined above, even though it is described as “preemptive” in 
nature.   
Preemption vs. Prevention: Anticipatory Military Activities 
The definitions discussed above show considerable variance in their content.  There is, 
however, one element that is consistently present in the various different definitions: time.  
                                                 
40 Leo Van Den Hole, "Anticipatory Self-Defence Under International Law," American University 
International Law Review 19 (2003): 73. 
41 François Heisbourg, "A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences," The Washington 
Quarterly 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 78. 
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Across virtually all the definitions, one of the key differences between preemptive and 
preventive military activities is the temporal proximity of the threat.  Walzer argues for a 
“spectrum of anticipation” with preemptive activities, which are “like a reflex action, a throwing 
up of one’s arms at the very last minute” at one end and “preventive war, an attack that responds 
to a distant danger, a matter of foresight and free choice” at the other.42  
Preemptive activities seem designed to forestall an imminent threat, while preventive 
activities are directed toward a more distant threat.  What constitutes a “distant” threat, however, 
appears to be based primarily on the perceptions and interpretation of the potential preventor.  
Additionally, the notion of a “distant threat” is contingent on various possibilities and 
probabilities.  As Barber noted above, the “threat” is contingent upon a string of “could-be’s and 
may-be’s.” 
This work will not focus on the preemptive/preventive distinction, but will instead look at 
the use of all types of anticipatory military activities.  By focusing on the type of threat faced and 
the policies adopted to counter such a threat, rather than on the semantically ambiguous terms 
preemptive or preventive, a more meaningful understanding of anticipatory military activities 
can be fashioned.   
Anticipatory military activities are defined as military actions taken in response to 
either an imminent threat or to counter a more distant threat within the context of an 
international crisis.  In this respect, the term “anticipatory military activities” includes the 
traditional concepts of both preemption and prevention. Additionally, it is important to stress that 
anticipatory military activities are limited to actions that take place within the context of an 
international crisis.  In this respect, anticipatory military activities do not include the proverbial 
                                                 
42 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Second (New 
York: Basic Books, 1992), 74-75. 
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“bolt out of the blue,” but, instead, are intended to deal with a particular, and identified, threat 
posed by another actor.  
The type of threat faced by the state still matters, and the analysis will include actions 
taken to counter both immediate/imminent and more distant threats.  Specifically, two different 
types of threats will be studied. The first type of threat is defined by the ICB project as “non-
violent military,” which includes activities such as troop mobilizations and deployments and is 
used in this work as representing an “imminent” threat.  The second type of threat is described as 
an “external change” which includes the development of new weapons technology and is used to 
represent the more “distant” threats.  Additional information about the operationalizations of the 
type of threats can be found in Chapter 6 and Appendix B.   
In addition to examining the type of threat involved, there are also two different types of 
responses that should be examined.  The first is anticipatory uses of military force.  These actions 
are characterized by the actual use of military force in anticipation of an attack or in response to 
another type of threat, such as troop deployment/mobilization, or the development or new 
military technologies such as nuclear weapons.  Examples of this type of action include the 
Israeli attack on Egypt in 1967 and the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility in 1981. 
The second type of response is anticipatory military activities that fall short of actual uses 
of force.  In these cases, the anticipator mobilized or deployed forces in response to a threat, but 
did not engage in actual armed conflict.  An example of this type of activity is the US quarantine 
of Cuba in 1962.  This category is important in that it not only illustrates when states are 
prepared to use force in an anticipatory manner, and can help determine if states are influenced 
by the legal and normative restrictions and limitations on the use of force.  In other words, it is 
possible that these cases represent instances where leaders decide to try non-violent means first, 
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but at the same time choose a policy such that they are still in a good position to take military 
action if necessary later.43 
It is important to be clear about what this study will not examine.  Specifically, this study 
does not look at reprisals, retaliatory strikes, or other forms of punishments for past wrongs.   
These are reactive policies, i.e., in response to an actual attack, and therefore do not fit into the 
rubric of anticipatory activities.  It must be stressed that there is a difference between a policy 
that is taken in response to a specific crisis trigger and a policy that is taken in response to an 
actual armed attack.  Although both could be considered “reactive,” they are not really the 
same—particularly with respect to their standing within international law and the just war 
tradition.   
As will be discussed in more depth throughout the remaining chapters, there is no legal or 
normative problem with states acting in self-defense in response to an armed attack.  This type of 
“reactionary” policy is excluded from this study.  The second type of action—a military response 
to a non-violent crisis trigger, or what is termed here an anticipatory military activity—is more 
contested within the legal and normative literature.  It is this type of action will be the primary 
focus of this work.   
Additionally, this study will not examine targeted assassinations or forcible regime 
change, both of which have often been discussed in conjunction with anticipatory military 
activities, particularly with respect to the Bush Doctrine and as counter-terrorism tools.44  The 
                                                 
43 It could be the case that these instances are examples where states were bluffing, in that they deployed 
troops, but were not prepared to use force.  However, in the data used, the cases that are coded as 
instances of anticipatory military activities that did not include the use of force, the crisis was resolved 
without force being used.  In this respect, it is impossible to know if these states were bluffing or not. 
44 For more information on targeted assassinations, see Steven R. David, "Israel's Policy of Targeted 
Killing," Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 111-26; Yael Stein, "By Any Name Illegal and 
Immoral," Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 127-37. For more information on regime 
change, see Dieter Janssen, "Preventive Defense and Forcible Regime Change: A Normative 
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reason for their exclusion is primarily pragmatic, since these actions are not included in the data 
currently available. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Assessment," Journal of Military Ethics 3, no. 2 (2004): 105-28; Jeffrey Record, "The Bush Doctrine and 
War with Iraq," Parameters 33, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 4-21; Robert S. Litwak, "Non-Proliferation and the 
Dilemmas of Regime Change," Survival 45, no. 4 (Winter 2003-04): 7-32. 
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CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
 
 
Preemptive and preventive military activities have been analyzed by numerous 
international relations scholars.  While there are a variety of different definitions of both 
preemptive and preventive military activities in the international relations literature (see Chapter 
2), the fundamental distinction between the two activities is the type of threat that precipitates 
their use: if the threat is imminent and impending, a military response would be considered 
“preemptive;” but, if the threat is more distant or even merely a potentiality, a military response 
would be considered “preventive.”1  Although this work does not focus explicitly on the 
traditional preemptive/preventive divide, for the purposes of this chapter it is important to keep 
these distinctions in mind.  In much of the international relations literature, preemptive and 
preventive military activities are treated as separate and distinct—each with unique enabling and 
inhibiting factors.  For this reason, the terms preemptive and preventive, as well as anticipatory 
military activities will be used, as appropriate, in this chapter.2 
There have been several studies that have specifically examined both preemptive and 
preventive military activities.  Additionally, other works discuss these activities vis-à-vis various 
causes of war.  These studies explore the use (or, non-use) of these activities as well as the 
various situations and factors that make states more or less likely to engage in them.  While there 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this study, the determination of the type of threat posed is based upon the coding of 
the action found in the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset, the primary data source used.  Full 
information on the data and all operationalizations can be found in Chapter 6 and in Appendix B.  
2 Combining preemption and prevention into “anticipatory military activities” does not imply that there 
are no differences or distinctions between the two actions.  Rather, by focusing on anticipatory military 
actions designed to deal with imminent threats and anticipatory military actions designed to deal with 
more distant threats, much of the current semantic ambiguity that surrounds the terms “preemption” and 
“prevention” can be avoided.  In this respect, the analysis can focus on the differences between the types 
of actions, rather than becoming bogged down in much of the rhetorical confusion that complicates the 
comparison across and between studies. 
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are a variety of different situations that could be conducive to the use of anticipatory military 
activities, by and large, these scholars argue that states rarely employ such military activities.   
Different scholars point to different factors to explain the paucity of actual uses of 
anticipatory military activities.  Among these explanations are the regime type of the actor, the 
political consequences of taking anticipatory action, or structural impediments.  According to 
this last logic, it is not the legal or normative elements that prevents, or dissuades, states from 
using anticipatory military activities, but rather, it is not in the strategic interest of the states to do 
so.3 
 At the same time, however, there are also many different “motivations” that may make 
anticipatory military activities appear to be an attractive policy option.  Vagts, for example, 
states that “Arguments in favor of preventive war combine strategic necessity with the 
momentary military superiority of one’s own side.”4  Furthermore, if there is a significant 
advantage in striking first, or, if a state is experiencing a decline in its power vis-à-vis a rival, a 
state may determine that the use of an anticipatory military activity would be the most 
efficacious way to secure its interests.5  Among the other concepts and elements within the 
                                                 
3 There appears to be some cross-over between the “political costs” that inhibit states from using 
anticipatory military activities and the legal and normative constraints discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.  
This overlap is discussed in more depth below, and will be examined in Chapters 6 through 8. 
4 Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York: 
King's Crown Press, 1956), 334. 
5 The term “interests” is notoriously vague and difficult to operationalize. Wolfers notes that the notion of 
“national interest” or “national security” does not have a exact meaning, and “while appearing to offer 
guidance and a basis for broad consensus, they may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he 
favors with an attractive and possibly deceptive name.”  He goes on to add that, “In a very vague and 
general way ‘national interest’ does suggest a direction of policy which can be distinguished from several 
others presenting themselves as alternatives.”  In this respect, “It emphasizes that the policy subordinates 
other interests to those of the nation.  But, beyond this, it has very little meaning.” Arnold Wolfers, 
Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1962), 147.   Haas notes that “it is contended that the national interest includes all those 
features of state aspirations which bear a relation to the permanent and enduring needs of the state, thus in 
fact begging the question [what is the national interest?] further.” Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: 
Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda," World Politics 5, no. 4 (July 1953): 380. Brodie notes that 
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international security literature that could impact the attractiveness or viability of using 
anticipatory military activities are the security dilemma, balance of power, deterrence theory, 
arms races, the offense-defense balance, power transition theory, windows of opportunity, 
enduring rivalries, misperceptions, surprise, polarity, crises, and international institutions.   
Before discussing the specific theories regarding anticipatory military activities, the underlying 
concepts will be defined and briefly discussed.   
It is important to note at the outset that due to certain peculiarities of both the data used 
and the time period under investigation, not all of the concepts discussed below will be directly 
tested in the following chapters.6  However, due to the fact that they are often discussed and 
emphasized in relation to preemption/prevention within the international security literature, they 
are included in this discussion.  The concepts that are excluded from the specific analysis, as well 
as the reasons and rationale for such exclusions are discussed as necessary.  Additionally, several 
of the concepts are closely related and tightly interconnected.  As a result, they cannot be tested 
individually.  In this respect, there are more individual concepts discussed than discrete 
hypotheses. 
This chapter is divided into three sections.  The first section provides a general discussion 
and overview of the international security concepts that relate to anticipatory military activities.  
                                                                                                                                                             
“According to customary usage, those of our interests are ‘vital’ that we are ready to fight to preserve.” 
Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973), 342.  At the same time, 
however, he cautions that “they are not fixed by nature nor identifiable by any generally accepted 
standard of objective criteria.” Brodie, War and Politics, 343.  Finally, Brodie offers this definition of 
“vital interests”: “They concern those issues in our foreign affairs that are thought to affect the survival or 
security of the nation, meaning specifically against military attack.” (emphasis in original) Brodie, War 
and Politics, 344.  To be sure, these definitions are not fully satisfying, and are still fairly malleable and 
can be used to justify a wide variety of activities.  Providing a definition of these concepts, however, is 
not the primary goal of this work, and in this sense, the last definition listed will be used throughout this 
work.    
6 The power transition theory, for example, is not tested quantitatively due to data problems that are 
discussed in more depth below and in Chapter 6.  The concepts associated with polarity and the balance 
of power are not included in the statistical analysis due to the fact that there is not very much variance on 
this variable within the dataset. 
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The descriptions and definitions contained in this section are broadly construed, and, therefore, 
the first section does not directly deal with anticipatory military activities, but rather provides the 
conceptual foundation necessary for more specific discussion of these activities vis-à-vis the 
international security literature. The second part of the chapter focuses on the more explicit 
treatment of anticipatory military activities within the international security literature.  Building 
upon the concepts presented in the first section, this section explores the security concepts that 
are posited in the literature to make the use of anticipatory military activities more or less likely.   
International Security: General Concepts and Definitions 
 A variety of different concepts and ideas have been generated to help explain the causes 
of war and the myriad of situations that make the outbreak of war more or less likely to occur.    
As Reiter notes, “Preemption is not a theory of war, but rather a path to or scenario for war 
predicted by some theories.”7  Since anticipatory military activities are not a type of war, but 
rather an element often included on the path to war, it is instructive to review and briefly discuss 
some of the theories about the causes of war and of the different elements that make the outbreak 
of war more or less likely.    
While there are numerous different theories on the causes of war, or on how and why 
various elements make war more or less likely, several are particularly relevant to the use/non-
use of anticipatory military activities.8  It is important to note that many of these concepts are 
                                                 
7 Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International 
Security 20, no. 2 (Autumn 1995): 6. 
8 It is important to stress that the below discussion about the causes of war is not intended to be an 
exhaustive survey of all the theoretical causes of war.  Rather, it is specifically restricted to those theories 
and ideas that relate directly to anticipatory military activities.   Other causes of war that are not discussed 
here include imperial expansion, civil war, war initiation for domestic reasons, and economic motivations.  
See, Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New  York: The Free Press, 1973); Seyom Brown, The 
Causes and Prevention of War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987); Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of 
Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: 
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related and closely linked to each other, and sometimes operate in conjunction with each other.  
They are discussed individually, however, due to the fact that they each offer a potential 
explanation (or at least a partial explanation) for why states do or do not use anticipatory military 
activities.  It is important to note at the outset that the following discussion of the “causes of 
war” is primarily theoretical in nature, focusing on the theoretical hypotheses about the causes of 
war rather than on their empirical testing. 
Causes of War: The Security Dilemma & Related Concepts 
 One of the most fundamental elements of the international relations literature on the 
causes of war is what is known as the “security dilemma.” Herz describes the security dilemma 
in the following manner: 
Groups or individuals living in [an anarchic society] must be, and usually are, concerned 
about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other 
groups and individuals.  Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to 
acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others.  This, 
in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst.  
Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power 
competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.9  
 
Butfoy argues that the security dilemma is a result of “a complex interplay between four factors.”  
These elements include: 
(a) the inherently violent and destructive potential of military capabilities; 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cambridge University Press, 1983); Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars and Other Essays (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); Jack S. Levy, "Quantitative Studies of Deterrence Success and 
Failure," in Perspectives on Deterrence, ed. Paul C. Stern et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989), 98-133; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between 
the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, 
eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Stephen 
Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); 
John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Kenneth N. Waltz, 
Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Wolfers, 
Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics; Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1966). 
9 John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2, no. 2 (January 
1950): 157. 
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(b) the nature and implications of international anarchy; 
(c) the politics of identity and interests; and 
(d) sense of threat.10  
 
The security dilemma thus refers to a situation where “the measures a state takes to increase its 
own security usually decreases the security of other states.”  Additionally, “it is difficult for a 
state to increase its own chances of survival without threatening the survival of other states.”11    
For Stern, et al., “The concept of ‘security dilemma’ in international relations reminds us 
that when a state takes strong action to protect itself against a perceived threat, that action is 
itself often perceived as a threat because it is interpreted as an increased capability or 
commitment to attack.”12 Butfoy argues that the security dilemma complicates the job of those in 
charge to determining a country’s defense policy: “On the one hand they can relax defence 
efforts in order to facilitate peaceful relations; the problem is that they may thereby make their 
country more vulnerable to aggression; on the other hand they can strengthen defence 
preparations; but this can have the unintended consequence of undermining long-term security 
through exacerbating international suspicions and reinforcing pressures for arms racing.”13 In 
this respect, the security dilemma can be viewed as a central element in the strategic/structural 
rationales that lead states to take anticipatory military activities.  They may fear that a) their rival 
                                                 
10 Andrew Butfoy, "Offence-Defence Theory and the Security Dilemma: The Problem with Marginalizing 
the Context," Contemporary Security Policy 18, no. 3 (December 1997): 45. 
11 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2001), 36. It is important to note that the concept of “security” is also debated and contested within the 
literature.  Brodie, for example, argues that security is a “flexible term, and that for a nation like the 
United States its meaning is legitimately, indeed almost necessarily, expanded to something beyond 
simple self-defense.” Brodie, War and Politics, 345.  There are problems with this notion, however, as 
Brodie notes that “The more distant or indirect the threat that is alleged to affect our national security, the 
more controversial is the question whether it actually does warrant a military response, and if so, what 
kind.” Brodie, War and Politics, 356. 
12 Paul C. Stern et al., "Deterrence in the Nuclear Age: The Search for Evidence," in Perspectives on 
Deterrence, ed. Paul C. Stern et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 7. 
13 Butfoy, "Offence-Defence Theory and the Security Dilemma: The Problem with Marginalizing the 
Context," 39-40. 
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is preparing for an attack or b) that they are declining relative to their rival and that they should 
take action while they still can. 
 A variety of different concepts and ideas have developed and evolved out of the larger 
security dilemma framework within the international security literature.  These concepts are 
particularly relevant vis-à-vis the causes of war. Some of the elements refer to measures taken to 
depress the likelihood of war, while others deal with different mechanisms that increase the 
likelihood of war.  Each of these concepts is briefly discussed below.14 
DETERRENCE THEORY 
 If one of the externalities of the security dilemma is the increased likelihood of conflict 
between two adversaries—each feeling less secure due to the other’s attempt to increase its own 
security—deterrence theory can be seen as a possible way to mitigate this dangerous situation.  
Reduced to its core, “deterrence means discouraging the enemy from taking military action by 
posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain.”15  Brodie argues 
that “The threat of war, open or implied, has always been an instrument of diplomacy by which 
one state deterred another from doing something of a military or political nature which the 
former did not wish the latter to do.”16  
Brody finds that while there is no single definition of deterrence, “the term, as it has 
gained general usage, has come to stand for any of a series of proposed strategies which would 
                                                 
14 While a complete and thorough discussion of these concepts is well beyond the scope of this work, the 
discussion of these elements will focus on the fundamental and core aspects of each.  It is also important 
to note that many of these concepts are debated throughout the literature, and often there is no one 
“accepted” definition.  These debates will be addressed as necessary and if relevant to the particular 
context of this work. 
15 Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), 4. 
16 Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," World Politics 11, no. 2 (January 1959): 174. 
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forestall, i.e., deter, possible aggression by making aggression ‘costly.’”17 For Snyder, deterrence 
can be seen as “simply the negative aspect of political power; it is the power to dissuade as the 
opposed to the power to coerce or compel.”18 Lebow describes deterrence as “an attempt to 
influence another actor’s assessment of its interests.”  He goes on to argue that deterrence “seeks 
to prevent an undesired behavior by convincing the party who may be contemplating it that the 
cost will exceed any possible gain.”19  For Jervis, “One actor deters another by convincing him 
that the expected value of a certain action is outweighed by the expected punishment.”20  
Cimbala states that “Deterrence is the process by which a state established in the minds of its 
potential opponents that they cannot obtain a military victory at an acceptable cost.”21  
 According to this perspective, one way to mitigate the security dilemma is to convince 
the opponent that any aggressive action will be met in kind, and that the retaliatory action will be 
severe enough to impose costs that outweigh any gains from the initial attack.22  In this respect, 
the negative consequences of the security dilemma can be dampened (at least hypothetically) by 
making aggressive action extremely unattractive.  Or, in other words, the basic logic behind 
deterrence theory is to counter the instability created by the security dilemma by instead creating 
a situation that dissuades (again, at least hypothetically) states from attacking.23   
                                                 
17 Richard A. Brody, "Deterrence Strategies: An Annotated Bibliography," The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 4, no. 4 (December 1960): 443. 
18 Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, 9. 
19 Richard Ned Lebow, "Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique," in Perspectives on 
Deterrence, Paul C. Stern et al. (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 25. 
20 Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security 7, no. 3 (Winter 1982-1983): 4. 
21 Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 257. 
22 Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and 
Practice (New York, 1974), 11. 
23 Some argue that deterrence is usually used primarily against “revisionist” or “expansionist states,” 
while states that prefer the status quo would have no incentive or motive to attack, and therefore would 
not need to be deterred. For more on this distinction, see Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of 
Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics 44, no. 4 
(July 1992): 497-538; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 
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 Jervis points out one of the important caveats of deterrence theory:  deterrence is only 
effective if the other states believe that the “defender” will actually carry out the threatened 
action, and if the “defender” threatens something that the potential attacker actually values.  If, 
on the other hand, the adversary does not believe that the defender will act, the deterrent threat is 
not “credible”24 and will, therefore, do nothing to reduce the likelihood of conflict.  In fact, such 
situations may even make conflict between the two more likely, since the adversary may believe 
that there will be no, or little, cost associated with attacking—i.e., the attacker does not believe 
that the defender will actually take any action in response, or that the action taken will be mild.  
Additionally, if the defender targets something that is not valued by the potential attacker, there 
will not be any incentive not to attack.25  As a result, Jervis argues that the defender is in a 
difficult situation, whereby “the state must display the ability and willingness to wage war.”  At 
the same time, “Issues of little intrinsic value become highly significant as indices of resolve.”26   
                                                                                                                                                             
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What 
Security Dilemma?" Security Studies 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 90-121; Paul W. Schroeder, "Failed Bargain 
Crises, Deterrence, and the International System," in Perspectives on Deterrence, Paul C. Stern et al. 
(eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 66-83.  While this differentiation does raise some 
important questions about how the security dilemma functions, it relies on the classification of states as 
either “revisionist” or “status quo.” Buzan argues that “Where status quo and revisionist states differ 
primarily is in their outlook on relations with the rest of the system.” Barry Buzan, People, States and 
Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991), 301.  Additionally, “If stability is the security goal of the 
status quo, then change is the banner of revisionism.” Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for 
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 303.  Wolfers argues that a status quo powers 
are states that “either desire to preserve the established order or that, while actually desiring change, have 
renounced the use of force as a method for bringing it about.”  On the other side are those nations, 
“formerly called ‘revisionist’ countries, which are bent on changing the status quo by force if necessary” 
Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, 125. This distinction, though 
conceptually clear, is difficult to quantify and is not used in this work.   
24 Huth notes that “The credibility of a deterrent threat depends upon the defender being perceived as 
possessing (1) military capabilities sufficient to inflict substantial costs on a potential attacker and (2) the 
will or intention to use those capabilities if necessary.” Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the 
Prevention of War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 4. 
25 Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," 13. 
26 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 59. 
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Jervis describes this situation in the following manner: “states often refuse to back down 
not because of the immediate and direct costs of doing so, but because of the belief that a retreat 
will be seen as an indication of general weakness and so lead others to expect retreats in the 
future.”27  Or, framed in a different light, “If you have been caught bluffing in poker, are others 
likely to call you in the next round in the belief that you bluff a lot or are they unlikely to do so 
because they think that you know it is no longer safe to bluff?”28 
Deterrence can be thus viewed as a “dynamic” process, in that “it acquired relevance and 
strength from its failures as well as its successes.”29  Brodie argues that “the very large number 
of wars that have occurred in modern times proves that the threat to use force, even what 
sometimes looked like superior force, has often failed to deter.”  He goes on to add that 
“deterrence failures” can also have positive outcomes, in that the “very frequency with which 
wars occurred contributed importantly to the credibility inherent in any threat.”30  The use of 
force to counter an attack or other hostile move thus makes future threats, i.e., deterrence, more 
credible.  According to Huth, the elements that come into play to in order to deter an adversary 
also create a situation that can be conducive to the use of anticipatory military activities.31 
SPIRAL MODELS 
 One of the more direct ways through which the security dilemma can contribute to the 
outbreak of war is through what is known as the “spiral model.”  Often presented as an 
alternative to deterrence,32 the spiral model offers another explanation of how the security 
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deterrence model applies when the defender faces an expansionist adversary and prescribes competitive 
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dilemma can push states into war.  As a result of the security dilemma, both sides may engage in 
a tit-for-tat process of arms buildups, based on the idea that the other’s build-up decreases its 
security and it must, therefore, engage in its own build-up to increase its security.   
Since the international system is anarchic, i.e., there is no 911 that states can call for help 
when they are in trouble, states must act to protect themselves.  And the best way that states can 
protect themselves, at least according to this perspective, is to become stronger than their current 
or potential rivals and adversaries.33  Due to the security dilemma, however, each action that a 
state takes to make itself more secure makes the other state(s) feel less secure and it then takes 
measures to increase its security.  Jervis argues that “When states seek the ability to defend 
themselves, they get too much and too little—too much because they gain the ability to carry out 
aggression, too little because others, being menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce 
the first state’s security.”34  
According to Kydd, this “cycle can even lead to war if mutual fears grow to such an 
extent that preemptive or preventive incentives to attack become dominant.”35  In other words, 
this cycle can create a situation where one side believes that an attack by the adversary is either 
imminent or likely in the future and, therefore, decides to strike now.  This aspect of spiral 
models will be discussed more below. 
                                                                                                                                                             
policies; the spiral model applies when the defender faces a status quo power, explains conflict as 
resulting fundamentally from the combination of international anarchy and the security dilemma, and 
prescribes cooperative policies.” Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and 
Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," 499. See also Jervis, Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics. 
33 See Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 63. 
34 Ibid., 64. 
35 Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics 49 (April 1997): 371-72. 
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ARMS RACES 
 Another mechanism through which elements of the security dilemma can lead to war is 
that of arms races.  The manner in which arms races induce war is similar to that of the spiral 
model.  In fact, arms races can be viewed as a tangible manifestation of the spiral model.36  
 This is not to imply that all arms races culminate in war, however.  Morrow, for example, 
argues that arms races “create fluctuations in the ratio of military capabilities between the racing 
nations” and that such “fluctuations create an incentive to escalate a dispute to war for the side 
that is losing a temporary military advantage.”37  From this perspective, arms races are closely 
linked to other causes of war, such as power shifts and windows of opportunity, that are 
discussed in more depth below. 
 Some scholars, however, caution against isolating arms races as a distinct and discrete 
cause of war.  Downs states that,  
Whether a given arms race leads to war or whether a decision maker committed to peace 
should aggressively match the arms policies of a rival state (or ignore them as a gesture 
of cooperation) depends on a host of factors.  These include national goals, strategic 
choices, the current technology of war, and the level of uncertainty and misperception 
that exists.  Because these factors vary dramatically from case to case, the likelihood that 
an arms race will lead to war and the optimal arms policy that a nation should follow vary 
as well.38  
 
Howard argues that “‘Arms races’ can no more be isolated than wars themselves from the 
political circumstances that give rise to them, and like wars they will take as many different 
forms as political circumstances dictate.”  He goes on to add that “If there are no political causes 
for fear or rivalry this process need not in itself be a destabilizing factor in international 
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relations.”39  This does not imply, however, that arms races are generally “peaceful.”  Rather, 
Howard adds,  
The trouble is that what is seen by one party as the breaking of an alien hegemony and 
the establishment of equal status will be seen by the incumbent powers as a striving for 
the establishment of an alternative hegemony, and they are not necessarily wrong.  In 
international politics, the appetite often comes with eating; and there really may be no 
way to check an aspiring rival except by the mobilization of stronger military power.  An 
arms race then becomes almost a necessary surrogate for war, a test of national will and 
strength; and arms control becomes possible only when the underlying power balance has 
been mutually agreed.40  
 
In this respect, arms races become especially dangerous when combined with the requirements of 
deterrence, such as the necessity of showing resolve, as well as the consequences of the security 
dilemma, such as the seemingly zero-sum nature of security.   Arms races can, in this respect, 
create a situation that is very conducive for the use of anticipatory military activities.  
THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCE 
 The security dilemma is also impacted by whether or not military technology gives a 
benefit or advantage to the offense or defense.41  Lynn-Jones defines the offense-defense balance 
as “the amount of resources that a state must invest in offense to offset an adversary’s investment 
in defense.”42  Lynn-Jones also adds that the offense-defense balance “can be described as the 
ease with which power (resources) can be translated into threat” and “is shaped by the 
technology that is available to states.”43   
                                                 
39 Howard, The Causes of Wars and Other Essays, 18. 
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41 Numerous scholars challenge the notion of the offense-defense balance.  For an overview of these 
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Marginalizing the Context."; Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A 
Theoretical and Historical Analysis," International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 (June 1984): 219-38; Sean 
M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 660-
91. 
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43 Ibid., 666. 
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Hopf notes that there are three elements of the “offense-defense balance.”  The first 
element is “the technical offense-defense military balance concerning the relative military 
advantages enjoyed by the offense or defense on the battlefield, that is castles versus canons, 
machine guns versus trenches, and so on.”  The next part is “the cumulatively of power 
resources, or the relative availability of the resources that underlay military capability and the 
relative ease of the extraction by occupying states.”  The final component is “the set of strategic 
beliefs held by the leaders of the great powers, their relative concern for their reputation, or 
credibility.”44  
 Van Evera argues that there are ten “war-causing effects” that arise when the offense is 
dominant.  These effects include the ease of conquest, difficulty of self-defense, higher levels of 
insecurity among states, greater first-strike advantages, larger windows of opportunity and 
vulnerability, diplomacy tends to rely on the use of fait accompli tactics, negotiations are more 
likely to fail and less likely to be employed, states tend to be more secretive vis-à-vis defense and 
foreign policies, arms races tend to be harder to control, and “offense dominance is self-
reinforcing.”45  Additionally, as will be discussed in more depth below, offense dominance can 
create a situation that is conducive to the use of anticipatory military activities.46  
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45 Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security 22, no. 4 
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and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance," International Security 28, no. 3 (2003/04): 60. Therefore 
the offense/defense balance as an explanatory variable is not particularly useful in the testing of the 
specific hypotheses presented in the later chapters.  However, since it is often discussed by scholars vis-à-
vis both preemption and prevention, its inclusion in this discussion is important in order to provide a 
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 When defense is dominant, on the other hand, the situation is reversed.  Territory is more 
easily defended and states have secure borders.  Additionally, states tend to be less aggressive, 
less interventionist, and “more willing to accept the status quo.”47  A situation where the defense 
is dominant would tend to make the use of anticipatory military activities less likely.  
Causes of War: The Balance of Power 
 There are numerous different definitions of the “balance of power.”  Brown argues that 
the balance of power “refers to the relative capabilities countries have for coercing others.”  He 
goes on to add that “Balances of power may be global or local, and their components will vary 
with different issues.”  And, while “military components usually constitute the heaviest weights 
in a coercive balance” it is important to realize that “the balance of power also includes 
nonmilitary pressures that countries in conflict can bring to bear on each other.”48  
Wolfers defines the balance of power “as meaning an equilibrium or a roughly equal 
distribution of power between two opponents, the opposite, then, of hegemony or domination.”49  
Claude juxtaposes the idea of a “balance of power system” with one of “collective security.”  For 
Claude, the “balance of power stresses the possibility of achieving order through the arrangement 
of appropriate patterns of conflictual relations, while collective security looks instead to the 
development of a structure of general cooperation to hold conflict in check.”50  
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 Others examine “balance of power theory” as opposed to merely a “balance of power.”  
Waltz, for example, describes balance of power theory in the following manner: 
A balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: They 
are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, 
drive for universal domination.  States, or those who act for them, try in more or less 
sensible ways to use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view.  Those 
means fall into two categories: internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to 
increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to 
strengthen and enlarge one’s own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing 
one)….To the assumptions of the theory we then add the condition for its operation: that 
two or more states coexist in a self-help system, one with no superior agent to come to 
the aid of states that may be weakening or to deny to any of them the use of whatever 
instruments they think will serve their purposes.51  
 
According to this perspective, there are certain characteristics of both states and the international 
system that will induce them to either band together to prevent an aggressor’s expansion or other 
hostile acts (i.e., balancing) or to join with the aggressor, hoping to partake of the spoils of war 
(i.e., bandwagoning).   
While the full dynamics of Waltz’s balance of power theory are not particularly relevant 
in this context, it is important to take note of the emphasis placed on the existence of anarchy as 
well as the enduring quest for security by states within the theory. Geller contends that the basic 
logic underlying the balance of power can be extrapolated to the dyadic level, so that “Just as in 
the case of an international system where deterrence against hegemonic expansion is reinforced 
by the formation of a blocking coalition, so too in the case of a dyadic relationship may a 
potential aggressor be deterred by equivalent opposing power.”52  
For the purposes of this work, the notion of the balance of power is important in that it 
could impact the degree to which one state’s behavior is seen by other states as threatening.    
However, since the focus is on unilateral anticipatory activities, and not coalitional activities, 
                                                 
51 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), 118. 
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much of the traditional “balance of power” concept is not entirely relevant in this situation.  In 
other words, the focus in this work will be on element of “balance of power” that concerns a 
state acting to prevent another from gaining a preponderance of power, rather than on the 
elements of polarity53 and whether the system is “balanced.”54  
POWER CYCLES, POWER TRANSITION, & WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY 
 Closely related to the idea of balance of power is the notion that the likelihood of conflict 
between two or more states is impacted by changes in the balance of power or relative power 
differentials between two or more states.  Specifically, many scholars have hypothesized that war 
and conflict becomes more likely as states experience shifts in their relative power vis-à-vis a 
rival or adversary.55 Geller notes that “Conceptually, dynamic power balances can be separated 
into two categories: transitions (a reversal of relative power transition) and power shifts (power 
convergence or divergence).”56   
Although power cycles and the associated concepts are not directly tested in this work,57 
their inclusion in this discussion is important due to the fact that they are often discussed as one 
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of the primary motivations that leads states to use anticipatory military activities.  According to 
Levy, the “theoretical significance of preventive war derives from the importance of the 
phenomenon of changing power differentials between states arising from uneven rates of 
growth.”58  The specific theories and hypotheses about power cycles and transitions and 
anticipatory military activities are discussed in more depth in later sections of this chapter. 
 Some scholars argue that shifts in states’ power can be seen as part of a dynamic cycle 
that involves the entire international system.  Doran argues that “Power cycle theory explains the 
evolution of systemic structure via the cyclical dynamic of state rise and decline.”  He adds that 
“The foundation of state power which the power cycle traces is national capability relative to 
that of other states in the system at that time.”59  Yoon adds that power cycle theory “focuses on 
the rise, maturation, and decline in capability of each state relative to all other states (including 
but not restricted to potential aggressors) in the relevant system.60  
Yoon notes that “Rather than the largest state ‘assuming control of the system’ (i.e., 
dominating), in power cycle theory the most powerful state ‘plays a leadership role’ along with 
other states capable of assuming a major role in foreign affairs.”  Additionally, it is important to 
note that in power cycle theory, both role and power are considered to be systemic.61  However, 
unlike power, “role exists only if legitimized through systemic acceptance, whereas power 
expresses itself through unilateral action and as control.”62 Tessman and Chan argue that power 
cycle theory “argues that changes in national power tend to follow a regular pattern of 
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ascendance, maturation, and decline and that these trajectories reflect the major states’ relative 
competitiveness in the international system.”63  
 In power cycle theory, war becomes more likely as a state finds its power, and 
accordingly its role in the system, changing.  As such, “each major state finds itself, at any given 
moment, to be gaining, losing, or maintaining its power position relative to its counterparts.”64  
At the same time, however, “the interests that states perceive themselves to possess and the roles 
that they aspire to hold do not tend to adjust sufficiently or promptly to the changes in their 
relative power.”  This situation, in turn, creates a situation that is ripe for “international 
tension.”65  Hebron and James note that “Power cycle theory, in essence, argues that major war 
grows out of a government’s unsuccessful struggle to adjust to a sudden, massive change in its 
projected ability to adjust to a sudden, massive change in its projected ability to exercise power 
and influence within the international system.”66  
 There are also other cyclical theories that deal with the changing power/status of states 
and the likelihood of war and conflict erupting.  Doran and Parsons discuss a “cycle of relative 
capability.” They note that “the relative capability of a major power at any time is the percent of 
the total capability among the major powers it holds at that time.”67  The position of states within 
this system changes over time along with their roles and influence in the system.  These changes 
can trigger conflict and war in a variety of different ways.  According to Doran and Parsons, 
changes in relative capabilities of states within these power cycles 
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may engender feelings of powerlessness, determinism, and subsequent helplessness in a 
governing elite anxious about security.  A government may respond to such feelings with 
aggressiveness and violent coercion, despite room for independent action.  Paranoid 
attributes establish the conditions for aggression in such contexts because slippage in 
relative power position may reinforce mistaken projections of hostility into rivalry.68  
 
Much like power cycle theory, the relative capability cycle also predicts that when a state is 
faced with its decline vis-à-vis others in the system, it is likely to lash out, often violently. 
 Organski and Kugler present another cyclical model, that of the “power transition.”  
According to this model, “the source of war is to be found in the differences in size and rates of 
growth of the members of the international system.”69  While shifts in each state’s power can 
lead to war, Organski and Kugler point out that this will not always be the case:  
changes in the power structure will not, in and of themselves, bring war about.  Satisfied 
great powers are not likely to interpret advantages gained by lesser powers as threatening. 
Moreover, the powerful and satisfied do not start wars.  Only if the great powers think 
that the changing system challenges their positions, or if they no longer like the way 
benefits are divided, should the shifts be deemed dangerous.70  
 
Additionally, “it is not a desire to maximize power or a single-minded urge to guarantee security 
in the narrow sense that leads nations to start major wars, though the latter is often the excuse 
furnished.”  Rather, “it is a general dissatisfaction with its position in the system, and a desire to 
redraft the rules by which relations among nations work, that move a country to begin a major 
war.”71  
 All of these models are based on the idea that there is something about shifts and changes 
in the distribution of power within the system that is conducive to the outbreak of war.  The 
individual operationalizations of these shifts vary, as do the mechanisms through which they 
occur, but, at their core, they are generally making the same argument.  Kim and Morrow offer a 
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more generalized position about shifts in power and war.  They argue that “Power shifts are more 
likely to lead to war as the challenger becomes more risk-acceptant, the declining state more 
risk-averse, the expected costs of war decrease, the rising state’s dissatisfaction with the status 
quo increases, and during periods of equality between the two sides.”72   
Huth and Russett also extend the ideas of power transition theory down from the systemic 
level to the regional level, or, in other words, focusing on the relationship between individual 
rival states.  They argue that these transitions make war or conflict more likely as a result of two 
factors: “(1) if the challenger’s current position of military advantage is diminishing, the 
challenger has an added incentive to confront its adversary before its relative position shifts to 
one of disadvantage; and (2) conversely, if the challenger’s military position is improving 
relative to its adversary, the challenger may become more assertive in its demands for a change 
in the status quo and more confident in its ability to force the adversary to make concessions.”73  
Closely related to the theories concerning power shifts and power transitions is the idea 
of “windows of opportunity.”  Lebow defines a “window of opportunity” as “a period during 
which a state possesses significant military advantage over an adversary.”74   
Windows of opportunity are often cited as one of the key factors leading states to employ 
anticipatory military activities.  As such, they will be discussed in more depth below.   
Causes of War: Enduring Rivalries & Protracted Conflict 
 The ideas of “enduring rivalries” and “protracted conflict” have also been discussed with 
respect to the causes of war.  Vasquez defines rivalry as “a relationship characterized by extreme 
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competition, and usually psychological hostility, in which the issue positions of contenders are 
governed primarily by their attitude toward each other rather than by the stakes at hand.”75 
Hensel defines enduring rivals as “two or more ‘actors whose relations are characterized by 
disagreement or competition over some stakes that are viewed as important, where each 
perceives that the other poses a significant security threat, and where this competition and threat 
perception last for substantial periods of time’.”76   Goertz and Diehl note that “‘rivalry’ in our 
conception signifies a certain level of competition, ‘enduring’ means that the competition is not 
ephemeral.”77  Azar, et al., give the following definition of “protracted conflict:” 
Protracted conflicts are hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with 
sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity.  These are 
conflict situations in which the stakes are very high – the conflicts involve whole 
societies and act as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity.  
While they may exhibit some breakpoints during which there is a cessation of overt 
violence, they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination.  It is 
only in the long run that they will “end” by cooling off, transforming or withering away; 
one cannot expect these conflicts to be terminated by explicit decision.  Protracted 
conflicts, that is to say, are not specific events or even clusters of events at a point in 
time; they are processes.78  
 
Both enduring rivalries and protracted conflict are characterized by repeated hostile interactions 
and relations between a set of states.79 
The effect of enduring rivalries or protracted conflicts on the likelihood of war has been 
examined in a variety of different contexts.  Brecher and Wilkenfeld examine the impact of 
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enduring rivalries and protracted conflicts on international crises.  They argue that not only are 
crises between these actors more likely to be triggered by violent acts, but also they are more 
likely to involve triggers that have a higher level of threat, e.g., threats to existence, and involve 
violent counter-measures.80  In other words, crises that take place in protracted conflicts are more 
likely to be both severe and violent—and more destabilizing.81  Vasquez examines the link 
between rivalry and war and argues that “the most important things about understanding whether 
rivalries result in war are: (1) the issues under contention—some issues, like territorial issues, are 
much more prone to war than others, for example, purely ideological issues; and (2) the pattern 
of interaction—that is, how the issues are handled.”82  
Others have examined the impact of enduring rivalries and protracted conflict on future 
relations between the parties involved.  Since enduring rivalries and protracted conflicts develop 
and evolve over time, and as a result of repeated interactions, some scholars argue that there is a 
residual effect of the rivalry/protracted conflict.  For Brecher and Harvey, protracted conflicts are 
“the conceptual link between international conflict and international crises.”83  Leng argues that 
“the propensity to draw lessons from the outcome of one dispute to guide policymaking in the 
next is especially strong when statesmen find that they are engaged in a second or third crisis 
with the same adversary.”84  For Hensel, “Continued involvement in crises or wars is seen as 
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likely to build up suspicion, distrust, and hostility, along with grievances and desires for revenge 
if their confrontations should lead to the loss of life or changes in the status quo ante.”85 
Goertz and Diehl argue that “the proposition that one conflict should be viewed in the 
historical context of previous conflicts seems plausible.”  This leads to a situation where “the 
interconnection of disputes is important in explaining the initiation of military conflict, the 
bargaining strategies used in that conflict, and the likelihood that the conflict will escalate into 
war.”86  Brecher argues that “prolonged acute and widespread hostility between the same 
adversaries creates an anticipation of violent behavior in the future.”  Additionally, “frequent 
resort to violence accentuates the image of violence as a protracted conflict norm.”87  
Causes of War: International Crises 
 One of the primary pathways through which states pass on the way to war is that of an 
international crisis.  While all crises do not result in war, many do.  Brecher and Wilkenfeld 
differentiate between international crises, which occur on the macro-level, and foreign policy 
crises, which occur on the micro level.88  For the International Crisis Behavior project,89 Brecher 
and Wilkenfeld provide the following definitions of both international and foreign policy crises: 
An international crisis is a situational change characterized by an increase in the intensity 
of disruptive interactions between two or more adversaries, with a high probability of 
military hostilities in time of peace (and, during a war, an adverse change in the military 
balance).  The higher-than-normal conflictual interactions destabilize the existing 
relationship of the adversaries and pose a challenge to the existing structure of an 
international system—global, dominant and/or sub-system. 
…. 
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taken by states in response to the initiation of these crises that is the primary element under investigation. 
89 The quantitative analysis in Chapter 6 is based on the data compiled as part of the ICB project.  
Additional information about the data can be found in Chapter 6 and Appendix B. 
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A foreign policy crisis, that is, a crisis viewed from the perspective of an individual state, 
is a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in a 
state’s external or internal environment.  All three are perceptions held by the highest 
level decision-makers of the actor concerned: a threat to basic values, along with the 
awareness of finite time for response to the external value threat, and a high probability of 
involvement in military hostilities.90  
 
Lebow also offers an operationalization of international crises.  The first element of a crisis is 
when “Policy-makers perceive that the action of another international actor seriously impairs 
concrete national interests, the country’s bargaining reputation, or their own ability to remain in 
power.”91  The second part is when “Policy-makers perceive that any actions on their part 
designed to counter this threat (capitulation aside) will raise a significant prospect of war.”92  The 
final element of crisis is that of a perceived time constraints that are operating on the actors.93  
There is nothing in the above definitions that would predestine such crises to escalate into 
the outbreak of violence or full-scale war. Brecher and Harvey note that “The change or increase 
in hostility is usually triggered by an external act or event; a threatening statement; the severance 
of diplomatic relations; a trade embargo; the movement of troops; violence against an ally or 
client state; or a direct military attack.”94  Brecher discusses a variety of different situations that 
increase the likelihood that an interstate (or foreign policy) crisis will develop and escalate into 
war.   
Specifically, he argues that “An incipient international crisis is most likely to develop 
into a fully-crystallized crisis when: a crisis occurs within a polycentric structure; it takes place 
outside the dominant system; it is part of a protracted conflict; the main adversaries are 
geographically proximate to each other; there are more than two adversarial actors; they are 
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heterogeneous in military, economic, political, and/or cultural terms; and there are several cross-
cutting issues in dispute.”  If the following conditions are added, the crises are more likely to 
escalate to include the use of violence: “there is considerable power discrepancy between the 
adversaries; they are ruled by military or other types of authoritarian regimes; and major powers 
are active in supporting clients in the crisis with military aid.”95  
Causes of War: Misperception 
 An important underlying element of all of these “causes of war” is the notion of 
perception/misperception.  Howard notes that “The causes of war remain rooted, as much as they 
were in the pre-industrial age, in perceptions by statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the 
fears for the restriction, if not the extinction, of their own.”96  As a result, it is essential that the 
actors involved have an accurate view and understanding of the situation at hand.  Particularly 
with respect to anticipatory military activities, where the action is taken before an armed attack, 
the element of misperception, and its consequences, is particularly important. 
 Misperceptions of the adversary can take many different forms.  Jervis presents two 
different types of misperceptions that can impair the functioning of deterrence.  The first type of 
misperception concerns an erroneous view of “what the target state values and fears,” or, in other 
words, what elements should be targeted by any deterrent threat.  If the threatened target is not 
valued by the targeted state, it will not be “deterred.”  The second type of misperception 
concerns an erroneous view of the credibility of the deterrent threat.97  If the target state does not 
believe that the deterrer will actually carry out the threatened action, it will not be deterred.   
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Misperceptions can also come in the form of erroneous assumptions about the capabilities 
and intentions of the adversary.98  Levy argues that “Of all forms of misperception, the one most 
likely to play a critical role in the processes leading to war is the underestimation of the 
adversary’s capabilities relative to one’s own.”99 Jervis argues that even though “it is usually 
hard to draw inferences about a state’s intentions from its military posture, decision-makers in 
fact often draw such inferences when they are unwarranted.”  Additionally,  
They frequently assume…that the arms of others indicate aggressive intentions.  So an 
increase in the other’s military forces makes the state doubly insecure—first, because the 
other has an increased capability to do harm, and, second, because this behavior is taken 
to show that the other is not only a potential threat but is actively contemplating hostile 
actions.100  
 
This problem is compounded by the fact that the statesmen believe that their state’s intentions 
are clear, and “others know that it is not a threat, it will conclude that they will arm or pursue 
hostile policies only if they are aggressive.”101  It is in this manner that the spiral model 
discussed above is often perpetuated. 
 Although the pitfalls of misperception are severe, Jervis argues that statesmen continue to 
be plagued by them.  In fact, Jervis asserts that statesmen often create a situation that is ripe for 
misperception, since they often “assume that their opposite numbers see the world as they see it, 
fail to devote sufficient resources to determining whether this is actually true, and have much 
more confidence in their beliefs about the other’s perceptions than the evidence warrants.”102  
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Especially when coupled with the sub-optimum decision-making environment produced by 
crises, or with the increased danger due to modern weaponry, misperception becomes an 
important element on the road to war. 
SURPRISE 
 While the concept of “surprise” is not a “cause of war,” but rather an aspect of war, it is 
important to examine the situations that could make it more likely for a state to either a) engage 
in a surprise attack, or b) be the victim of a surprise attack.103  This is especially the case when 
examining anticipatory military activities.  Betts describes surprise as “the difference between 
the victim country’s actual military readiness at the time of attack and the degree of readiness it 
planned to have if given warning.”104  Russett notes that there is a “point of surprise” in every 
conflict that he defines in the following manner: 
The moment when those controlling the foreign policy of a state realize that something is 
going wrong and is likely to involve their state in war.  While the awareness may exist to 
some degree for a very long period before the key event, there is usually a point which 
can be identified as signaling a sharp increase in the awareness of danger.  It is not the 
moment when the danger actually develops, as it may develop before the actors are aware 
of it.105  
 
As such, the notion of surprise is closely linked to misperception and other cognitive elements. 
 Ben-Zvi notes that in two cases where states were “surprised,”106  
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it was the continued inability of the political and military leaders of the victim states to 
update their assessments of the adversary’s military capabilities during the period 
preceding the onslaught which proved to be the main factor responsible for the 
inadequate response in the face of the clearly perceived threat of war.  Thus, while 
perceptions of the enemy’s immediate intentions were revised and updated in view of the 
accumulating tactical indicators of the approaching war, no such change took place in the 
perceptions of the adversary’s capabilities, which remained largely outdated and 
depreciatory.107  
 
According to this position, leaders are often surprised because they do not believe that the 
situation has changed enough to sufficiently lower the costs of war for the adversary.  While the 
leaders may acknowledge a shift in the adversary’s intentions, they may not realize that the 
adversary now has the requisite capabilities to implement these new goals. 
Anticipatory Military Activities: Do States Preempt? 
 While there are a plethora of different factors that could influence the likelihood of a 
state’s using anticipatory military activities, a few generalizations can be made.  For one, it 
appears that uncertainty, which underlies most of the concepts discussed above, and is applicable 
to both the capabilities and the intentions of the adversary, tends to increase, at least 
hypothetically, the probability of a state using anticipatory military activities to deal with threats 
posed by an adversary.  This is primarily due to the fact that states tend to expect the worst from 
their adversary.  Or, in other words, as the adage goes, it’s better to be safe than sorry.   
 But, is this actually the case?  If uncertainty is truly as rampant and detrimental as many 
scholars suggest, and if taking anticipatory military action is seen as an effective tool for dealing 
with this uncertainty, one would expect to see states frequently employing these activities.  But, 
as Reiter notes, for the most part states do not take anticipatory action.  It is important to note 
that the absence of such actions does not necessarily imply a corresponding lack of uncertainty.  
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To be sure, there are numerous different elements at play, all of which must be taken into 
consideration.  However, it is also true that just as the influence of many of the international 
security concepts can be underestimated, they can also be overestimated, leaving a situation of 
partial understanding.  In this respect, Chapters 6 through 8 seek to rectify at least part of this 
problem by integrating and including concepts from a variety of different sources, specifically, 
through adding legal and normative elements into the analysis. 
Several scholars have empirically tested various hypotheses about preemptive and 
preventive war using concepts and theories derived from the international security literature.  
While there is diversity vis-à-vis the explanatory variables used in these studies, there appears to 
be consensus with respect to the conclusions: states rarely use anticipatory military activities.  
Before discussing these conclusions, it is important to look at the different explanations and 
hypotheses tested in these studies. 
Pathways to War: Enabling Factors 
 Anticipatory military activities are not a type of war,108 but rather a type of action that can 
signal the beginning of a war or be used in response to a particular crisis trigger, such as the 
development of a new military technology109 or the mobilization of an opponent’s military 
forces.110  In this sense, anticipatory military activities can be viewed as a “tactic” used by states 
involved in some form of crisis situation.  One of the primary questions of interest in this chapter 
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is if there are structural or strategic elements that make states more or less likely to use 
anticipatory military activities.  In other words, are there certain situations where anticipatory 
military activities are more likely to be the “preferred” pathway to war?  From the theoretical 
perspective, there are several situations and conditions that should make the use of anticipatory 
military activities appear more appealing to states. 
 One of the first of these situations is if there is a significant advantage to “striking first,” 
or at least preparing to go to war first.111  Van Evera distinguishes between a “first-strike 
advantage,”112 where the first to use force gains an advantage, and a “first-mobilization 
advantage,” when the first to prepare for war (i.e., mobilize its troops) gains the advantage.113  
Snyder describes the “first-strike advantage” as being a situation where “if war is believed to be 
imminent, one’s own losses are minimized by getting in the first blow.”114  According to Fearon, 
“In the pure preemptive war scenario leaders reason as follows: ‘The first-strike advantage is so 
great that regardless of how we resolve any diplomatic issue between us, one side will always 
want to attack in an effort to gain the (huge) advantage of going first.’”115  
Betts refers to a “first-strike bonus” for the side that strikes first in that it would suffer 
“less damage from retaliation” by striking first.116  Schelling argues that “the likelihood of war is 
determined by how great a reward attaches to jumping the gun, how strong the incentive to 
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hedge against war itself by starting it, how great the penalty on giving peace the benefit of the 
doubt in crisis.”117  Jervis presents a similar argument, stating that 
If technology and strategy are such that each side believes that the state that strikes first 
will have a decisive advantage, even a state that is fully satisfied with the status quo may 
start a war out of fear that the alternative to doing so is not peace, but an attack by its 
adversary.  And, of course, if each side knows that the other side is aware of the 
advantage of striking first, even mild crises are likely to end in war.118  
 
According to the “first-strike advantage,” states that fear an impending crisis or war with an 
adversary would be better off striking first rather than waiting and having to absorb an enemy 
attack.  In this respect, the strategic benefits of “going first” are seen to outweigh the potential 
costs—political, legal, or normative—that may be attached to such actions. 
 Huth argues that there are elements of deterrence theory that could also create a situation 
conducive to the use of anticipatory military activities.  Specifically, the requirements for 
successful deterrence may also create a situation that is conducive for the use of anticipatory 
military activities.   
In a situation of attempted deterrence, the sensitivity of a potential attacker to military 
threats and challenges to its reputation make it difficult for a defender to undertake 
actions that demonstrate resolve while avoiding provocation.  For example, in a crisis 
situation military preparations by a defender may be perceived as preparations for a 
potential attack and may thereby create incentives for a preemptive strike by the state that 
is supposed to be deterred.  The distinction between an offensive and a defensive posture 
is often difficult to discern, and therefore policymakers assuming the worst may perceive 
the defender’s military preparations as a potential offensive threat.119  
 
For Morgan, the requirements of deterrence could lead to anticipatory action, due to the fact that 
“in constantly refining their military forces and plans states might deliberately or inadvertently 
make deterrence more unstable.”  This would happen because after one state achieved a 
“technological breakthrough,” it could create a window of opportunity, thereby making a first-
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strike appear to be an attractive option.  At this point, according to this logic, the other state 
would then be afraid of the adversary’s anticipatory action, and take one of its own.120  
Another element that could influence whether or not a state would use anticipatory 
military activities is the offense-defense balance.  When the offense has the advantage, the “first-
strike” benefits discussed above may be amplified: 
The greater the offensive advantage, the greater the potential advantage for a preventer 
who chooses to strike first, and hence the stronger the preventive motivation.  This is 
particularly compelling if the offensive advantage is expected to persist into the future 
period of the adversary’s superiority, for that would increase the seriousness of the future 
threat.121  
 
For Van Evera, when the offense is dominant, “the size of the advantage accruing to the side 
mobilizing or striking first increases, raising the risk of preemptive war.”  Additionally, offensive 
dominance causes both windows of opportunity to “open wider, forcing faster diplomacy and 
raising the risk of preventive war.”122  
 Additionally, several scholars have pointed to shifting power differentials as a prime 
motivation for a state to engage in anticipatory military activities.  Gilpin notes that “By 
launching a preventive war the declining power destroys or weakens the rising challenger while 
the military advantage is still with the declining power.”123  He also offers another explanation of 
how shifts in relative power or in power differentials can lead to anticipatory military activities: 
it is the perception that a fundamental historical change is taking place and the gnawing 
fear of one or more of the great powers that time is somehow beginning to work against it 
and that one should settle matters through preemptive war while the advantage is still on 
one’s side.  The alternatives open to a state whose relative power is being eclipsed are 
seldom those of waging war versus promoting peace, but rather waging war while the 
balance is still in that state’s favor or waging war later when the tide may have turned 
against it.124  
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Levy argues that the “theoretical significance of preventive war derives from the importance of 
the phenomenon of changing power differentials between states arising from uneven rates of 
growth.”125   
Copeland cautions that not all “declines” are the same, and they will not all result in the 
same outcomes.  Specifically, “Two aspects of its decline will be of utmost importance to the 
declining state’s calculus: the depth of decline—how far the state will fall before it bottoms out; 
and the inevitability of decline—the degree of certainty that the state will fall if it sticks with 
current policies.”126  Copeland also adds, 
All things being equal, the more severe a state’s decline will be in the absence of strong 
action, the more severe its actions are likely to be, that is, the more risks of inadvertent 
spiraling it will be willing to accept.  In the extreme, when decline is expected to be both 
deep and inevitable, and when even hard-line crisis or deterrent/containment policies are 
unlikely to overcome it, leaders may see preventive war as the only option.127  
 
The difficulty for leaders in this situation, however, is being able to determine how significant 
the decline will be, and how rapidly the decline will occur.   
These shifting power differentials are closely related to arms races.  Lebow notes that 
“Mutual perceptions of threat are likely to be greatest when the disadvantaged side has 
progressed far enough with its armaments program to begin to diminish its adversary’s military 
advantage.”128 Additionally, “The anxiety generated by a diminishing military advantage, 
coupled with what appears to be aggressive muscle flexing by the adversary in the process of 
closing the strategic gap, can make preventive war an attractive option to leaders.”129  
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This situation is similar to what has been described as the “preventive motivation.”  Levy 
defines the preventive motivation as developing “from the perception that one’s military power 
and potential are declining relative to that of a rising adversary, and from the fear of the 
consequences of that decline.”130  Fearon notes that frequently it “is argued that if a declining 
power expects it might be attacked by a rising power in the future, then a preventive war in the 
present may be rational.”131  
 With the advent of the nuclear era, the risks of being a victim of a surprise attack have 
grown to such an extent that many scholars argue that states could be driven to preempt the 
adversary’s preemption.  Schelling has described this situation in the following manner: “We live 
in an era in which a potent incentive on either side—perhaps the main incentive—to initiate total 
war with a surprise attack is the fear of being a poor second for not going first.”132    
Additionally, Schelling notes that “If surprise carries an advantage, it is worth while to 
avert it by striking first.”  He goes on to add that “Fear that the other may be about to strike in 
the mistaken belief that we are about to strike gives us a motive for striking, and so justifies the 
other’s motive.”  This creates a situation whereby “it looks as though a modest temptation on 
each side to sneak in a first blow—a temptation too small by itself to motivate an attack—might 
become compounded through a process of interacting expectations, with additional motive for 
attack being produced by successive cycles of ‘He thinks we think he thinks we think…he thinks 
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we think he’ll attack; so he thinks we shall; so we will; so we must.”133  From this perspective, 
anticipatory military activities, if there is a “first-strike advantage,” become almost inevitable. 
International crises can also create situations that are conducive for the use of 
anticipatory military activities.  According to Copeland, 
Most important, crises typically involve the increased mobilization of each side’s military 
forces, the placing of these forces on alert, and hostile rhetoric (demands and threats).  
These measures ensure that the state will not be caught unprepared, while also serving as 
signals of a state’s resolve.  Yet they can also produce a mutual fear of surprise attack, 
since each side is uncertain as to what the other will do with its mobilized forces.134  
 
 In this respect, crises can serve to heighten and reinforce many of the elements discussed above. 
 
 According to the perspectives discussed above, it would appear that states would have a 
multiplicity of opportunities and motivations to engage in anticipatory military actions.  The 
incentives to “anticipate” are numerous, and the underlying logic is persuasive.  After all, what 
state would want to knowingly accede to its own destruction, or at least be the victim of 
significant damage, if it could prevent such an occurrence by adopting a more proactive policy?  
These elements, however, are only part of the picture.  There are also a number of constraining 
elements within the international security literature that work against the use of preemptive and 
preventive activities.   
Limiting Factors: International Institutions 
International institutions are seen by some scholars as a way to reduce the likelihood of 
war erupting.  Simmons and Martin note that while there are numerous definitions of 
international institutions, “most scholars have come to regard international institutions as sets of 
rules meant to govern international behavior.”  Rules “are often conceived as statements that 
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forbid, require or permit particular kinds of actions.”135 In this respect, international institutions 
are intended to reduce uncertainty by explicitly spelling out how states should behave vis-à-vis 
each other.  
Keohane and Martin argue that international institutions can reduce conflict in a number 
of ways.  First, institutions can “mitigate fears of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge.”  
Additionally, “Institutions can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts 
and by assuring states that gains are evenly divided over time, for example by disclosing 
information about the military expenditures and capacities of alliance members.”136  Keohane 
also argues that institutions can  
create the capability for states to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways by reducing the 
costs of making and enforcing agreements—what economists refer to as ‘transaction 
costs.’  They rarely engage in centralized enforcement agreements, but they do reinforce 
practices of reciprocity, which provide incentives for governments to keep their own 
commitments to ensure that others do so as well.  Even powerful states have an interest, 
most of the time, in following the rules of well-established international institutions, since 
general conformity to rules makes the behavior of other states more predictable.137  
 
Accordingly, if an international institution exists that establishes rules regulating the use of force 
or the settlement of disputes, such as the United Nations (at least in theory), such an institution 
could reduce the likelihood that states will settle disputes through the use of force. 
Limiting Factors: Domestic & Political Constraints 
 Wolfers notes that “the moral dilemmas constantly facing statesmen and their critics 
revolve around the question of whether in a given instance the defense or satisfaction of interests 
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other than survival justifies the costs in other values.”138  In a similar vein, some scholars argue 
that there are political constraints that discourage states from using anticipatory military 
activities.  These elements include the regime type of the actors involved and the potential 
international political consequences of engaging in such controversial activities.  While not 
explicitly referring to either normative (i.e., the just war tradition) or international legal elements 
as constraining states from using anticipatory military activities,139 many of the scholars who 
focus on the political constraints bring these elements into play. 
 Reiter notes that one of the reasons states tend not to use anticipatory military activities is 
that “the political costs of attacking first often prevent preemption.”140  According to this 
argument, there are strings attached to “going first.”  States contemplating preemption could be 
susceptible to a negative response to the action by either key allies or the international 
community as a whole.  For Reiter, this element was crucial in Israel's decision not to use 
anticipatory military action in October 1973: 
On the morning of October 6, 1973, the Israeli cabinet concluded correctly that an Arab 
attack was likely later that day.  However, despite this assessment and the ingrained 
Israeli belief in the military advantages of striking first, the leadership decided with little 
dissent not to preempt because they feared that attacking first would jeopardize relations 
with the United States.  Indeed, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and U.S. Ambassador 
Kenneth Keating had previously told Israeli diplomats that if Israel attacked first, the 
United States would not come to Israel's aid.141  
  
While there may be a “first-strike bonus” from the strategic or tactical perspective, there may 
also be a “first-strike penalty”142 from the political and diplomatic perspective.  According to 
                                                 
138 Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, 60. 
139 See Chapters 3 and 4 for more on the legal and normative perspectives on anticipatory military 
activities. 
140 Reiter, "Preemptive Wars," 6. 
141 Ibid., 24-25.  See Chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion of this case. 
142 Elements included in a “first-strike penalty” include being labeled as an aggressor, which could 
convince other states to ally with the state’s rivals, and also could “inflame and energize the opponent’s 
public for war.” Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, 70. 
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Van Evera, “If this political penalty is small, a military first-strike advantage still provides a 
general first-strike advantage.”  But, on the other hand, “a large political penalty can outweigh 
even a large military first-strike advantage, converting a military success into a general political-
military failure.”143  
The relative strength of each of these contrasting elements may be impacted by the 
intricacies and particularities of each crisis situation.  However, due to the legal and normative 
uncertainties of anticipatory actions, allies of the would be preemptor/preventor may decide to 
withhold their support. 
 Misperception can compound the difficulties inherent in deciding if a state should engage 
in anticipatory military activities.  Betts notes that while launching a first-strike “may be the only 
way to avoid the consequences of being struck first in the near future”, in the real world, “it is 
rarely possible to be sure that the enemy preparations for war are definite, or are aggressively 
motivated, rather than precautionary reactions to rising tension and fear.”144  
Others examine if the regime type of a state impacts its propensity to use anticipatory 
military activities.  Schweller argues that there are a variety of different factors that reduce the 
likelihood that democracies will use anticipatory military activities, and that these factors can 
help explain why different states respond to the same situations in different manners, i.e., why 
some states preempt while others do not.  There are numerous attributes of democratic states that 
Schweller proposes predisposes these states away from using anticipatory military activities.  For 
instance, Schweller extrapolates Kant’s position that “public opinion inhibits democratic state 
actors from initiating wars expected to be of great risk and cost” to apply to “preventive war,” 
                                                 
143 Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, 70. 
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which by its nature is risky, since it is “an unprovoked war now to avoid the risks of war under 
worse circumstances later.”145   
Other characteristics of democratic states that influence the use or non-use of anticipatory 
military activities include the civilian control over the military (which serves to mitigate the 
“military’s institutional preference for offensive doctrine”),146 the knowledge that the next 
election is just around the corner and that wars often come with a substantial political cost and 
therefore “democratic elites require something more than the assumption of a potential future 
threat based on the projection of an irreversible decline in relative power,”147 and finally, there 
are the normative and “moral” constraints imposed by the “moral values of that society.”148  
Schweller does not argue that democracies never employ anticipatory military activities, but 
rather that they are severely constrained with respect to which crises and situations will be 
conducive to their use. 
There are situations where even democracies will resort to the use of anticipatory military 
activities.  For example, Huth argues that “When the potential attacker perceives a threat of 
preemption by the defender the costs of escalation and initiating force are likely to be far less 
constraining than when it perceives no threat of preemption.”149  Lebow offers a similar 
argument, stating that “Leaders who believe that their national interests require military action 
can still be constrained by public opinion or other domestic political forces.” Additionally, 
leaders may be dissuaded from launching conflict due to the costs involved with such a policy.150  
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Levy and Gochal build upon Schweller’s arguments by looking at the situations in which 
democracies might use anticipatory military activities.  They argue that the type of threat faced is 
crucial in determining if a democracy will in fact respond with the use of an anticipatory military 
act.  According to Levy and Gochal, “If the adverse power shift is sufficiently great, the 
adversary sufficiently hostile, the probability of a future war sufficiently large, and alternative 
options to deal with the threat unavailable or inadequate, military action to forestall the 
threatening shift in power and its consequences might well be morally justifiable by Walzer’s 
criteria.”151  Or, in other words, such action would be congruent with the requirements of the just 
war tradition which are discussed in Chapter 5. With respect to the United States, Gaddis argues 
that “military action had to be linked to morality: to preempt even clear and present danger was 
to take the responsibility for initiating the use of force, and that always carries a cost.”152 In other 
words, democratic leaders are bound and constrained by the normative and moral elements 
contained in the just war tradition.   
An additional constraint against the use of anticipatory military action is the fact that “the 
greatest danger inherent in preventive war is that it sets in motion a course of events over which 
statesmen soon lose control.”153 Particularly since the true nature of the threat is often unknown, 
especially with regard to the more “distant” threats, it is possible that the anticipatory action 
could unleash a chain of events that are more destructive and costly than the action, which was a 
mere potentiality, they were designed to forestall.  This raises the costs associated with such 
activities, and therefore could decrease the attractiveness of the activities.   
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States may also be constrained against using anticipatory military activities because of 
the precedent that such actions would create.  Litwak notes that critics of the 2002 National 
Security Strategy of the United States (NSS), which enumerated an explicit doctrine of 
preemption, raised concerns that such actions, “particularly when the threat is not demonstrably 
imminent, will undermine an important norm of global governance.”  Additionally, it is feared 
that “If the United States exercises this unilateral military option, it could give license to other 
states to do the same.”154  
While there are numerous factors that would appear to create a situation conducive to the 
use of anticipatory military activities, there are also some substantial constraining elements that 
serve as a counter-balance.  The question remains, however, which elements are more 
influential?   
Anticipatory Military Activities: When Do States Preempt? 
While there has been a significant amount of theoretical discussion about which 
situations make the use of preemptive/preventive military activities more or less likely, there has 
been relatively little empirical testing of these theories.  This work seeks to fill part of this gap.  
Additionally, what quantitative testing has been carried out has been somewhat problematic.  For 
example, these studies are based on data taken from the Correlates of War (COW) project, which 
does not code for preemption/prevention.   
In his study examining preemption, Reiter operationalizes “preemption” in the following 
manner: “A war is preemptive if a primary motivation for the attack is that that the attacker 
thinks that the target is likely to strike first within 60 days.”155  While the operationalization itself 
is sound, it applicability to the specific dataset is more problematic.  It is not clear, for example, 
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how such a determination is made.  The COW dataset does not contain information regarding 
perceptions of threat or perceived likelihood of war, which would appear necessary to make such 
a determination.  In this respect, the COW data does not appear satisfactory vis-à-vis quantitative 
testing of hypotheses regarding the use of anticipatory military activities. 
As opposed to those studies, this work uses different data to test these hypotheses.  This 
work uses the International Crisis Behavior dataset, which focuses on how states act during 
crises.  In this respect, this project examines the use of anticipatory military activities in response 
to a particular crisis.  As such, this work does not examine the proverbial bolt out of the blue, or 
the complete surprise attack.  To be sure, many of the crises were initiated by a surprise attack, 
but the motivations of the “surprising” or “triggering” entity are not examined here.  Rather, 
what is relevant for these cases is why the target state was surprised.156   
Additionally, one of the goals of this work is to examine the extent to which both the 
strategic/structural elements as well as the normative and legal aspects influence state behavior.  
Are democracies less likely to use anticipatory military activities?  Does the type of threat or 
trigger impact the likelihood that states will employ anticipatory military activities?  Do the 
structural and strategic elements, such as the security dilemma and shifting power differentials 
between rivals, override the legal and normative constraints on using these activities? 
Besides the problems with the data used, these studies have examined the use of either 
preemption or preventive war.  They did not, however, examine both together.  While there are 
important theoretical rationales for looking at the concepts separately, the same can also be said 
for examining both together.  The analysis provided in Chapters 6 through 8 distinguishes 
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between the actions taken in response to imminent versus distant threats (i.e., the traditional 
preemptive/preventive divide).  Chapter 6 provides statistical analysis for both types of 
activities,157 Chapter 7 provides case studies focusing on responses to “imminent” threats, and 
the case studies in Chapter 8 concern responses to more “distant” threats. 
 
 
157 Statistical models are built to test the hypotheses for both types threats together and for each threat 
individually. 
CHAPTER 4: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 This chapter will focus on the standing of anticipatory military activities within 
international law.  Specifically, are such activities permitted under international law?  While 
there is substantial disagreement on the legality of anticipatory military activities, the 
conventional answer is no, with a few exceptions.  In other words, under the traditional 
interpretation of international law, anticipatory military activities are only allowed under a very 
strict set of circumstances.  Additionally, only some kinds of anticipatory military actions, 
specifically those designed to counter an imminent and actual armed attack are permitted.  
Brown argues that the “right to preempt” a threat that is an “unprovoked act of aggression” and 
is imminent is merely an extension of the legitimate right to self-defense.1  However, 
anticipatory military activities designed to prevent a distant or potential attack are not permitted 
under international law.   
 There is considerable debate among international law scholars with respect to the concept 
of self-defense and its legal standing.  While modern international law (i.e., treaty law) has 
repeatedly sought to outlaw the use of force, under certain circumstances, namely in conditions 
of self-defense, the use of force is permissible.  Customary international law also permits the use 
of force in self-defense.  What constitutes an act of legitimate self-defense, however, is a highly 
contentious topic.2  It is this debate about the legality of self-defense that lies at the heart of the 
legality of anticipatory military actions. 
 Dinstein argues that self-defense is in a sense actually “armed self-help.”  In an 
international system that is anarchic and defined by the lack of any centralized authority, states 
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must act on their own to ensure their survival.  Often, this includes the use of force.  Dinstein 
goes on to argue that only after “the universal liberty to go to war was eliminated, could self-
defence emerge as a right of signal importance in international law.”3  Although international 
law has been used to formalize and regularize interactions between states, it has not yet matured 
to the point that the potentiality of states acting unilaterally in their own defense no longer exists. 
 Before discussing the development of the concept of self-defense in international law, a 
brief discussion about the nature of international law itself is in order. 
The Nature and Development of International Law 
 It is generally accepted that there are three or four primary “sources” of international 
law.4  According to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), there 
are four elements of international law:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the consenting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 51, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.5  
  
This last segment is roughly analogous to the use of precedent in municipal law.  Each of these 
elements will be discussed below. 
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Treaty Law 
Treaties are the most formalized and explicit component of international law.  They are 
negotiated by two or more states, signed by the leaders of those states, and are considered to be 
binding upon the signatories.  Von Glahn describes treaties as declarations of “existing rules.”  
For von Glahn, what is important for international law are treaties known as “law-making 
treaties.”  These treaties are “concluded between a number of countries acting in their joint 
interest, intended to create a new rule, and adhered to later by other states, either through formal 
action in accordance with the provisions of the treaty or by tacit acquiescence in and observance 
of the new rule.”6  He goes on to argue that, 
A law-making treaty, then, is an instrument through which a substantial number of states 
declare their understanding of what a particular rule of law is, by which new general rules 
for the future conduct of the ratifying or adhering states are laid down, by which some 
existing customary or convention rule of law is abolished or modified, or by which some 
new international agency is created.  It is this kind of treaty through which conventional 
international law is created.7  
 
In this respect, treaty law represents the formal agreement of two or more states to act in a 
particular way.  Treaties, in this sense, are quite similar to contracts in municipal law.  
Additionally, when disputes arise between signatory states, there is a tangible record that can be 
consulted.  It is also important to emphasize that treaty law is only binding upon states that have 
ratified the particular treaty.  In this respect, treaty law is the most restrictive element of 
international law.     
 According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties should not be 
viewed as “a static instrument” and can be interpreted based upon the ways in which states apply 
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the treaty.8  Article 31 of the Vienna Convention argues that when interpreting a treaty, “any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation” should be taken into account.9  Schachter, however argues that “At 
times, the line between violations and emerging law may be difficult to draw, made more 
difficult by the absence of judicial authority and the great disparities in power in the international 
community.”10 In this respect, there are some similarities between treaty law and customary law, 
in that both are inherently linked to state practice.   
Customary Law 
If treaty law is that which has been codified into tangible and concrete agreements, 
customary law is based in the amorphous, and sometimes contentious, realm of state practice and 
habit.  The fact that customary international law cannot be traced to a particular treaty or 
agreement, however, does not minimize its importance or its relevance to international law as a 
whole.  Instead, customary law represents a vital and essential component of international law.  
Cohan notes that since a wide range of issues are not regulated by treaty law, “customary 
international law may sometimes have more widespread application than treaty law.”11  
Additionally, since customary law is not a formal agreement between specific parties, but rather 
based on the practice of states, it is seen as having universal jurisdiction.12  
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Kelly defines customary law as “a set of norms derived from practice that is invested 
with binding authority by the relevant community.”  He goes on to add that customary law “is 
not mere practice or habitual behavior, rather it is a normative order consisting of rights and 
duties abstracted from practice.”13  Additionally, “The ultimate test of customary law is what do 
the members of a society regard as the rule.”14  
Arend and Beck note that customary international law is developed as a result of state 
behavior.  They state that, “If, over a period of time, states begin to act in a certain way and come 
to regard that behavior as being required by law, a norm of customary international law has been 
developed.”  This law-building aspect of behavior is tempered, however, because in order for the 
state practice to develop into customary international law, the states must act “because they 
believe that the practice is required by law.”15 Another definition of customary international law 
states that it is the “collection of international behavioral regularities that nations over time come 
to view as binding as a matter of law.”16   
Von Glahn describes international legal custom as, “a usage with a definite obligation 
attached to it.”  He goes on to add that, “failure to follow a legal custom entails the possibility of 
punishment, of sanctions, or retaliation; it involves, therefore, state responsibility toward other 
nations.”17   
Cohan offers various definitions of customary law.  He notes that Grotius states that “the 
proof for the new law of nations is similar to that for unwritten municipal law; it is found in 
unbroken custom and the testimony of those who are skilled in it.”  He adds that Vattel argued 
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that “customary law of nations” is comprised of “certain maxims and customs consecrated by 
long use, and observed by nations in the mutual intercourse with each other as a kind of law.”  
Finally, Cohan offers a quasi-definition of customary international law, stating that “One of the 
traditional criterions advanced for determining the content of customary international law is 
‘concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of situation falling within the 
domain of international relations.’”18  
There are two central elements of customary international law: state practice and opinio 
juris.19  According to Roberts, “State practice refers to general and consistent practice by states, 
while opinio juris means that the practice is followed out of a belief of legal obligation.”20 
Opinio juris is defined by Cohan as, “a kind of ‘state of mind’ on the part of states that a certain 
form of conduct is permissible, required, or mandated by international law.”  Cohan goes on to 
add that, “opinio juris refers to statements and declarations by states that articulate the legality of 
practices in question.”21   
One recent example of opinio juris is found in the September 2002 National Security 
Strategy of the United States.  This document stated,  
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before 
they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an 
imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the 
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legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible 
mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.22  
 
It is clear that the Bush administration was making an argument in favor of anticipatory military 
activities based on customary international law.23 
One problem with the application of customary international law is that it is primarily 
based upon state practice.  In this respect, if states do not act in a particular way, there is an 
accepted customary prohibition against such action.  This formulation, however, is problematic 
in that it ignores other possible explanations for state behavior.  Perhaps there are other factors 
involved that could also explain state behavior.  It could be that states have not engaged in a 
certain behavior simply because it was not in their interest to do so, as opposed to there being a 
legal constraint preventing the action.  In light of these issues, Goldsmith and Posner offer a 
different conceptualization of customary international law based upon rational choice theory. 
Goldsmith and Posner argue that, “States do not comply with [customary international 
law] because of a sense of moral or legal obligation; rather [customary international law] 
emerges from the states’ pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage.”24  
According to this perspective, it is not appropriate to argue that states act in accordance with 
customary international law.  Rather, what is important is understanding why states pursued the 
actions in question.  This position is similar to much of international relations theory that argues 
that states act in accordance with their self-interests.25   
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Similar problems seem to plague the notion of opinio juris.  How can one determine if 
leaders frame their actions in terms of international law merely to provide a shield of legitimacy 
for what they would do anyway, and not because they feel a “moral obligation” to act in a certain 
way?  This is a crucial element of determining if a state’s behavior is consistent with customary 
international law.   In its 1969 decision regarding the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ 
argued that: 
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, 
or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered 
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it…The States concerned must 
therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.26  
 
Additionally, if customary international law is also dependent upon state practice, a 
“chronological paradox” arises.  According to Byers, “states creating new customary rules must 
believe that those rules already exist, and that their practice, therefore, is in accordance with 
law.”27  The requirements of customary law seem to present a “chicken and egg” situation.  
Customary law rests upon state practice and statements that show that the state is operating in a 
manner consistent with customary law.  But, it is not clear how such customary law is created or 
modified, if customary international law arises out of state practice and opinio juris.   
 The reliance on state practice and opinio juris leads to a second quandary.  How can it be 
determined if a state’s action is either a) in violation of international law or b) an indication of 
the development of a new custom?  Furthermore, Byers argues that “the requirement of opinio 
juris meant that only some instances of stat practice counted for the purpose of the customary 
                                                 
26 Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 131. 
27 Ibid., 131. 
82 
process, since a state had to believe that its behavior was already required by customary 
international law.28  
These problems have led some, such as Kelly, to suggest that since “there is neither a 
common understanding of how customary international legal norms are formed, nor  agreement 
on the content of those norms,” customary international law “is then a matter of taste.”  He goes 
on to argue that “it cannot function as a legitimate source of substantive legal norms in a 
decentralized world of nations without a broad base of shared values.”29  While this position is 
somewhat extreme, it does highlight some of the challenges of inherent in the use of customary 
international law. 
General Principles of Law 
The category of “general principles” is much more difficult to clearly define than the 
other aspects of international law.  Von Glahn states that there are two primary 
conceptualizations of general principles of law.  The first takes the position that these principles 
are taken from “domestic jurisprudence” and then applied to international relations.  The second 
position links natural law to positive law, or is “the transformation of broad universal principles 
of a law applicable to all of mankind into specific rules of international law.”30  Von Glahn also 
adds the caveat that “Most modern writers appear to regard general principles of law as a 
secondary source of international law, little used in practice but helpful on occasion.”31  
Arend and Beck note that this element of international law is more problematic and 
harder to define than either treaty or customary law.  They note that there are three primary ways 
in which these “general principles” can be understood.  In the first, general principles are seen as 
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“those basic legal principles that are present in most domestic legal systems.”  The next 
interpretation states that these general principles may reflect ideas “about the nature of 
international law that states have come to accept.”  The final possibility is that “the meaning of 
general principles of law is that they refer to ‘principles of higher law,’ such as principles of 
humanity or equality.”32  
Judicial Decisions and the Writings of Legal Scholars 
 According to von Glahn, “the more often a rule involved in a decision happens to be in 
line with the basic structure of the regional or general legal system affected, the more likely will 
it be accepted, respected, and followed by the legal persons in that system.”  He goes on to add, 
“Thus the decisions of international courts and arbitral awards handed down by international 
tribunals may serve to interpret a rule, apply a rule, or eliminate an obsolete rule.”33  Opinions of 
the justices sitting at the ICJ often serve to clarify provisions of international law.  For example, 
the decision in the Nicaragua case is often referred to in order to determine the standing of self-
defense in international law.34 
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response to an ‘armed attack’.”  International Court of Justice, "Case Concerning the Military and 
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)," Case 
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inus_isummaries/inus_isummary_19860627.htm>.  According to Kastenberg, “Despite its lengthy 
analysis, the ICJ never mentioned any of the several concepts pertinent to modern aspects of sovereignty, 
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 It is important to note that unlike treaty law, the decisions of the ICJ are not binding upon 
the states involved.  There is no sanction method attached to the Court, therefore states can 
choose to disregard the Court’s decision.  This does not necessarily mean that the Court is 
irrelevant, but it does highlight the major limitation of much of international law—it is 
unenforceable.  Perhaps it is for this reason that the normative element is so important with 
respect to international law.  The rationale being that states follow international law because it is 
the right thing to do, not out of fear of punishment.  The issue of why states follow international 
law is discussed below. 
 The other part of this element of international law is the writings and teachings of legal 
scholars.  While these writings do not necessarily create international law, they can be used by 
states to examine the different interpretations of the law.  Such writings are used by statesmen 
and scholars alike to understand and apply international law.  This element is closely related to 
the idea of opinio juris discussed above in the context of customary international law.  In this 
respect, some scholars do not consider this element as a completely separate and discrete part of 
international law. 
International Law and State Behavior: Compliance or Coincidence? 
 The above discussion about the nature of international law leaves a primary question 
unanswered.  Particularly, why do states follow international law?  Or, more fundamentally, do 
states follow international law?  Does international law actually have an influence on state 
behavior?  These questions will be empirically tested in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. 
                                                                                                                                                             
namely, aiding and abetting terrorist organizations, anticipatory self-defense, and preemption.  Indeed, the 
ICJ’s reliance on customary international law seems to indicate that Article 51 did not eviscerate its 
usage.” Joshua E. Kastenberg, "The Use of Conventional International Law in Combating Terrorism: A 
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 There are various different positions vis-à-vis both influence of and compliance with 
international law. The traditional position is that states follow international law because they 
consented to it, through the negotiation and ratification process.  From this perspective, states are 
expected to follow the rules that they created.35   
Fisher, however, notes that “Shared values and a sense of community, by themselves, are 
not enough to cause a government to respect the law.”36  Fisher goes on to argue that what is 
important about international law is that it actually influences what governments want, and can 
influence how states act accordingly. 
In one sense law cannot restrain a government from doing what they want, but law affects 
what they want.  In the absence of a legal rule to the contrary, the United States 
government might well conclude that they wanted to take over the oil fields of Kuwait.  
The existence of a rule of international law which makes it improper for the United States 
to seize the oil fields of Kuwait results in the United States government’s not wanting to 
seize the fields.  Law, by affecting what governments want, does restrain them from 
doing things which they would otherwise want to do.37  
 
Fisher adds 
Law thus operates as a restraint by making certain courses of action, if illegal, either 
ineffective or counterproductive.  That illegality operates as a restraint in the obverse of 
the fact that legality may serve as a tool.  
 
International law may also operate as a restraint by raising the political cost which a 
country pays for engaging in certain conduct.38  
 
Finally, Fisher also notes that “Law also operates as a restraint by raising for each country the 
fear of setting a harmful precedent.”39  In this respect, states follow, or obey, international law 
                                                 
35 Andrew T. Guzman, "A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law," California Law Review 90 
(December 2002): 1833. 
36 Roger Fisher, International Conflict for Beginners (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1970), 158. 
37 Ibid., 163. 
38 Ibid., 174.  In this respect, Fisher explicitly links the legal constraints to the political costs that Reiter 
discusses. 
39 Ibid., 175. 
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because it is the most effective way to achieve the desired policy, but it also minimizes 
associated costs with the policy.    
Some argue that states follow international law because it reduces uncertainty and shows 
that they are reliable and trustworthy.40 The logic behind this position is that it increases stability 
and reduces the potential for conflict among states.  This idea is similar to that advanced by 
international relations scholars, such as Martin and Simmons, who study the role of international 
institutions.41 These approaches share the same underlying assumption that regimes, either legal 
or institutional, can influence state behavior, foster cooperation, and perhaps reduce conflict. 
Guzman argues that states follow international law because of a concern “about 
reputational and direct sanctions triggered by violations of the law.”42   At the same time, since 
“the magnitude of reputational sanction is limited…they will not always provide sufficient 
incentive for nations to comply with the law.”43  
 At the same time, there are incentives for some states to disobey international law.  For 
example, strong states, such as the United States, may not be constrained by international law 
due to the fact that they “cannot be punished when they violate international law, so they may do 
better by violating international law when doing so shows that they will retaliate against threats 
to national security.”44 For other states, disobedience of international law may serve their 
interests by making them seem to be “unpredictable or irrational.”45  
 Furthermore, Benvenisti argues that a distinction must be made between actions that are 
illegal and inexcusable and those that are illegal and excusable.  In this respect, a state may act in 
                                                 
40 Goldsmith and Posner, "A Theory of Customary International Law," 1133. 
41 Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 729-57. 
42 Guzman, "A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law," 1827. 
43 Ibid., 1186. 
44 Goldsmith and Posner, "A Theory of Customary International Law," 1135. 
45 Ibid., 1136. 
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a manner that is, according to the letter of the law, illegal, but it may be considered excusable, 
and therefore the state would not be subject to sanction.  He states, “even if an anticipatory attack 
is unlawful under Article 51 and customary international law, it doesn’t necessarily mean that if 
someone used their power in anticipatory self-defence they would be condemned by the UN or 
brought before the ICC.”46   
 Others, however, argue that international law does not really constrain state behavior, but 
rather is used to merely justify actions that the state would pursue anyway.  According to Watts, 
“In effect, States’ apparent acceptance of international law may be little more than high-sounding 
tokenism: they may feel that the importance of international law can be safely acknowledged 
precisely because, in the final analysis, it is weak and can be ignored.”47  
Gray cautions against this position, arguing that “Simple assertions that this use of 
language is mere cynical manipulation of the rules, and no more than ex post facto rationalization 
for actions reached on other grounds, are not justified in the absence of empirical evidence that 
this is in fact the case and are no more plausible than the opposite version that states are in fact 
influenced by law.”48  Chayes makes a similar argument, stating that while “We cannot ask for a 
demonstration that legal considerations dictated decision”,49 evidence can be found that the legal 
elements influenced decision-makers:  
One important piece of evidence for constraint would be to examine the conduct in terms 
of the asserted prohibition.  If the conduct complies, there is at least a prima facie 
argument that the norm operated in its intended sense.  The converse is even more 
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47 Watts, "The Importance of International Law," 8. 
48 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
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compelling: if the conduct violates the norm, it would seem to be very strong evidence 
that the law did not constrain.50  
 
Without full access to the entire decision-making process, it is unlikely that scholars will be able 
to truly provide the empirical evidence that Gray proposes.  Chayes’s position is somewhat more 
amenable to scholarly analysis, however, in that it relies primarily on the action ultimately 
taken—rather than the process through which the decision was made to take the action.51   
 Additionally, some scholars note that attributes of states can determine how states view 
international law.  Gray, for example, argues that powerful states, primarily the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, have a great deal of power to determine the content of 
customary law or the ways in which the UN Charter is interpreted.  Since they can effectively 
sanction or condemn any action, regardless of whether or not it is really consistent with the UN 
Charter, they have the ability to “create new customary international law in reinterpretation of 
the Charter.”52 Schachter echoes this sentiment, stating that “power is a factor limiting the 
efficacy of legal constraints.”  Additionally,  
A relatively powerful state may pursue its perceived interest in violation of its 
international obligations; it may do so with impunity or pay a price.  Moreover, it may by 
its very violation shape the future law.53  
 
Falk notes that the United States, “as the dominant state in a unipolar world order enjoys an 
exemption from legal accountability with respect to uses of force irreconcilable with the UN 
Charter system; other states, in contrast, would be generally held to account unless directly 
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52 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 18. 
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protected under the United States exemption.”54 In this respect, it is possible that international 
law does not really serve as a constraint on these states’ actions.  Rather, international law can be 
manipulated to serve their interests. 
Development of the Prohibition on the Use of Force in International Law 
Early Prohibitions on the Use of Force 
According to Van Den Hole, “The bellum justum doctrine, which originated in the 
Middle Ages, legitimized the resort to violence in international law as a procedure of self-help 
only if certain criteria were met relating to a belligerent’s authority to make war, its objectives, 
and its intent.”55 The idea of just war is discussed in depth in Chapter 5, but it is important to 
note that the development of the just war tradition was an important step in the development of a 
general prohibition of the use of force.  It was the development of the modern state system, 
predicated on the idea of sovereignty, that led to the development of formal rules to regulate 
interactions between these juridically equal entities. 
 With respect to the legality of the use of force in international law, scholars often refer 
back to Hugo Grotius.  In a Congressional report, International Law and the Preemptive Use of 
Force Against Iraq, Ackerman writes, “Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, stated in 
the seventeenth century that ‘[i]t be lawful to kill him who is preparing to kill.’”56  While Grotius 
did advocate a very broad standard for the legitimate use of force, including “in the defense of 
chastity,”57 to argue that Grotius would approve of anticipatory military action against a distant, 
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and merely potential, threat would be to ignore other elements of his work.  Grotius also states 
that,  
The danger, again, must be immediate and imminent in point of time.  I admit, to be sure, 
that if the assailant seizes weapons in such a way that his intent to kill is manifest the 
crime can be forestalled….But those who accept fear of any sort as justifying anticipatory 
slaying are themselves greatly deceived, and deceive others.58  
 
He goes on to argue that,  
if a man is not planning an immediate attack, but it has been ascertained that he has 
formed a plot, or is preparing an ambuscade, or that he is putting poison in our way, or 
that he is making ready a false accusation and false evidence, and is corrupting the 
judicial procedure, I maintain that he cannot be lawfully killed, either if the danger can in 
any other way be avoided, or if it is not altogether certain that the danger cannot be 
otherwise avoided.  Generally, in fact, the delay that will intervene affords opportunity to 
apply many remedies, to take advantage of many accidental occurrences.59  
 
In other words, anticipatory action can be taken, but the threat must be imminent and force must 
be the last viable option available.  
Vattel also presented a similar argument, combining elements of the just war tradition 
with “legal” elements.  According to Vattel 
The right of employing force, or making war, belongs to nations no farther than is 
necessary for their own defence, and for the maintenance of their rights….Let us say in 
general, that the foundation, or cause of every just war is injury, either already done or 
threatened….the just and lawful object of every war, which is, to avenge or prevent 
injury.60  
 
Vattel goes on to argue, that when faced with a neighbor “by whom a nation fears she may one 
day be crushed,” the state “must either have actually suffered an injury or be visibly threatened 
with one, before [it is] authorized to take up arms, or have just grounds for making war.”61  
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These requirements are in line with the ideas expressed in the just war tradition, primarily 
that force must be used as a last resort and only after all other means of resolving the conflict, or 
mitigating the threat, have been exhausted.  Additionally, it is interesting that the position of both  
Grotius and Vattel would be closely reflected in what would become the cornerstone of the 
modern position in customary international law about the use of force in self-defense.   
Customary International Law and the Use of Force 
 The regulations on the use of force in customary law are less stringent than those found in 
treaty law.  One of the first instances where the use of force was limited under customary law 
came in the mid-1800s.  In what is referred to as the Caroline incident, the limitations and 
requirements for the use of force in self-defense were articulated by Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster.  In 1837, British troops attacked an American ship, the Caroline, in the cover of 
darkness in order to prevent the ship from supplying insurgents in Canada.  The United States 
protested this act, and demanded an apology and reparations.  On July 27, 1842, Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster sent a letter to Lord Ashburton.  This letter also contained a copy of an 
earlier correspondence sent to Ambassador Henry S. Fox on April 24, 1841.  It was in this 
correspondence that Webster laid out what would become the roots of customary law’s limits on 
the use of force in self-defense. 
 Webster argued in order to justify its use of force against the Caroline, the British 
Government must prove that the action was undertaken because of the “necessity of self-defence, 
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”  Webster 
went on to state the following: 
It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the 
necessity of the moment authoirsed them to enter the territories of The United States at 
all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-
defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.  It must be shown 
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that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on board the Caroline was impracticable, 
or would have been unavailing; it must be shown that day-light could not be waited for; 
that there could be no attempt at discrimination between the innocent and the guilty; that 
it would not have been enough to seise and detain the vessel; but that there was a 
necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking her in the darkness of the night, while 
moored to the shore, and while unarmed men were asleep on board, killing some and 
wounding others, and then drawing her into the current, above the cataract, setting her on 
faire, and, careless to know whether there might not be in her the innocent with the 
guilty, or the living with the dead, committing her to a fate which fills the imagination 
with horror.  A necessity for all this, the Government of The United States cannot believe 
to have existed.62  
 
It is from this letter that the modern requirements of necessity, imminence, and proportionality 
became an integral part of international law vis-à-vis self-defense and the use of force.     
 Jennings notes that Webster’s letter is important in that it represented the first time that 
the right of self-defense moved from being “an absolute primordial right” to being an action that 
can be regulated and limited.63 Others have framed Webster’s letter in a different light.  
Ackerman states that, “The classic formulation of the right of preemptive attack was given by 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster in connection with the famous Caroline incident.”64  Eckert 
and Mofidi state that,  
Webster impliedly acknowledged Britain’s right to anticipatory self-defense; he never 
questioned that right in principle.  One can assume, therefore, that anticipatory self-
defense was deemed a proper response even before the predicate attack actually occurred, 
so long as the state acted in a justifiable and unquestionable manner.  Webster’s 
statement concerning when anticipatory self-defense may be properly exercised remains 
the standard limitation for self-defense in customary international law.65  
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Others have also used Webster’s response to the Caroline incident as providing the customary 
legal basis for the right to use anticipatory military activities.  Taft, for example, states that “The 
President’s National Security Strategy relies on the same legal framework applied to the British 
in Caroline….The United States reserves the right to use force preemptively in self-defense when 
faced with an imminent threat.”66  
 Webster’s formula has become a cornerstone of much of the literature about the 
legitimate use of force in self-defense.  Arend notes that there is an “accepted doctrine of 
anticipatory self-defense” in customary law that was laid out in the Caroline incident.67  Kearley 
notes that it has become commonplace in today’s scholarship about international law and self-
defense to base the legality of using force in self-defense on Webster’s reaction to the Caroline 
incident.   
However, Kearley argues that this is a misinterpretation of Webster’s intent, and, 
furthermore, that these interpretations distort the historical record.  According to Kearley, the 
proper interpretation of Webster’s formula regarding self-defense applies only “to extra-
territorial uses of force by a state in peacetime against another state which was unable or 
unwilling to prevent its territory from being used as a base of operations for hostile activities 
against the state taking action.”68 Brownlie takes a similar stance vis-à-vis the meaning of 
Webster’s letter.  He states that “The Webster correspondence in reality merely stated a right of 
self-defence which had a more limited application than the vague right of self-preservation and 
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the broad and political concept of self-defence found in nineteenth-century thought and 
practice.”69 According to this approach, Webster’s formula was not intended to allow the use of 
force in response to any threat, but only in response to a specific type of threat. 
At the same time, however, Webster’s formula also raises many questions.  Taylor notes 
that Webster’s formula does not elaborate upon what constitutes an “imminent threat,” how 
“necessity” is to be defined, what is meant by “instant,” how long a “moment for deliberation” 
lasts, and above all, who is to determine the meanings of these elements?70  In fact, the ambiguity 
inherent in these fundamental concepts is an issue that continues to complicate the conceptual 
picture with respect to the use of force and self-defense in international law. 
Modern Treaty Law and the Use of Force 
The first modern attempt to limit the use of force through treaty law came with the 
establishment of the League of Nations.  Under the Covenant of the League of Nations an 
extensive set of procedures was established to regulate the use of force.71 The League of Nations 
established an elaborate institutional process through which states were supposed to be able to 
resolve their differences without using force.  Article 12 of the Covenant states 
The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute 
likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial 
settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they will agree in no case to resort to war 
until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report 
by the Council.  In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial 
decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be 
made within the six months after the submission of the report.72  
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The Covenant, however, did not outlaw the use of force by states.  Article 15 states that, “If the 
Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other 
than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League 
reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the 
maintenance of right and justice.”73  
 After the demise of the League of Nations, an additional attempt was made to limit the 
use of force in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which officially banned the use of war as an 
“instrument of national policy.”  While this treaty was by far the most extensive attempt to date 
to restrict the use of force, it is important to note that the signatories of the Pact believed that the 
use of force in self-defense remained lawful.  This is evidenced by the correspondence between 
the various negotiators of the Pact.  For example, the French negotiators noted that “The 
renunciation of war, thus proclaimed, would not deprive the signatories of the right of legitimate 
defense.”74  The negotiators from the United States stated: 
There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty to restrict or impair in any 
way the right of self-defense.  That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is 
implicit in every treaty.  Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty 
provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion, and it, alone, is competent to 
decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense.  If it has a good 
case, the world will applaud and not condemn its action.  Express recognition by treaty of 
this inalienable right, however, gives rise to the same difficulty encountered in any effort 
to define aggression.  It is the identical question approached from the other side.  
Inasmuch as no treaty provisions can add to the natural right of self-defense, it is not in 
the interest of peace that a treaty should stipulate a justice conception of self-defense 
since it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mold events to accord with an agreed 
definition.75  
 
Wright notes that the states involved feared that by expressly defining the right of self-defense, 
the treaty would thereby limit and impair this essential right.  In the words of Secretary of State 
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Henry L. Stimson, “This right is so inherent and universal that it was not deemed necessary to 
insert it expressly in the treaty.”76    
However, since the Pact did not expressly enumerate what constituted legitimate self-
defense, it remained unclear what type of activities were permitted under these new guidelines.77 
Such ambiguity with respect to what constituted self-defense would also come to characterize the 
prohibition on the use of force contained in the Charter of the United Nations. 
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE USE OF FORCE 
 Today, international law has been codified in the Charter of the United Nations.  
Virtually all sovereign states are members of the UN, and, accordingly, are bound by the 
Charter’s provisions.  As a result, the Charter is viewed as having universal applicability.78 
McCormack notes that the United Nations was established to maintain international peace and 
security, and that the “whole scheme of the Charter was based on the provision of a system of 
collective measures to prevent and remove threats to the peace.”79   
The Charter deals extensively with the use of force, but with respect to self-defense two 
provisions are particularly relevant.  Article 2(4) of the Charter expressly prohibits the use of 
force.  It states: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.80  
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There are only two exceptions to this general prohibition of the use of force.  Chapter VII allows 
for the Security Council to sanction the use of force to “keep the peace.”  Article 51 allows for 
force to be used in self-defense in response to an armed attack: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.  Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority 
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.81  
 
There has been extensive discussion and debate as to the meaning of both Article 2(4) and 
Article 51 with respect to what constitutes self-defense and what qualifies as an armed attack. 
 On the surface, it appears that the Charter explicitly outlaws the use of force, except in 
specific, and extraordinary, circumstances.  This language, however, is both vague and open to 
numerous interpretations. 82  With respect to Article 2(4) and Article 51, the debate centers 
around how restrictive the prohibition on the use of force really is. 
Much of the debate concerns the language of Article 51, which provides for the “self-
defense” exception to the prohibition on the use of force.  The primary focus of this debate 
revolves around the following clause of Article 51: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs…”  Does this 
include the right to anticipatory self-defense or preemption that is allowed under customary 
international law?   This position focuses on the “inherent right” element of the clause.  On the 
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other hand, does the clause limit self-defense only to situations where an actual armed attack has 
occurred?  This perspective focuses on the second part of the clause. 
   There are two primary positions in this debate.  The “restrictionist” side argues that the 
use of force is prohibited except in the few instances that are specifically enumerated in the 
Charter.  Randelzhofer argues that “The prevailing view refers, above all, to the purpose of the 
UN Charter, i.e., to restrict as far as possible the use of force by the individual State, and 
considers Art. 51 to exclude any self-defence, other than that in response to an armed attack.”83  
According to this argument, there are only three clear exceptions to the prohibition on the 
use of force: 1) actions explicitly authorized by the Security Council, 2) collective and individual 
self-defense to an actual armed attack, and 3) measures taken against former enemies (i.e., the 
Axis powers from World War II).84  Kunz argues that the right to self-defense “does not exist 
against any form of aggression which does not constitute ‘armed attack.’”85  He goes on to argue 
that the mere “threat of aggression” would not be sufficient to justify the unilateral use of force.86   
Some have even argued that the inclusion of the caveat of if “an armed attack occurs” 
supercedes the “freedom of action which states had under traditional law.”  Jessup goes on to 
argue that, 
A case could be made out for self-defense under the traditional law where the injury was 
threatened by no attack had yet taken place.  Under the Charter, alarming military 
preparations by a neighbouring military state would justify a resort to the Security 
                                                 
83 Albrecht Randelzhofer, "Article 51," in The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Bruno 
Simma, (ed.) Volume I, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 792; Michael McGinty, 
"That Was The War That Was: International Law, Pre-Emption and the Invasion of Iraq," RUSI Journal 
148, no. 3 (June 2003): 20-25. 
84 Timothy Kearley, "Regulation of Preventive and Preemptive Force in the United Nations Charter: A 
Search for Original Intent," Wyoming Law Review 3 (Winter 2003): 669-70. 
85 Josef L. Kunz, "Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations," The American Journal of International Law 41, no. 4 (October 1947): 878. 
86 Kunz, "Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations," 878. 
99 
Council, but would not justify resort to anticipatory force by the state which believed 
itself threatened.87  
 
Supporters of this approach believe that the Charter must be taken at face value, in other words, 
the Charter says what it means and means what it says.  Additionally, supporters of this argument 
advance the position that the “limits imposed on self-defence in Article 51 would be meaningless 
if a wider customary law right of self-defence survives unfettered by these restrictions.”88  
This position holds true for Article 51’s provisions about self-defense, meaning that when 
the Charter stated that self-defense is permitted in the event of an armed attack, this means only 
after an armed attack has occurred.  Randelzhofer states that this position is supported by the ICJ 
in its judgment in the Nicaragua case.  He argues that the ICJ “proceeds on the assumption that 
the existence of an armed attack is a conditio sine qua non for the exercice of the right to 
individual and collective self-defence.”  He presents the following excerpts of the judgment in 
support of this position: 
In the case of individual self-defence, the exercise of this right is subject to the State 
concerned having been the victim of an armed attack.  Reliance on collective self-defence 
of course does not remove the need for this. 
 
The Court has recalled above…that for one State to use force against another, on the 
ground that that State has committed a wrongful act against a third State, is regarded as 
lawful, by way of exception, only when the wrongful act provoking the response was an 
armed attack.  Thus the lawfulness of the use of force by a State in response to a 
wrongful act of which it has not itself been the victim is not admitted when this wrongful 
act is not an armed attack.  In the view of the Court, under international law in force 
today—whether customary international law or that of the United Nations system—States 
do not have a right of ‘collective’ armed response to acts which do not constitute an 
‘armed attack’.89  
 
At the same time, the ICJ did not take a position on the use of individual anticipatory action.  In 
the same decision, the ICJ stated: 
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In view of the circumstances in which the dispute has arisen, reliance is placed by the 
Parties only on the right of self-defence in the case of an armed attack which has already 
occurred, and the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed 
attack has not been raised.  Accordingly Court expresses no view on that issue.90  
 
According to this perspective, there is clarification that the collective use of anticipatory military 
force would be in violation of both customary and treaty law, but it remains unclear as to the 
standing of a unilateral action of this type. 
 On the other side of the debate are those who see the prohibitions in Article 2(4) and 
Article 51 as being less stringent, and more open to interpretation.  This group is often referred to 
as the “counter-restrictionist” school.  They argue that one of the key components on the 
Charter’s restriction on the use of force is the fact that Article 2(4) outlaws uses of force that are 
“against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  In this respect, they argue that the Charter 
was designed to prohibit uses of force that are aggressive in nature, not necessarily to prohibit 
any use of force whatsoever.   
Furthermore, the “counter-restrictionists” view the “inherent right” clause of Article 51 to 
indicate that the Charter did not replace the customary right to anticipatory self-defense against 
an imminent attack.  In this respect, the term “inherent right” is not “a dynamic term capable of 
shifting in meaning over time; the scope of the right was fixed in customary law in 1945 and 
is…not susceptible to restriction in light of subsequent state practice.”91  
 Several scholars have also argued that international law is not a “suicide pact.”92  Others 
have taken this idea a step further, and argued that the anticipatory use of force against an 
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imminent attack is permitted under the UN Charter.   Schmitt argues that “it would be absurd to 
suggest that international law requires a State to ‘take the first hit’ when it could effectively 
defend itself by acting preemptively.”93 Kearley states the following in support of this position: 
Given the continued inability of the Security Council to take effective actions to 
eliminate “threat[s] to peace, breach[es] of the peace or act[s] of aggression,” it is 
preferable to interpret Article 51 as including the rights of intervention in self-defense 
and of anticipatory self-defense, as narrowly defined in the Caroline doctrine, than to 
interpret it as eliminating these rights.  States that truly are the victims of armed 
harassment by forces operating out of another state, or that are threatened by imminent 
and grave aggression from another state, should not be forced to act outside the law.94   
 
Other scholars supporting this position have argued that Article 51 explicitly discusses only one 
type of self-defense, in response to an armed attack, but that this does not imply that there are not 
other types of self-defense that are also legitimate.   
Van Den Hole argues that since “self-defence is a pre-existing, inherent right recognized 
in customary international law,” the UN Charter cannot outlaw elements of self-defense that are 
legitimate under customary international law, such as anticipatory self-defense.95  McCormack 
echoes this sentiment when he states that “Article 51 should be interpreted to include 
anticipatory self-defense within specified limits: (1) so that regional organizations do not have an 
unrestricted right to use force; and (2) so that, both individually and collectively, states have the 
freedom to defend themselves against the threat of an attack that the Security Council will do 
nothing to stop.”96  McCormack also agues that “In requiring member states to forego the right to 
use force, the framers of the Charter envisaged that the Security Council would guarantee the 
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protection of individual states from violations of Article 2(4) against them by other states.”97  
Others, however, argue that this interpretation is misguided, since it privileges one part of Article 
51 over another. 
In an attempt to determine what the drafters of the Charter intended, or what the proper 
interpretation of the Charter should be, some scholars have gone back to the drafting history of 
the Charter, also known as the travaux préparatories.  By looking at drafts, proposals, and 
meeting minutes, these scholars have tried to trace the development of the Charter.  The 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that “supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its completion” can be used 
to determine the meaning of a treaty when the text of the treaty “leaves the meaning ambiguous 
or obscure” or “leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”98   
Randelzhofer notes that “nothing can be drawn from the travaux préparatories” with 
respect to the proper interpretation of Article 51.99 This is also evidenced by the fact that 
different scholars have different interpretations of the travaux préparatories.  For example, 
Jessup refers to the travaux préparatories to support a more restrictive interpretation of Article 
51.100 Henkin echoes this sentiment, stating that “The fair reading of Article 51 permits unilateral 
use of force only in a very narrow and clear circumstance, in self-defense if an armed attack 
occurs” and that “Nothing in the history of its drafting (the travaux préparatories) suggests that 
the framers of the Charter intended something broader than the language implied.”101   
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O’Connell argues that “the drafting history of the Charter” supports the position that “the 
prohibition of force was intended by the drafters to be very broad, admitting of only explicit 
exceptions.”102 Franck argues that “It is beyond dispute that the negotiators deliberately closed 
the door on any claim of ‘anticipatory self-defence.’”103  Brownlie states that “There is no 
indication in the discussions that the right of self-defence in the Article was in contrast with any 
other right of self-defence permitted by the Charter or that the phrase ‘if an armed attack occurs’ 
was anything other than a characterization of the right of self-defence.”104  
Kearley, on the other hand, argues that an examination of the development of the UN 
Charter indicates that the states involved in the negotiations included explicit reference to self-
defense because of a strong desire of the negotiators that this right be maintained.105 
Additionally, he goes on to state that “The record shows that in the case for the Charter’s use of 
force rules, the drafters expressly refrained from defining aggression and implicitly avoided 
defining the limits of individual self-defense because they knew they could not agree upon such 
definitions.”106  Finally, he states that although “the drafters assumed that the traditional right of 
self-defense would remain unimpaired,” “The minutes show no uses of the term anticipatory 
self-defense nor do they show any clear debate about the concept.”107 In this respect, the travaux 
préparatories do not really provide much help in determining the status of anticipatory military 
activities (or the extent of the right of self-defense) within the UN framework. 
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Self-Defense, the Use of Force, and International Law Today 
 International law is not a monolithic bloc of rules and regulations.  Rather, it is an 
amalgamation of numerous sources and components.  It is unclear if one element is more 
important or carries more weight.  Accordingly, it is difficult to determine the legality of an 
action that is in violation of treaty law but consistent with customary law.  Furthermore, since 
customary law evolves and changes over time, it is difficult to determine if an action taken is a 
violation or merely an indication of the evolution of customary law.  For example, if a state 
violates existing customary law but is not sanctioned by other states, is this an example of a 
violation?  Also, since treaty law is also susceptible to new interpretations, it is difficult to 
determine if a specific action is a violation of the law or an indication of a new and valid 
interpretation.  Additionally, if states are unwilling or unable to impose effective punishment on 
violations, how effective or influential is international law?108   
 Furthermore, the meaning of treaty law can also change over time.  As discussed above, 
the interpretation of treaties can evolve over time and analysis of the meaning of treaties must be 
adaptive to changes in state practice.  The UN Charter is susceptible to these changing 
interpretations, and it is possible that as state practice changes, so too must the interpretations of 
the provisions of the Charter.  Gray notes that in its decision in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ 
“seems to have accepted the possibility of a dynamic interpretation of Articles 51 and 2(4) based 
on the development of state practice.”109  This idea makes intuitive sense since the world itself is 
not static.  New technologies, such as nuclear weapons, and new threats, such as international 
                                                 
108 It is not the purpose of this work to provide a definitive answer to these questions.  That is left to the 
international law scholars.  Rather, this study seeks to determine if international law plays a role in 
determining state behavior. 
109 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 4. 
105 
terrorism, arise that were not present when the Charter was originally adopted.  In order for the 
Charter to remain relevant, it must be able to adapt to the changing international landscape. 
There appears to be a consensus among legal scholars that force can be used unilaterally 
in self-defense against an actual armed attack.   Additionally, there is fairly widespread 
acceptance of the use of anticipatory military activities if the threat is clearly imminent, along the 
lines of the Caroline doctrine.110  
McCormack notes that the interpretation of Article 51 that allows the anticipatory use of 
military force is valid for three reasons: “(1) It reflects the intentions of the framers of the 
Charter, (2) it is consistent with the purposes of the Organisation, and (3) because examples of 
state practice show that, regardless of what states say they believe about the right to use force in 
anticipation of an attack, in situations where they have felt intolerably threatened states have 
used force.”111   
Schmitt argues that while there is a legal right for states to “act preemptively in self-
defense,” there are strict limitations on this right.  Specifically, “there must be near certainty that 
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an armed attack will be launched, peaceful alternatives to resolution of the situations must be 
exhausted beyond reasonable doubt, defensive action can only be taken during the last available 
window of opportunity, and the defensive force cannot exceed that necessary to deter the 
threat.”112 Maxon presents several “criteria” that should be met before force can be used either in 
the traditional conception of self-defense, or in “anticipatory” self-defense.  With respect to the 
use of force in self-defense, the following guidelines are offered: 
1. Is the proposed response aimed at protecting the status quo?…Actions that have 
retribution as the objective are not self-defense and are aggressive in nature. 
2. Has there been a violation of a legal obligation? Each member state of the United 
Nations is obligated by Article 2(4) to refrain from using force or threats of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.  Threats to either 
of these fundamental values would violate that legal duty… 
3. Has there been an actual armed attack from an external source? As distinguished 
from anticipatory self-defense…the clearest case for self-defense arises when one 
state has been subjected to armed attack by another state or an organization sponsored 
by another state… 
4. Is the response, or proposed response, timely? Actions in self-defense must not be 
remote in time from the initial aggression.  A delayed response may be seen by the 
international community as a threat to international peace and security.  The need for 
immediacy (necessity) of action is lost if too much time lapses between the initial 
overt act of aggression and the defensive reaction. 
5. Is the military response in self-defense necessary? Article 2(3) of the Charter cautions 
all member states to resolve their disputes by peaceful means.  Article 33 requires 
parties to a dispute to refer it to the Security Council should they fail in its resolution.  
Before military force may be used in self-defense, the threatened state is required to 
attempt all practical, peaceful means to resolve the dispute.  If there is a realistic, 
meaningful alternative to military action, self-defense is not available.  There is, 
however, no requirement to exhaust all peaceful means if it would be fruitless to do 
so.  If, however, the need for military action is not clear, it is not justified. 
6. Is the military response in self-defense proportionate to the threat? A nation acting in 
self-defense may use force no greater than that needed to halt the danger posed by an 
aggressor nation…. 
7. Has any military response been immediately reported to the Security Council?… 
8. Has the Security Council taken meaningful, effective measures to stop the aggressive 
conduct? Once the Security Council takes effective action to end the aggressive acts 
of a state, the target state must cease its self-defense activities.113 
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With respect to anticipatory self-defense, Maxon notes that the primary question that needs to be 
answered is if there the threat of armed attack is both imminent and immediate.  In order to 
answer this question, he provides the following criteria: 
Are there objective indicators that an attack is imminent? Factors such as troop buildups, 
increased alert levels, increased training tempo, and reserve call-ups may suggest that an 
attack is imminent. 
 
Does the past conduct or hostile declarations of the alleged aggressor reasonably lead to 
a conclusion that an attack is probable? A pattern of aggressive past conduct or hostile 
public statements may demonstrate an intention by an aggressor nation to launch an 
armed attack. 
 
What is the nature of the weapons available to the alleged aggressor nation, and does it 
have the ability to use them effectively? Weapons of mass destruction and modern 
delivery systems make waiting for an actual armed attack exceedingly dangerous.  While 
possession of such weapons alone is not indicative of an intent to use them, it is a factor 
that must be considered with all other relevant factors. 
 
Is the use of force the last resort after exhausting all practicable, peaceful means? Unlike 
actions in self-defense following an armed attack, preemptive actions generally mean 
some time is available for peaceful resolution….114  
 
Not only does Maxon extend the legal right of self-defense to include anticipatory self-defense, 
albeit within fairly tight parameters, but he also explicitly links anticipatory self-defense to many 
of the elements of the Just War tradition, which are discussed in Chapter 5.  
Byers notes that there has been a great deal of reluctance on the part of states to “claim a 
right of anticipatory self-defense.”115  Gray extends this position by stating that this reluctance is 
due to the fact that states are unsure of the legality of anticipatory self-defense.  She states that 
the reluctance of states “to rely on anticipatory self-defence…is strong evidence of the 
controversial status of this justification for the use of force, as is the deliberate avoidance of the 
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issue of the legality of anticipatory self-defence by the International Court of Justice in the 
Nicaragua case.”116  
Although there is considerable debate among international legal scholars, there is support 
for the use of anticipatory military activities—albeit within very limited and strict parameters.  
The key element is the imminence factor.  In order for the anticipatory action to be considered 
legitimate, i.e., “legal,” act of self-defense, it must be taken in response to an imminent threat.  
 What qualifies as imminent, however, is often times in the eye of the beholder.  It seems 
as if the framers of the UN Charter clearly intended the Security Council to make such decisions.  
However, given the fact that the Security Council did not develop into the strong body that was 
envisioned, it is somewhat problematic to require States to defer all judgments on imminence to 
the Security Council.   
Some also argue that the nature of “imminence” changes over time.  Schmitt notes that 
“the requirement of imminency must evolve as the nature of the threat changes.”117 In this 
respect, the requirement of going through the Security Council before taking action may be 
untenable.  According to Greenwood, 
Where the threat is an attack by weapons of mass destruction, the risk imposed upon a 
State by waiting until that attack actually takes place compounded by the impossibility 
for that State to afford its population any effective protection once the attack has been 
launched, mean that such an attack can reasonably be treated as imminent in 
circumstances where an attack by conventional means would not be so regarded.  The 
second consideration is the method of delivery of the threat.  It is far more difficult to 
determine the time scale within which a threat of attack by terrorist means would 
materialize than it is with threats posed by, for example, regular armed forces.  These 
would be material considerations in assessing whether, in any particular case, an attack 
should be treated as imminent. 
 
Nevertheless, the requirement that an attack be imminent cannot be ignored or rendered 
meaningless. Even when taking into account [these] issues…the right of self-defense will 
justify action only where there is sufficient evidence that the threat of attack exists.  That 
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will require evidence not only of the possession of weapons but also of an intention to use 
them.118  
 
In this respect, the imminence factor is not irrelevant, but must be tweaked to a certain extent in 
order to effectively address the challenges that states face today.  In such a situation, a state may 
not necessarily have time to go through the sometimes lengthy process of bringing the issue to 
the Security Council before taking action.   
 Some also argue that the failure of the Security Council to effectively deal with threats 
has virtually negated the prohibitions contained within the Charter.  The prohibitions on the use 
of force were predicated upon a functioning Security Council that would be able to maintain 
peace and security.  If, however, the Security Council is unable to effectively fulfill its 
obligations, these scholars argue, it is unreasonable to expect states to continue to be bound to a 
system that is not working and thereby sacrifice their own security.119  
 Others, however, contend that states knowingly and willingly entered into a binding 
agreement when they signed the UN Charter.  Along these lines, McCormack argues: 
The fact that the Security Council did not live up to expectations does not mean that 
Article 2(4) is no longer binding on states.  In signing the Charter, states unconditionally 
obligated themselves to the proscription in Article 2(4).120  
 
According to McCormack, while states are still bound to Article 2(4), the fact that the Security 
Council failed to live up to expectations does provide somewhat more leeway in terms of the 
legitimate use of force by states.  He states that “Article 51 should also be interpreted to allow 
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states to help achieve the maintenance of international peace and security in situations where the 
Council cannot or will not take action.”121  
 At the same time, there are also complications due to the changing nature of the threats 
involved.  The threats faced by States in the early 1940s when the Charter was drafted are 
markedly different from the threats faced by States today.  This has made many scholars question 
if the rules embodied in the UN Charter should (or can) evolved and adapt over time to reflect 
the new reality.122   
Henkin cautions, however, that while the “law, like the institutions of the United Nations, 
must grow to reflect changes in nations, in relations between nations, [and] in the force available 
to affect relations between nations” this “reinterpretation” process is “dangerous and delicate.”123  
For Schmitt, “law must be construed in the context in which it is to be applied if it is to remain 
relevant; and in the twenty-first century security environment, insistence on a passé application 
of international legal principles to strategies of preemption would quickly impel States at risk to 
ignore them.”124  
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Comparative Law 11 (Spring 2003): 7-19; Thomas Graham, Jr. "Is International Law Relevant to Arms 
Control? National Self-Defense, International Law, and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Chicago Journal 
of International Law 4 (Spring 2003): 1-17; Haass, "Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving 
Responsibilities."; Henkin, "The United Nations and Its Supporters: A Self-Examination."; Nabati, 
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 Jessup quotes a 1946 Department of State Memorandum that argues that the 
conceptualization of what an armed attack is must change to reflect the new technological 
environment: 
It is equally clear that an “armed attack” is now something entirely different from what it 
was prior to the discovery of atomic weapons.  It would therefore seem to be both 
important and appropriate under present conditions that the treaty define ‘armed attack’ 
in a manner appropriate to atomic weapons and include in the definition not simply the 
actual dropping of an atomic bomb, but also certain steps in themselves preliminary to 
such action.125  
 
Dinstein argues that sometimes “the opening of fire is an unreliable test of responsibility for an 
armed attack.”126  He goes on to say that: 
The crucial question is who embarks upon an irreversible course of action, thereby 
crossing the Rubicon.  This, rather than the actual opening of fire, is what casts the die 
and forms what may be categorized as an incipient armed attack.  It would be absurd to 
require that a defending State should sustain and absorb a devastating (perhaps a fatal) 
blow, only to prove an immaculate conception of self-defense.127  
 
In this respect, he distinguishes between a “preventive strike [that] anticipates an armed attack 
that is merely ‘foreseeable’ (or even just ‘conceivable’)” and “an interceptive strike [that] 
counters an armed attack which is ‘imminent’ and practically ‘unavoidable.’”128   
 For the purposes of this study, the question to be examined is to what extent the legal 
elements actually influenced state action during specific crises.  Arend and Beck argue that in 
order to determine if an accepted norm is actually a “law,” it must be accompanied by both 
authority and control.  In other words, states must believe that it is a law and must act 
accordingly.129  If this is true, then the opposite must also apply: an accepted norm is not a “law” 
if states do not believe it to be so, nor act in accordance with the norm.  According to this 
                                                 
125 Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations: An Introduction, 166-76. 
126 Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defence, 170. 
127 Ibid., 172. 
128 Ibid., 172. 
129 Arend and Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm, 9. 
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position, if states do not adhere to the restrictionist interpretation of Article 51, which would 
outlaw anticipatory military activities, it would be hard to support the position that such 
prohibition is in fact law.   
 One of the hypotheses that will be tested is that states are constrained by the legal 
elements, but only up to a certain point.  If the threat posed were sufficiently severe—such as a 
threat to the state’s existence—the costs of violating international law would be less than the 
costs of taking no action.  Additionally, within international law there is more support for 
anticipatory action taken to redress imminent threats as opposed to more distant threats.  In this 
respect, states could take anticipatory action in response to an imminent threat, again within 
certain limits, and still be operating within the boundaries of international law.   
Support for the notion that the type of crisis, i.e., what type of threat is faced and how 
severe the threat is, influences whether or not international law acts as a constraint on state 
behavior is supported by Goldsmith and Posner’s rational choice approach to understanding 
customary international law.  Goldsmith and Posner argue that states’ interests play a pivotal role 
in understanding how international law is interpreted.  In this respect, when a state faces a crisis 
that threatens its security or existence, its interests (i.e., survival) may trump constraints on 
actions found in international law.   
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CHAPTER 5: THE JUST WAR TRADITION 
 
 Concern with minimizing the use of force has a long history.  Arend and Beck note that 
limitations on the legitimate use of force can be found as early as 330 BC with the idea of “holy 
war” contained in the Hebrew Bible.  Under this conception, only a war that was instituted by 
God was permissible.1  This idea later developed into the tradition of “just war,” which codified 
the conditions under which it was permissible to use force and engage in war.   
 The just war tradition deals with a vast and expansive range of activities, and has been 
examined and interpreted by numerous scholars.  It is important to note at the outset that this 
chapter is particularly concerned with the standing of anticipatory military activities within the 
just war tradition, not the tradition in its entirety.  While a brief overview of the just war tradition 
is important, the emphasis will be placed on the just war tradition as it relates to anticipatory 
military activities.  
The Just War Tradition: Development and Components 
 The just war tradition was developed in order to bridge the gap between the Christian 
teachings of pacifism and the need to engage in military activities to defend the state’s interests.  
Augustine argues, 
For if the Christian religion condemned wars of every kind, the command given in the 
gospel to soldiers asking counsel as to salvation would rather be to cast away their arms, 
and to withdraw themselves wholly from military service; whereas the word spoken to 
such was, “Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely, and be content with your 
wages,”—the command to be content with their wages manifestly implying no 
prohibition to continue in the service.  Wherefore, let those who say that the doctrine of 
Christ is incompatible with the State’s well-being give us an army composed of soldiers 
such as the doctrine of Christ requires them to be; let them give us such subjects…as the 
Christian religion has taught that men should be, and then let them dare to say that it is 
                                                 
1 Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN 
Charter Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1993), 11-12. 
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adverse to the State’s well-being; yea, rather, let them no longer hesitate to confess that 
this doctrine, if it were obeyed, would be the salvation of the commonwealth.2  
 
Johnson notes that Augustine dealt with this quandary by creating “a justification of war under 
certain prescribed circumstances, yet with genuine limits on the harm that could be done even in 
a justified war.”3  For Miller, “Saint Augustine’s basic distinction between the just and the unjust 
war provided a useful guide for the priest and the Christian layman, and formed the basis for 
meeting an urgent need of the time, i.e., defense against the invasion of the barbarians.”4  
Cullinan describes the just war tradition as 
a moral framework for relating ends and means in considering whether and how armed 
force may be permissible or even required.  It reflects the collective legacy of Western 
thought—both religious and secular—in grappling with enduring moral concerns where 
the stakes are literally matters of life and death.5 
 
In this respect, the just war tradition can be viewed as being a “middle ground” between the 
pacifistic position, outlawing all war, and the militaristic or realist position, which did not put 
any moral or ethical constraints on the waging of war.6   Weigel defines the just war tradition as 
“a kind of ethical calculus, in which moral reasoning and rigorous empirical analysis are meant 
to work together, in order to provide guidance to public authorities on whom the responsibilities 
of decision-making fall.”7 
                                                 
2 Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, The Political Writings of St. Augustine, edited by Henry Paolucci 
(Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2002), 180. 
3 James Turner Johnson, Can Modern War Be Just? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 1. 
4 Lynn H. Miller, "The Contemporary Significance of the Doctrine of Just War," World Politics 16, no. 2 
(January 1964): 254. 
5 John F. Cullinan, "Preempt Iraq: Necessity, Law, and Justice, " National Review December 16 2002, 
August 1, 2004 <www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-cullinan121602.asp>. 
6 Nick Fotion, Bruno Coppieters, and Ruben Apressyan, "Introduction," in Moral Constraints on War: 
Principles and Cases, ed. Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 
11.; Inis L. Jr. Claude, "Just Wars: Doctrines and Institutions," Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 1 
(Spring 1980): 83-96. 
7 George Weigel, “Getting ‘Just-War’ Straight & Pre-Emption, Just War and the Defense of World 
Order.” 2003, Catholic Educator's Resource Center, October 17, 2003 
<www.catholiceducation.org/articles/social_justice.sj0008.html>. 
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 Although what is today considered the “just war tradition” can be traced to Augustine and 
the early Christians, similar ideas were explored by the ancient Romans and Greeks as well as by 
ancient Chinese and Indian philosophers.8  While it is interesting to note that concerns with 
morality and warfare were pursued in various cultures, it was the Augustinian tradition that 
developed into the just war tradition, and is part of the foundation of Western positive 
international law.  Accordingly, the below discussion will be restricted to the Augustinian 
tradition. 
It is also important to note that the just war tradition is not, nor has it ever been, static or 
rigid.  Rather, it has evolved and changed over time in accordance with the evolving and 
changing nature of political actors and the military technologies they employ.9  According to 
O’Brien, there are three primary sources of the “classic just war doctrine:”  
1. The theological tradition, represented by the writings of St. Augustine, St. Thomas 
Aquinas, and the late Scholastics…. 
2. The canonists and ecclesiastic councils. 
3. Customary jus gentium incorporated into just war doctrine, mainly by later 
Scholastics.10  
 
The classical just war tradition later developed into what O’Brien calls “Modern Just War 
Doctrine.”  O’Brien describes the development of the just war tradition in the following manner: 
                                                 
8 Fotion, Coppieters, and Apressyan, "Introduction," 11-12. 
9 For detailed histories and discussions of the evolution of the just war tradition, see Bruno Coppieters and 
Nick Fotion, (eds.), Moral Constraints on War: Principles and Cases (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2002); James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical 
Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981); Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War & Peace: 
An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999); James Turner 
Johnson, Morality & Contemporary Warfare (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); James Turner 
Johnson, "Just War, As It Was and Is," First Things 149 (January 2005): 14-24; Robert L. Holmes, "Can 
War Be Morally Justified? The Just War Theory," in Just War Theory, ed. Jean Bethke Elshtain (New 
York: New York University Press, 1992); Michael D. Ramsey, "Textualism and War Powers," The 
University of Chicago Law Review 69, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 1543-638. 
10 William V. O'Brien, "The International Law of War as Related to the Western Just War Tradition," in 
Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic 
Traditions, John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (eds.) (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 165. 
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in its long evolution, just-war doctrine has assumed an eclectic character.  It spans several 
normative disciplines.  In its origins just-war doctrine is heavily theological.  As it 
developed in Scholastic thought it became more and more philosophical, an expression of 
natural law.  At the same time, just-war theory was enriched by the chivalric code and by 
emerging jus gentium, the law of nations.  In the twentieth century, just-war doctrine has 
been elaborated in a substantial body of Catholic social thought on war of mixed 
theological-philosophical character.  The contemporary just-war literature by moral and 
legal publicists likewise reflects varied emphases from theological to philosophical to 
pragmatic political-military.11  
 
According to Elshtain, the evolution of the just war tradition also included its secularization.  
This process did not remove the “ethical content” of the tradition, and was facilitated when the 
tradition was “absorbed into the thinking of international law.”  Additionally, “many of its 
ethical constraints were encoded in both the Geneva and Hague Conventions” and “the just war 
tradition had become part of the way in which much of the world spoke of war and peace 
questions.”12  
Johnson discusses another element of the evolution of the just war tradition, namely that 
the different components develop different meanings over time, stating that “an illustration of the 
divergence of meaning that has historically been attached to these terms, just cause in the Middle 
Ages could be construed in terms of punishing evildoers in the stead of God, while today it tends 
to be put, especially in international law, in terms of outlawing aggression and defining a limited 
right of self-defense.”13  
                                                 
11 William V. O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War (New York: Praeger, 1981), 13. 
12 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World 
(New York: Basic Books, 2003), 53. Johnson Johnson, "Just War, As It Was and Is." argues that this 
process has served to erode and distort much of the core of the just war tradition.  In this respect, he notes 
that what has developed as “positive international law” diverges significantly from the just war tradition 
and privileges what were secondary aspects of the tradition over more fundamental elements. 
13 Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry, xxii. 
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Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: The Building Blocks of a “Just War” 
 Today, there are seven basic principles of the just war tradition, divided into two different 
categories.14  The first concerns jus ad bellum or “justice on the way to war.”  The elements of 
jus ad bellum include the following: legitimate authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, 
and reasonable chance of success.  These elements are designed to help guide statesmen vis-à-vis 
the decision to go to war or use force.   
 The second part of the just war tradition is jus in bello or “justice in war.” This category 
includes the requirements of proportionality and the discrimination between combatants and 
noncombatants.  The elements of jus in bello are meant to guide statesmen in their conduct once 
war has been initiated.15 
If the jus ad bellum requirements must be met prior to the use of force, then these 
elements can be seen as superceding the jus in bello criteria.  According to Johnson, “if a given 
resort to force has not been morally justified, then even the most strictly delimited uses are, 
                                                 
14 Johnson notes that for Aquinas, there were only three elements that served to make a war (bellum) 
“just.”  These included: sovereign authority, just cause, and right intention.  Additionally, Johnson argues 
that it is important to note the specific importance of the word “bellum” for Aquinas.  “Bellum in 
medieval usage referred to any use of armed force by a sovereign ruler, whether this force was applied 
internally to that ruler’s society or externally.  Its opposite was duellum, use of force on private authority 
and thus presumptively for private purposes.  Bellum, in the terms of just war theory, might be just or 
unjust, depending on circumstances; duellum could only be unjust.”  This is markedly different from the 
contemporary understanding of “bellum,” which, according to Johnson, “has certain particular meanings 
which we may wrongly read back into [Aquinas].  In positive international law it refers to a specific 
relationship of conflict between or among states, and more broadly to ‘armed conflict’ that may involve 
nonstate actors within states or across national borders.” Johnson, "Just War, As It Was and Is," 16.  For 
Johnson, this changing interpretation of “bellum” has served to change and morph the just war tradition 
away from its traditional basis.  More on this shift and transformation will be discussed throughout this 
chapter. 
15 Since the jus in bello elements are intended to guide behavior within an armed conflict, they are 
excluded from later parts of this work, which focuses on anticipatory military activities that, by definition, 
take place before (or signal the beginning of) the war. 
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according to just war tradition, unjust.”16  Johnson also argues that there are particular jus ad 
bellum elements that must be adhered to first, before the other elements should even be 
considered.  Specifically, if the use of force is not undertaken by sovereign authority for a just 
cause and with the “right intention,” it cannot be just, regardless if it complies with the other jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello criteria.17   This does not take away from the importance of the jus in 
bello criteria, but rather limits their applicability to an analysis of the justness of a particular 
resort to force, which falls solely within the realm of jus ad bellum. 
It is also important to note that the different elements of the just war tradition are not 
completely independent of each other.  Rather, they should be viewed as component parts of a 
greater whole.  O’Brien argues that viewing the components in this manner is necessary to 
prevent actors from selectively choosing to adhere to certain requirements while ignoring others 
when determining if their action is “just.”  He goes on to state that judgments vis-à-vis the just 
war criteria can be reevaluated and reassessed as a result of additional information and 
experience.18   
Each of the component parts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are briefly discussed below. 
LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 
 One of the primary concerns for Augustine revolved around the idea of who could send 
soldiers to battle.  According to Augustine, “Yet the natural order which seeks the peace of 
mankind, ordains that a monarch should have the power of undertaking war if he thinks it 
advisable, and that the soldiers should perform their military duties in behalf of the peace and 
                                                 
16 James Turner Johnson, "Just Cause Revisited," in Close Calls: Intervention, Terrorism, Missile 
Defense, and 'Just War' Today, Elliott Abrams (ed.) (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 
1998), 3. 
17 See Johnson, "Just War, As It Was and Is," 17-18. 
18 O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War, 35-36. 
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safety of the community.”19 O’Brien argues that in Augustine’s time, “it was important to insist 
that war—in which individuals would be called upon to take human lives—must be waged on 
the order of public authorities for public purposes.”20  According to Johnson,  
Only a person in a position of responsibility for the good of the entire community may 
rightly authorize the use of the sword.  Anyone not in such a position who resorts to the 
sword, for reasons however lofty, is guilty of disturbing the public good.  The only 
exception to this is the use of arms in response to an attack under way or immediately 
offered, but even this allowance disappears when public authority is at hand to combat 
this evil.  So the authority of a sovereign is necessary for a just war, because we are here 
talking about bellum, the only kind of resort to the sword that may be just.  That Aquinas 
puts this requirement first is not accidental but follows from the logic of the concept of 
just war being set out: only uses of force by sovereign authority have the potential to be 
justified; thus this is the primary criterion.21  
 
While this constraint was originally intended to distinguish between (legitimate) public wars and 
(illegitimate) private wars, it has evolved over time as the nature of political actors has changed.  
 In the contemporary just war tradition, the requirement of legitimate authority is 
generally taken to refer to the necessity that war be declared by sovereign states.  This area is 
somewhat complicated, however, with respect to non-state actors, particularly national liberation 
movements, or international organizations, such as the United Nations or the European Union.22  
Can these groups engage in a “just war?”  Additionally, with respect to international 
organizations, do these groups supplant the individual states’ rights to engage in a just war?  In 
                                                 
19 Augustine, The Political Writings of St. Augustine, 163-64. 
20 O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War, 17. 
21 Johnson, "Just War, As It Was and Is," 17. 
22 While these groups have never “gone to war,” there is some debate among scholars as to the 
“legitimacy” of the use of armed troops in peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention missions, which 
some see as akin to “armed intervention.” Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Just War and Humanitarian 
Intervention," in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (Washington, DC: American Society of International 
Law, 2001), 1-12; John Langan, S.J., "Humanitarian Intervention: From Concept to Reality," in Close 
Calls: Intervention, Terrorism, Missile Defense, and 'Just War' Today, Elliott Abrams (ed.) (Washington, 
D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1998); George R. Lucas, Jr., "The Role of the 'International 
Community' in Just War Tradition--Confronting the Challenges of Humanitarian Intervention and 
Preemptive War," Journal of Military Ethics 2, no. 2 (June 2003): 122-44; Tony Pfaff, Peacekeeping and 
the Just War Tradition (Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/index.html. 
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other words, does the legitimate authority for engaging in just war rest with the sovereign state or 
the international organization?   
The answers to these questions are outside the scope of this work.23  Instead, the more 
“traditional” conceptualization of legitimate authority will be applied, namely that the authority 
to engage in a “just war” rests with the recognized governments of independent states.  Thus, 
while states may decide to deploy their own forces under the umbrella of the United Nations or 
other multilateral organizations, the decision to engage those troops, or to deploy them 
independently and unilaterally, rests with the sovereign governments of the individual states.  As 
such, these deployments can still satisfy the requirements of the just war tradition, provided that 
they are carried out in a manner consistent with the other requirements of the tradition. 
JUST CAUSE 
One of the central, and oldest, elements of the just war tradition is that of “just cause.”  
Langan argues that just cause is in fact the first and central requirement of the just war tradition, 
so that without “a just cause, there can be no just war, so this will always be the most 
fundamental requirement.”24 The just cause requirement of the tradition is intended to limit war 
by defining the specific situations that were deemed grave enough to warrant the use of force.   
                                                 
23 The question of legitimate authority, international organizations, and non-state actors is particularly 
relevant with respect to the Bush Doctrine and the “War on Terrorism.”  Additional information on this 
issue can be found in Chapter 9.  For discussions of the changing nature of legitimate authority, see 
Eugene R. Rostow, "Competent Authority Revisited," in Close Calls: Intervention, Terrorism, Missile 
Defense, and 'Just War' Today, Elliott Abrams (ed.) (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 
1998); Gregory D. Foster, "Just War Doctrine in an Age of Hyperpower Politics," The Humanist 64, no. 2 
(March/April 2004): 23-25; Johnson, Can Modern War Be Just?; James Turner Johnson, "Aquinas and 
Luther on War and Peace: Sovereign Authority and the Use of Armed Force," Journal of Religious Ethics 
31, no. 1 (2003): 3-20; Johnson, "Just War, As It Was and Is."; George Weigel, "The Just War Tradition 
and the World After September 11th," Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 5, no. 3 
(Summer 2002): 13-44. 
24 John Langan, "Is There a Just Cause for War Against Iraq," Georgetown Journal of International Law 
4, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2003): 88. 
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Johnson notes that there are at least 4 different elements that are traditionally viewed to 
be components of “just cause.”  These elements are: 1) intervention to protect “innocent 
neighbors” from unprovoked aggression, 2) punishing evil, 3) defense, and 4) wars that are 
viewed as “holy” or based on various ideological foundations such as “war of national 
liberation.”25  Johnson also argues that “defense” is a central element of just cause, stating that 
“defense always constitutes a just cause” and that “[t]his idea is as old as the ages”.26 However, 
consistent with the rest of the just war tradition, what counts as a “just cause” has also changed 
over time.   
Johnson argues that the changes vis-à-vis just cause were a result of the changing nature 
of politics and warfare that occurred in the nineteenth century.  The combination of nationalism 
and mechanized warfare caused many to try to find a way to minimize the occurrence of war, 
which was done by limiting just cause to one element only: self-defense.  The reason for this 
limitation is fairly straightforward: “From the perspective of those who saw war itself as the evil 
to be avoided, the other classically recognized just causes—recovery of something wrongly 
taken and punishment of evil—were too easily made instruments of national self-interest.”27 For 
Johnson, this necessitated a reconceptualization of just cause, such that by the twentieth century, 
the Catholic just-war doctrine had reduced “just cause” to include only defense.28   
This does not mean that just cause as “defense” is limited to the use of force in response 
to an actual armed attack.  Often termed a “presumption against war,” which was first used in the 
1983 pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace, many have interpreted the just war tradition today 
as limiting the legitimate use of force to instances when an armed attack has actually occurred.  
                                                 
25 Johnson, Can Modern War Be Just? 19. 
26 Ibid., 19. (emphasis in original) 
27 Johnson, "Just Cause Revisited," 17. 
28 Ibid., 19. 
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Johnson argues that this “presumption against war” is not an accurate interpretation of the just 
war tradition:  
the modern-war pacifists get it wrong: their contingent judgment [that massive 
destruction is an inherent element of modern warfare] does not describe a permanent 
truth about warfare in the modern age.  The morality of modern war, as of all war, 
depends on the moral choices of those who fight it.  It is not the choice to fight that is 
inherently wrong, as the ‘presumption against war’ argument has it; it is the choice to 
fight for immoral reasons and/or by immoral means.29  
 
This does not imply that leaders are given a carte blanche in terms of justifiable uses of force.   
Rather, from this perspective, it is important to understand that within the just war 
tradition, there are times when uses of force are justified, and that these situations are not 
confined to situations where an actual armed attack has occurred.  In this respect, Holliday notes 
that the 1996 Encyclopedia of War and Ethics states the following about just cause: 
Self-defense is the obvious rationale for going to war.  But the principle of just cause has 
been extended to cover defense of another state against aggression, intervention to protect 
potential victims of massacre, assisting secessionists, and even preemptive strikes against 
potential aggressors.30 
 
Or, in other words, there may be instances when it is permissible to use force in an anticipatory 
manner.    
Others have also discussed what “just cause” means in the contemporary world.  Rengger 
argues that “in the modern context” the idea of just cause “has shrunk to national self-defense 
against armed attack, or perhaps, retaliation for armed attack.”31  Powers notes that according to 
the Catechism of the Catholic Church, just cause is limited to situations where “the damage 
                                                 
29 Johnson, "Just War, As It Was and Is," 19. 
30 Ian Holliday, "When is a Cause Just?" Review of International Studies 28 (2002): 560. 
31 Nicholas Rengger, "On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century," International Affairs 78, 
no. 2 (2002): 359. 
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inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations [is] lasting, grave and certain.”32  
According to Weigel, 
In the classic just war tradition, “just cause” was understood as defense against 
aggression, the recovery of something wrongfully taken, or the punishment of evil.  As 
the tradition has developed since World War II, the latter two notions have been largely 
displaced, and defense against aggression has become the primary, even sole, meaning of 
just cause.  This theological evolution has parallels in international law: the defense 
against aggression concept of just cause shapes Articles 2 and 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations.33  
 
It is not clear, however, if defense “against aggression” limits states only to responsive action 
after an armed attack, or, if it permits anticipatory action.  What is clear is that within the 
modern just war tradition, just cause appears to be limited to situations where the threat is both 
severe and imminent—a constraint that can be seen clearly in modern positive international law, 
particularly in the UN Charter’s articles 2(4) and 51, which set the framework and guidelines for 
the use of force and the parameters of self-defense.34   
 The idea of just cause lies at the heart of the debate about the “justness” of anticipatory 
military activities.  Accordingly, just cause will be discussed in more depth below. 
RIGHT INTENTION 
Kunz notes that “Even the prince who has a just cause of war, can make an unjust war, if 
he acts from wrong motives, such as territorial aggrandizement or elimination of the enemy as a 
competitor in the future.”35  This statement focuses on the “right intention” element of the just 
war tradition, which can be viewed as both an extension of just cause as well as an independent 
                                                 
32 Gerald Powers, Would an Invasion of Iraq Be a "Just War?", Special Report no. 98 (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 4. 
33 Weigel, "Getting ‘Just-War’ Straight & Pre-Emption, Just War and the Defense of World Order," 27. 
34 Claude, "Just Wars," 93. 
35 Josef L. Kunz, "Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale," American Journal of International Law 45, no. 3 
(July 1951): 530. It is interesting to note that Kunz seems to be arguing that preventive war would be 
unjust, in that it does not fulfill the requirement of right intention. 
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moral principle within the just war tradition.  Holmes argues that the right intention requirement 
is as important as the other jus ad bellum elements, since it is “expressly required” since “having 
a just cause and legitimate authority is insufficient” on their own to justify going to war.36 
 In their 1983 pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace, the US Catholic Bishops offered 
this definition of right intention: 
Right intention is related to just cause—war can be legitimately intended only for the 
reasons set forth above as a just cause.  During the conflict, right intention means pursuit 
of peace and reconciliation, including avoiding unnecessarily destructive acts or 
imposing unreasonable conditions (e.g., unconditional surrender).37  
 
According to O’Brien, there are three different elements of right intention.  First, the action in 
question must be limited in scope to only “the pursuit of the avowed just cause.” Next, the 
ultimate goal of any military action or war must be “a just and lasting peace.”  Finally, the rights 
of the enemy must be protected, even in times of conflict.38   
While the above definitions seem straightforward enough, the right intention portion of 
the just war tradition is highly susceptible to the critique that it is overly subjective in nature.  It 
is often nearly impossible to determine the “true” intentions of any state or actor.  Holmes argues 
that it is “subjectivistic, dependent upon inner purity”.39  The problematic nature of the concept 
does not strip if of any utility, but rather exemplifies some of the problems inherent in applying 
the just war tradition in an empirical analysis of state behavior.  
Since the actions investigated in this study, both in the quantitative and case study 
analysis, were taken in the course of an international crisis, and in response to specific threats or 
actions by another action, the requirement of right intention will not be directly relevant.  In 
                                                 
36 Holmes, "Can War Be Morally Justified? The Just War Theory," 200. 
37  US Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter, "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," in 
Just War Theory, ed. Jean Bethke Elshtain (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 100. 
38 O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War, 34. 
39 Holmes, "Can War Be Morally Justified? The Just War Theory," 200-01. 
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other words, since the actions are responsive in nature, it is assumed that they were not taken out 
of aggressive motivations, and therefore comply with the requirements of right intention. 
LAST RESORT 
According to the principle of last resort, recourse to armed force is only “just” if all other 
peaceful means of conflict resolution have been attempted.  Johnson describes the last resort 
criterion in the following manner: 
force must be the last step, not taken until other steps have been tried.  The traditional 
idea that force must be the last resort thus carries with it the counsels of caution and 
prudence and serves as an implicit reminder that force may inspire more force, with the 
danger of loss of rational control over events.  On the other hand, this criterion of last 
resort reminds us that the use of force may be a legitimate resort, when there are no other 
ways left to protect values that require to be preserved.40 
 
Walzer argues that a literal interpretation of last resort is untenable and would effectively outlaw 
all uses of force.  Rather, he argues for a more expansive and flexible interpretation of last resort: 
For we can never reach lastness, or we can never know that we have reached it. There is 
always something more to do: another diplomatic note, another UN resolution, another 
meeting.  Once something like a blockade is in place, it is always possible to wait a little 
longer and hope for the success of (what looks like but isn’t quite) nonviolence.  
Assuming, however, that war was justified in the first instance, at the moment of the 
invasion, then it is justifiable at any subsequent point when its costs and benefits seem on 
balance better than those of the available alternatives. 
 
But sending troops into battle commonly brings with it so many unanticipated costs that it 
has come to represent a moral threshold, one that political leaders must cross with great 
reluctance and trepidation.  This is the truth contained in the “last resort” maxim.  If there 
are potentially effective ways of avoiding actual fighting while still confronting the 
aggressor, they should be tried.41 
 
Roberts notes that this “moral obligation requires an assessment of all means available to meet a 
particular threat—economic, political and military—and, of those deemed sufficient to do so, a 
                                                 
40 Johnson, Can Modern War Be Just? 24. (emphasis in original) 
41 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Second (New 
York: Basic Books, 1992), xiv-xv. (emphasis in original) 
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preference for means other than war.” 42   In this respect, last resort cannot be viewed as an 
absolute point in time, but rather it is dependent upon the particulars of each situation.   
 The concept of last resort plays a central role in the legitimacy of anticipatory military 
activities and will be discussed in more depth below. 
REASONABLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS 
The final jus ad bellum criterion is “reasonable chance of success.”  Fotion and 
Coppieters note that this element is a rather late edition to the just war tradition, being first 
discussed by Grotius.43 
According to this requirement, if there is not a good chance that the use of force would be 
successful in redressing the wrong done and restoring peace, it would therefore inflict more harm 
than good, and therefore, be “unjust.”  In this respect, it is closely related to the jus in bello 
requirement of proportionality.   
According to the US Catholic Bishops’ Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, this element is 
a “difficult criterion to apply, but its purpose is to prevent irrational resort to force or hopeless 
resistance when the outcome of either will clearly be disproportionate or futile.”44  O’Brien notes 
that decisions with respect to proportionality, such as “the probable good to be achieved by 
successful recourse to armed coercion in pursuit of the just cause must outweigh the probably 
evil that the wary will produce” “must be made in the light of realistic estimates of the 
                                                 
42 Brad Roberts, "NBC-Armed Rogues: Is There a Moral Case for Preemption?" in Close Calls: 
Intervention, Terrorism, Missile Defense, and 'Just War' Today, ed. Elliott Abrams (Washington, DC: 
Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1998), 86. (emphasis in original) 
43 Nick Fotion and Bruno Coppieters, "Likelihood of Success," in Moral Constraints on War: Principles 
and Cases, Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion (eds.) (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 79. 
44 US Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter, "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," 
100-01. 
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probability of success.”45  O’Brien also includes an important caveat to the reasonable chance of 
success criterion.  He states that “A war of self-defense may be engaged in irrespective of the 
prospects for success, particularly if there is a great threat to continued existence and to 
fundamental values.”46   
This criterion is also vulnerable to the critique that it is highly subjective in nature.  Who 
is to determine what constitutes “success?”  Who is to determine what constitutes a “reasonable 
chance?”  Who is to determine what is “proportional?” And, finally, who is to determine what 
constitutes legitimate “self-defense?”   
Additionally, this is component particularly troublesome with respect to the anticipatory 
use of military force, when the true nature of the threat is unknown.  The specifics of this 
criterion and anticipatory self-defense are discussed in more depth below. 
The next two elements, proportionality and discrimination, are part of jus in bello.  Since 
these requirements deal with conduct during the actual war (which is outside the scope of this 
work), they are discussed only briefly. 
PROPORTIONALITY 
 Proportionality is also a criterion for jus in bello.  Within the jus in bello framework, 
proportionality concerns the levels of force that are permitted within the actual war context.  For 
Van Damme and Fotion, proportionality in jus in bello “refers to the total calculus of the balance 
of goods and evils associated with a particular operation or action in the course of a war.”47  
O’Brien argues that “the principle of proportion deals with military means at two levels: (1) 
                                                 
45 O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War, 28. 
46 Ibid., 31. 
47 Guy Van Damme and Nick Fotion, "Proportionality," in Moral Constraints on War: Principles and 
Cases, Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion (eds.) (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 129. 
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tactically, as proportionate to a legitimate military end, raison de guerre; and (2) strategically, as 
proportionate to the just-cause ends of the war, raison d’état.”48  
DISCRIMINATION 
 In the jus in bello framework, discrimination refers to distinguishing between combatants 
and non-combatants during the conduct of war.  Much like the other elements of the just war 
tradition, there are multiple different interpretations of this criterion.  For this discussion, 
however, it is sufficient to note that the just war tradition “prohibits direct intentional attacks on 
noncombatants and nonmilitary targets.”49 
Anticipatory Military Activities and the Just War Tradition 
Many of the early thinkers argued that force could, in fact, be used in a proactive, or 
anticipatory manner while still being considered just.  However, although Grotius, Vattel, and 
Vitoria seemed to advocate a permissive position vis-à-vis the justice of anticipatory military 
activities, the legitimate use of such actions was tied to the notion of self-defense, which is 
linked to an actual threat.50  Force could only be used to forestall what was seen as an imminent 
attack.  Johnson summarizes these positions as arguing that in order “to employ preemptive self-
defense one must be absolutely certain that the enemy intends to attack.”51  But, Johnson also 
argues that “the moment of last resort may come before the enemy fires its first shot across one’s 
                                                 
48 O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War, 42. 
49 Ibid., 42. 
50 Johnson, "Just Cause Revisited.”; Gregory M. Reichberg, "Preemptive War: What Would Aquinas 
Say?" Commonweal 131, no. 2 (January 30 2004): 9-10.  Again, it is important to stress the inherent 
complications inherent in the idea of “actual threat.”  Who determines what is a threat?  Where is the line 
between perception and reality?  For the purposes of this work, threats will be determined based on a) the 
coding of the dataset and b) the statements of the actors during the specific crises.  The purpose of this 
work is not to determine if the threats were real, or merely imagined, but rather how the actors dealt with 
elements that have been coded as “threats” or were perceived as such. 
51 Johnson, "Just Cause Revisited," 14. 
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borders.” 52  In other words, the use of force in an anticipatory manner can be congruent with the 
requirements of the just war tradition. 
According to Osgood, 
The principles of just war, quite reasonably, proscribe the resort to war for ends other 
than self-defense.  But the concept of national self-defense is plausibly stretched to cover 
an almost limitless range of actions encompassed in the expansive rubric of national 
security.  On the other hand, the stricter construction of self-defense to proscribe 
“aggression”—a concept that has proved impossible to define authoritatively—excludes 
the first use of force under a range of circumstances that, arguably, render the first use of 
force morally acceptable or even compelling—as, for example, in Israel's preemptive 
strike against Egypt in 1967 or America’s blockade against the Soviets in the Cuban 
missile crisis of 1962.53  
 
Osgood goes on to argue that while the “presumption against the first use remains valid,” it 
“should not rule out anticipatory self-defense in exceptional and scrupulously circumscribed 
circumstances, as when it is clear that there is no other way to protect the state from external 
armed attack or intimidation.”54  
Support for this position can also be found in the writings of other contemporary just war 
scholars.  According to Crawford, 
one may also, in cases of a credible threat of imminent attack, act preemptively to prevent 
such a threat from being realized.  On the other hand, preventive war, waged to defeat a 
potential adversary before its military power can grow to rival your own, is not just.55 
 
For Crawford, preemption can be “morally justified” provided that four conditions are met. First, 
the action must conform to a “narrow conception of the ‘self,’” i.e., “When our lives are 
threatened we must be able to defend ourselves, using force if necessary” but “war itself—and 
certainly preemption—is not justified to protect imperial interests or assets taken in a war of 
                                                 
52 Johnson, Can Modern War Be Just? 25. (emphasis added) 
53 Robert E. Osgood, "Force in International Relations: The Moral Issues," in Ethics and International 
Relations, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson, vol. 2, Ethics in Foreign Policy (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Books, 1985). 
54 Osgood, "Force in International Relations: The Moral Issues." 
55 Neta C. Crawford, "Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War," Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 
(March 2003): 7. 
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aggression.” Next, the threat must be imminent and immediate, which only includes threats 
“which can be made manifest within hours or weeks unless action is taken to thwart an attack.”  
In this respect, “capability alone is not a justification.”  The third criteria revolves around the 
likelihood of success.  For preemption to be morally justified, “there should be a high likelihood 
that the source of the military threat can be found and that the damage it was about to do could 
be greatly reduced or eliminated by preemptive attack.”  Finally, the idea of last resort is also 
important.  In this respect, “there must be no time for other measures to work, or those other 
measures must be unlikely to avert a devastating attack, the preparations for which are already 
underway.”56  In other words, the just war concepts of just cause, reasonable chance of success, 
and last resort must all be considered when determining if anticipatory military activities are 
“morally justified.” 
Walzer also argues that anticipatory military activities are permitted when there is 
“sufficient threat,” which he describes as consisting of three things: “a manifest intent to injure, a 
degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in 
which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk.”57  Schroeder 
echoes this sentiment, stating that: 
To justify a resort to preemptive war, a state needs to give reasonable evidence that the 
step was necessary, forced upon the initiator by its opponents, and also that it represented 
a lesser evil, i.e., that the dangers and evils averted by war outweighed those caused the 
international community by initiating it.  This requires showing that the threat to be 
preempted is (a) clear and imminent, such that prompt action is required to meet it; (b) 
direct, that is, threatening the party initiating the conflict in specific concrete ways, thus 
entitling that party to act preemptively; (c) critical, in the sense that the vital interests of 
                                                 
56 Neta C. Crawford, "The Best Defense: The Problem with Bush's "Preemptive" War Doctrine,". Boston 
Review 28, no. 1 February/March 2003, September 5, 2004 
<www.bostonreview.net/BR28.1/crawford.html>. 
57 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 81. 
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the initiating party face unacceptable harm and danger; and (d) unmanageable, that is, not 
capable of being deterred or dealt with by other peaceful means.58 
 
Again, this reiterates the centrality of the ideas of just cause, reasonable chance of success, and 
last resort. 
Roberts argues that, with respect to the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons, there can be a “moral case for preemption,” provided that certain criteria are met.59  He 
also argues that many of the traditional just war criteria should be evaluated somewhat 
differently with respect to the threat from nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.  These new 
technologies necessarily alter the calculus with respect to just cause, last resort, proportionality, 
and reasonable chance for success.  For example, with respect to last resort, Roberts argues that 
“Particularly when rogue regimes and weapons of mass destruction are part of the threat 
calculus, the last-resort criterion should probably be subject to a quite narrow interpretation” 
since they can be developed quickly and “when arsenals already exist, deferring a preemptive 
strike may induce an aggressor to dispense his weapons and give him the time to do so, greatly 
reducing the likelihood that preemption will eliminate them.”60  These criteria, however, still 
must be met in order for any act of preemption to be “just.”   
Langan echoes this idea that modern technology necessitates a revision of just war 
criteria, particularly last resort.  He argues that, 
A requirement that we must wait until an attack has actually begun seems unrealistic at a 
time when missiles can deliver destructive payloads within minutes and when terrorists 
can launch lethal surprise attacks.  Some have claimed that the mere possession of 
weapons of mass destruction by a rogue state or by a terrorist group constitutes an 
intolerable threat to the security of the United States and its allies.  It is clear that the 
acquisition and possession of such weapons indicates the presence of anxiety and 
hostility, and it is reasonable for a state that thinks itself to be the likely target of such 
                                                 
58 Paul W. Schroeder, "Iraq: The Case Against Preemptive War,". The American Conservative October 21 
2002, April 29, 2003 <http://www.amconmag.com/10_21/iraq.html>. 
59 Roberts, "NBC-Armed Rogues: Is There a Moral Case for Preemption?" 106. 
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weapons to take measures to defend itself.  Indeed, if the danger is grave and imminent, 
then the state may well be justified in attacking first.61 
 
Again, the notion of an imminent threat is a central requirement for any “just” use of force. 
Others take a more expansive view of what types of anticipatory military activities are 
“just.”  Tucker, for example, argues that even preventive war can be justified since “the 
‘anticipatory’ use of force remains as an integral feature of the right of self-defense the 
legitimacy of preventive war is preserved.”62  Weigel echoes this sentiment, arguing that “[a]t the 
level of moral principle, however, there may be instances when it is not only right to ‘go first,’ 
but ‘going first’ may be morally obligatory.”63    This position, however, is supported by a small 
minority of scholars. 
At the same time, however, there are some that express concern about including 
anticipatory activities within the framework of the just war tradition.  For Hoffmann, 
“anticipatory self-defense—preemptive war—can be even more a source of serving-claims than 
self-defense against an armed attack in progress.”  He goes on to argue that this highlights one of 
the “central difficulties of jus ad bellum: each state’s resort to self-interpretation, and the 
political uncertainties of assessment.”64  Foster echoes this, stating that the “established just war 
precepts, rather than being clear guides to action (or inaction), can be vague, malleable, and 
                                                 
61 Langan, "Is There a Just Cause for War Against Iraq," 89. 
62 Robert W. Tucker, The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1960), 121. 
63 George Weigel, "Just War and Pre-Emption: Three Questions," The Catholic Difference October 2 
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64 Stanley Hoffmann, "States and the Morality of War," Political Theory 9, no. 2 (May 1981): 153. 
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subject to self-serving manipulation by governments seeking both legitimacy and exculpation for 
their martial sins.”65 
It is interesting to note that the development and evolution of both international law and 
the just war tradition present specific parallels.  For example, in both customary international law 
and the classical just war tradition (both which are “early” manifestations), anticipatory actions 
taken in self-defense, but not in response to an actual armed attack are permissible.  At the same 
time, many interpretations of international treaty law and the contemporary just war tradition 
(both of which are “later” manifestations) limit the legitimate/just use of force to situations 
where an armed attack has already occurred.  While these interpretations that limit the use of 
force to responsive self-defense are not unanimous, it is telling that these interpretations are 
present in scholarship focusing on both modern treaty law and the just war tradition. 
 As with international law, there seems to be a clear division between what types of 
anticipatory military activities are permissible and what types are not.  The imminence 
requirement once again proves to be the most salient in terms of distinguishing legitimate from 
illegitimate anticipatory military activities.  In a similar vein to that found in international law, 
anticipatory military activities designed to counter an imminent threat are permitted.  All others, 
whether designed to counter a distant or merely potential threat, are not considered legitimate. 
There is also debate about the extent to which the requirements inherent in the just war 
tradition can, and do, influence state behavior.  Elshtain states that “Just war insists on the power 
of moral appeals and arguments of the sort that, for the strategic realist, is mere window 
dressing, icing on the cake of strategic considerations.”66   Roberts argues that statesmen are 
influenced by the just war tradition, stating that the “memoirs of public officials along with 
                                                 
65 Foster, "Just War Doctrine in an Age of Hyperpower Politics," 23. 
66 Elshtain, "Just War and Humanitarian Intervention," 3. 
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public statements of the moment reveal a good deal of concern and often debate about whether 
particular military actions will be just, and will be perceived as just by the American public and 
the international community.”67  Walzer notes that the just war tradition “now provides the 
crucial framework, the vocabulary and the conceptual scheme, with which we commonly argue 
about war.”68  He also argues that “moral theory has been incorporated into war-making as a real 
constraint on when and how wars are fought.”69 
Oppenheim, on the other hand, argues that states should not be constrained on the basis 
of “moral principles.”  He argues that it would be “pointless to urge governments on moral 
grounds to disregard the national interest for the sake of other goals”70 and “if a specific foreign 
policy is clearly the best or the only way of protecting national security, adopting it is not 
chracterizable as morally right or wrong.”71  According to Schlesinger,  
If in the management of foreign affairs, decisions can be made and questions disposed of 
on other grounds, so much the better.  Moral values in international politics—or so, at 
least, my temperament enjoins me to believe—should be decisive only in questions of 
last resort.  One must add that questions of last resort do exist.72  
 
He goes on to add, 
It is not only that moral principles are of limited use in the conduct of foreign affairs.  It 
is also that the compulsion to see foreign policy in moral terms may have, with the 
noblest of intentions, the most ghastly of consequences.  The moralization of foreign 
affairs encourages, for example, a misunderstanding of the nature of foreign policy.  
Moralists tend to prefer symbolic to substantive politics.  They tend to see foreign policy 
as a means, not of influencing events, but of registering virtuous attitudes.73  
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For Schlesinger, the “national interest” serves as a better determinant of foreign policy.  This is 
not to say that there is no room for “morals” in foreign policy, but rather that they should be a 
component part of the national interest, “but they should not supersede it.”74  
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 seek to determine if the just war tradition does impact states’ 
decisions vis-à-vis the use of anticipatory military activities.  Specifically, chapter 6 uses 
quantitative data analysis to determine if just war requirements have an impact on how states 
respond to international crises.  Chapters 7 and 8 will examine the histories of particular cases to 
determine if the statesmen making the decisions used the just war tradition, or the ideas 
contained within it, when making their decisions about how to respond to particular international 
crises.  Chapter 7 looks at how leaders responded to crises triggered by “imminent” threats, 
while Chapter 8 examines cases where the crises were triggered by threats that were classified to 
be of a more distant nature. 
For the purposes of this work, emphasis will be placed on the ideas of just cause, last 
resort, and reasonable chance of success.  The reasons for this are twofold.  The first is primarily 
instrumental and related to the data available.  Since the data available only includes actions 
taken by recognized, sovereign states, it is assumed that they conform to the requirement of 
legitimate authority.75  Additionally, since the data consists of responses to crises, it is assumed 
that the actions in question were not of a purely aggressive nature, but rather in response to an 
aggressive act by another state, which would conform to the requirements of right intention.   
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75 This assumption is also based on the idea that legitimate authority rests with the sovereign state and not 
with an international organization such as the United Nations. 
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CHAPTER 6: STRATEGIC NECESSITY, LAW, AND NORMS I  
QUANTITATIVE DATA TESTING 
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, there are a variety of different approaches and 
explanations for the use, or non-use, of anticipatory military activities (AMAs).  The 
international security literature suggests that anticipatory military activities are likely in response 
to numerous situations, such as shifting balances of power, weapons proliferation, and in 
response to the imminent threat of an armed attack.1  According to this literature, the decision to 
utilize and employ AMAs is determined purely by the strategic situation, which is independent 
of either the constraints or requirements of both international law or the just war tradition.  At the 
same time, however, the literatures from international law and the just war tradition provide 
numerous legal and normative constraints and limitations on the legitimate use of these 
anticipatory military actions.  The primary goal of this chapter is to investigate if these legal and 
normative elements do in fact constrain states against the use of anticipatory military activities.  
In other words, are the security related elements or the legal and normative elements more 
influential? 
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Anticipatory military activities can be divided along two distinct parameters.  The first 
concerns the type of action taken.2  Did the AMA include the actual use of force, or, did the 
action fall short of the “force” threshold?  Both types are important and will be investigated.  An 
example of the first type of response, which included the use of force, is the Israeli attack on 
Egypt in 1967.  In this study, these types of actions are coded as anticipatory military activities 
that included the use of force, or AMF.  The US decision to impose a naval quarantine in Cuba in 
response to the deployment of Soviet missiles on the island is an example of an AMA that did 
not include the use of force.  These types of activities are coded as anticipatory military activities 
that did not include the use of force, or ANTNVIOL.  The statistical analysis also includes a 
third variable that is a composite of both types of activities.  This variable is called anticipatory 
military activities, or AMA.3  In this respect, a “positive outcome” for the AMA variable 
indicates some form of anticipatory action was taken. 
The second parameter concerns the type of threat the precipitated the action (i.e., caused 
the actor to engage in an AMA).  There are two types of threats that are of primary interest in 
this study.  The first is the threat of an imminent attack.  In these cases, the anticipator acts due to 
the fact that it perceives that an attack is imminent.  This is the type of action that is usually 
referred to as being “preemptive.”  The second type of threat is more distant in nature, such as 
the development/deployment of a new technology that could be used against the anticipator at 
some point in time in the future.  These activities are usually described as being “preventive.”   
As discussed in Chapter 2, the use of the terms preemptive/preventive are problematic for 
a variety of reasons.  This does not mean that the inherent differences in the underlying concepts 
are unimportant.  Rather, it necessitates the use of different terminology to describe these 
                                                 
2 This parameter serves as the dependent variable(s) for this study. 
3 The operationalizations of these concepts are discussed in more depth below.  Full information on all 
operationalizations can be found in Appendix B. 
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actions.  With this in mind, this study will examine the use of AMAs with respect to two 
different types of threats, or triggers, that initiated the crisis within which the AMA was used or 
considered as a policy option.   
One of the unique elements of the International Crisis Behavior Project’s dataset is that it 
includes information on “crisis triggers.”4  According to the ICB Codebook,  
The trigger or precipitating cause of a foreign policy crisis refers to the specific act, event 
or situational change which leads decision-makers to perceive a threat to basic values, 
time pressure for response and heightened probability of involvement in military 
hostilities.  A trigger may be initiated by: an adversary state; a non-state actor; or a group 
of states (military alliance).  It may be an environmental change; or it may be internally 
generated.5 
 
There are two distinct triggers that are particularly relevant in this context, and that clearly 
distinguish between the traditional preemptive/preventive divide.   
The first type of trigger is that of a “non-violent military act,” which includes a: “show of 
force, war game or maneuvers, mobilization, movement of forces, [or] change of force posture to 
offensive.”  These activities, rather than presenting a more distant threat, can be viewed as 
creating a more imminent threat of attack and war.  In this respect, anticipatory military activities 
taken in response to a “non-violent military act” can be viewed as being “preemptive.” 
                                                 
4 The ICB dataset was chosen as the primary dataset for this project due to its unique character.  By 
coding for the “triggering events” that precipitated a crisis, rather than focusing on the first use of force, 
as is the case in the more standard datasets such as the Correlates of War (COW) or the Militarized 
Interstate Dispute (MID) datasets.  While this creates an excellent opportunity to investigate when states 
use anticipatory military activities (i.e., first use of force or potential for use of force), it does create some 
substantial difficulties with respect to the integration of variables from other datasets and sources.  These 
limitations, however, are outweighed by the unique ability afforded by the dataset to test hypotheses 
about the use of anticipatory military activities.  The constraints and limitations of the data will be 
discussed in more length throughout the remainder of this chapter.  The ICB project website gives case 
descriptions, including historical background, which will be used to determine which crises were actual or 
potential instances of anticipatory military activity.  This information is available at: 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/.  It is important to note that only crises that were triggered by external 
entities and that were not part of an intra-war crisis were included in this analysis.    
5 Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Online, 2003 
<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/>. 
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The second type of trigger is referred to as an “external change,” which is described as 
an: “intelligence report, change in specific weapon, weapon system, offensive capability, change 
in global system or regional subsystem, [or] challenge to legitimacy by international 
organization.”  The activities included within this trigger represent more distant, or even merely 
potential, threats.  In this respect, anticipatory military activities taken to counter this type of 
trigger could be described as being “preventive” in nature. 
These two distinct triggers can also be distinguished in another manner.  Actions 
designed to counter the “non-violent military act” trigger can also be termed  “conventional 
uses,” and can be viewed as activities intended to counter a conventional military threat.  As 
discussed above, these activities are usually employed to respond to an imminent threat.  
Examples of such uses include the Israeli attack on the Egyptian army in June 1967 and the 
British strike on American forces in 1837, known as the Caroline incident.6   
The second type of threat deals with the problems of proliferation or actions that could 
signal the development of more distant threats by other states.  While these activities are often 
designed to function as a “counterproliferation tool,” they could also be in response to other 
operational military changes by an adversary, as indicated by the trigger label of “external 
change.”  In this respect, these activities are designed to counter more distant threats.  Examples 
of this type include the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and possible attacks by 
the United States on Chinese nuclear facilities in 1960-647 and North Korea in 1993-94.8     
                                                 
6 These actions are usually referred to as “preemptive war.”  Van Evera argues that there are three distinct 
types of preemptive war: generic preemptive war, accidental war, and reciprocal fear of surprise attack.  
Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, 42-44. Since each of these categories all 
concern conventional military threats, they are all included in this first group of activities. 
7 William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United 
States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64," International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/01): 54-
99; Lyle J. Goldstein, "When China Was a 'Rogue State': The Impact of China's Nuclear Weapons 
Program on US-China Relations During the 1960s," Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 37 
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 As discussed in the previous chapters, activities designed to counter an imminent military 
threat are more conducive to justification vis-à-vis both the just war tradition and international 
law.  Brown notes that the “right to preempt” is in fact “an extension of the right of self-
defense,” but only if “it is indisputably the case that there is an imminent threat of unprovoked 
aggression.”9  Preparations for launching an attack, such as troop mobilizations, are highly 
visible and thus it is easier to demonstrate that the adversary was preparing for an imminent 
attack.   
The second type of activities presents a more complicated situation.  With respect to 
anticipatory activities designed for counterproliferation or in response to another type of 
“external change,” it is harder to a) prove that the new technology, reactor, or 
chemical/biological weapons factories are solely for military purposes, b) show that these 
weapons will be used against the preemptor/preventor as soon as they are deployable, and c) 
show that the preemptor/preventor is the intended target of these weapons.  Lacking affirmative 
confirmation of the above criteria, acting in an anticipatory manner against such targets is not 
congruent with the standards imposed by international law or the just war tradition. 
 Aside from the difficulties addressed above, there are at least two additional elements that 
influence the possibility of such activities being undertaken.  The first element is where the 
weapons program stands in terms of its development.  In other words, if the new technology is 
                                                                                                                                                             
(November 2003): 739-64; Robert S. Litwak, "The New Calculus of Pre-Emption," Survival 44, no. 4 
(Winter 2002-03): 53-80. 
8 Bruce Cumings, "Bush's Bomb,". Nation 276, no. 19 March 19 2003: 4-5, Academic Search Premier, 
October 27, 2003; Bruce Cumings, "North Korea: The Sequel," Current History 102, no. 663 (April 
2003): 147-51; Litwak, "The New Calculus of Pre-Emption," 64; James J. Przystup, Anticipating 
Strategic Surprise on the Korean Peninsula, Strategic Forum no. 190 (Washington, DC: Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002), 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF190/sf190.pdf; Jonathan Schell, "A Nuclear Education,". Nation 
276, no. 20 May 26 2003: Letter From Ground Zero, 7, Academic Search Premier, October 27, 2003. 
9 Chris Brown, "Self-Defense in an Imperfect World," Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 2-
8. 
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already deployed, the reactor has already been turned on, or if viable chemical/biological agents 
have already been produced, military activity against the production facilities is unlikely.  The 
reason for this is straightforward: at this stage in WMD development, destruction of the facilities 
would be as bad as an attack using the weapons.  To be sure, the damage would be inflicted upon 
the developing state, but it would be harder to justify any activities that would have such 
catastrophic consequences.  Additionally, the preemptor/preventor would also have to consider 
the likelihood of a reprisal using these WMD by the target state. 
 The second element that plays a role in determining the use or non-use of anticipatory 
military activities for counterproliferation focuses on the previous interactions of the states 
involved.  In this respect, these activities are more likely to be used in instances where there have 
been previous deterrence failures.  Conventional deterrence is a much easier strategy to pursue, 
and it is assumed that it will remain the preferred method of counter-proliferation.  If, however, 
there is a prior relationship between the would-be preemptor/preventor and the target state where 
deterrence failed, it is unlikely that the preemptor/preventor would attempt the same strategy 
again.  Rather, it would search for alternatives, hence the use of anticipatory military activities. 
 Although international law is unclear about the legitimacy of anticipatory activities, there 
is a clear demarcation between what activities can be considered acceptable and those that are 
not.  First, it is generally accepted that states should defer to the United Nations Security Council 
to deal with threats.  States are able to undertake unilateral (or multilateral, but outside of the 
UN) responses to threats only after the UN has been consulted, but failed to act.  In this respect, 
it is essential to determine if the states in question attempted to work through the UN, or 
bypassed it in favor or unilateral action.  This requirement dovetails with the just war 
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requirement of “last resort” that requires all other remedies for solving the crisis be implemented 
before military actions are taken.   
 Additionally, if states are signatories to various treaties and conventions that explicitly 
call for the peaceful resolution of crises, it can be, at least partially, inferred that these states are 
at least partially amenable to the use of international law to resolve crises.  In this respect, it is 
posited that states that belong to more of these organizations would be more likely to try and 
resolve the crisis through the channels and framework of one or more of such organizations 
rather than taking anticipatory military action.  While this does not necessarily correlate with the 
state feeling bound or constrained by international law, it can indicate that the state is somewhat 
committed to the role of international law in the regulation of relations between states.   
The use of anticipatory military activities, but not of anticipatory military force, could 
also indicate that the actor was sensitive to the limitations on the use of force contained in both 
international law and the just war tradition.  For example, a deployment could begin while 
negotiations are underway.  If the negotiations failed, the state would be in a position to still use 
anticipatory military force, while still adhering to the requirements of last resort.  Additionally, 
the state could deploy while the Security Council deliberated on the issue.  If the Security 
Council failed to act, the state could use anticipatory military force in accordance with 
international law, since the use of force in self-defense is permitted when the Security Council 
fails to act.   
Finally, leaders who are more risk-averse are less likely to use AMAs when the 
legitimacy or legality of such actions are in question.  Such actions could inflict substantial costs 
on the anticipator, costs that a risk-averse actor may be unwilling to accept.  If the AMA is 
designed to counter an imminent threat, which could be viewed as “legitimate,” or if the threat is 
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severe enough, the benefits of taking such action would outweigh the potential costs.  For actors 
who are more risk-acceptant, the constraints against taking anticipatory military action to counter 
a non-imminent threat should not be as influential. 
 There is a clear distinction between imminent and more distant threats in both the 
international law and just war literature.  Although there is no clear demarcation between a threat 
that is “imminent” and one that is “not imminent,” the distinction is essential with respect to both 
legal and normative justification for the activities in question.  For the purposes of this study, the 
“imminence” of the threat was determined by the type of action that triggered the crisis, as coded 
in the ICB data.     
 According to much of the international security literature, however, states are likely to 
take action based on the strategic situation that they are confronted with—not on the basis of the 
legal and normative acceptability of the action in question.  In this respect, if the state is faced 
with a threat that is best dealt with through the use of an anticipatory military activity, it will act 
accordingly.   
 The following hypotheses will be tested below. 
H1: States are likely to engage in anticipatory military activities to counter military 
threats, controlling for the legal and normative constraints.  
 
H2: States are likely to engage in anticipatory military activities in response to the 
development/acquisition of new military technologies by adversaries, controlling 
for the legal and normative constraints.  
 
H3: States are likely to engage in anticipatory military activities to counter threats that 
are perceived be imminent, controlling for the legal and normative constraints  
 
H4: States are likely to engage in anticipatory military activities during crises that are 
part of protracted conflicts, controlling for the legal and normative constraints.  
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H5: States are unlikely to use anticipatory military activities against states that have an 
operational nuclear program; they are more likely to use anticipatory military 
activities against states that have a newly established, but not yet operational, 
nuclear program. 
 
 
H6: States that are members of multiple treaties and organizations that call for the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts will use anticipatory military activities to counter 
imminent threats only and will not use anticipatory military activities to counter 
other types of threats.   
 
H7: The gravity of the threat involved will serve as an intervening variable that could 
mitigate the influence of international law.  If a state is faced with a threat to its 
existence, it may act in a manner that is not consistent with international law, i.e., 
use anticipatory military activities to deal with threats that may not pass the 
“imminence test.” 
 
H8: The relative power of the state can also mitigate the influence of international law.  
Powerful states may act in a manner inconsistent with international law because 
they do not fear the potential sanctions that may be imposed.   
 
H9: Democracies are more likely to be constrained by international law and the just 
war tradition, since they must rationalize their policies to their populations, 
therefore these states are less likely to use anticipatory military activities that may 
be either in violation of international law or contrary to the requirements of the just 
war tradition. 
 
H10: Leaders who are more risk-averse will be less likely to engage in anticipatory 
military activities, while those that are more risk-acceptant are more likely to 
engage in such activities. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 The impact of international law and the just war tradition on the use of anticipatory 
military activities will be quantitatively tested using logistic regression.10  Specifically, this 
chapter will seek to determine if the use or non-use of anticipatory military activities was 
determined primarily through the international security concepts, as Reiter suggests, or if other 
elements such as the just war tradition and international law were also influential.       
                                                 
10 Logit will be used since the dependent variable is dichotomous. 
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Occurrences of anticipatory military attacks have not been coded in any data set.  Reiter 
uses data from the Correlates of War project to determine which wars were preemptive in nature.  
This coding is based on an analysis of the motivations for war (which is not coded in the data 
set).  According to Reiter, “A war is preemptive if a primary motivation for the attack is that the 
attacker thinks that the target is likely to strike first within 60 days.”11  This process is 
problematic in that it is unclear how it was determined that the target was “likely to strike first.”   
Ideally, there would be data available that not only identified anticipatory activities but 
also discussed the events that lead up to the anticipatory activity.  While preemption and 
prevention are not expressly measured in the international relations quantitative datasets, the 
International Crisis Behavior Project12 does measure international crises, including the specific 
triggers that started the crisis.     
Rather than measuring the actual dyadic conflict, this dataset focuses on the action that 
triggered the crisis, as opposed to focusing on the initiation of armed conflict.  Nine different 
triggers are identified, ranging from a verbal act to a violent act.13  The “trigger” variable in the 
dataset was originally coded as a categorical variable.14  In order for it to be included in a logit 
analysis, this variable was recoded in two different manners.  The first recode transformed the 
original variable into a simple dichotomous variable according to whether or not the threat was 
military in nature.  The second transformation created multiple dichotomous variables for each of 
the triggers.  For the purposes of this work, two triggers are of particular interest: “external 
change” and “non-violent military.”  Three discrete models will be created for these different 
triggers, operationalized as MILTHRT (all military threats), EXTCHANG (external change 
                                                 
11 Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International 
Security 20, no. 2 (Autumn 1995): 13. 
12 Brecher and Wilkenfeld, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Information about all variables and recodes can be found in Appendix B. 
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trigger), and NONVMIL (non-violent military trigger).  The EXTCHANG triggers represent 
distant (i.e., “non-imminent” threats) while the NONVMIL triggers represent imminent threats. 
The dependent variable under investigation is the use of an anticipatory military activity, 
which is operationalized through the threatened state’s response to the action that triggered the 
crisis.  In the actor-level ICB data set, these responses are coded by type of activity, ranging from 
no activity to violent military acts.  While the dataset does not directly code for anticipatory 
military activities or anticipatory uses of force, it does provide detailed case summaries 
describing the various actions undertaken by the crisis actors.  These summaries were analyzed 
to determine if the response was anticipatory in nature.15  Three variables were created, AMF for 
responses that were examples of anticipatory uses of force (such as a military attack), 
ANTNVIOL for responses that were examples of anticipatory military activities that did not 
include the use of force (such deployments), and AMA that combined both types of activities.  In 
this respect, a “positive outcome” for the AMA variable indicates some form of anticipatory 
action was taken. 
Quantitative testing of the impact of international law is hampered by the lack of 
available data.  Ideally, there would be data that measured states’ compliance with international 
law.  However, such a “compliance” measure does not currently exist.  Accordingly, it is not 
possible to directly test the hypothesis that states that tend to follow international law do not use 
anticipatory military activities.  This does not mean that all the elements of international law 
must be excluded from the quantitative analysis, however.   The primary data used with respect 
to the role of international law is the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) “Multilateral Treaties of 
                                                 
15 In order to ensure inter-coder reliability, the creation of new variables within the dataset has been 
reviewed by an additional coder, following the same coding rules. 
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Pacific Settlement” dataset.16  This dataset codes for the entry and exit of states into both 
regional and global treaties that include elements in their charters that call for the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts. A measure that codes for the number of these agreements to which the 
state is a member is included in the models. 
Measurement of the elements in the just war tradition is also problematic and severely 
constrained.  The impact of the just war tradition is measured primarily through the concepts of 
just cause, last resort and reasonable chance for success.  As discussed in Chapter 5, there is 
significant overlap between the concepts of just cause and self-defense.  In fact, numerous 
scholars have argued that self-defense is the fundamental “just cause.”  In this respect, the 
measures that are used to test the hypotheses relating to self-defense also capture much of the 
essence of the just cause concept.     
The variable used to test for “last resort” is also somewhat problematic.  Ideally, this 
variable would be constructed on the basis of a full time-line of the crisis, which would detail 
every action taken by the parties to the crisis.  Given the size of the dataset, such an investigation 
was not feasible for this project.  Rather, the case descriptions provided in the ICB dataset were 
used to determine if the action taken was consistent with the requirements of last resort, such as 
bringing the conflict to the UN or using other non-violent conflict resolution techniques before 
military actions were employed.  
Finally, the reasonable chance for success element of the just war tradition is 
operationalized by measures of state power.  The logic behind using these measures is that the 
stronger the anticipator is, with respect to both the target and in a more general sense, the greater 
likelihood that the anticipatory action will be successful.  The primary measure used focuses on 
                                                 
16 ICOW data are available at: http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/icow.html#mtops 
 148
the power discrepancy between the anticipator and the target state.  An additional measure was 
included in the reduced model that captured the trend in capabilities of the anticipator.17  
Before moving on to the hypothesis testing, it is important to take note of the significant 
limitations and constraints of the data employed.  Due to the unique nature of the primary 
dataset, the integration of data from other sources was limited and severely constrained.  
Specifically, the ICB dataset codes for actions taken not only by states, but also non-state actors 
as well as groups of states acting together.  Accordingly, when data from other sources, which 
deal with the actions of single states only, was integrated into the ICB data, those crises that were 
triggered by either non-state actors or by multiple states become lost to the realm of “missing 
data.”  Additionally, other sources of data, such as the measurement of risk propensity of leaders, 
also cause significant reduction of the number of cases in the dataset when integrated.  This 
reduction was severe, with approximately 40% of the cases suffering from this problem when 
new data were added.18  However, the richness of the data provided in the ICB dataset outweighs 
the limitations vis-à-vis the integration of additional data.  As will be discussed in more depth 
below, two different groups of statistical models were created, one using primarily the ICB data 
and another, albeit significantly reduced, with additional data added.   
Numerous sources were explored for usable data.  For example, the Yearbook of 
International Organizations was consulted to determine if there was a source of a “compliance” 
measure with respect to international law.  Additionally, various think-tanks and academic 
                                                 
17 Due to the difficulties in integrating this measure into the larger dataset discussed below, the 
capabilities variable was not included in the primary analysis.  Full results of the models including the 
capability measure are included in Tables A2.1-A2.3. 
18 Statistical models were constructed using these models. The results of these models are presented in 
Tables A1.1-A1.3 
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centers were researched to determine if they had relevant data.19  With respect to international 
law, the ICOW measure discussed provided the best alternative to a compliance-based measure 
for international law.  Since the dependent variables are actions taken by states in response to 
crises, the limitations concerning non-state or multiple state triggering entities did not affect the 
usability of the ICOW data.  In other words, with respect to the ICOW data, all of the original 
cases were retained.  To be sure, the data complications and limitations have presented 
significant constraints on the quantitative analysis contained in this chapter.    
Hypothesis Testing 
 In order to test the above hypotheses, several different logit models were constructed.  
Three different dependent variables were tested, one where anticipatory military force was 
used,20 one where anticipatory military activities short of the actual use of force were employed, 
and one that includes both types of anticipatory military activities.  Additionally, the effects of 
three different types of triggers were estimated: triggers that were of a military nature,21 triggers 
                                                 
19 Sources consulted include: American Society of International Law, Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management, Correlates of War Project, EUGene, Peace Research Institute of 
Oslo, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Interuniversity Consortium for Political and 
Social Research, United Nations, and the Uppsala Conflict Data Project.  Additionally, the data 
compilation sites maintained by political scientists Paul Hensel, Richard Tucker, and Christopher Gelpi 
were also searched for relevant data.  
20 Since the number of cases where “anticipatory military force” was used is very small, the hypotheses 
for this variable were also tested using RELOGIT, a statistical technique designed to correct for rare 
events.  The results, however, were not significantly different from those generated through the more 
traditional logit models.  The RELOGIT results are presented in Table A2.1.  For more information on 
RELOGIT, see Michael Tomz, Gary King, and Zeng Langche, "RELOGIT: Rare Events Logistic 
Regression, Version 1.1," 1999, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  <http://Gking.Harvard.Edu>; Gary 
King and Langche Zeng, "Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data," 1999, Department of Government, 
Harvard University <http://GKing.Harvard.Edu>; Gary King and Langche Zeng, "Estimating Absolute, 
Relative, and Attributable Risks in Case-Control Studies," 1999, Department of Government, Harvard 
University <http://GKing.Harvard.Edu>. 
21 The military threat variable is a dichotomous variable created from the original categorical “trigger” 
variable in the dataset.  Triggers classified as being verbal acts, political acts, economic acts, other non-
violent acts, or internal verbal or physical challenges to the regime or elite were recoded as “no military 
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classified as “external change” and triggers classified as “non-violent military” acts.22  In the 
datasets used, the frequencies, or actual occurrences of positive outcomes, for the different 
dependent variables are as follows: AMA = 68; AMF = 16; ANTNVIOL = 52.  The descriptive 
statistics for all variables in the models are provided in Table A3.1 in Appendix A. 
 Due to the multiplicity of models, the hypothesis testing will be conducted in three 
stages.  The first model presented deals with the triggers classified as “military threats” and its 
associated hypotheses.  The second model focuses on triggers classified as “external change” and 
“non-violent military” and their associated hypotheses.  The third model is an “interaction” 
model that tests for specific relationships between various independent variables. 
Model I: Military Threats Triggers 
The logit coefficients for the model controlling for “military threats” are presented in 
Table I.1. 
Table I.1: Logit Coefficients for Responses to Triggers Classified as “Military Threats” 
Any Anticipatory 
Activity (AMA) 
Including Force 
(AMF) 
Without Force 
(ANTNVIOL)  Logit 
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Logit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Logit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Military Threat  1.804***  5.96 -0.594        -0.93  2.356***  6.63 
Last Resort  0.238       0.44 -1.944*** -3.04 1.960*  1.72 
Nuclear Status of 
Actor  0.180       1.24  0.336         1.24  0.147  0.94 
Power Discrepancy -0.008       -1.56 -0.009         -1.05 -0.007 -1.29 
Military/Security Issue  0.428        1.26  0.099          0.15  0.453  1.13 
Threat of Grave 
Danger -0.391       -0.74  0.610          0.71 -0.732 -1.18 
Threat to Existence  1.835***  3.24  1.951**     2.40  1.972***  2.87 
Regime Type of Actor  0.162        0.47  1.037         1.58 -0.067 -0.17 
Regime Type of 
Triggering State -0.398       -0.91 -0.571         -0.64 -0.368 -0.71 
(Table continued)
                                                                                                                                                             
threat” and given a value of 0.  Triggers classified as being external changes and non-violent military acts 
were recoded as “military threats” and given a value of 1. 
22 ICB definitions of these triggers are described above. 
 151
 
Protracted Conflict -0.524*     -1.71 -0.373         -0.62 -0.544* -1.65 
Nuclear Status of 
Triggering State -0.377*** -2.65 -0.385         -1.38 -0.395** -2.28 
Membership in 
International 
Organizations 
 0.049        1.06 -0.040         -0.44 0.072  1.38 
Constant -2.877*** -4.04 -2.146**   -2.14 -5.045*** -4.10 
       
Pseudo R2  0.154   0.145   0.216  
Wald χ2  64.16***   57.03***   64.53***  
Log pseudo-likelihood -168.725  -60.665  -129.769  
N 504  504  488  
*p <0.10       
**p <0.05       
***p <0.01       
 
While the logit coefficients alone are not very meaningful, and most of the coefficients 
fail to reach statistical significance, there are some interesting findings within Table I.1.  First, 
the presence of a “threat to existence” has a positive effect on the likelihood that an anticipatory 
action will be used in response to the military trigger that precipitated the crisis.  This effect is 
statistically significant for each of the dependent variables. 
According to H7, the gravity of the threat involved could mitigate the impact of both 
international law and the just war tradition. In this respect, it is expected that in the presence of a 
threat to existence, there should be an increase in the likelihood that states will use anticipatory 
military activities.  Table I.2 presents predicted probabilities of states using the different types of 
anticipatory activities if a threat to its existence is or is not present in the crisis.  The logit 
coefficients used to generate these predicted probabilities23 can be found in Table I.1. 
Table I.2: Predicted Probabilities and Threats to Existence  
DV No Threat to Existence Threat to Existence 
Any Anticipatory Activity 0.093 0.391 
Including Force 0.017 0.124 
Without Force 0.058 0.317 
                                                 
23 See Appendix A for information on how the predicted probabilities were generated. 
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Table I.2 generally supports H7.  The coefficients for both “any anticipatory activity” and 
“including force” are statistically significant at the .01 level, while the coefficient for the 
“without force” variable is significant at the .05 level.  It is striking the extent to which a threat to 
existence influences the likelihood that states will engage in anticipatory military activities.  This 
is by far the largest change created by any of the variables tested in the logit analysis.  The fact 
that a threat to a state’s existence should wield a large influence on the predicted probabilities 
that states will engage in anticipatory military activities is not surprising.     
According to H1, states are likely to engage in anticipatory military activities to counter 
military threats, controlling for the legal and normative constraints.  In other words, the existence 
of a military threat should increase the likelihood that states will engage in anticipatory military 
activities, regardless of the impact of either international law or the just war tradition.  The 
coefficients presented in Table I.1 support this hypothesis, at least for the “any anticipatory 
activity” and “without force” variables.   
Table I.3 presents predicted probabilities of engaging in the three types of anticipatory 
military activities if a military threat is and is not present.  These predicted probabilities were 
generated using the logit coefficients found in Table I.1. 
Table I.3: Predicted Probabilities and Military Threats 
DV Military Threats not Present 
Military Threats 
Present 
Any Anticipatory Activity 0.066 0.297 
Including Force 0.021 0.013 
Without Force 0.036 0.278 
 
The “military threats” variable is statistically significant at the .01 level for both 
variables, and the positive coefficients indicate that the presence of a “military threat” increases 
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the likelihood that states will respond to crises triggered by these types of threats with 
anticipatory activities.  In the “including force” model, however, the “military threat” variable 
did not achieve statistical significance, and one can see that there is little difference in predicted 
probabilities for the military threat present or not present conditions.   
As Table I.3 indicates, there is a considerable increase in the predicted probability that 
anticipatory military activities, in general, will be used to counter military threats.  It is 
interesting, however, that for actions that include the use of force, the predicted probabilities 
actually decrease with the presence of a military threat, though the difference is not statistically 
significant.  H1 is generally supported, at least with respect to non-violent anticipatory activities.  
However, since the coefficient for the model that explicitly tested the “including force” variable 
did not achieve statistical significance, it is difficult to conclude very much beyond the point that 
the presence of a military threat increases the likelihood that states will respond with a non-
violent anticipatory action.   
There are also three variables presented in Table I.1 that achieve statistical significance in 
the models for “any anticipatory activity” and “without force” but not for the “including force” 
variable.  In addition to the “military threats” variable discussed above, the coefficients for the 
variables measuring the “nuclear status of the triggering state” and “protracted conflict” are 
statistically significant in the models for “any anticipatory activity” and “without force,” but not 
in the “including force” model. 
The “nuclear status of the triggering state,” is significant at the .01 level for the “any 
anticipatory activity” and at the .05 level for the “without force” model.  The coefficients are 
negative across the board, indicating that the more advanced the triggering entity’s nuclear 
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program, the less likely it is that an anticipatory activity (at least one that does not include the 
use of force) will be used against it in response to a crisis that it initiated.   
H5 argues that the states will be more likely to use anticipatory military force against 
states that have not yet obtained a fully operational nuclear program.  Using the model generated 
for the “military threat” variable, predicted probabilities for the different levels of nuclear 
capability were generated and are presented in Table I.4.  These predicted probabilities were also 
generated using the “military threats” model presented in Table I.1. 
Table I.4: Predicted Probabilities and Nuclear Capabilities  
DV No (foreseeable) nuclear capability 
Foreseeable 
nuclear 
capability 
Possession of 
nuclear 
capability 
Developed nuclear 
capability with second 
strike capability 
Any Anticipatory 
Activity 0.109 0.079 0.057 0.042 
Including Force 0.021 0.015 0.011 0.009 
Without Force 0.069 0.048 0.034 0.025 
 
The generated predicted probabilities support H5 in that the probability of engaging in 
anticipatory military activities, at least as measured by “any anticipatory activity” and “without 
force,” steadily declines as the nuclear capability of the target state increases.   
The third variable with mixed statistical significance measures the impact of protracted 
conflict on the likelihood that states will respond to crises with anticipatory activities.  According 
to H4, states that are engaged in protracted conflicts are more likely to engage in anticipatory 
military activities during a crisis.  Using the model based upon the “military threat variable,” 
which is the most inclusive of the three models, Table I.5 presents the predicted probabilities for 
this hypothesis. The logit coefficients used to generate these predicted probabilities can be found 
in Table I.1. 
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Table I.5: Predicted Probabilities and Protracted Conflict 
DV Protracted Conflict not Present Protracted Conflict Present 
Any Anticipatory Activity 0.129 0.080 
Including Force 0.024 0.016 
Without Force 0.081 0.050 
 
The coefficients for both the “any anticipatory activity” and “without force” variables 
reach statistical significance at the .10 level.  The coefficient for the “including force” variable 
does not reach statistical significance at any level.  The results presented in Table I.5 indicate 
that the presence of a protracted conflict reduces the likelihood that anticipatory military 
activities will be employed.  In this respect, H4 is not supported.  Again, it is important to note 
that the changes in predicted probabilities are fairly small, and were either marginally 
statistically significant or not significant, particularly with respect to the “including force” 
variable.  Additionally, coupled with the fact that the majority of the other variables in the model 
did not achieve statistical significance it is difficult to place too much confidence in these results. 
It is also hypothesized that the relative power of states can influence whether or not they 
use anticipatory military activities.  The rationale behind this hypothesis is that strong and 
powerful states do not have to fear reprimand or sanctions for violations of international law.  
Additionally, this hypothesis is related to the just war tradition with respect to the “reasonable 
chance for success” requirement.  In this respect, stronger states would be more likely to engage 
in anticipatory military activities because there is a better chance that they would be successful.  
This hypothesis is tested using two variables: the power capability of the anticipator24 and the 
power discrepancy between the anticipator and the triggering/target state.  Predicted probabilities 
                                                 
24 The power capability variable was only included in the reduced model.  However, since the mean of the 
variable was 0.000030, when entered into the predicted probability models, it was effectively eliminated.  
As a result, no statistical testing of this element of the hypothesis will be presented. 
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for the power discrepancy variable will be generated using the model based upon the military 
threat variable. The logit coefficients used to generate these predicted probabilities can be found 
in Table I.1. 
Table I.6: Predicted Probabilities and Power Discrepancy 
DV -30 -15 0 +15 +30 
Any Anticipatory 
Activity 0.126 0.114 0.102 0.093 0.084 
Including Force 0.025 0.022 0.020 0.017 0.016 
Without Force 0.080 0.071 0.064 0.058 0.521 
 
None of the coefficients for power discrepancy attain statistical significance.   
Accordingly, there are not really any supportive “findings” with respect to this hypothesis.  At 
the same time, however, the predicted probabilities for the power discrepancy variable run 
contrary to the direction that was hypothesized.  In the predicted probabilities, if the anticipator 
is weaker than the target, it is more likely to use anticipatory military activities.  This result 
seems strange, and it is possible that it is due to a misspecification of some sort.   
Another interesting finding in Table I.1 concerns the “last resort” variable.  It is 
interesting that this variable fails to achieve statistical significance for the “any anticipatory 
action” variable, but achieves significance at the .01 level for the “including force” variable, and 
at the .10 level for the “without force” variable.  Due to the way the data are coded, the 
seemingly “negative” impact of the last resort variable for the “including force” model is actually 
indicative of a positive effect.  In this respect, if the conditions of “last resort” are met, there is an 
increased likelihood that an anticipatory action including the use of force will be used during a 
crisis initiated by a “military trigger.”  The opposite holds true for the “without force” model.   
While predicted probabilities were not generated for this variable, these findings do support the 
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idea that the normative element of last resort does influence states with respect to the use of 
anticipatory military activities. 
Additionally, due to the nature of the dependent variables studied, and ordered logit 
model is also estimated for the “military threats” variable.   In this model, the three different 
dependent variables are combined into a single variable with three possible values: 0 if no 
anticipatory action was taken, 1 if the anticipatory action did not include the use of force, and 2 if 
anticipatory action included the use of force.  The coefficients from this model are presented in 
Table I.7. 
Table I.7: Ordered Logit Coefficients for Triggers Coded as “Military Threats” 
 Ordered Logit Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Military Threats  1.660***     5.64 
Last Resort  0.004           0.01 
Nuclear Status of Actor  0.194          1.25 
Power Discrepancy -0.008         -1.08 
Military/Security Issue  0.401           1.24 
Threat of Grave Danger -0.340          -0.63 
Threat to Existence  1.851***     3.35 
Regime Type of Actor  0.252          0.77 
Regime Type of Triggering State -0.383          -0.94 
Protracted Conflict -0.505*        -1.70 
Nuclear Status of Triggering State -0.367**      -2.27 
Membership in International 
Organizations  0.040            0.93 
   
Pseudo R2  0.124  
LR χ2  58.43***  
Log pseudo-likelihood -207.284  
N 504  
   
*p <0.10   
**p <0.05   
***p <0.01   
 
As one would expect, the coefficients for the ordered logit presented in Table I.7 are remarkably 
similar to those for the regular logit in Table I.1.  In fact, except for the “last resort” variable, 
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which is only significant for the “including force” model, the ordered logit and regular logit are 
virtually identical in terms of the variables that attained statistical significance.  In this respect, 
there does not appear to be any added utility to be gained from using the ordered logit model. 
Model II: External Change and Non-Violent Military Triggers 
The logit coefficients for the model that controls for “external change,” or those threats 
that are distant in nature, and “non-violent military acts,” or those threats that are more 
imminent, are presented in Table II.1. 
Table II.1: Logit Coefficients for Responses to Triggers Classified as “External Change” or 
“Non-violent Military” 
Any Anticipatory 
Activity (AMA) 
Including Force 
(AMF) 
Without Force 
(ANTNVIOL)  Logit 
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Logit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Logit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
External Change  1.253*  1.94 -0.850 -1.01  1.861**  2.43 
Non-Violent Military  1.934***  5.96 -0.493 -0.57  2.464***  6.60 
Last Resort  0.132  0.24 -1.990*** -2.79  1.874  1.64 
Nuclear Status of 
Actor  0.203  1.39  0.341  1.25  0.173  1.08 
Power Discrepancy -0.008* -1.65 -0.009 -1.05 -0.008 -1.38 
Military/Security Issue  0.341  0.92  0.063  0.09  0.372  0.86 
Threat of Grave 
Danger -0.380 -0.70  0.601  0.69 -0.716 -1.11 
Threat to Existence  1.844***  3.23  1.980**  2.37  1.951***  2.79 
Regime Type of Actor  0.116  0.33  1.040  1.61 -0.134 -0.33 
Regime Type of 
Triggering State -0.467 -1.02 -0.592 -0.69 -0.423 -0.78 
Protracted Conflict -0.480 -1.56 -0.362 -0.60 -0.508 -1.53 
Nuclear Status of 
Triggering State -0.377*** -2.56 -0.385 -1.37 -0.395** -2.20 
Membership in 
International 
Organizations 
 0.049  1.07 -0.040 -0.45 0.073  1.42 
Constant -2.760*** -3.70 -2.102* -1.94 -4.946*** -3.91 
       
Pseudo R2  0.157   0.145   0.219  
Wald χ2  64.34***   58.02   66.05***  
Log pseudo-likelihood -168.099  -60.635  -129.367  
N 504  504  488  
(Table continued)
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*p <0.10       
**p <0.05       
***p <0.01       
 
Interestingly, the coefficients and their associated levels of statistical significance 
presented in Table II.1 are remarkably similar to those presented in Table I.1.  It is interesting 
that the component elements of the “military threats” variable, the “external change” and “non-
violent military” variables, also achieve statistical significance for the “any anticipatory activity” 
and “without force” models, but not for the model for the “including force” variable.   
Additionally, it is interesting the “last resort” variable only attains statistical significance for the 
“including force” variable. 
H2 suggests that the presence of an “external change” trigger, representing a distant 
threat, will increase the likelihood that states will use anticipatory military activities.  Table II.2 
presents the predicted probabilities of these outcomes. The logit coefficients used to generate 
these predicted probabilities can be found in Table II.2. 
Table II.2: Predicted Probabilities and External Change 
DV External Change not Present External Change Present 
Any Anticipatory Activity 0.093 0.274 
Including Force 0.019 0.011 
Without Force 0.057 0.290 
 
The coefficients for “external change” achieve statistical significance at the .10 level for 
the “any anticipatory activity” model, at the .05 level for the “without force” model, and do not 
achieve any level of significance for the “including force” model.  The results presented in Table 
2 are somewhat contradictory.  While the effect of an “external change” trigger is as expected for 
both the “any anticipatory activity” and “without force” variables, with both types of activities 
becoming more likely in the case of an “external change,” the results for the “including force” 
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variable are not as predicted.  In fact, the use of anticipatory military force becomes more likely 
if there is not the presence of an “external change.”  The change in the predicted probability is so 
small and statistically insignificant, however, that it is difficult to conclude that there is a real 
impact of the “external change” variable on the likelihood that anticipatory military force will be 
used.   
H3 posits that states will be more likely to use anticipatory military activities to counter 
“imminent” threats, as operationalized by the “non-violent military act” trigger.  Table II.3 
presents the predicted probabilities for the use of anticipatory military activities in response to 
this type of trigger. The logit coefficients used to generate these predicted probabilities can be 
found in Table II.1. 
 Table II.3: Predicted Probabilities and Non-Violent Military Acts 
DV Non-Violent Military Act not Present 
Non-Violent Military Act 
present 
Any Anticipatory Activity 0.069 0.341 
Including Force 0.020 0.016 
Without Force 0.039 0.316 
 
The findings presented in Table II.3 offer some support for H3.  The coefficients for the 
“any anticipatory activity” and “without force” variables attain statistical significance at the .01 
level.  The coefficient for the “including force” variable, on the other hand, fails to achieve 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  There is a substantial increase in the likelihood 
that non-violent anticipatory military activities will be taken in response to this type of threat.  
However, it is surprising that there is no increase in the likelihood that an anticipatory military 
activity involving the use of force will be used to counter such threat.  This result is particularly 
puzzling in that it would be in response to this type of trigger that a state could legitimately (i.e., 
it would be most likely to be consistent with the legal and normative requirements) engage in an 
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anticipatory military activity.  However, since the other variables in the models generally fail to 
reach statistical significance, it is important not to place too much confidence in these results.   
As with Model I, an ordered logit model is also created for Model II.  Table II.5 presents 
the ordered logit coefficients for the model that includes variables measuring the specific types 
of threats, rather than the composite “military threats” variable. 
Table II.5: Ordered Logit Coefficients for Threats Coded as “External Change” or “Non-
violent Military” 
 Ordered Logit Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
External Change  1.226**      2.12 
Non-violent Military  1.762***    5.60 
Last Resort -0.086        -0.17 
Nuclear Status of Actor  0.213          1.36 
Power Discrepancy -0.009         -1.11 
Military/Security Issue  0.333         1.00 
Threat of Grave Danger -0.326         -0.60 
Threat to Existence  1.844***    3.32 
Regime Type of Actor  0.221          0.67 
Regime Type of Triggering State -0.431         -1.04 
Protracted Conflict -0.473         -1.58 
Nuclear Status of Triggering State -0.367**     -2.25 
Membership in International 
Organizations  0.040          0.93 
   
Pseudo R2  0.125  
LR χ2  59.26***  
Log pseudo-likelihood -206.871  
N 504  
   
*p <0.10   
**p <0.05   
***p <0.01   
 
As with Model I, the ordered logit coefficients presented in Table II.5 are very similar to those of 
the regular logit presented in Table II.1.   There is one difference in the ordered logit, however.  
In this model the power discrepancy variable fails to attain statistical significance, while it is 
significant for the “any anticipatory activity” model in Table II.1.  It is not significant with 
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respect to the models for “without force” or “including force.”  This is a very slight discrepancy, 
however, and does not warrant the utilization of the ordered logit over the regular logit models. 
Model III: Interactions 
An additional model is also estimated to test for certain interactions between membership 
in these international organizations and the specific types of threats.  This “interaction” model 
also included variables that tested for the interaction between the regime type of the actor and 
membership in these treaty organizations as well as regime type of the actor and the type of 
threat involved.  The logit coefficients generated in this model are presented in Table III.1. 
Table III.1: Logit Coefficients for Interaction Model 
Any Anticipatory 
Activity (AMA) 
Including Force 
(AMF) 
Without Force 
(ANTNVIOL)  Logit 
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Logit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Logit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
External Change -1.032 -0.43 -16.941*** -8.34  0.061  0.02 
Non-violent Military  1.948***  3.56  0.967  0.54  2.489***  4.12 
Last Resort  0.185  0.29 -1.850** -2.52  2.024  1.50 
Nuclear Status of Actor  0.265*  1.74  0.480*  1.89  0.182  1.03 
Power Discrepancy -0.009* -1.85 -0.008 -0.97 -0.010* -1.76 
Military/Security Issue  0.166  0.42  0.059  0.08  0.201  0.43 
Threat of Grave Danger -0.578 -0.89  0.511  0.58 -1.021 -1.23 
Threat to Existence  1.661***  3.12  1.679*  1.95  1.807***  2.78 
Regime Type of Actor  0.630  1.06  1.627* 1.92 -0.056 -0.07 
Regime Type of 
Triggering State -0.475 -1.07 -0.659 -0.82 -0.432 -0.82 
Protracted Conflict -0.319 -1.02 -0.372 -0.61 -0.316 -0.95 
Nuclear Status of 
Triggering State -0.479*** -3.16 -0.397 -1.34 -0.490*** -2.85 
Interaction: Membership 
& Regime Type of 
Actor 
-0.027 -0.44 -0.110 -1.18  0.034  0.44 
Interaction: External 
Change & Regime Type 
of Actor 
 2.164  1.39    2.707  1.61 
Interaction: Non-Violent 
Military & Regime Type 
of Actor 
-1.209* -1.85 -0.945 -0.58 -0.883 -1.19 
(Table continued)
 163
 
Interaction: External 
Change & Membership  0.157  0.85 -0.138 -0.51  0.088  0.40 
Interaction: Non-Violent 
Military & Membership  0.098  1.35 -0.277 -0.89  0.073  0.98 
Constant -2.583*** -3.00 -2.525** -2.09 -4.680*** -3.19 
       
Pseudo R2  0.178   0.164   0.239  
Wald χ2 72.92***   .  72.79***  
Log pseudo-likelihood -163.991  -59.315  -125.915  
N 504  504  488  
*p <0.10       
**p <0.05       
***p <0.01       
 
The results of the interaction model are disappointing in that they are not substantially 
different from those in Model II.  In fact, only one of the coefficients for interaction variables 
achieves statistical significance.   Only the measure for the interaction between the “non-violent 
military” triggers and the regime type of the actor achieves statistical significance, and only at 
the .10 level.   Additionally, it is perplexing that the coefficient is negative, while the 
hypothesized relationship is positive.  Specifically, I hypothesize that there will be a negative 
relationship between democracy and the use of anticipatory military actions to counter the distant 
threats operationalized through the “external change” variable.  At the same time, it was 
hypothesized that there will be a positive relationship between democracy and the use of 
anticipatory military activities to counter more imminent threats as operationalized by the “non-
violent military threat” variable.   
The logic behind this is straightforward.  Actions taken in response to the imminent 
threats are more consistent with the requirements of both international law and the just war 
tradition, and, therefore, it should be easier for democratic regimes to gain public support for 
these policies.  Actions taken in response to the more distant threats are not consistent with the 
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requirements of either international law or the just war tradition and therefore it would be harder 
to gain public support for these activities.      
According to Table III.1, however, the opposite is the case.  In fact, with respect to 
“imminent threats,” as operationalized through “non-violent military” triggers, there is an 
additional negative effect for democracies.  In other words, democracies are less likely to use 
anticipatory activities against imminent threats than non-democracies.  This relationship is 
statistically significant at the .10 level.  Even more interesting is the (non-significant) finding that 
democracies are more likely to use anticipatory actions against a “distant threat.”  These findings 
run contrary to H9. 
According to H6, the number of treaties that call for the peaceful resolution of conflict 
that a state belongs to will have an impact on the state’s likelihood of using anticipatory military 
activities.  This “membership” measure is being employed as a proxy for the role of international 
law.  Specifically, the more of these treaties a state has signed on to, the less likely it will be to 
use anticipatory military activities to counter distant threats, since such actions would be in 
violation of international law.  However, since there is a consensus that states can use 
anticipatory military activities to counter imminent threats, it is predicted that the membership in 
these treaties will not affect the likelihood to use anticipatory military activities.   
The other interaction variables, which would test H6, were not statistically significant.  In 
this respect, H6, which posited that if states were parties to treaties that called for the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts they would only use anticipatory activities to counter imminent threats, 
can neither be confirmed nor rejected.    
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Summary and Conclusions 
 According to the data presented above, it is difficult to come to any strong conclusions 
about the influence of either international law or the just war tradition on the likelihood that 
states will engage in anticipatory military activities.  There are numerous factors that could 
explain the lack of robust results.  First, it is important to note that the sample size is quite small 
(N=504 for AMA and AMF models, N=488 for the ANTNVIOL model) and of those cases, a 
very small number were examples of anticipatory military activities (AMA = 68; AMF = 16; 
ANTNVIOL = 52).25  Additionally, very few of the coefficients are statistically significant.  In 
fact, the coefficient for the variable representing the role of international law fails to reach 
statistical significance in any of the iterations of the different models.  The only coefficient to 
achieve statistical significance in all the models is for the variable measuring the “threat to 
existence.”  These results remain consistent even in the rare events logit models. 
One potential explanation for the relative stability of the predicted probabilities can be 
found in the characteristics of the data.  Since most of the independent variables are 
dichotomous, there is not room for much variance among the values.  Accordingly, this leads to 
fairly static probabilities.  Additionally, the stability among the predicted probabilities can also 
be attributed to the fact that the coefficients for each of the variables are all fairly small in 
magnitude.  This fact combined with the dichotomous nature of the majority of the independent 
variables creates a situation that is conducive for fairly static predicted probabilities. 
                                                 
25 The hypothesis concerning risk propensity and the use of anticipatory military activities was only tested 
using the reduced dataset.  However, the mean of the risk variable was 0.091 and the values ranged from a 
low value of –1.00 to a high value of 1.00.  Accordingly, there was not any meaningful variation in the 
predicted probabilities generated for the variable.  Due to this, coupled with the fact that it was only 
included in the reduced dataset, predicted probabilities for this variable are not presented. For the reduced 
dataset, N = 303; AMA = 42; AMF = 10; ANTNVIOL = 32. 
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This is not to say that either international law or the just war tradition do not have any 
impact of state behavior or on the likelihood that states will engage in anticipatory military 
activities.  Rather, it is possible that the effects of these elements simply do not appear in a 
quantitative study with the data available today.  The development of new measures, such as a 
compliance-based measure for international law or a more complete measure of last resort, could 
help with this aspect.  The next step in trying to answer the question about the influence of 
international law and the just war tradition on the use of anticipatory military activities is to carry 
out in-depth case studies of particular instances where these activities either were or were not 
used. 
Additionally, several variables that could help in the analysis were not included in the full 
dataset.  Particularly relevant are leadership characteristics of the (potential) anticipator such as 
risk propensity, and measures of state decline.  Due to the existing data, or the data that could be 
integrated into the primary dataset used, inclusion of these variables in the statistical analysis 
proved untenable.  Perhaps in the future new data will be available that will facilitate the 
inclusion of these variables in the existing models.   
The variable dealing the nuclear capability of both the triggering/target and anticipator 
states should also be expanded to determine if the stage in development has a distinct effect or if 
it is merely the presence of nuclear weapons that has an impact.  The nuclear capability of the 
triggering/target state is one of the few variables that achieved statistical significance in all the 
AMA models and it would be interesting to explore this variable in more depth. 
While it is difficult to draw too many conclusions from the data presented, it does appear 
to cast some doubt on the idea that democracies to do not engage in preventive war.  
Additionally, the relationships captured in the interaction variables should be explored in more 
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depth, as its possible that there is there is some relationship between the different elements, 
particularly with respect to the “including force” variable.  There appears to be some 
specification problem with this particular model that needs to be explored in more depth that 
may be obscuring possible relationships within the model. 
 Although the statistical results are somewhat disappointing in that they do not appear to 
offer conclusive and robust findings about the influence of either the legal or normative elements 
on the use of anticipatory military activities, one strong conclusion can be drawn from the 
statistical analysis.  In each of the models presented, one variable consistently attained statistical 
significance: “threat to existence.”  In this respect, it can be argued that when states are faced 
with a threat to their existence, they are more likely to respond to the crisis trigger with an 
anticipatory activity—regardless of the legal and normative constraints or prohibitions against 
such actions.  While the statistical analysis does not allow for any conclusions about the 
constraining role of international law or the just war tradition, it does indicate at least one 
situation when these elements do not constrain states.   
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CHAPTER 7: STRATEGIC NECESSITY, LAW, AND NORMS II  
ANTICIPATORY MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND IMMINENT THREATS 
 
 The case studies examined are divided into two groups, based on the type of threat posed 
in the specific crisis.  Threats that were classified as imminent (and coded as “non-violent 
military” triggers in the ICB dataset) are examined in this chapter.  The cases dealing with more 
distant and developing threats (classified as “external change” triggers) will be discussed in the 
next chapter.  Three cases will be examined for each type of threat, one representing each of 
three alternative responses: the use of an anticipatory military action that included the use of 
force (AMF), the use of an anticipatory military action that did not include the use of force 
(ANTNVIOL), and no response.1  By examining multiple cases that are similar with respect to 
the crisis trigger, but differ in terms of the response taken, it is possible to look at the differing 
impact of the various influences (i.e., structural/security, legal, and normative).  In other words, 
the primary goal of these case studies is to determine if the legal and normative elements 
discussed in the previous chapters constrained states and influenced what type of response was 
chosen to deal with a specific crisis. 
 For the purposes of these cases studies, it is important to note at the outset that it is not 
the entire period of the crisis, or all actions taken within the crisis, that is under investigation.  
The present study is interested in a very limited segment of each crisis.  Since the primary 
research question involves the use (or non-use) of an anticipatory military activity, only a certain 
portion of each specific crisis is relevant. Specifically, the time period under investigation begins 
with the triggering event that signals the beginning of the crisis (as identified in the ICB dataset) 
                                                 
1 The cases were selected first on the basis of the type of trigger that initiated the crisis—either a non-
violent military event or an external change.  Only after this first selection on the basis of an independent 
variable was made were the values on the dependent variable considered.  The three cases studied present 
variation with respect to the value of the dependent variable.  For information on the importance of this 
element, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 129-32. 
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and ends when the decision vis-à-vis the use of an anticipatory military activity is made.  This 
does not mean that prior events will be ignored or excluded, but rather that they will only be 
included as they pertain to the decisions in the individual crises with respect to the use of 
anticipatory military activities. 
 Additionally, the case studies presented below are not intended to present comprehensive 
or exhaustive histories, descriptions, or discussions of the individual crises or events.  There are 
vast literatures on most of the cases presented, and it is not the intention to repeat or attempt to 
replicate those studies below.  Rather, these case studies are intended to examine one aspect of 
the various crises or events—namely the decision for or against employing an anticipatory 
military activity.  Therefore, there are elements of each crisis that will not be addressed or 
discussed at length.2  It should also be stressed that the case studies are primarily focused on the 
actions taken by one particular actor within the crisis, namely the actor who was in the position 
to take anticipatory military action in response to the particular crisis trigger.  To be sure, no 
crisis occurs in a vacuum, and there are always at least two sides involved in any crisis.3  In this 
respect, the actions of third parties are included to the extent that they influenced the decision 
vis-à-vis anticipatory military activities.    
 The three cases addressed in this chapter are the June 1967 Israeli strike on Egypt (the 
Six Day War crisis), the July 1951 Indian mobilization (the Punjab War Scare I crisis), and the 
Israeli decision in October 1973 not to deploy troops or respond to reports of an impending 
                                                 
2 For example, the operational details of the decisions made during the actual fighting, i.e., the histories of 
the actual wars or attacks, will not be discussed in these case studies.  Where applicable, references to 
descriptions and histories of these cases will be provided. 
3 The narrow scope of the case studies is not intended to downplay the importance of other actors who 
were involved in the specific crisis, but rather to allow for a more in-depth analysis of the decisions of the 
specific actor studied.  These other actors are not wholly excluded from the analysis, but rather they are 
not the central focus.  At this stage in the analysis, the goal is to try to understand the actions of a specific 
actor in a particular crisis—how did actor X respond to the specific triggers in this crisis.  Once 
developed, this framework can be extended to include additional cases and actors as appropriate. 
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attack (the October-Yom Kippur War crisis).4  To what extent did the legal and normative 
constraints on the use of AMAs influence the decision makers involved in these crises?  Did 
these elements play a role in the determination of what policy/reaction would be employed in 
response to the crisis?   
Going First: The Israeli Decision to Use An Anticipatory Military Activity in June 1967 
 The Israeli decision to use an anticipatory military action in June 1967 is often described 
as a textbook example of a “preemptive” strike designed to deal with an imminent threat. 
According to Handel, the following elements had been expressed to be casi belli by Israel:  
a. A threatening concentration of Arab military forces on one or more of its borders 
(especially when combined with new military treaties among Arab neighboring states 
directed against Israel).  
b. The closing of the Straits of Tiran or any other direct air and sea routes to Israel. 
c. An intolerable level of Arab guerilla activities or any other form of intensified military 
semi-warfare that cannot be countered by reprisal or retaliation policies. 
d. An attempt by an Arab state more powerful than Jordan or Lebanon to take control of 
either of these and change the balance of power on Israel’s eastern or northern border. 
e. A situation in which Israel’s security is seriously undermined by unbalanced arms 
supplies to Arab countries not matched by similar supplies to Israel.5  
 
Multiple Israeli “red lines,” or casi belli, had been crossed by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, 
such as the blockade of the Straits of Tiran, the movement of Egyptian troops into the Sinai, and 
the placement of the Jordanian armed forces under foreign command.  Israeli decision makers 
felt that the writing was on the wall: war was imminent. And, due to its strategic situation, it 
could ill-afford to absorb a first blow.  Accordingly, Israel seized the initiative and struck first, 
                                                 
4 The cases selected represent the range of possible outcomes on the dependent variable: use of an 
anticipatory military that included the use of force, use of an anticipatory military activity that did not 
include the use of force, and a response that did not include the use of an anticipatory military activity.  
For a discussion on the importance of including “negative cases,” see James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, 
"The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research," American Political 
Science Review 98, no. 4 (November 2004): 653-69. 
5 Michael I. Handel, Israel's Political-Military Doctrine, Occasional Papers in International Affairs no. 30 
(Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs Harvard University, 1973), 65. (emphasis in original) 
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initiating an anticipatory military activity against its Arab neighbors on the morning of June 5, 
1967.   
But, is this the whole story?  Was the decision to “preempt” based solely on the strategic 
situation?  Or, were alternatives, particularly those in the diplomatic realm, also considered and 
pursued first?  Did the Israeli actions conform to the requirements of international law and the 
just war tradition?  Were Israeli decision makers concerned with the legal and normative 
constraints?  Or did the strategic concerns trump all else?  From the various case histories, 
reports, and documents available concerning the time leading up to the outbreak of the Six Day 
War,6 it appears that the decision to use an anticipatory military action was only taken as a last 
resort, after all other avenues, particularly diplomatic and legal, had been exhausted.  
Additionally, there is some support for the conclusion that the Israelis had at least the tacit 
approval from the United States for the action.  In this respect, it appears that the constraints 
inherent in both international law and the just war tradition did influence Israeli decision makers 
and did play a role in the policy ultimately chosen to deal with the specific crisis. 
According to the ICB data, the Six Day War crisis began on May 17, 1967 with two 
specific acts carried out by Egypt.  The first act was an overflight by the Egyptian air force of the 
Israeli nuclear research facility in Dimona and the deployment of Egyptian troops into the Sinai.  
These acts were then followed by the expulsion of UN observer forces (UNEF) from the Sinai, 
forces which had been dispatched to the region following the 1956 Suez crisis/war in order to 
maintain the cease-fire in the area.  The next major escalation of hostilities was the Egyptian 
closure of the Straits of Tiran on May 22-23, which constituted a virtual blockade of the Israeli 
southern port of Eilat.  Additionally, according to Sela, the blockade of the Straits was 
                                                 
6 Numerous names have been given to each of the wars fought between Israel and the Arab states.  For the 
sake of clarity and consistency, this work uses the same names as used in the ICB case descriptions. 
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“accompanied by threatening, bellicose speeches, tauntingly challenging Israel to war and 
proclaiming that Egypt was now strong enough to win.”7  It was within this context that the 
decision regarding the use of anticipatory military action unfolded.  
In his analysis of the Six Day War, Brecher divided the crisis period into three distinct 
phases: 1) May 17 – 22: “Apprehension and Mobilization;” 2) May 23 – 28: “Delay and 
Diplomacy;” and 3) May 29 – June 4: “Resolution.”8  This temporal distinction is useful for 
understanding how the Israeli leadership came to the decision to use an anticipatory military 
action.  Additionally, it is possible to see how the various influences of structural/security, legal, 
and normative elements shifted in importance throughout the different stages of the crisis.  
Accordingly, Brecher’s crisis timeline will be used to structure the analysis below. 
The primary Israeli decision-makers during this crisis were Prime Minister and Defense 
Minister9 Levi Eshkol, Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Minister of Labor Yigal Allon, and Moshe 
Dayan.  After the formation of a national unity government on June 1, 1967, the following 
individuals were members of the Ministerial Committee on Defense, within which the decision 
to take anticipatory action was made: Zalman Aranne, Minister of Education and Culture; Abba 
Eban; Pinhas Sapir, Minister of Finance;  Eliahu Sasson, Minister of Posts; Yaacov Shimshon 
Shapira, Minister of Justice; Yigal Allon; Israel Barzilai, Minister of Health; Haim Moshe 
Shapira, Minister of Interior; Zerah Warhaftig, Minister of Religious Affairs; Moshe Kol, 
Minister of Tourism; Menachem Begin, Minister without Portfolio; Yosef Saphir, Minister 
without Portfolio; and Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense. 
                                                 
7 Avraham Sela (ed.), Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East (Jerusalem, Israel: The Jerusalem 
Publishing House, Ltd., 1999), 65. 
8 Michael Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1980), 91-92. 
9 Until June 1, 1967 when the defense portfolio was given to Moshe Dayan. 
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Stage 1: May 17 – 22 
 The first stage of the crisis began with the withdrawal of the UNEF forces from the Sinai 
and the subsequent movement of Egyptian troops into the area.  According to Wagner,  
Although Egypt was reluctant to ascribe any aggressive motives to this action, her Syrian 
brothers were not so reserved, as indicated in a statement of Syrian foreign Minister 
Ibrahim Makhous: “The withdrawal of the UN forces in this manner, which means ‘make 
way, our forces are on their way to the battle,’ proves that there is nothing that can stand 
in the way of the Arab revolution and that reaction’s attempt to raise doubts regarding the 
presence of these forces had boomeranged.”10  
 
The Israelis were concerned by this action, and by such statements.  Aware of Israeli concerns, 
President Johnson explicitly warned the Israelis against engaging in “retaliatory action”11 in 
response to Egyptian actions in Sinai.  According to Rodman, “While [Washington] did not 
formulate a specific solution to the crisis, it apparently hoped to restore the status quo ante—that 
is, to put United Nations peacekeeping troops back at their posts as well as to convince Israel and 
Egypt to demobilize their armed forces.”12  In what would soon become an all-too familiar 
mantra, Johnson stated in a note dated May 18,  
I want to emphasize strongly that you have to abstain from every step that would increase 
the tension and violence in the area.  You will probably understand that the United States 
cannot accept any responsibility for situations that are liable to occur as a result of action 
in which we were not consulted.13  
 
For the Israelis, the message from the United States was clear: do not take any unilateral action at 
this point in time.  And, as long as the situation remained as it was, the Israelis were prepared to 
live with the status quo.  As Wagner notes, the situation on May 18 was such that “The 
consensus among the members of the Israeli government was still that this move was forced on 
                                                 
10 Abraham R. Wagner, Crisis Decision-Making: Israel's Experience in 1967 and 1973 (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1974), 68-69. 
11 It is not entirely clear what Johnson meant by “retaliatory action.”  At the same time, however, it does 
seem likely that Johnson was cautioning Israel against using anticipatory action in response to the crisis. 
12 David Rodman, "The Diplomatic Prelude to the Six-Day War," Midstream 47, no. 4 (May/June 2001): 
8. 
13 Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 107. 
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Nasser by [political] pressure and that the UNEF withdrawal was an international issue and had 
not yet reached the stage of severe domestic crisis.”14  In other words, let the international 
community deal with the problem.   
Indeed, the issue of UNEF troops was perfectly suited for the international community 
since it dealt with an issue that was squarely within the international community’s purview.  
According to Bar-Zohar, there was a “top-secret document kept in the U.N. files that 
Hammarskjöld had drawn up in 1957 after a seven-hour conference with Nasser in which it had 
definitely been agreed that the U.N. forces stationed in Sinai could not be withdrawn without the 
consent of the U.N. General Assembly.”15  Since no General Assembly consent had been granted 
to the withdrawal of the UNEF forces, it could be argued that Nasser was in violation of this 
agreement.  Bar-Zohar goes on to argue while Eban was making this argument, “He seemed to 
forget that the most solemn treaty becomes only a scrap of paper as soon as one of its signatories 
decides to disregard it.”16  The crisis soon progressed beyond the legality of Nasser’s expulsion 
of the UNEF forces.        
 The situation began to change dramatically on May 19, when it became clear to the 
Israelis that the Arab states were beginning to coordinate their forces, Syria announced that its 
forces were fully mobilized, and Egyptian missile bases were at “full alert.”  Additionally, large 
numbers of troops and materiel were being massed by the Egyptians in the Sinai.  As a result of 
these developments, it was believed in Israel that it was now a possibility that the Straits of Tiran 
could be closed,17 which was a declared “red line” for Israel.  In response to the new, and 
                                                 
14 Wagner, Crisis Decision-Making: Israel's Experience in 1967 and 1973, 69. 
15 Michael Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues Behind the Six-Day War, 
translated by  Monroe Stearns (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1970), 38. 
16 Bar-Zohar, Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues Behind the Six-Day War, 39. 
17 See Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 76-77.  It is important to note that the blockade/closure of the 
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worsening situation, the Israeli Cabinet decided to mobilize troops and also to try to enlist 
international support for its rights to the international waterway in the event that it should be 
closed.  These diplomatic efforts were clearly couched in both the terminology and spirit of 
international law.  Rather than respond to the crossing of the declared red lines with the use of 
military force, as would be predicted by the security literature, the Israeli government instead 
decided to pursue non-violent means of conflict resolution first.  In other words, Israel sought 
recourse through the use of international law before using military force—which would then be 
used as a last resort after the other means had failed.  Brecher notes that: 
The Prime Minister wrote to de Gaulle: “Israel on her part will not initiate hostile acts but 
she is firmly resolved to defend her territory and her international rights.  Our decision is 
that if Egypt will not attack us, we will not take action against Egyptian forces at Sharm-
e-Sheikh—until or unless they close the Straits of Tiran to free navigation by Israel.”18  
 
Foreign Minister Eban also sent correspondence to his French counterpart, Couvre de Murville.  
Again, according to Brecher,  
Eban reminded him that France had in the past confirmed, and identified herself with, 
former Foreign Minister Meir’s statement of March 1957, in which Israel stated that 
“Interference with free passage will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling it to 
exercise of the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter.”19  
 
In this respect, the diplomatic activity undertaken during the first stage of the conflict clearly 
shows that the Israeli government was concerned with acting within the confines of international 
law, and fully expected to get support from the law.  The centrality of international law in the 
minds of Israeli decision makers is clear.  Not only were they asking for the support of their 
friends and allies, but they were also laying the legal justifications for any future actions. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Straits of Tiran was a major cause of the 1956 Suez Crisis/War.  For more information on this crisis/war 
see Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Sela, Political Encyclopedia of the Middle 
East. 
18 Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 111. 
19 Ibid., 111. 
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On May 22, after the announcement of the withdrawal of the UNEF forces from Sinai, 
but before the closure of the Straits of Tiran, Eshkol announced to the Knesset that he had 
authorized a partial mobilization of reserve troops in response to the developing crisis. During 
the debate that ensued, there were some who called for Israel to take a more activist policy in 
response to the Arab actions.  MK Menachem Begin stated, 
In the last few days our security situation has become graver, and this will not disappear 
overnight.  The nation, which has withstood many tests, must know this.  It knows that it 
is surrounded by enemies who seek to destroy it, even though this fact is sometimes 
obscured….it will not accept violations of our national sovereignty, acts of hostility or 
mines; it will act within its internationally-recognized rights to defend itself against this 
aggression. 
 
A week ago Egypt announced that it was sending its forces towards Israel…and that if 
Israel attacked Syria, Egypt would wage war on Israel….Everyone knows that Egypt is at 
war with Israel.  If that country sends its troops, tanks, planes and cannon towards our 
border, that is an open and explicit threat of aggression.  That is how the entire world 
understands troop movements of this kind on the border between two countries, one of 
which has announced that they are at war.20  
 
Begin also discussed the notion of the erosion of Israeli deterrence: 
 
The enemy in the south threatens us with aggression if we use our right to defend 
ourselves against the aggression of the enemy in the north.  If that threat were to succeed, 
if we were to accept acts of hostility orchestrated by Syria and implemented by its 
emissaries, because Egypt threatens us with aggression…not only would that be an 
unparalleled victory for the enemy but our state would be open to attack, Jewish blood 
could be shed freely and our sovereignty would be a mockery.  That is why it must be 
said loud and clear that the threat of aggression from the south will not induce Israel to 
accept the aggression from the north.  And if that aggression continues Israel will 
implement its right to self-defense.21  
 
Begin, a member of the opposition at the time,22 was setting out the argument for taking 
unilateral action to deal with the situation.  While the argument was still couched in the 
framework of self-defense, it was predicated on the notion of self-reliance—the idea that Israel 
                                                 
20 Netanel Lorch (ed.), Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981 (Lanham Maryland: Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs and University Press of America, Inc., 1993), 1556. 
21 Lorch, Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981, 1557-58. 
22 Begin would become a minister without portfolio in the National Unity government that would be 
formed on June 1, 1967. 
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had to act to protect its own interests.  At this stage in the crisis however, the Eshkol government 
was not yet prepared to abandon the diplomatic/multilateral approach in favor of Begin’s 
preferred unilateral path. 
The final element that Brecher includes in this first stage of the crisis was Nasser’s 
decision on May 22 to close the Straits of Tiran.23  This event also signaled a significant shift and 
escalation in the crisis. 
Stage 2: May 23 – 28 
On May 23, Nasser gave a speech where he announced the closure of the Straits to all 
ships traveling to Israel, which Spiegel describes as “technically an act of war”.24  During this 
speech, Nasser stated,  
Yesterday the armed forces occupied Sharm [el]-Shaykh.  What does this mean?  It is an 
affirmation of our rights of our sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba, which constitutes 
Egyptian territorial waters.  Under no circumstances can we permit the Israeli flag to pass 
through the Gulf of Aqaba.  The Jews threatened war.  We say they are welcome to war, 
we are ready for war, our armed forces, our people, all of us are ready for war, but under 
no circumstances shall we abandon any of our rights.  These are our waters.25  
 
Not only did Nasser announce the blockade of Israel, but he also made it clear that Egypt was 
preparing for war with Israel, an event that clearly concerned the Israelis.26 
                                                 
23 It is interesting to note that, according to Quandt William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American 
Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 43, 
Johnson ordered the Sixth Fleet moved into the eastern Mediterranean on May 22.   It is unclear, 
however, if the orders came before or after the Straits were closed to Israeli shipping.  Regardless of the 
timing vis-à-vis the closure of the Straits, the movement of the Fleet, with its two aircraft carriers was 
indicative of the fears of impending escalation of the crisis. 
24 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, From 
Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 137. 
25 Meron Medzini (ed.), Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1947-1974 (Jerusalem: Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, 1976), 740. 
26 This created a situation similar to Schelling’s description of why states might initiate surprise attacks.  
According to Schelling, fear that the other may be about to strike can create a situation where “it looks as 
though a modest temptation on each side to sneak in a first blow—a temptation too small by itself to 
motivate an attack—might become compounded through a process of interacting expectations, with 
additional motive for attack being produced by successive cycles of ‘He thinks we think he thinks we 
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While U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, acquiesced to Nasser’s 
request to remove UNEF troops from the Sinai, and the UN Security Council failed to take any 
action regarding either the removal of UNEF or the blockade of the Straits,27 both the United 
States and the United Kingdom viewed the blockade as a violation of international law.  In a 
statement on May 23, 1967, President Johnson stated that,  
The United States considers the gulf to be an international waterway and feels that a 
blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace.  
The right of free and innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of 
the entire international community.28  
 
According to Quandt, “In an effort to build public support for the administration, the president 
contacted former President Eisenhower, who confirmed that in 1957 the United States had 
recognized that if force were used to close the strait, Israel would be within her rights under 
article 51 of the UN Charter to respond with force.”29  
In this respect, Israel had some foundation within international law to take action in order 
to restore its legal rights to use what were viewed as international waters.  At the time of the 
blockade, however, there was substantial pressure, particularly from the United States, not to 
take anticipatory action.  Even though Johnson supported Israeli rights to use the waterway, he 
cautioned Israel against taking unilateral actions to secure those rights.30  This element will be 
discussed in more depth below.     
                                                                                                                                                             
think…he thinks we think he’ll attack; so he thinks we shall; so we will; so we must.” Thomas C. 
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 207.     
27 According to Safran, Soviet opposition prevented the passage of a US-sponsored resolution that would 
have prohibited Egypt from initiating the blockade while the Security Council discussed the issue. Nadav 
Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1982), 389. 
28 Medzini, Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1947-1974, 742. 
29 Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976, 44. 
30 In fact, “restraining Israel” was one of the key elements of Johnson’s strategy to deal with the crisis.  
According to Quandt, “A dilemma clearly existed.  In order to keep Israel from acting on her own, as 
even the United States acknowledged she had a right to do in order to reopen the strait, an acceptable 
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It was after Nasser’s speech announcing the blockade of the Straits that Prime Minister 
Eshkol again addressed the Knesset with respect to the situation.  Eshkol presented a summary of 
the events that had occurred between the 15th and 22nd of May, and the actions that the 
government had taken in response, up to and including the decision to mobilize reserve troops.  
In this address, Eshkol clearly linked international law and the blockade of the Straits.  He stated 
that,  
This morning the President of Egypt issued a statement regarding his intention of closing 
the international waterway through the Straits of Tiran which links the Gulf of Eilat with 
the Red Sea to ships bearing the Israeli flag as well as to other ships carrying cargo of a 
strategic nature. 
 
Distinguished Knesset, any obstruction of freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the 
Straits is a grave violation of international freedom and the sovereign rights of other 
nations and an act of aggression against Israel. 
 
As the Knesset knows, since 1957 various governments, including those of the principal 
maritime nations, have declared their intention of implementing their rights to free 
navigation in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Eilat.  During the last few days Israel 
has been in close contact with those governments….In consequence, I can say that 
international support for those rights is serious and quite widespread. 
 
What is to be tested here is a clear and official international commitment on which 
international law and order depends.  Thus, this is a fateful moment not only for Israel but 
for the whole world.  In view of this situation, I hereby appeal to the Powers to act 
immediately to implement the right to free navigation to our southern port, a right which 
belongs to every nation, without discrimination.31  
 
In this respect, Eshkol was making a clear and direct appeal to international law in order to 
resolve the crisis.32   At this point in time, Israel could have chosen to take unilateral military 
                                                                                                                                                             
alternative had to be presented.  The stronger the stand of the United States and the firmer its commitment 
to action, the more likely it was that Israel could be restrained; by the same token, the less likely it was 
that Nasser would probe further.  Yet a strong American stand was incompatible with the desire for 
multilateral action, which had to be tried, in Johnson’s view, in order to ensure congressional and public 
support.  Such support was essential at a time of controversy over the United States role in Vietnam.” 
Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976, 45. 
31 Lorch, Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981, 1570. 
32 The United States had already stated that it considered the Straits to be an international waterway, to 
which all states should be afforded equal access.  It was this “right” to which Eshkol was referring. 
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action in response to Egyptian actions.  It did not.  Rather, it chose to pursue diplomatic and legal 
action, attempting to resolve the crisis through means other than resort to force.  
At a Ministerial Defense Committee Meeting on the same day, Eban stated that it “is not 
whether we must resist, but whether we must resist alone or with the support and understanding 
of others.”33  According to Brecher, although the Egyptian actions challenged Israel's deterrent 
capability—a fundamental component of Israel's security conception—“before Israel responded 
militarily, there were several powerful reasons for diplomatic activity: to explore Soviet 
intentions; to test the willingness of the Western powers to fulfill their 1957 commitments to 
break Israel's isolation; and to consult with friendly states, first and foremost the United states, in 
order to assure their diplomatic support if victory were achieved on the battlefield.”34  
To this end, the Cabinet made three decisions with respect to the blockade of the Straits 
of Tiran: 1) the blockade was an act of “formal aggression”; 2) a formal decision on how to 
respond to the blockade would be postponed for forty-eight hours while advice was sought from 
the United States; and 3) the Foreign Minister would explore the possibility of traveling to meet 
in person, with the President of the United States to discuss the situation.35  There was much 
debate during the meeting and, although the formal decision was made to wait, it was by no 
means supported by all in attendance.   
Even as Prime Minister Eshkol was receiving advice from his generals that the time was 
ripe to take anticipatory action,36 he was being advised against such a course of action from the 
United States.  According to Oren, 
                                                 
33 Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 120. 
34 Ibid., 120. 
35 Ibid., 121-22; Abba Eban, Abba Eban: An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1977), 337. 
36 Wagner, Crisis Decision-Making: Israel's Experience in 1967 and 1973, 73. Stein notes that Rabin, a 
major proponent of taking military action, “acknowledged that a 48-hour delay would impose little 
military cost.  The additional time would be used to complete military preparations.” Janice Gross Stein, 
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another letter from Johnson had arrived exhorting Israel to “manifest steady nerves” and 
recalling his and previous presidents’ commitments to its security.  Though U Thant’s 
decision on UNEF was regrettable, Johnson wrote, the Soviets seemed cooperative, and 
the United States was working to peaceably resolve the crisis “in the United Nations or 
outside it.”  Until it did, the U.S. was willing to furnish a number of items—100 half-
tracks, Patton tank and Hawk missile parts, food and economic aid totaling $47.3 million, 
plus a $20 million loan—to tide Israel over.  The package came with a catch, however: 
Israel could not challenge the blockade with a test boat or under any circumstances 
precipitate war.  “Any Israeli unilateral action cold be justified only after all peaceful 
measures had been exhausted,” Undersecretary Rostow warned Eppy Evron.  “Such 
justification would have to be demonstrated before the people of the United States and 
the world.”37  
 
As long as the primary threat remained only the blockade of the Straits, Eshkol and the Cabinet 
were content to wait for the United States and the other maritime states, such as the United 
Kingdom, to try to work out a solution.   
 On the other hand, had the Israelis not been concerned about the various political 
repercussions of their actions, i.e., the first-strike disadvantage discussed in the security 
literature, the situation could have provided a good justification and foundation for taking 
anticipatory military action. There was also a strong strategic basis for taking such action, such 
as the crossing of a declared red line, the maintenance of credible deterrent capability, or the 
first-strike advantage. While there was a legal foundation for such actions, i.e., the illegal 
blockade of the international Straits of Tiran, the normative constraints of all other reasonable 
alternatives being exhausted seemed to have been operating on the Israeli decision makers at this 
point in time.  In other words, if the Israelis had not been constrained by the legal and normative 
elements, they could have taken anticipatory military action as soon as the Straits were 
blockaded, or as soon as the first Egyptian troops were deployed in the Sinai.  But the Israelis 
                                                                                                                                                             
"The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Inadvertent War Through Miscalculated Escalation," in Avoiding War: 
Problems of Crisis Management, Alexander L. George (ed.), (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 140.  
Eban argues that this was not the case, stating that “Most were agreed that the moment for military 
reaction was not yet ripe, and that a political phase must first ensue….No proposal of immediate riposte 
was made that day.” Eban, Abba Eban: An Autobiography, 335. 
37 Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 87. 
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decided to wait, at least for the time being, and pursue diplomatic measures to attempt to deal 
with the crisis. 
 During this period, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity, with frequent consultations 
between the Israelis, the Americans, the British, and the French.38  Foreign Minister Eban was 
dispatched for consultations with the United States, and made stops in Paris and London on the 
way to Washington.  From France and the United States, the message to the Israelis was the 
same: it is within Israel's best interest not to preempt.  The British, on the other hand, told Eban 
what they were willing to do, but offered no advice as to what type of policy Israel should 
follow. 
During his stop in Paris, Eban was warned by de Gaulle against taking unilateral, 
preemptive action.  According to Eban,  
Even before I was seated near his desk…he said loudly, “Ne faites pas la guerre.”  At 
that moment we had not even been introduced. We then exchanged greetings and the 
General went on as if completing his previous sentence, “At any rate, don’t shoot first.  It 
would be catastrophic if Israel were to attack.  The Four Powers must be left to resolve 
the dispute.  France will influence the Soviet Union toward an attitude favorable to 
peace.”39  
 
When asked by de Gaulle what Israel intended to do about the crisis, Eban stated, 
If the choice lies between surrender and resistance, Israel will resist.  Our decision has 
been made.  We shall not act today or tomorrow, because we are still exploring the 
attitude of those who have assumed commitments.  We want to know whether we are to 
be alone or whether we shall act within an international framework.  If Israel fights alone 
(and she does not recoil from this), she will be victorious, although the price in blood 
may be heavy.  If the powers act in accordance with their engagements, Israel will 
harmonize her resistance with theirs.  It is only in order to explore this prospect that we 
have not yet put our rights to the test.40  
 
                                                 
38 If the Israelis had only been concerned with the reaction of the United States, it is unclear why time 
would have been spent trying to elicit support from other states. 
39 Eban, Abba Eban: An Autobiography, 341. 
40 Ibid., 342. 
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In this respect, Eban’s message to the French clearly shows that the Israelis were concerned that 
any resort to force be viewed as being taken as a last resort, after all other peaceful means had 
been exhausted.  Additionally, there was a clear preference for a multilateral solution. 
 There is one other element of the discussion between Eban and de Gaulle that is 
important in this context.  If the use of force in international law and in the just war tradition is 
limited to “self-defense,” how is it to be determined what kind of actions are taken in self-
defense and what types of actions are the “opening of hostilities”?  Eban and de Gaulle presented 
opposing views on this matter.  According to Eban’s perspective,  
[Israel] could not be the first to “open hostilities,” since these had already been opened: 
Nasser’s blockade and declaration were acts of war.  Whatever Israel did would be a 
reaction, not an initiative.  A state could be attacked by many methods apart from gunfire.  
Civil law recognized no distinction between assault through strangulation and assault 
through shooting.  Nor did international law.41  
 
For de Gaulle, however, “Opening hostilities,” implied “firing the first shot.”42  The differences 
in these two perspectives lies at the heart of the debate concerning the legality of anticipatory 
military activities.43   With respect to the Six Day War, the fact that the United States and the 
United Kingdom recognized that the Straits of Tiran were an international waterway and that the 
blockade constituted a violation of international law seems to support, at least partially, Eban’s 
position.   
It was also during this period that the crisis escalated further.  As long as the situation on 
the ground remained the same, i.e., as long as the most significant element of the crisis issue 
remained the blockade, the Israelis were content to heed the calls of the United States and other 
allies and wait for diplomatic activities to take their course.  On May 25, however, the situation 
began to change. 
                                                 
41 Eban, Abba Eban: An Autobiography, 342. 
42 Ibid., 342-43. 
43 See Chapter 4 for elaboration. 
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Intelligence estimates received by the Israelis on May 25th indicated that the Egyptian 4th 
Armored Division had finally been deployed into the Sinai. According to Brecher, this event 
precipitated a shift in the views of the Israeli decision makers, leading them to believe that time 
for diplomatic actions was running out.  Brecher notes that from this day on, “there was 
increasing pressure on Eshkol by Israel's military leaders…to go to war; the time limit given to 
he political decision-makers on the 23rd was running out.”44  As a result of the new facts, the 
Israeli government instructed Eban to apprise the United States of the new situation.   
Eban was originally dispatched on his diplomatic mission to explore alternatives for 
dealing with the closure of the Straits.  Now, however, his instructions had changed.  A telegram 
was dispatched to Eban from Eshkol, requesting Eban to inform the Americans that the Israelis 
believed an attack was now believed to be imminent: 
As a result of events during the last twenty-four hours, be advised that we expect a 
surprise attack from the Egyptians and Syrians at any moment.  The United States 
Government should declare at once that any attack on Israel would be regarded as an 
attack on the United States.  It should also issue instructions that in that spirit to its forces 
in the area.  It is recommended that you show this cable to the highest officials, the 
President himself or the Secretary of State.45 
 
These pleas, however, were met with deaf ears, and skepticism, by the Americans.  Later that 
same day, Eban was told by Secretary of State Rusk that the United States does “not share the 
appraisal that any Arab state was planning an immediate attack on Israel.”  Additionally, 
according to Brecher, Eban was told that  
The President would act to live up to American commitments, and he was taking a strong 
political and diplomatic stand in Cairo, as well as in other capitals.  But it was absolutely 
essential for him to act with the approval of Congress and public opinion; and in the 
meantime, Israel should not take pre-emptive action.46  
 
                                                 
44 Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 130. 
45 Ibid., 131. (emphasis in original) 
46 Ibid., 133. 
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A more formal and explicit warning against taking anticipatory action was given to the Israelis 
by President Johnson himself.  In an aide-mémoire given to Eban by Johnson, the United States 
warned the Israelis about taking preemptive action: 
Regarding the Straits we plan to pursue vigorously the measures which can be taken by 
maritime nations to assure the Straits and the Gulf remain open to free and innocent 
passage of all nations.  I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself 
responsible for the initiation of hostilities, Israel will not be alone unless it decides to do 
it alone.  We cannot imagine that Israel will make this decision.47  
 
It appears, however, that Johnson did not believe that these warnings would be persuasive, as it 
is reported that “As Eban left the White House, Johnson turned to his advisers and stated: ‘I’ve 
failed.  They’ll go.’”48  Additionally, it is also interesting to note that the American warning 
seems to indicate that the United States still believed that they fundamental aspect of the crisis 
was the blockade of the Straits of Tiran, not the prospect of an invasion or imminent attack by 
the Arab forces. 
 As the Jerusalem’s and Washington’s fundamental beliefs about the nature of the crisis 
began to diverge, so too did the preferred methods for dealing with the crisis.  Washington still 
held fast to the belief that the Straits could be reopened through multilateral action, while Israel 
was starting to feel pressed to take military action in response to the situation.  According to 
Stein,  
Once the credibility of Israel's deterrent reputation became the central issue, a military 
response was imperative whether or not Egypt was planning to attack.  Senior military 
leaders insisted that the damage to Israel's capacity to deter made an Arab attack 
inevitable, sooner or later.  In the analysis of military leaders, Israel's critical need to 
                                                 
47 Eban, Abba Eban: An Autobiography, 359. (emphasis in original) Quandt discusses the internal 
American debates and discussions with respect to the Eban/Johnson meeting and notes that Rusk was 
particularly concerned with who was the first to fire.  Quandt notes that “The view was expressed [by 
Rusk] that no overt act of aggression had yet occurred.  Until Egypt resorted to the use of armed force, 
according to this argument, the United States commitment to Israel would not be activated.” Quandt, 
Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976, 52. 
48 Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976, 54. 
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protect its capacity to deter blurred the distinction between preemptive and preventive 
war.49  
 
In other words, as Egypt continued to mobilize and deploy troops into the Sinai, and Israel 
continued to take no response, in direct contradiction to its previous statements that such actions 
would be viewed as a casus belli, many in Israel were afraid that this was creating a situation 
whereby Egypt and the other Arab states would feel emboldened to strike Israel, and that Israel 
would offer no resistance.  Such a situation would be unbearable for Israel.  While the Israelis 
were now more concerned with the threat of an attack as opposed to the blockade, they also 
remained committed to seeing what would transpire out of Eban’s consultations with the United 
States.   
 At the same time, however, the crisis continued to escalate.  On May 26, 1967, Nasser 
gave a lengthy and vitriolic speech to the Arab Trade Unionists.  In this speech, he stated, 
We were waiting for the day when we would be fully prepared and confident of being 
able to adopt strong measures if we were to enter the battle with Israel.  I say nothing 
aimlessly.  One day two years ago, I stood up to say that we had no plan to liberate 
Palestine and that revolutionary action was our only course to liberate Palestine…. 
 
Recently we felt we are strong enough, that if we were to enter a battle with Israel, with 
God’s help, we could triumph.  On that basis, we decided to take actual steps. 
… 
With regard to military plans, there is complete coordination of military action between 
us and Syria.  We will operate as one army fighting a single battle for the sake of a 
common objective—the objective of the Arab nation. 
 
The problem today is not just Israel, but also those behind it.  If Israel embarks on an 
aggression against Syria or Egypt, the battle against Israel will be a general one and not 
confined to one spot on the Syrian or Egyptian borders.  The battle will be a general one 
and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel.  I probably could not have said such 
things five or even three years ago.  If I had said such things and had been unable to carry 
them out my words would have been empty and worthless.50  
 
                                                 
49 Stein, "The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Inadvertent War Through Miscalculated Escalation," 141. 
50 Medzini, Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents, 1947-1974, 744. (emphasis added) 
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Coupled with the increased mobilization and deployment of Egyptian troops, Nasser’s speech 
caused significant concern and alarm among Israeli leaders. 
May 26 also turned out to be a pivotal day for Eban’s mission to the United States as well 
as for the Israeli crisis decision-making process.  With increasing domestic pressure to take some 
sort of response to the escalating crisis, Eban was instructed to return home the next day and 
report on his meetings.  On the 26th of May, however, the American message of “help is on the 
way” and “Israel will only be alone if she acts alone” that had been conveyed previously would 
become murkier. 
Over the course of a few hours, the Israelis would receive seemingly different messages 
from different messengers, albeit all ostensibly from the same ultimate source.51  At a meeting 
with officials at the Defense Department,52 the distance between the American and Israeli 
positions was becoming clearer.  What had previously been viewed as similar aims, i.e., the 
opening of the Straits, were now seen as similar outcomes, but of differing ultimate goals.  For 
the Israelis the issue had now become much more serious than merely the blockade.  As 
discussed above, it had now developed into a test of Israeli deterrence, a test that was becoming 
more real with the continued deployment of Egyptian troops into the Sinai.   The Americans at 
this meeting seemed to grasp the changing nature of the situation.  According to Brecher, at this 
                                                 
51 The policy making process of the United States with regards to the Six Day War crisis is not under 
investigation for this study.  Accordingly, the underlying causes for the contradictory—or at least 
confusing—messages given to the Israelis is not addressed at length in this work.  For more information 
on American policy towards the crisis, see Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976; William B. Quandt, "Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What 
Color Was the Light?" Middle East Journal 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 198-228; Spiegel, The Other Arab-
Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, From Truman to Reagan. 
52 According to Brecher, McNamara, General Wheeler, and other Pentagon officials were at this meeting. 
Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 135-36. 
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meeting, “Because of fear of the charge of collusion, the Israelis were never told they should go 
to war, but neither did the Pentagon representatives say they should not.”53  
In preparation for the meeting between Eban and Johnson, Evron met with Johnson and 
cabled a report of the meeting back to Jerusalem.  Evron reported the following in his cable 
about the meeting:  
When I entered his room, the President told me that he fully understood the gravity of 
Israel's position. His reaction to the Foreign Minister would be in accordance with what 
Mr. Eban had heard from Rusk and others that morning, namely that any American 
involvement would require Congressional support of the intentions and decisions of the 
President.  The first step would have to be the laying of a Congressional basis for any 
support of Israel's position.  The President emphasized that he was working energetically 
in that direction.  The United States had pledged itself to preserve freedom of passage in 
the Straits of Tiran: and the United States would carry out that obligation.  But anything 
involving even a possibility of force would be impractical and would boomerang unless 
the proper Congressional basis were laid in advance.  The President agreed that the 
United Nations in its present composition would not be able to do anything; no result 
would come from its discussions.  Yet those discussions were vital in order to give proper 
support to the President, in the Congress and the public, as well as in the international 
domain.  The President spoke without confidence about the result of the Secretary-
General’s mission to Cairo, but said that it would be foolish to ignore the effect of his 
report.  Any action by any member state before the report were published would be 
received badly in many places.  The President spoke optimistically about the possibility 
of setting up a structure with the active support of Britain and other maritime powers 
after the conclusion of a quick debate at the United Nations.  Here he mentioned several 
countries who might be willing to cooperate.  He had taken counsel with some of his 
leading advisers.  All of them could be described as friends of Israel.  They had expressed 
their support in the following formulation: The objective is to open the Straits for 
navigation by all states including Israel and this objective shall be carried out.  Mr. 
Johnson made it clear that the appraisal in Jerusalem about an imminent Egyptian 
surprise attack was not shared by the United States.  Israel was a sovereign Government, 
and if it decided to act alone, it could of course do so; but in that case everything that 
happened before and afterwards would be upon its responsibility and the United States 
would have no obligation for any consequences that might ensue.  He refused to believe 
that Israel would carry out unilateral action which was bound to bring her great damage.  
But, he added, this was Israel's affair.  As President of the United States he must carry out 
American commitments to Israel in a way which seemed to him best, within the 
framework of American interests.  He emphasized several times, that Israel could depend 
on him.  He said that he was not a coward and did not renege on his promises, but he was 
not prepared to act in a manner which seemed to him to endanger the security of the 
                                                 
53 Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 136. 
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United States, or to bring about the intervention of the Soviet Union, in the event, simply 
because Israel has decided that Sunday is an ultimate date.54  
 
Evron’s cable presented an interesting quandary for the Israeli leadership.  For the United States, 
the key problem appears to have been the opening of the Straits.  For the Israelis, on the other 
hand, the situation had become more serious, as discussed above.  In fact, it appears from 
Evron’s message that Johnson was aware of the divergence between US and Israeli perceptions 
of the crisis, and what types of actions might be necessary to deal with the crisis.  
 According to Quandt, “Johnson was aware of the awkwardness of the policy he was 
pursuing.” While it would take some time to establish a multilateral force to open the Straits, if 
such a force could even be established, the situation in the region could change, and Israel could 
be faced with different challenges, that needed to be dealt with differently.  Quandt argues that 
Johnson “apparently still wanted the Israelis to hold off on military action, but as time went by 
he seems to have become resigned to letting the Israelis take whatever action they felt 
necessary.”55  These conflicting messages can clearly be seen in the statements discussed above.  
At this stage in the crisis, however, Johnson’s admonitions against taking unilateral action were 
still persuasive in Jerusalem. 
 The Israeli Cabinet decided again on May 28 to delay taking any military action.  Brecher 
notes that in an October 1967 interview with Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv, Eshkol clearly states 
that pressure from the United States was a key element in the decision to wait: 
Had we not received Johnson’s letter and Rusk’s message, I would have urged the 
Government to make the decision to fight; but their communications pointed out not only 
that unilateral [Israeli] action would be catastrophic but also that the United States was 
continuing with its preparations for multilateral action to open the Gulf to shipping of all 
nations.  I could not forget that the letter was signed by the President who had once 
promised me face-to-face: “We will carry out whatever I ever promise you.”  I did not 
                                                 
54 Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 137. 
55 Quandt, "Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?" 214. 
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want him to come afterwards and say, “I warned you in advance and now you cannot 
make any claims whatever on the United States and its allies.”56  
 
The United States appeared to be telling Israel that not all options had been exhausted yet.  Or, in 
other words, the United States was not convinced that any use of force would really be a last 
resort.   
It was hypothesized in Chapter 5 that threats of grave danger or to a state’s existence 
would be countered with anticipatory military actions, regardless of the legal and normative 
constraints. This hypothesis was based upon the structural/strategic arguments.   The 
structural/strategic arguments about anticipatory military activities disregard what happens 
within the “black box” of the individual states, regarding them as irrelevant and inconsequential.  
As the crisis continued to escalate, and the threat became more severe and increasingly grave, 
according to this hypothesis, Israel should have taken anticipatory action at this point.  However, 
the statement of Eshkol clearly shows that the government of Israel was concerned about the 
repercussions of its actions—that it was constrained not by the distribution of power or other 
elements of the international “structure,” but by legal and normative principles, even if they were 
transmitted through a third party.  This aspect of the case will be discussed in more depth below. 
 While Eban was abroad consulting with others about the crisis, Eshkol was facing an 
increasingly restless domestic audience.  According to Brecher, “The Prime Minister knew that 
since the morning of 27 May, the General Staff had been expecting the decision to go to war: In 
contacts during the last two days, they had been led to understand that such a decision was 
imminent.”57  Eshkol was now faced with the unenviable task of informing the military that the 
government had decided to wait a little longer. 
                                                 
56 Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973, 147. 
57 Ibid., 149.  According to Kimche and Bawly, the army leadership was also skeptical as to how firm the 
US warnings really were: “they pointed to the fact that the Americans had not explicitly threatened Israel 
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 Accounts of the meeting between Eshkol and the generals show that the meeting did not 
go very well.  Brecher gives the following account of the meeting: 
[Eshkol] was told by Sharon, M. Peled, and Avraham Yaffee—with Allon, Rabin, and 
Bar-Lev standing aside silently—that there was no way to avoid war any more and that 
every day that passed might increase the losses.  The generals expressed their concern 
with the effect of further waiting on the IDF’s and the public’s morale, and the possible 
effect on the enemy; and Yariv particularly stressed the dangers of a first Egyptian strike.  
Eshkol, clearly shaken, tried to reassure the generals.  According to Bar-Lev, he 
answered substantially thus: “We have to have patience.  I am sorry that you feel the way 
you do.  It is necessary to continue negotiations, in order to exhaust all other possibilities, 
before going to war.  This was also necessary in order to avoid a repetition of the post-
Suez [1956] Crisis, when Israel was forced to withdraw.”58  
 
Again, the impact of the normative constraint—that the use of an anticipatory military activity be 
used as a last resort—was clearly operating at this point in the crisis.     
Stage 3: May 29 – June 4 
 The third, and final stage for this analysis, of the Six Day War crisis began on May 29.  
This stage began with an address to the Knesset by Eshkol.  In this speech, Eshkol summarized 
recent events, and detailed the actions that Israel took in response.  Eshkol stated, in part: 
These actions and statements have altered the political and security situation in the 
region.  Consequently, the Government has taken a series of political and defense steps 
designed to guarantee Israel’s vital interests.  The first condition for maintaining the 
peace and our interests is our military strength.  For that reason, with the Government’s 
consent, I have ordered the mobilization of the IDF’s reserves.  They are now ready to 
thwart the enemy’s plans on all fronts and borders. 
 
Members of the Knesset, the Government of Israel has stated on more than one occasion 
that it will exercise its right to freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf 
                                                                                                                                                             
with reprisals or sanctions if she went to war.  There was nothing like the tough line the United States had 
taken after the Suez War.  If the Americans had really been so anxious that Israel refrain from any action, 
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of Eilat, and will defend it if necessary.  That is a supreme national interest regarding 
which there can be no concession or compromise.  It is clear to us—and I think to the 
world, too—that as long as the blockade exists peace is endangered.  It is that grave 
situation, which I believe, obliges us first of all to clarify, with maximal urgency, with 
those Governments which undertook to support and implement freedom of navigation 
whether they are prepared to translate their commitments into action, in accordance with 
the international law which the Egyptian ruler has violated so blatantly. 
 
The purpose of the Foreign Minister’s brief visits to Paris, London and Washington was 
to clarify that question.  The Foreign Minister explained to the leaders of those countries 
that this is a matter of vital national importance and that we are resolved to ensure it, 
come what may.  From the Foreign Minister’s discussions it transpired that all the 
Governments with which he came into contact aspire to maintain the status quo which 
was recently broken.  The President of the U.S. and the Prime Minister of Britain issued 
firm public statements on the subject. 
 
The position of the U.S. is especially interesting, since in 1957 its government was the 
first to issue an undertaking to Israel, through diplomatic contacts, in a letter from then-
President and Secretary of State and in public statements at the U.N. and elsewhere. 
 
After having heard President Johnson’s statement of May 23 and our Foreign Minister’s 
report on his talks in Washington, the Government had the firm impression that the U.S. 
was unequivocally committed to ensuring freedom of navigation in those international 
waters.  A similar attitude was evinced by the Prime Minister of Britain, Mr. Harold 
Winston, in his public statement and in his talks with the Foreign Minister.  Other 
maritime nations have informed us of their readiness to support freedom of navigation 
effectively.  We have also been told that practical consultations are already being held on 
this issue.  Given these considerations, it is reasonable to expect that the countries which 
support freedom of navigation in principle will act effectively and quickly in order to 
ensure that the Straits and the Gulf will be open to the passage of the ships of their and 
other countries, without discrimination.  This expectation, which is based on explicit and 
official undertakings, has greatly influenced the position and actions of the Government 
at this stage.  There is no doubt that the expression of the Great Powers’ readiness to 
guarantee freedom of navigation has been influenced by both their principles and the 
knowledge that Israel will ensure its rights. 
 
Our obligation was, first of all, to test the international commitment, and this will become 
apparent in the next few days.  Israel regards the closing of the Straits as an act of 
aggression against it.  The Israel Government’s statement to the U.N. Assembly of 1 
March 1957 continues to express our policy.  We are currently involved in widespread 
political activity designed to restore freedom of navigation.  This activity would not have 
been possible and its chances would have been minimal had it not been for our own 
strength and the justice of our demand.  On the other hand, our mutual relations with the 
nations of the world have helped us to increase our strength and maintain our rights, and 
will continue to do so. 
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The Egyptian ruler’s announcement of the closure of the Straits, the terrorist activities, 
his aggressive intentions and the concentration of his army on our border have raised 
tension in the region to a peak.  Nasser has brought war dangerously near.  On various 
occasions I have reported to the Knesset and the nation about the IDF’s growing strength.  
Today our Army is at the height of its strength in manpower, knowhow, fighting spirit 
and weaponry.  Our attention must be focused not only on ensuring freedom of 
navigation but also on the danger of a military attack led by Egypt.  Anyone with eyes in 
his head can see that as long as the huge concentration of forces of Egypt and its allies 
remains on the borders there can be a conflagration at any moment.  Consequently, the 
IDF will remain armed and mobilized, ready for any test and, when necessary, able to 
repel any attack.59   
 
Eshkol’s address makes it clear that the Israeli government was prepared, if necessary, to use 
force to deal with the crisis, but was also committed to exploring all other alternatives first.  The 
question remained, however, as to how long Israel should, or could, wait.  Additionally, it would 
become increasingly difficult to determine how likely these other alternative were to be 
successful, and what the costs would be for waiting for their implementation. 
 The crisis escalated again on May 30, when Jordan’s King Hussein signed a defense 
agreement with Egypt.  For Israel, this represented the crossing of yet another red line, the 
placement of Jordanian troops under foreign military control.60   More and more the situation 
seemed to be one of impending war—and the Israelis were growing increasingly concerned.61  
According to Wagner, “As seen in Israel, the military union of two of the former enemies could 
serve no purpose but an attack on Israel.”62  
 At the same time, there was much confusion as to the stance of the United States.  
According to Quandt,  
To the Israelis, however, the lack of a new policy from Washington in the light of the 
new circumstances was tantamount to saying: “We’ve tried all of our alternatives and 
have nothing new to offer.”  The Israelis began to scrutinize Johnson’s messages for 
indications that he really wanted Israel to act unilaterally, provided the United States 
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would not be drawn in.  After all, what was really meant by the curios oft-repeated 
phrase: “Israel will only be alone if it decides to go alone.”  It was not quite an absolute 
prohibition.  It did not require a Talmudist to read into the phrase the hint of a “green 
light” to Israel—and there were plenty of Talmudists in Israel who were convinced that 
the United States policy was precisely that.  The multinational fleet was simply not 
plausible; and, besides, there were some reports that Eban had missed the point of 
Johnson’s talk, assuming a stronger commitment than was intended.  To check on these 
impressions and to follow up on earlier suggestions that intelligence liaison should be 
improved, the head of Israeli intelligence, Meir Amit, flew to Washington under an 
assumed name on May 30.63  
 
With King Hussein’s announcement coming just before Amit’s departure, it would provide a 
good opportunity for the Israelis to determine the depth of the American commitment—and one 
last opportunity to determine if all other courses of action had been depleted before military 
actions needed to be utilized to deal with the crisis. 
 While the decision to take anticipatory military action was not taken at the May 30 
Cabinet meeting, the seeds of such action were clearly in place at this time.  Wagner notes that 
conflicting versions exist about when the decision to “preempt” was taken, with some arguing 
that the decision was taken on May 30, while others maintain that while a hard decision was not 
taken at this meeting, it was clear “that the Cabinet majority for diplomatic action no longer 
existed after the May 30 pact although no actual vote was taken.”64   
 At the same time, Eshkol was faced with increasing pressures from within.  The 
government found itself having to justify to the military, and the people, its policy of waiting in 
the face of the escalating crisis.  While Eshkol, Eban, and other members of the Cabinet were 
willing to take virtually no action in response to what were seen as clear Arab provocations, 
members of the opposition and the military saw this a signs of Israeli weakness that would be 
exploited.  As a result of these domestic pressures, coupled with the rapidly escalating crisis, a 
national unity government was created, which brought members of the opposition formally into 
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the government.  On June 1, 1967 the national unity government was created, with a new 
Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan.65 
 Some point to the inclusion of Dayan in the government, who advocated the use of 
military strikes to deal with the crisis, as “a surrogate decision to launch the war.”66  Others, 
however, point to additional developments that smoothed the way for the decision to be made.  
Specifically, new messages, albeit through informal channels, arrived from the United States, 
that removed the last obstacle to taking military action.   
 According to Oren, there were four elements that helped erode the remaining hesitancy in 
the Israeli cabinet against taking military action.  The first was the prolonged inability of the 
United States to effectively mount an international flotilla to reopen the Straits.  It was quickly 
becoming apparent to all involved that the multilateral plan to open the Straits was not going to 
happen, regardless of the best intentions of those involved.  The numbers of states actively trying 
to implement the plan had significantly dwindled, and the plan was effectively irrelevant.   
The next element that influenced the Israeli government was, according to Oren, “an off-
the-cuff remark made by Secretary of State Rusk who, when asked whether the U.S. would 
continue restraining Israel, replied ‘I don’t think it’s our business to restrain anyone.’”67  
According to Bar-Zohar,  
On May 30 the United States began to wake up.  As soon as the agreement between 
Nasser and Hussein had been signed, the Americans realized that they had been on the 
wrong track.  Late that night Walt Rostow called Evron and confessed for the first time 
that he could see no solution.68  
 
This shows a marked shift from the previous American position, whereby the United States 
placed definite pressure on the Israelis not to take anticipatory action.   While the motives for this 
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shift are not under investigation here, it is important to note that such a statement was viewed in 
Jerusalem as a crucial element in the decision to take anticipatory action. 
Additionally, on June 1 Eban received “a document…which had a decisive effect on my 
attitude” that was from an American “known for his close contact with government thinking.”69  
According to Eban, the document stated, 
If Israel had acted alone without exhausting political efforts it would have made a 
catastrophic error.  It would then have been almost impossible for the United States to 
help Israel and the ensuing relationship would have been tense.  The war might be long 
and costly for Israel if it broke out.  If Israel had fired the first shot before the United 
Nations discussion she would have negated any possibility of the United States helping 
her.  Israelis should not criticize Eshkol and Eban; they should realize that their restraint 
and well-considered procedures would have a decisive influence when the United States 
came to consider the measure of its involvement.70  
 
Eban also adds,  
The American friend whose thinking seemed typical of the current Washington view 
understood that “time was running out ad that it was a matter of days or even hours.” But 
he believed that “if the measures being taken by the United States prove ineffective, the 
United States would now back Israel.”71  
 
Eban was one of the last holdouts for maintaining the diplomatic course, and this statement 
seems to have convinced him that diplomacy had run its course and it was now time to pursue 
other alternatives. 
 The final element that convinced the Cabinet that the time for diplomacy had ended came 
from another statement from an American to the Israelis.  According to Oren,  
Even “greener” was the light that Arthur Goldberg seemed to be giving Israel.  “You 
must understand that you stand alone and you have to know the consequences,” he 
imparted to Gideon Rafael, explaining that Regatta [the multilateral plan to open the 
Straits] was dead and that only Israel could meet the existential threat Nasser now posed.  
American and world opinion would favor Israel, Goldberg concluded, especially if the 
                                                 
69 Oren identifies this individual as Abe Fortas. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the 
Modern Middle East, 153. 
70 Eban, Abba Eban: An Autobiography, 384-85. 
71 Ibid., 385. 
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Arabs were to fire first.  “I understand that if you do act alone you will know how to 
act.”72  
 
With the messages of at least lukewarm support emanating from Washington, as opposed to the 
strongly worded warnings issued earlier in the crisis, the Cabinet felt less constrained about 
taking military action. 
 Additionally, on June 2, Eshkol sent another cable to de Gaulle asking for support.  
According to Bar-Zohar,  
The closing of the strait was in itself an act of aggression against Israel.  “We might have 
retaliated sooner,” Eshkol continued, “but we followed the advice of our friends, 
including you, and we decided to wait.  Unfortunately, the results of that decision have 
been disappointing.  The Soviet Union has rejected your proposal for a conference of the 
four powers, and the Security Council is again paralyzed by futile debate.  Destruction 
threatens Israel.  One-third of the Jewish people were exterminated by the Nazis, and now 
the question of our survival has come up again.”  The cable ended with a pathetic appeal: 
“It grieves us to see that until now, France, the land of liberty and of the highest ideals of 
humanity, did not let its voice be heard.  Mr. President, I beg you to act so that France 
may be heard, and show her loyalty to us as a friend and ally so that our friends as well as 
our enemies may see that your country is the friend and ally of Israel.”73  
 
In response, the French sent back a message that stated, in part, “France will give neither 
approval nor aid to whatever nation takes up arms for any reason, and fires the first shot.”74  It 
was thus clear to the Israelis that they were not going to change the minds of the French. 
The fact that the Cabinet was no longer afraid of condemnation by the United States does 
not mean that the government was not afraid of any condemnation that would arise from the use 
of anticipatory military action.  In fact, the opposite is true.  In the fateful Cabinet meeting where 
the decision to take anticipatory military action was made, the issue of international 
condemnation was raised and debated.  According to Oren, one minister suggested that Israel 
attempt to pass a ship through the Straits in order to officially establish a casus belli, one that 
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could not be denied vis-à-vis international law.  He offered the following rationale for this 
action:  
Better that one or two of our sailors get killed than that Israel get blamed for starting the 
war….I had no doubts about victory.  It was the day after victory that worried me.75  
 
It appears, however, that this fear now failed to convince the required majority needed to 
continue to delay military action.  According to Oren, Allon responded to the above fears by 
stating, “They will condemn us…and we will survive.”76  
 The Cabinet meeting of June 4 concluded with a formal vote that officially authorized the 
IDF to take anticipatory military action against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.  The resolution was 
passed unanimously.  The text of the resolution is as follows: 
After hearing a report on the military and political situation from the Prime Minister, the 
Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister, the Chief of Staff and the head of military 
intelligence, the Government ascertained that the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan are 
deployed for immediate multi-front aggression, threatening the very existence of the 
State. 
 
The Government resolves to take military action in order to liberate Israel from the 
stranglehold of aggression which is progressively being tightened around Israel. 
 
The Government authorizes the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister to confirm to 
the General Staff of the IDF the time of action. 
 
Members of the Cabinet will receive as soon as possible the information concerning the 
military operation to be carried out. 
 
The Government charges the Foreign Minister with the task of exhausting all possibilities 
of political action in order to explain Israel’s stand to obtain the support of the powers.77  
 
The decision was thus made to employ an anticipatory military action.  The Cabinet decision 
makes it very clear that the military response was in response to the aggressive acts taken by 
others, and that Israel viewed these acts as being a threat to its very existence.   
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From Diplomacy to Anticipatory Military Action 
 The Six Day War crisis raises a number of interesting, and important, questions vis-à-vis 
the interaction of structural/security, legal, and normative elements and anticipatory military 
activities.   According to Brecher, Allon wrote a paper dealing with preemption in the spring of 
1967, although it was not published until after the war.  In this paper, Allon wrote,  
I oppose a pre-emptive war morally and politically; morally, because as long as we can 
postpone the war without endangering Israel, there is no need to pre-empt, and by acting 
thus there is a possibility that the war will be postponed for many years….Politically it 
would be an historic mistake to become involved in an aggressive war.  In that case we 
would lose friends in the world and there is a possibility that we might face an embargo.78 
 
This passage clearly shows the predisposition against taking anticipatory action.  At the same 
time, however, Allon also maintained that Israel must still keep the option of taking anticipatory 
action open, in certain circumstances: 
Israel has the right—and even the obligation—to go to war in six possible situations: 
1. The concentration of offensive [Arab] forces which constitute a threat to Israel; 
2. when it seems that the enemy is preparing a surprise attack on Israel’s air bases; 
3. in case of an aerial attack on nuclear reactors and scientific institutions; 
4. when terror and shelling are of such a magnitude that passive defense and retaliatory 
acts could not overcome them; 
5. if Jordan joins a military alliance with any other Arab state and permits foreign troops 
to be stationed on her territory; [and] especially west of the Jordan River; 
6. if Egypt blockades the Straits of Tiran.79 
 
Allon’s writings show the dilemma that was faced by the Israeli leadership during this period.  
On the one hand, there was an acknowledgment that there were normative and legal constraints 
against taking anticipatory action.  On the other hand, there was also an argument to be made for 
“going first” in certain instances.  The question is, however, which side was more persuasive. 
On the whole, the Six Day War crisis tends to support the idea that states are constrained 
by the legal and normative elements up to a certain point, i.e., until the attack is about to happen, 
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or except when the state is faced with a sufficiently grave threat, such a threat to its existence.  If 
the normative and legal constraints were not operating on Israeli decision makers during the Six 
Day War crisis, or, in other words, if the process was dominated by the security/structural 
elements, anticipatory action should have occurred earlier in the crisis.   
In fact, there were three distinct points in the crisis where Israel could have taken 
anticipatory military action—indeed, instances where the security literature would predict that 
Israel would take anticipatory action.  The first opportunity came when Nasser imposed the 
blockade of the Straits of Tiran on May 22.  Not only was this a declared “red line” for the 
Israelis, one which they had gone to war over before, but it was also viewed as an act of 
aggression by other states, such as the United States and the United Kingdom.  According to the 
ideas found in the security literature, Israel should have taken anticipatory military action in 
response to the closure of the Straits, regardless of the position of other states in the system.   
The closure of the Straits was a direct challenge to one of Israel’s expressed casi belli.  A 
failure to act once one red line was crossed could erode Israel’s deterrent capability and serve to 
embolden Israel’s adversaries to engage in increasingly belligerent and risky policies, believing 
that no response would be forthcoming—which is exactly what happened.  But, instead of taking 
immediate action to deal with this threat, however, Israel was constrained by the legal and 
normative elements to attempt to try all non-military solutions first and work through legal 
institutions to try and find a solution to the crisis.  Spiegel argues that “The Israeli Cabinet 
concluded that if the Western community would establish the international status of the 
waterway through action, Israel could avoid force.”80  In this respect, the Israeli government was 
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clearly trying to work through the international community first, and only take unilateral action 
second.   
 The second opportunity for taking anticipatory military action came on May 25th with the 
receipt of information by Israeli intelligence with respect to the full deployment of the Egyptian 
4th Armored Division in the Sinai.  This event led the Israelis to conclude that the outbreak of 
war was a real possibility “at any moment.”81  The incentive to “preempt” such an attack was 
compounded the next day with Nasser’s speech when he declared that the battle that Egypt and 
Syria were preparing for would be “a general one and our objective will be to destroy Israel.”82  
In this instance, the incentives to engage in anticipatory action derived not as much from the 
need to maintain Israel’s deterrence capability, but instead from the elements of the “first-strike 
advantage.”   
According to the first-strike advantage, states that fear an impending attack or war with 
an adversary would be better off striking first rather than waiting and having to absorb an enemy 
attack.  The first-strike advantage was particularly salient for Israel in 1967 due to the small 
territorial size of the country and the fact that there was no “defense buffer” between its 
adversaries and its population centers.  But, at this stage in the crisis, the political costs—again, 
the operation of legal and normative constraints—of taking anticipatory action were seen as 
outweighing the potential benefits of taking anticipatory action, and the decision was made to 
continue pursuing non-military means of resolving the crisis. 
 The third opportunity to take anticipatory military action came on May 30 when it was 
announced that Jordan had signed a defense pact with Egypt.  The placement of Jordanian troops 
under the control of another country represented another “red line” for Israel and was viewed in 
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Israel as foreshadowing the outbreak of war.  Once again, according to the security literature, the 
first-strike advantage should have persuaded the Israelis to strike at this time.  However, they did 
not.  It is important to note, however, that unlike the two examples discussed above, after May 
30, consensus among the Cabinet to pursue diplomatic efforts began to evaporate.  In this 
respect, the events of May 30 may have tipped the scales so that the first-strike advantages began 
to outweigh the first-strike penalties that had kept the Israelis from acting in an anticipatory 
manner previously.   
 To be sure, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine exactly what the underlying 
motivations were for the decisions made during the crisis.  At the same time, however, there does 
appear to be support for the idea that the Israelis were at least influenced by international law and 
the normative aspects of the just war tradition.  For example, the fact that the Israeli leadership 
sought the support of multiple states in resolving the crisis, repeatedly appealed to the framework 
of international law vis-à-vis specific elements of the crisis, and repeatedly undermined its own 
strategic situation and ignored its own declared red lines in deference to the constraints imposed 
by the requirements of international law and the just war tradition are indicative of this influence.  
With respect to international law, Harkavy notes, 
Faced with military imperatives impelling it to preempt, it also had to face the widely 
held prevailing norms, however hypocritical on the part of many, about the illegitimacy 
of “aggression,” assumed to include preemptive action even where extreme provocations 
were involved, or for that matter even a “legal” casus belli in the form of a blockade.  
Needless to say, the almost monolithic hostility of the bulk of nations represented in the 
United Nations simply exacerbated its position. 
… 
Granted, the UN’s writ is neither binding nor enforceable in such matters and it is solely 
the threat of big-power intervention looming behind the resolutions which gives them any 
force….Nevertheless, it is apparent that Israel, long rendered altogether cynical by 
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lopsided UN declarations, still feels at least the psychological pressures of having to defy 
UN “votes” and resolutions in order to ensure its survival.83  
 
On the just war side, O’Brien states  
The means necessary to the defense of this just cause [the survival of the state] was a 
highly effective deterrence posture based on the credible threat of devastating preemptive 
action whenever the existence of Israel was in clear and present danger.  The probability 
of success in June 1967 was acceptable by just war standards, provided Israel could carry 
out a pre-emptive first-strike against Egyptian air power.  Anticipatory self-defense was, 
therefore, integral to the whole just war calculus. 
… 
The just war requirement of exhaustion of peaceful remedies, akin to the provisions of 
UN Charter Article 33, was certainly met, perhaps to a fault.  Eshkol’s and Eban’s efforts 
to resolve the crisis by diplomatic means apparently only increased the Arab appetite for 
aggression.84  
 
In this respect, the legal and normative elements were important, and did influence the Israeli 
decision-makers. 
 Additionally, the pivotal role of the United States in the crisis must be addressed.  Israeli 
leaders where particularly sensitive to the wishes of the American leadership—and were careful 
not to disregard explicit warnings given by the Americans.  From this perspective, the primary 
factor influencing Israel’s decision vis-à-vis the use of an anticipatory military action was only 
the position of the United States on the issue.  It was only after the Israelis believed that the 
Americans had given their tacit approval (or at least would not openly dissent to such a move) 
did the Israelis decide to employ the anticipatory military activity.  In this respect, it was only the 
patron-client relationship between the United States and Israel that determined what action was 
taken and when, with both sides paying lip service to international law and the just war tradition, 
but without really paying heed to either.    
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At the same time, however, it is also possible that American pressure was only one input 
into the Israeli decision-making calculus, albeit one that happened to follow a congruent 
trajectory with that of the legal and normative constraints discussed above.   In this respect, it is 
possible that when trying to decide what type of response to take with respect to the crisis, the 
Israeli leadership was concerned with both the United States as well as the constraints found in 
international law and the just war tradition.   
According to this perspective, it was not merely serendipitous that the “constraints” from 
the United States were lifted at the point when the Israeli leadership appeared to already be at the 
precipice of authorizing anticipatory action.  Rather, the shift in the American position was due 
to the same changes in the crisis that caused increased alarm among the Israeli leadership.  
Perhaps the same elements that caused increased alarm for the Israeli leadership also convinced 
the Americans to ease the constraints and restrictions on Israeli action.   
According to Handel, one of the key elements of the IDF’s strategic military doctrine is 
that the “IDF will undertake a pre-emptive (interceptive) attack if the security of the state is 
endangered.”85 While this may be the case, the IDF has been constrained by the political 
leadership from implementing this doctrine until the political leadership was satisfied that war 
was in fact the last resort and was truly imminent. 
Opting for the Middle of the Road: India’s Response in 1951 
 The second crisis to be discussed is called the Punjab War Scare I in the ICB crisis 
dataset.  According to the ICB crisis summary,  
India’s crisis was triggered on 7 July 1951 when Pakistan moved a brigade to within 15 
miles of the Kashmir district of Poonch.  These military movements, along with the 
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perception of talk of jihad (holy war) and the growing evidence of political instability in 
Pakistan, led Prime Minister Nehru to respond on 10 July with an order to move Indian 
troops to the Punjab border and to Jammu and Kashmir.  Leaves for Indian army officers 
were canceled. 
 
The crisis trigger was classified as a “non-violent military act,” thereby placing this crisis within 
the “imminent” threat category.  India’s decision to deploy troops in response to the crisis trigger 
was coded as an instance of an anticipatory military activity that did not include the use of force.  
In this respect, this crisis presents an interesting opportunity to explore a case where a state was 
faced with an imminent threat and decided to respond with a non-violent anticipatory military 
activity. 
 Unfortunately, very little information is available about this crisis.  As such, it is not 
possible to draw too many conclusions from this case.  What information is available, however, 
is instructive for the particular context of this study.  The only source located that deals 
specifically with this particular iteration of the protracted conflict between India and Pakistan, 
except for the ICB crisis summary, was Keesing’s Contemporary Archives.   
 From the material available in the Keesing’s account, it appears that the conflict was 
primarily dealt with through the exchange of letters and correspondence between the two parties 
as well as extensive communications and related activities conducted via the United Nations.  
The majority of this correspondence consisted primarily of tit-for-tat exchanges of accusations of 
the other side being the aggressor. 
 For example, Keesing’s provides the following summary of a July 15, 1951 press 
conference given by Liaquant Ali Khan:  
Mr. Liaquant Ali Kahn recalled at the press conference that over a year earlier smaller 
concentrations of Indian forces against Pakistan had led to so grave a situation that the 
two countries were brought to the brink of war.  He had therefore tried to persuade Mr. 
Nehru to agree to an effective “no war” declaration whereby all disputes between India 
and Pakistan would be settled by peaceful methods of negotiation, mediation, and 
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arbitration, but Mr. Nehru had unfortunately rejected this formula.  India, he declared, 
appeared “determined to flout the wishes of the Security Council by deliberately creating 
a situation inimical to a just and peaceful settlement,” and in pursuance of this objective, 
extensive propaganda had been started that the Pakistani pres was inciting to war against 
India, whereas in fact the Indian press and leaders were indulging in much more serious 
and violent incitement to war.  This had been followed by a publicity campaign designed 
to magnify a few minor border incidents beyond all proportion and out of their context, 
ignoring the fact that Indian forces along the cease-fire line had been responsible for 
“hundreds of incidents” during the previous 2½ years.  In the light of the heavy 
concentration of Indian forces which had taken place on Pakistan’s borders, it cold be 
seen that all this propaganda had been part of a preconceived plan and had been intended 
as a cover for the forward movement of Indian forces, but Pakistan, which had 
demonstrated her earnest desire for a just and peaceful settlement of her dispute with 
India, would not allow herself to be intimidated or influenced by any threat of force.86  
 
A summary of Nehru’s July 17, 1951 reply is also provided:  
Mr. Nehru, in his reply on July 17 to Mr. Liaquat Ali Kahn, said that the latter’s 
apprehensions were “completely unjustified,” as India’s policy continued to be “to 
preserve and ensure peace and to avoid war.” Although the Indian Government had 
demonstrated this last year by reducing the Army, “in the hope that this might have some 
effect on Pakistan,” “continued and intensive efforts” had been made to increase 
Pakistan’s armed forces, which had been largely massed on the Indian frontiers; an 
“intensive and astonishing campaign for a jehad and war against India” had been carried 
on in Pakistan,” not only in the press but by responsible authorities”; and during the 
previous five weeks raids into Kashmir across the cease-fire line and elsewhere had been 
intensified.  The Indian Government could not ignore “this continual talk of and 
preparation for war in Pakistan,” and therefore ordered certain troop movements for 
defensive purposes; they had no intention whatever of taking any aggressive action, but 
would resist any aggression against Indian territory.  The letter to Mr. Liaquant Ali Kahn 
concluded: “I would earnestly urge you to stop propaganda for jehad and war against 
India in Pakistan.  This will help more than anything else in improving relations between 
our two countries.”87  
 
Both countries ascribed aggressive motivations to the other, while at the same time announcing 
that they had no intention of taking “aggressive action” against the other. 
 No further escalation occurred during this crisis, and no violence was used by either side.  
While it is not possible to make any conclusive determination as to why India decided merely to 
deploy troops in response to the crisis trigger, as opposed to actually using military force, it is 
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important to note that according to the ICB data, India was not faced with either a threat of grave 
danger or a threat to its existence.  Rather, the Pakistani triggering event was classified as a 
“territorial threat.”  Perhaps this level of threat was not sufficient for the Indian leadership to 
warrant the use of an anticipatory military activity that included the use of force, but did call for 
the deployment of troops in case the situation worsened. 
 It is also instructive that both India and Pakistan made extensive use of the United 
Nations throughout the crisis.88  Combined with the series of diplomatic exchanges between the 
leaderships of the two countries, it appears as if both India and Pakistan were at least somewhat 
constrained by the legal and normative elements—particularly as embodied in the United 
Nations.  
Deciding to Wait: Israel in October 1973 
 As opposed to the two cases discussed above, the Israeli decision not to take any 
anticipatory action in October 1973 was not accompanied by any flurry of diplomatic activity or 
much political fanfare.  No major Knesset debates were held to discuss the likelihood of an 
impending attack by Israel’s Arab neighbors.  Diplomats were not sent on urgent missions 
around the globe to secure assurances of aid in the event of war, and no urgent appeal was made 
to the United Nations Security Council.  The simple reason for this lies in the fact that until the 
very last moment before the Arab attack began, Israeli decision makers and intelligence officials 
did not believe that such an attack was likely.  At the same time, however, it is important to 
stress that once these leaders realized that such an attack was likely, Prime Minister Meir was 
constrained against taking anticipatory action by the legal and normative elements.   
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 Regardless of the fact that conflicting intelligence was being received, some of it 
indicating that Egypt and Syria seemed to be preparing to attack,89 the political and military 
leadership failed to adjust their “attitudinal prism” away from the preexisting belief that war 
would not break out in the near future.  In fact, in what has become one of the most widely 
studied and analyzed events in Israeli history, many have argued that the decision to wait was not 
one of prudence, influenced by legal and normative concerns and constraints, but rather one of 
the greatest political, diplomatic, intelligence, and military blunders in Israeli history. 
At the time, Israeli political-military doctrine was based upon an idea known as 
“Ha’Conceptzia,” or The Concept.  According to this idea, Israeli decision makers were 
convinced that war would only break out if, and only if, certain conditions were met.  According 
to Haber and Schiff, there were two main elements of Ha’Conceptzia: 1) Egypt needed the 
ability to attack Israeli airbases with both surface-to-surface missiles and attack aircraft and 2) 
Egypt would not go to war without Syria and vice versa.90   And since these conditions were not 
met in September/October 1973, Israeli decision makers did not believe that war was a real 
possibility at that time.  Rodman also notes that “The Meir government, of course, neglected to 
consider the idea that the Arab world might accept defeat on the battlefield in order to advance 
its political agenda.”91  Additionally, up until October 5, the Israeli leadership was continually 
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reassured by the intelligence establishment that the likelihood of war in the near-term was low, if 
not negligible.92  
The utility of Ha’Conceptzia, and the problems associated with it, are not particularly 
relevant for the limited scope of this particular discussion.  What is important, however, is how 
Ha’Conceptzia dominated the decision-making process and influenced the leaders vis-à-vis the 
specific crisis under investigation.  It is also important to note that while the entrenched nature of 
Ha’Conceptizia played a crucial role in explaining the actions taken, it was not the only relevant 
factor.  Other elements, such as more recent interactions in the protracted conflict between Israel 
and the various Arab states (i.e., repeated and systematic mobilizations and escalations that failed 
to result in war), as well as changes in the relations between the superpowers, must also be taken 
into account.  Since no action takes place within a vacuum, it is impossible to isolate the sole 
cause, or input, that led to a certain policy being adopted.     
The contrasts with the situation in 1967 are striking.  In the face of similar stimuli, Israel 
took different actions.  Rather than trying to mobilize international support both bilaterally and 
through the use of international organizations in the face of increasingly disturbing signs of 
impending hostilities, Israeli leaders remained lackadaisical about the prospects of the outbreak 
of armed hostilities.  This does not mean, however, that when the time came to make the decision 
vis-à-vis the use of an anticipatory military activity that the Israeli decision makers were not 
influenced, or constrained, by the legal and normative elements.  In fact, as discussed below, 
when faced with the decision of whether or not to “preempt” the impending Egyptian and Syrian 
attack, Prime Minister Golda Meir was clearly constrained and influenced by the normative and 
legal elements.  
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Since the crisis itself was of a much shorter duration, there were fewer stages involved in 
its development and progression.  As a result, the analysis of the October 1973 crisis is not as 
detailed as the Six Day War crisis discussed above.  This fact, however, does not detract from the 
importance of the crisis for the testing of the hypotheses of interest.  Rather, it is merely 
indicative of the differing nature of the different crises. 
Crisis Progression and Development 
 According to the ICB case description, the October-Yom Kippur War crisis for Israel was 
triggered on October 5, 197393 by the following events: 
a movement of Egyptian forces toward the Suez Canal and a change from a defensive to 
an offensive posture….At the same time, Israel’s intelligence service belatedly reported 
an impending Egyptian attack across the Canal scheduled for the following day.94  
 
These crisis triggers were classified as being “non-violent military threats,” and thereby fit into 
the rubric of an imminent threat as defined in previous chapters.  Additionally, the crisis triggers 
are strikingly similar to those that precipitated the Six Day War and Punjab War Scare crises 
discussed above. 
 In the Meir government, most decisions were made by the “Kitchen Cabinet,” which 
included Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, and Minister 
without Portfolio Yisrael Galili.  Also participating in these small meetings was Chief of Staff 
David Elazar.   
 The pre-war crisis period was short lived, with the outbreak of fighting coming the next 
day, in the afternoon on October 6.  The major decision of consequence for this discussion was 
                                                 
93 Wagner notes that the crisis began on October 2, 1973 “with an announcement by the Egyptian press 
that a ‘high state of readiness’ by Egyptian forces was in effect along the Suez Canal.” Wagner, Crisis 
Decision-Making: Israel's Experience in 1967 and 1973, 151.  
94 Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Online, 2003 
<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/>. 
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made during this brief crisis period, in fact, it was made the day the war started—October 6.  
According to Handel’s timeline of the events of surrounding the Yom Kippur War, the decision 
not to take anticipatory military action was taken at about 9:30 in the morning on October 6.95  
 After the decision was made not to take anticipatory action, Meir informed the full 
Cabinet of the decision and gave instructions to inform the United States of Israel’s decision.96 
Schiff notes that “Golda and her ministers have just made a decision exceptional in the history of 
warfare; Israel is to announce to her enemies that she knows of their intention to attack, and even 
the hour when the offensive is to begin.”  He goes on to add that the “assumption is that the 
Arabs may be deterred at the last moment when they realize that their plans are known.”97 This 
strategy did not work, and the war commenced a mere four and half hours after the decision was 
made, with the first shots being fired at 1:55 in the afternoon.98  
Deciding Not to Take Anticipatory Action 
 According to Handel, there were multiple inputs that influenced the Israeli decision-
makers vis-à-vis the use of an anticipatory military activity in this crisis.  These elements 
included the IDF’s confidence, or in Handel’s words “overconfidence” in “its ability to 
overcome any attack.”99  Another element that contributed to the decision not to preempt was the 
altered geographical situation that developed as a result of the Six Day War.  In this respect,  
the new borders…gave the IDF more time to react to external threats, thereby making 
pre-emption less critical than before.  Given the general satisfaction with the status quo, 
anything less than a hundred percent guarantee of war was regarded as an insufficient 
                                                 
95 Michael I. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, Jerusalem 
Papers on Peace Problems no. 19 (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1976), 38. 
96 Golda Meir, My Life (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1975), 427. 
97 Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973, translated by trans. Louis Williams (Tel Aviv: 
University Publishing Projects Ltd., 1974), 42. 
98 Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, 38. 
99 Ibid., 51. (emphasis in original) 
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cause to risk a pre-emptive strike—one which the Israelis feared would become a self-
fulfilling prophecy.100  
 
Stein also discusses the importance of the new post-1967 strategic situation.  According to Stein, 
The change in the cease-fire lines in June 1967 removed centers of population from a 
direct line of fire and, in the south, provided a broad protective shield for defense on the 
ground.  For the first time, military and civilian leaders began to speak of ‘secure’ or 
‘defensible’ borders and reformulated concepts of deterrence and defense in response to 
changes in their strategic environment.  Most significant was the increased emphasis on 
deterrence, a new concern with unintended war, and a major debate about an appropriate 
strategy of defense.101  
 
Stein also discusses the role of the new borders and their impact on the use of anticipatory 
military activities: “Deputy Prime Minister Allon, one of the foremost exponents of a strategy of 
‘anticipatory counter-attack’ before 1967, argued in the spring of 1973 that a strong and secure 
boundary ‘….lessens, in comparison with the past, the need to employ a strategy of a pre-
emptive attack.’”102   
Herzog offers a similar perspective, stating “The depth afforded by the territories taken 
by Israel in the Six Day War gave the country for the first time in its history a strategic 
option.”103  Herzog goes on to argue that “The Israeli General Staff could therefore now exercise 
an option by either launching a pre-emptive attack if war seemed imminent or alternatively 
allowing the enemy the first-strike—with all the international political disadvantages of such a 
move accruing to him—and thereafter utilizing the depth afforded by the Sinai Desert to 
manœuvre, concentrate and counter-attack.”104  In this respect, Israeli leaders felt that they had 
more flexibility vis-à-vis the policy options now available.  The new borders allowed them the 
                                                 
100 Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, 51-52. (emphasis in 
original) 
101 Janice Gross Stein, "'Intelligence' and 'Stupidity' Reconsidered: Estimation and Decision in Israel, 
1973," The Journal of Strategic Studies 3, no. 2 (September 1980): 155. 
102 Ibid., 159. 
103 Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement: October 1973 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), 3. 
104 Ibid., 4. 
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option to absorb some limited fighting, and therefore lessened the pressure to use anticipatory 
military activities to ensure that the fighting occurred on the adversary’s territory. 
To be sure, these two elements are important, and indicate that there were important 
strategic and structural reasons why Israel did not use an anticipatory military activity.  But, 
according to Handel, these were not the primary influences.  Instead, Handel offers the following 
perspective: 
Without a doubt, however, the major cause for deciding not to pre-empt was linked to the 
third level of the international system, the international environment.  Israel’s dependence 
on the goodwill of the United States for the supply of weapons and spare parts, as well as 
for political and economic support, led Israel’s leaders to avoid pre-empting for fear of 
alienating the United States.  If Israel had successfully pre-empted, it would have 
appeared as the aggressor, thus forfeiting American support.  Given Israel’s isolation in 
the international system, it could not afford, at any cost, to estrange its only reliable ally.  
To a lesser degree, it was also important for Israel not to appear to other countries as the 
invader.105  
 
Stein echoes this argument, stating that not only were the new strategic boundaries an important 
element, but also “international political factors and the importance of great power support—
long a concern of Israel’s civilian leaders—militated against pre-emption”.106  
 Dayan offers the following description of the October 6 meeting when the decision on 
whether to take anticipatory action was taken: 
We were faced with four principal issues: mobilization of our reserves and reinforcement 
of the fronts; a possible pre-emptive strike by our Air Force; evacuation of children and 
women from our frontier settlements in the Golan Heights and delivery of a warning to 
Egypt and Syria.  There were two aspects to such a warning: it might move the two Arab 
states to call off their invasion.  But if they nevertheless went ahead, the United States 
would know who was responsible, and this might ensure her support for us.  At all 
events, it would avoid a situation in which America might believe that war could have 
been prevented but that, even though we had not initiated it, we had not done all in our 
power to forestall it.107  
 
Dayan goes on to add, 
                                                 
105 Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, 52. 
106 Stein, "'Intelligence' and 'Stupidity' Reconsidered: Estimation and Decision in Israel, 1973," 159. 
107 Ibid., 460. 
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I rejected the idea of a pre-emptive strike by the Air Force as well as the mobilization of 
more reserves than were required for immediate defense.  I feared that such moves would 
burden our prospects of securing the full support of the United States….And if American 
help was to be sought, then the United States had to be given full proof that it was not we 
who desired war—even if this ruled out pre-emptive action and handicapped us in the 
military campaign.108  
 
Brecher notes that Meir, with much cynicism, “made her calculation by drawing upon Israel’s 
experience in the 1967 crisis period, before the Six Day War, when, even with Nasser’s 
provocative acts, ‘we witnessed the ‘great support’ given to us by the whole world.’”109  Israeli 
leaders remembered what had happened during the period before and after the Six Day War, and 
they did not want to have to go through that again. 
 Much has been written about the Yom Kippur War being the quintessential “intelligence 
failure.”110  And part of this fits with the decision not to take anticipatory action: the signs of an 
impending attack were so clearly evident, how could any competent leader fail to take action to 
forestall such an attack?  Without digressing too much, it is worth noting that during the two 
years that preceded the Yom Kippur War, a cycle of Arab mobilizations and alerts—but without 
actual war erupting—had taken place.  In fact, according to Handel, during this period  
a ‘cry wolf’ situation developed at least three times: at the end of 1971 – [Sadat’s] ‘year 
of decision’; in December 1972; and in April-May 1973.  From Israel’s point of view, a 
continuous reaction to such false alarms was too expensive, and was viewed as part of an 
Arab war of nerves.  The cumulative effect of those false alarms had a negative impact on 
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Israel’s alertness and attention, and also contributed to the underestimation of Arab 
capabilities.111  
 
Schiff describes the situation in the following manner: 
Israeli intelligence data fell on deaf ears.  There was no willingness to accept facts at face 
value.  Perhaps Israeli commanders understood what was going on, but they built an 
impenetrable psychological wall around themselves.  Intelligence Branch now became 
part of an almost inevitable process; instead of influencing they were influenced.  They 
served as good eyes and ears, but the brain and heart assumed that the Egyptians would 
not dare start a war—as long as Sadat frequently promises it and doesn’t deliver.112  
 
In such a situation, the Israeli leadership needed to be absolutely certain that an attack was going 
to actually occur before taking anticipatory action.  Wagner describes the situation in the 
following manner: 
In short, alerts and mobilizations by the Arab states, principally Egypt and Syria, came to 
be viewed as part of the “normal” course of events, and not reflecting a separate crisis 
level as before.  Thus, while Israeli intelligence continued to provide accurate 
information on such developments, it came to be interpreted as ebb and flow rather than 
in crisis terms.113  
 
The fact that the recent interactions between Israel and the Arab states had been characterized by 
repeated increases in hostile rhetoric and troop mobilizations, but without an actual outbreak of 
armed hostilities, complicated the situation for the Israeli leaders.   
 The existing intelligence estimates of both Israel and the United States, coupled with 
elements of Ha’Conceptzia produced a situation that led Israeli leaders to downplay the 
possibility of the outbreak of war in the near term.  The repeated mobilizations and deployments 
of Arab forces over the previous two years—i.e., escalations that did not culminate in war—
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created an even more difficult situation for Israeli decision makers.114 On the one hand, these 
actions seemed to reinforce the dominant perceptions—that the Arabs were not prepared for war, 
but were instead hoping to provoke Israel into striking first.  Additionally, these elements 
reinforced the reluctance to go against the legal and normative traditions against taking 
anticipatory action.  On the other hand, however, these same actions, and the sense of 
complacency they induced within Israel, left Israel vulnerable to the type of surprise attack that 
was carried out by Egypt and Syria. 
International Law, Just War, & Golda Meir 
Unlike the Six Day War, in this case there was not a long pre-war crisis period.  If the 
crisis trigger was grave enough, this shortened pre-war crisis period could buttress the strategic-
based rationales for the use of anticipatory military activities.  Or, in other words, in this type of 
crisis, if the threat is grave enough and the time frame is compressed to such an extent that the 
actor does not have the luxury of dillydallying with diplomatic niceties, such as Eban’s world 
tour in May/June 1967, the first-strike penalty could be eliminated, thus removing the constraints 
against taking anticipatory action.   
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At the same time, such a compressed crisis could create a situation where the use of an 
anticipatory action would be consistent with the requirements of the legal and normative 
traditions.  If the crisis was precipitated by actions that were seen as foreshadowing an imminent 
attack, there is legal support for acting in an anticipatory manner.  With respect to the normative 
element, as Walzer argued, last resort does not mean that everything needs to be tried, but 
everything that has a good likelihood of working needs to be tried.  In this respect, if the crisis 
period is sufficiently compressed, and if war appears to be truly imminent in a matter of hours, 
does not the issue (i.e., constraint) of last resort collapse as well?   
But, in the October-Yom Kippur War crisis, the compressed nature of the crisis did not 
sway the Israeli leadership towards the use of an anticipatory military activity.  Meir explicitly 
rejected using anticipatory military actions to deal what was by then known to be an imminent 
threat of attack by Egypt and Syria.  Moreover, her rejection of these activities was based 
primarily, if not solely, on both normative and legal elements: she did not want Israel to be seen 
as the aggressor.  
The actions of the Israeli leadership during the period leading up to the outbreak of the 
October-Yom Kippur War are indicative of how low the threat was truly perceived to be in 
Israel.  In sharp contrast with the crisis leading up to the outbreak of the Six Day War, there were 
no major Knesset debates regarding the prospect of war, and no full cabinet sessions on the 
matter.  In fact, the decision not to take anticipatory action was taken by Meir at a meeting of the 
“Kitchen Cabinet,” attended only by Meir, Allon, Dayan, Elazar, and Galili, as opposed to during 
a meeting of the full Cabinet.115  
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As was the case in the Six Day War crisis, the Israeli leadership was again influenced by 
the legal and normative constraints, as well as by the United States, against taking anticipatory 
military action.  In this case, however, these constraints pushed the Israelis against taking action.  
According to Brecher, “The decision not to pre-empt was defined by the Prime Minister as a 
political decision, influenced mainly by prior experience, especially 1967, when Israel was 
accused of starting the Six Day War.”116  Brecher goes on to add that Meir later stated,  
I regret not launching it [an interceptive strike] because there is no doubt that the 
[military] position would have been much better.  I do not regret [the decision]…because 
at least we do not have that argument with the world.117  
 
Brecher also adds that Meir also stated during the war, “Will anyone dare, this time…to say the 
truth, that responsibility for this awful war rests with them [the Arabs]?”118  Wagner reports that 
Meir stated, “This time it has to be crystal clear who began, so we won’t have to go around the 
world convincing people our cause is just.”119  
 In this respect, it is clear that the issue of culpability for initiation of the hostilities was of 
primary importance for the Israeli government—Israel did not want to be seen as the aggressor, 
or as “breaking the rules” in the eyes of the United States or the international community.  At the 
same time, however, it is important to note that the elevation of the legal and normative elements 
above the strategic ones came only after Meir was assured that Israel’s survival was not at 
risk.120  Again, according to Brecher, 
There appears to have been a third perceptual component in the Prime Minister’s 
approach to the decisional problem of pre-emption.  Three times during the 6 October 
morning meeting she asked Elazar and Peled whether Israel’s survival would be placed in 
jeopardy—and whether there would be long-run military disadvantages—if the decision 
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were not to pre-empt.  When they answered in the negative, her primary concern was set 
at rest, and the two external inputs—U.S. reaction and world opinion—held sway.121  
 
The influence of the United States and “world opinion” are not necessarily wholly distinct and 
separate inputs.  Rather, they can be viewed as component parts of a larger element.  To be sure, 
the United States was viewed as being more important, and it’s opinion carried more weight in 
Jerusalem, but the opinion of other actors in the system could not be dismissed out of hand 
either.  Rather, both elements were important in the decision-making process that ultimately 
culminated in the decision not to take anticipatory action in October 1973.    
This account supports the hypothesis that the constraints inherent in the legal and 
normative traditions are not total or absolute, but can be mitigated or limited if the strategic 
situation is grave enough.  But, on the other hand, if the strategic situation is such that the 
survival of the state is not at risk, or if the threat is not of a similarly grave level, the state may, in 
fact, be constrained by the legal and normative elements.  
Imminent Threats & Anticipatory Actions: Are States Constrained? 
 The case studies presented above indicate that states tend to be constrained by the legal 
and normative prohibitions against taking anticipatory military activities, at least to a certain 
point.  As expected, states do appear to be constrained against taking anticipatory military 
activities unless the threat is both a) imminent and immediate and b) sufficiently grave to warrant 
losing potential support from friends and allies.  Making that determination, however, is quite 
difficult—and is one of the primary difficulties facing leaders.  If these two conditions are not 
met, however, the constraints against anticipatory military activities contained in international 
law and the just war tradition do appear to have a restraining effect on states’ behavior. 
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 It is important to note that both conditions, the imminence and gravity of the threat, are 
crucial elements of the equation.  As the October 1973 case illustrates, imminence alone is not 
sufficient to override the legal and normative costs of taking anticipatory military action. 
 Additionally, as the Punjab and the October 1973 cases both demonstrate, it is often 
difficult for leaders to determine what constitutes an “imminent” threat.  In both of these cases, 
the leaders were presented with situations that were strikingly similar to previous conflicts that 
did not culminate in the eruption of war.  How were the leaders to know if this time would be 
different?  How are leaders to know if the adversary’s rhetoric and actions are to be taken 
seriously, i.e., indications of intentions to strike, or are merely evidence of posturing and bluster?  
The same can be said with respect to the defender’s use of rhetoric with respect to international 
law.  To be sure, these are amongst the most intractable—and important—questions that face 
international relations and foreign policy scholars, and as such they are not, and cannot be, 
answered here.   
But what does become clear from these cases is that with respect to undertaking an 
especially risky alternative (launching an anticipatory military action), leaders seem to need 
more than just merely a “feeling” that war is likely.  In other words, it appears that before states 
are willing to use anticipatory military activities to counter an imminent threat, they need to be 
sure that the threat is real—i.e., they need some hard evidence that the attack is about to come.  
However, it needs to be emphasized again that even this evidence is not enough to convince 
states to engage in these activities. 
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CHAPTER 8: STRATEGIC NECESSITY, LAW, AND NORMS III  
ANTICIPATORY MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND DISTANT THREATS 
 
 Chapter 7 focused on the use/non-use of anticipatory military activities to counter 
imminent threats.  This chapter shifts the focus away from imminent threats and looks at how 
states have responded to crises precipitated by more distant threats.  All three cases examined in 
this chapter were triggered by events classified in the ICB dataset as “external change.”  This 
variable is defined as an “intelligence report, change in specific weapon, weapon system, 
offensive capability, change in global system or regional subsystem, [or] challenge to legitimacy 
by international organization.”1  In this respect, the threat that initiated the specific crisis was not 
imminent in nature, but rather was more distant, i.e., could develop in the future.  Traditionally, 
military actions taken to deal with these types of threats have been labeled “preventive,” or, in 
other words, the action is intended to prevent the threat from fully emerging or developing. 
 The divide between imminent and distant threats is crucial vis-à-vis both international 
law and the just war tradition.  As was discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, there is general consensus 
that anticipatory action taken in response to an imminent threat is legitimate, while there is more 
debate amongst scholars as to the legitimacy of anticipatory action taken in response to a more 
distant threat.  This is not to say that there is no support for anticipatory action taken in response 
to a more distant threat, but merely that this support is not as widespread.  At the same time, 
however, it is essential to stress that the point of this chapter is not assess the legality or 
legitimacy of the actions taken by the individual states with respect to the particular crises 
studied.  Rather, the primary goal is to try and ascertain, to the extent possible, if the leaders 
were influenced and constrained by the legal and normative elements when deciding how to deal 
with the specific crises. 
                                                 
1 Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Online, 2003 
<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/>. 
 222
 As with Chapter 7, three cases will be examined in this chapter, each representing a 
different type of response to the same type of triggering event.  The first case is the Israeli strike 
on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981 (Iraq Nuclear Reactor), the second is the US naval 
quarantine of Cuba in October-November 1962 (Cuban Missiles), and the third is the US 
decision to take no military action after receiving reports concerning the construction of a Soviet 
submarine base in Cuba in September 1970 (Cienfuegos Submarine Base).  The first case is an 
example of an anticipatory military action (AMA) that included the use of force, the second is an 
example of an anticipatory military action that did not include the use of force (ANTNVIOL), 
and the third a “no response” case. 
Striking the Reactor: The Israeli Raid on Osiraq in June 1981 
 On June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air Force destroyed the Osiraq nuclear reactor2 located 
outside Baghdad.  According to the ICB case information, the crisis began in January of 1981, 
when the French announced that the reactor would become fully operational as of July 14.  Not 
only was this operation the first time that a state successfully destroyed the nuclear facility of 
another state, but it is also commonly viewed as being the textbook example of the use of 
preventive military force as a counter-proliferation tool.3  
Israeli concerns about the Iraqi nuclear project were voiced as early as January 1976.4  
On January 27, 1976, the matter was brought before the Knesset.  During the debate that ensued, 
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MK Nof gave details of the type of reactor that was under construction, as well as why Israel was 
concerned about the Iraqi project: 
The nuclear fuel used by the reactor is 93 percent enriched uranium and the core of the 
reactor is approximately seven pounds of uranium 235.  Plutonium can be manufactured 
by a sophisticated reactor of this kind.  Both the plutonium and the enriched uranium can 
serve as nuclear explosives. 
 
Five pounds of plutonium are sufficient to produce an atom bomb of approximately ten 
kilotons, the same size as the one dropped on Hiroshima…. 
 
Apart from the plutonium, which requires a complicated separation installation, the bomb 
can be manufactured from enriched uranium.  The latest information is that the French 
company which looked for uranium deposits in Iraq found a rich field there.  Thus, if the 
plot to establish the nuclear center in Iraq is not foiled, that country will have technical 
knowhow, trained personnel and bombs….Iraq is one of the countries which waged war 
on Israel in 1948.  It refused in 1949, and still refuses, to sign an armistice agreement 
with Israel.  It conducts public hangings, massacres the Kurdish people, and its rulers are 
unstable and irresponsible….5 
 
During the same session, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon stated,  
With alertness and concern, the Government of Israel is keeping track of the cooperation 
between Arab countries and countries with advanced nuclear technology.  We have 
warned those countries of the dangers involved in giving nuclear technology to countries 
which could use it for aggressive purposes in the region.6  
 
The matter was then referred to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.  In this respect, 
Israel put the world on notice a full five years before it acted that it considered the Iraqi reactor 
to be a significant threat.   
Additionally, Israel would spend the next five years trying to convince other states of the 
threat posed by the Iraqi reactor and get the project stopped.  According to Perlmutter, et al., on 
September 14, 1980,  
In the midst of Israeli diplomatic pressures aimed at limiting assistance provided to the 
Iraqi project by France and Italy, Deputy Defense Minister Zipori publicly warns: “We 
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will explore all legal and humane avenues.  If pressure doesn’t work, we will have to 
consider other means.”7  
 
The attack on the reactor was not the proverbial bolt out of the blue, so to speak, but rather came 
at the end of a prolonged period of concerted effort by the Israelis to try to get the project halted.8  
Only after these efforts failed did Israel decide to strike the reactor.  Accordingly, a brief 
discussion of the other avenues pursued is helpful in understanding why Israel eventually took 
the anticipatory action it did.    
Watching, Waiting, and Warning: 1974 – 1980 
 According to Feldman, there were five elements that were central to Israel’s belief that 
Iraq was trying to develop a nuclear weapons program as opposed to merely working to develop 
a civilian power source.  These elements included: 
 first, Iraq’s initial desire to purchase the non-economical but [a] plutonium-
producing gas-graphite power reactor from France; 
 second, its purchase of a 70 megawatt (thermal) Material Testing Reactor, an 
extremely odd move for a nation not involved in the indigenous production of 
power reactors; 
 third, Iraq’s insistence that the Osiraq reactor be fuelled by 92 percent-enriched 
weapons-grade uranium rather than by the less enriched “Caramel” fuel; 
 fourth, its purchase of some 250 tons of natural uranium, which, given the other 
components of Iraq’s nuclear program, makes little sense unless plutonium 
production was intended; and, 
 fifth, the acquisition of plutonium-separation “hot cell” simulators from Italy.9  
 
Meanwhile, the development of the Iraqi reactor project was closely monitored by Israel. 
At the first stages of the development, in the winter of 1974-1975, Israeli military 
intelligence (AMAN) and Israeli foreign intelligence (Mossad) viewed Iraq’s nuclear project 
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8 It is interesting to note that the June 1981 air strike is not believed to be the first time Israel used force 
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and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad, xxxiv. 
9 Shai Feldman, "The Bombing of Osiraq-Revisited," International Security 7, no. 2 (Autumn 1982): 115. 
 225
“high in their order of priorities, although at this stage the project is not regarded as an imminent 
threat.”10  In 1976, the issue was brought before the Knesset, but did not become a central 
element within the Israeli security agenda at this time.   
 The French-Iraqi “nuclear cooperation agreement” was finalized on April 4, 1976, and 
after this point, the Israelis brought the issue to the United States, asking “that all possible steps 
be taken to prevent the implementation of that agreement.”11  According to the report issued by 
the Israeli Government, during the course of 1976, “the United States administration shared 
Israel’s concern about various aspects of the transaction, and that it apparently had approached 
the Government of France for clarifications.”12  
  In February 1977, Foreign Minister Allon met with an Iranian official.  Reports differ as 
to the substance of the meeting.  Perlmutter, et al., report that the meeting was intended to 
determine if there was interest in “possible Israeli-Iranian cooperation against the Iraqi nuclear 
project.” According to this account, “The Iranian response is lukewarm.”13  Nakdimon offers a 
different version of Allon’s visit.  According to Nakdimon, Allon went to Iran seeking 
information about Iraq’s nuclear program.  The Iranians, however, were not very forthcoming 
with such information, beyond confirming that the French were assisting in the building of a 
nuclear research facility, which served to further alarm the Israelis.14 In March 1977, Allon met 
with French Foreign Minister de Guiringuad.  During these meetings, Allon told the French that 
the Israelis were concerned that the Iraqis would be able to produce weapons-grade materials 
                                                 
10 Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad, xxx. 
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with the proposed reactor.  The French, however, remained convinced that sufficient safeguards 
existed to prevent such an occurrence from happening.15    
 In May 1977, the right-wing Likud party won the national elections for the first time and 
Menachem Begin became prime minister.  As a result of these elections, a new cast of characters 
were involved in the leadership of the Israeli government.  One of the first elements on Begin’s 
agenda was a meeting in early June with the directors of both AMAN and the Mossad 
concerning Iraq’s nuclear project.  This commitment would be extended in November with the 
establishment of a permanent committed designed specifically to deal with this “Iraqi threat.”  
The primary duty of the committee was “to estimate, on the basis of intelligence information, the 
status of the Iraqi project and to find ways to hinder the Iraqi road to achieving nuclear 
capability.”16  
 The first security cabinet meeting concerning the Iraqi reactor was held on August 23, 
1978.  Among those participating in this meeting were Prime Minister Begin, Deputy Prime 
Minster Yigal Yadin, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, Deputy 
Defense Minister Mordechai Zipori, Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon, and Finance Minister 
Simha Ehrlich.  Additionally, Lieutenant-General Raphael Eitan, Chief of Staff of the Israel 
Defense Force (IDF), Military Intelligence Director Shlomo Gazit, Military Intelligence’s expert 
on the Iraqi project Colonel David Bnaya, Director-General of the Israeli Atomic Energy 
Commission Brigadier-General (res.) Uzi Eilam, and Nahum Admoni, who was in charge of the 
committee charged with following the progress of the Iraqi project were also in attendance.   
Opinions were divided among those present at the meeting as to how the issue should be 
dealt with.  Sharon advocated “that Israel regard any Arab attempt to develop or acquire nuclear 
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weapons as a clear casus belli to be met with appropriately forceful means.”17  At this time, 
however, support for the military option was limited to Sharon and Ehrlich.  Others at the 
meeting, particularly Yadin, expressed concerns that the threat was not yet immediate, and that 
the costs of an attack at this point would outweigh the benefits, i.e., there would be a significant 
first-strike disadvantage in that the political costs would be significant.  From this perspective, 
there was no time pressure to strike at the moment, and other alternatives could be pursued first.  
At the same time, however, the military option was not dismissed, and the Israeli Air Force 
(IAF) began to develop both operational and technical plans for the destruction of the reactor.18  
 Israeli leaders repeatedly and routinely expressed their concerns about the Iraqi reactor to 
both French and American officials.  During a February 1979 visit to Paris, Foreign Minister 
Dayan broached the issue with French leaders but was unable to persuade them to halt the 
project.  At the same time, Dayan also expressed concern about the continued animosity and 
hostility towards Israel expressed by Iraq, its increased arms purchases, and its increasingly close 
ties with the Soviet Union.19   
 In July 1980 Foreign Minister Shamir met with the French Chargé d’Affaires in order “to 
officially express Israel’s ‘profound concern’ over the Osiraq reactor.” In response, “France 
denied that any real danger of nuclear proliferation existed at Osiraq and a day later replied that 
‘Iraq, like any other country, has the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and [France] 
does not see any reason for this right to be refused.’”20  The United States was also consulted vis-
à-vis the Iraqi reactor during this period, with the Israelis asking the United States “to make 
every possible effort to prevent Iraq from acquiring a military nuclear potential.”  According to 
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the Israeli Government report, “In those contacts U.S. officials left little doubt that they viewed 
Iraq’s nuclear development with concern.”21  
 Shamir also met with Italian officials concerning the Iraqi program during the summer of 
1980.  The Israeli Government report notes that in his meetings with Italian Foreign Minister 
Colombo, Shamir 
pointed out that Iraq’s hostility towards Israel, the character of its regime, its declared 
intention of destroying Israel and its active participation in three wars against Israel since 
1948, all obliged Israel to express its deepest concern that Iraq was given a massive 
destructive capability.  In view of the above, [Shamir] called upon the Government of 
Italy to refrain from strengthening Iraq’s capacity to endanger Israel’s existence.22  
 
The Italian Government replied that its cooperation with Iraq was scientific in nature, and was in 
compliance with the requirements of the NPT.  Additionally, Italy assured Israel that if it became 
apparent that the nuclear program was not designed for scientific purposes, its assistance would 
be terminated.23  
 In September 1980, Shamir met again with French leaders.  In this meeting, Shamir 
raised concerns about a nuclear Iraq, particularly in light of the Iran-Iraq War, which had 
recently erupted.  Shamir argued that the outbreak of the war “highlighted the extremist and 
aggressive character of Iraq, and…made Iraq’s pursuit of a military nuclear capability even more 
disturbing.” The French, however, were not persuaded: 
The Foreign Minister of France emphasized that, although he understood Israel’s 
concern, France did not share it.  He added that France furnished Iraq with nuclear 
technology and equipment for research purposes and that its nuclear cooperation with 
Iraq was based on France’s evaluation that Iraq had no plans to manufacture nuclear 
weapons—at least not at that stage—though he could not take a stand with regard to 
possible developments in the distant future.  He further stated that, in his country’s 
judgment, the alternative of withholding nuclear technology from Iraq was 
unacceptable.24  
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The matter was raised again with French leaders in both October 1980 and January 1981, 
although to no avail. 
Regardless of the assurances provided by France about the “peaceful nature” of the Iraqi 
nuclear program, in Israel concerns remained about the ultimate aim of the reactor.  These 
concerns can be traced to both the type of technology acquired as well as the rhetoric of the Iraqi 
regime.   
On the technological side, the primary concern was that the equipment purchased was 
intended for the production of fissile material.  Additionally, the Israelis were unconvinced that 
the IAEA safeguards connected with the reactor would be sufficient to prevent the diversion of 
these materials to military projects.  Shoham notes that not only were several weeks notice 
needed before any inspections could take place, but all inspectors had to apply for visas before 
they could enter Iraq to conduct inspections.25 Additionally, there are three important limitations 
with respect to the agreement reached between Iraq and the IAEA with regards to inspections: 
a) Inspection is intermittent and advance notice is given prior to the arrival of inspectors.  
This would have permitted Iraq to load Osiraq with natural uranium following each 
inspection and to unload it before the next.  In this way, Iraq could have produced 
plutonium without the fear of being detected by IAEA inspectors. 
b) Inspection procedures permit the use of television or photographic surveillance for 
monitoring between inspection visits.  However, no such measures are foreseen under 
the present safeguards approach for [Materials Testing Reactors] such as Osiraq.  As 
a result, no means are available to provide any indication of diversion between 
inspections.  
c) The NPT does not provide for the possibility of carrying out special inspections on 
the basis of accusations.26  
 
Additionally, since the IAEA has no enforcement powers of its own, and the United Nations 
Security Council would have to approve any sanctions—an outcome that appeared unlikely due 
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to Soviet support for Iraq—the Israeli government stated that “Iraq could also abrogate its 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA—with no known back-up safeguards in force—without 
fear of sanctions or of incurring any other major risks.”27 As a result of these limitations, 
Feldman concludes that “Israel’s decision to preempt the Iraqi program was clearly based on the 
assessment that these safeguards would not be an effective barrier to Iraq’s efforts.”28  
Concerns also arose as a result of Iraqi statements and rhetoric.  For example, in 1975, 
Saddam Hussein was reported as explicitly linking Iraq’s purchase of a nuclear reactor as “the 
first Arab attempt at nuclear arming.”29  Additionally, another Iraqi leader stated: 
The Arabs must get an atomic bomb.  The countries of the Arab world should possess 
whatever is necessary to defend themselves.30  
 
In this respect, Iraqi statements backed up Israeli fears that the nuclear reactor was designed for 
military purposes.   
At the same time, the Israelis were clearly concerned that they would be the ultimate 
target of the nuclear weapons eventually produced by this reactor.  Iraq had been a participant in 
multiple wars with Israel, and, unlike other Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, had 
never signed a formal armistice with Israel.  As such, Iraq was still “technically” at a state of war 
with Israel.  In this respect, the legal elements were seen as somewhat different as opposed to the 
Israeli cases presented in the previous chapter.  This is not to imply that the legal elements were 
not considered by Israeli leaders, but rather that in this case the legal elements were viewed from 
a different perspective: instead of operating in a situation where the crisis was precipitated by an 
adversary who had signed an armistice, and therefore was not technically still engaged in 
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hostilities with Israel, in this case, the adversary was not a party to any formal termination 
agreement.  The role of international law in the decision to strike is discussed in more depth 
below.   
An additional source of concern for Israel was the fact that Iraqi leaders had joined 
repeatedly called for the destruction of Israel.  In an interview published on January 31, 1980, 
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hamadi stated,  
Iraq cannot agree to the existence of Zionism – neither as a movement nor as a 
state….The Arab nation cannot agree to the amputation of any part from its 
body…because the land of Palestine is an Arab land and we cannot conceive giving it 
up….The struggle against Zionism is for us a struggle in which there can be no 
compromise.31  
 
On March 27, 1980, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein told the “National People’s Conference” in 
Baghdad 
I do not think that there is anyone who believes that the monstrous Zionist entity 
conquering our land really constitutes a state.  On the contrary, we disagree with some 
Arab regimes and organizations because of our belief that Arabs must not give their 
signature and agreement to the monstrous Zionist entity, even within the borders of 5 
June 1967.32  
 
To be sure, the Iraqis were not alone using this type of rhetoric vis-à-vis Israel.  Calls for Israel’s 
destruction, or the destruction of the “Zionist entity,” were not new and had long been a 
rhetorical tool used by many Arab leaders.  However, Iraq was the only Arab state that was 
actively pursuing the development of an atomic program.33   
Additionally, after the October 1973 War (in which Iraq was a participant), Iraq rejected 
the idea of any form of political settlement with Israel, becoming part of the “rejection front.”   
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The rejection front was a group of Arab states and Palestinian groups that argued that the conflict 
with Israel could only be solved by Israel’s destruction—not through diplomatic channels.  
According to Sela, the underlying motivation for many members of the rejection front was Pan-
Arab nationalism, and a fear that “the diplomatic process would lead to effective legitimization 
of Israel by the Arab states…”34 Since Iraq was one of the leading members of the rejection 
front,35 along with Libya, it is clear why the Israelis would feel threatened by Iraq’s attempts to 
acquire nuclear technology—and why they would try to get their friends and allies to help 
prevent this from happening. 
The combination of the failure of Iraq to sign any armistice agreement with Israel and the 
consistently belligerent rhetoric coming out of Baghdad created a situation that caused great 
alarm in Israel.  For the Israelis, these two elements indicated the hostile intent of the Iraqi 
regime.  In this respect, the attempt to acquire a nuclear capability took on additional 
significance. 
While the diplomats were working to get the project stopped through official channels, 
less “official” channels were also at work on the matter. In the summer of 1980, the Israelis 
began a concerted public relations campaign against the Iraqi nuclear program.  The Israeli 
media was replete with articles with headlines including “A nuclear Arab bomb: A casus belli 
for Israel?” and “Israeli regards the French adventure [in Iraq] as introducing the Middle East to 
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the age of the first nuclear strike”.36  The message was clear: “As Time magazine put it, Israel 
had given a silent warning that if it considered Iraq close to reaching the bomb, it might use a 
pre-emptive strike on Iraq’s nuclear facility.”37  
Much of Israel’s diplomatic maneuvering, both formal and informal, and was done 
publicly, to such an extent that even the Iraqis took notice.  Shoham reports that, 
On October 4, 1980, an official Iraqi newspaper noting that “the one who fears the Iraqi 
nuclear reactors is the Zionist entity,” concluded, “This entity has raised heaven and hell 
against Iraqi attempts to acquire nuclear technology and it has threatened that it will not 
stand with hand tied towards that.”38  
 
In this respect, the Israelis were making it very clear to all involved that they were trying to 
exhaust all possible non-military means to stop the progress of the Iraqi nuclear project.     
Planning The Attack 
 The planning for an eventual attack on the Iraqi reactor began in earnest in late 1979.  In 
October the IDF was instructed to begin developing a plan for an eventual strike on the reactor.39  
In January 1980 the idea of striking the reactor was discussed again, and Defense Minister Ezer 
Weitzman argued that “the situation was not yet ripe for such a strike.”40  On March 2, Prime 
Minister Begin was given a report that presented the potential costs and benefits of hitting the 
Iraqi reactor:41   
While the report confirms that the goal of the Iraqi project is to achieve nuclear 
capability, it concludes that, since the Iraqi project is accepted as legitimate by world 
opinion, its destruction by Israel might lead to some negative consequences.  Specifically, 
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the report warns of the following possible outcomes: an Iraqi attempt to take revenge by 
attacking sensitive targets in Israel, including the nuclear complex in Dimona; hostile 
world public opinion, especially if the destruction of the reactor when it is operational 
(‘hot’) causes large-scale radioactive contamination; international sanctions in response 
to the Israeli breaking of international norms whereby nuclear reactors should not be 
attacked; intensified anti-Israeli activity in the Arab world; breaking off the fragile peace 
process with Egypt; combined Arab military action, with Soviet backing; and damage to 
the US-Israeli relationship.42  
 
It is reported that Begin concluded from the report that the rector must be destroyed before it 
became “hot” in order to minimize the possible adverse consequences of the action.43  In other 
words, the first-strike disadvantages would be greater once the reactor was turned on.   
 On October 14, 1980, the security cabinet met again to discuss the Iraqi reactor.  Begin 
reportedly told the cabinet that Israel had to make a decision between “two evils.”  The first, 
“evil” would be a military strike on the Iraqi reactor, “with the risk of adverse reactions.” The 
second “evil” would be to take no action in response to Iraq’s nuclear program.  Begin told the 
cabinet  
I have come to the conclusion that we must choose the first of the two evils.  Why? First, 
because now is an opportune moment.  The Gulf War has weakened Iraq and has also put 
a halt to work at the reactor, which is still ‘cold.’  That means it is feasible to bomb it 
without the risk of radioactive contamination of its vicinity.  Who knows if such an 
opportune moment will reoccur? It must be clear that if Israel does not prevent it, Iraq 
will manufacture nuclear weapons.  Everything points to that.  Saddam Hussein is a 
vicious and bloodthirsty tyrant.  Why does he need a nuclear reactor, and nuclear 
weapons?….Somewhere in the vicinity of Baghdad weapons of mass destruction are 
being prepared for use against us.  Are we at liberty to sit by with folded arms in view of 
that terrible danger? It is our duty to our people to take the risk—and act.44  
 
Begin’s position was not supported by the entire cabinet, nor was it supported by all of the 
military and intelligence specialists also in attendance at the meeting.  The primary argument 
against the strike was two-fold: first, since the reactor was not yet operational, there was still 
time to pursue the diplomatic course to get the project halted; second, it was unknown what kind 
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of impact the strike will have on the Arab world, and the attack could actually ameliorate intra-
Arab relations and solidify their “opposition to Israel.” 
 Interestingly, opposition to the proposed strike was also expressed by the Mossad chief 
Hofi, the director of AMAN Saguy, and General Tamir who was the head of the national-
security unit of the Defense Ministry.  Their primary opposition to the strike came from the fact 
that they were unconvinced that Iraq was actually capable of building a bomb.  Additionally, 
Hersh notes that Saguy argued that the “adverse reaction in Washington” would be more costly 
to Israel’s national security than the Iraqi reactor.45  At the same time, however, their deputies 
were advocating for a strike.  Members of the security cabinet were also divided.  When time 
came for a vote, Begin, Shamir, Sharon, Ehrlich, and Hurwitz voted in favor of the strike.  
Voting against were Yadin, Burg, Hammer, and Shostak.  Without a clear majority in favor, 
Begin was compelled to bring the matter before the full cabinet.46  
On October 28, 1980, Begin brought the issue before the full government.  Begin began 
the meeting by telling the ministers that the topic under discussion was “of the highest 
confidentiality” and must not be leaked outside of the meeting.  Begin went on to state, 
I want to put it in brief: a great clock is hanging over our heads, and it is ticking.  
Somewhere on the banks of the Tigris and the Euphrates, there are men plotting to 
annihilate us, and they are preparing the means for implementing their criminal design.  
Every passing day brings them closer to their goal. 
 
We must ask ourselves the significance of nuclear weapons being constructed by a state 
like Iraq.  The significance is: a threat to the life of every man, woman and child in Israel.  
In another five years, or maybe just three years, the Iraqis will have two or three atomic 
bombs, each of the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.  Saddam Hussein is a 
bloodthirsty tyrant who seized power by killing his best friends with his own hands.  He 
will not hesitate to employ weapons of mass destruction against us.  We must take that as 
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our point of departure.  It is our duty toward the nation which elected us to conduct its 
affairs. 
 
Employment of such weapons against concentrations of our civilian population will entail 
bloodshed the like of which there has not been since ‘those days’ in the forties [during the 
Holocaust].  In the face of such danger, are we at liberty to sit with arms folded? Will we 
discharge our duty by acting in such a manner? 
 
If nuclear weapons fall into Iraqi hands, one of two things can happen: we shall be 
obliged to either surrender to their demands or run the risks of mass annihilation.  
Atrocious! We must ask ourselves: is there no way of preventing it?  Since the day I 
learned of Iraq’s intentions, the matter has given me no rest.  We have done much to 
delay those preparations.  But a nation does not live on borrowed time.  The hour has 
come to reach a decision.  To prevent the reconstruction of the reactor and its activation, 
there is no course other than military action, and that is the proposal I submitted recently 
to the group of ministers which has followed the matter.  Military action will entail great 
risks, above all to those carrying out the operation.  We shall do everything to reduce 
those risks to a minimum.  In addition, there are political risks.  It is necessary to take a 
calculated risk, and to realize that the risk of inaction exceeds the risk involved in acting.  
If the operation is followed by a diplomatic onslaught against us, we shall withstand it.  
Even if the enemy attempts a military response, it will be immeasurably less severe than 
the terrible danger in store for Israel should nuclear weapons fall into the enemy’s hands.  
If we do not act now, we shall not be able to excise this terrible danger to ourselves and 
our children.47  
 
In his statement to the cabinet, Begin argued that the first-strike disadvantages were outweighed 
by the costs of inaction.   
At the same time, the potential negative consequences of the strike were also discussed.  
These elements included the potential for UN sanctions, a decline or deterioration in US/Israeli 
relations, renewed hostilities with Egypt and the rest of the Arab world, and a retaliatory 
response by Iraq.  An additional concern revolved around the fact that the Iraqis may already be 
possession of weapons-grade material, with which they could build a bomb regardless of the 
status of the reactor.48  
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After Begin made his statement, the cabinet discussed the available options.  During the 
ensuing debate, Ehrlich stated,  
The reactor is a danger to our existence.  We are dutybound to destroy it.49  
 
One of the hypothesized limitations on the constraining impact of the legal and normative 
elements is when a “threat to existence” is involved.  Many in the Israeli cabinet clearly viewed 
the Iraqi program as constituting such a threat.50  For those supporting the strike option, the 
threat faced was sufficiently severe to outweigh the costs associated with actions taken in 
response.  In this vein, and despite the concerns, the government approved the planned operation, 
by a vote of ten to six.51   Opposition leader Peres was informed of the government’s decision to 
strike the reactor on December 30, and reportedly did “not express explicit objection to the 
plan.”52  
 In early- to mid-1981, there was another round of internal debate about both the utility 
and timing of a strike against the Iraqi reactor.  In March another cabinet meeting was held to 
discuss the situation, although no official vote was taken on the matter.  At the same time, there 
was also pressure from within to hold off on an attack, at least for the time being.  The primary 
justification given for waiting was not that the Iraqi reactor was not a threat, but rather “there 
was no urgency to do it now.”53  In other words, there was still time to pursue other alternatives 
to try to deal with the situation. 
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 Traditionally, Sunday is the day that the Israeli cabinet sits for its weekly meetings.  On 
May 10, 1981, the chief of the Mossad attended the meeting to discuss the planned attack on the 
Iraqi reactor.  During this meeting, Hofi again advised Begin and the cabinet against taking 
action until the reactor became “hot,” which he believed would be in September.  For Begin, 
there were not only security implications of this delay, such as increased risks associated with the 
destruction of the functioning reactor, but also adverse political implications.   
With elections scheduled for June Begin was afraid that the Likud would not do well.  As 
a result, he feared that he would no longer be prime minister, that the new prime minister would 
not strike the reactor, and that Israel would be left facing an “existential threat.”54  It is 
interesting, although not surprising, that one of the main rationales used by Begin to buttress his 
argument in favor of striking the reactor was purely political.  Although Begin would not 
concede to delay the mission until September, the cabinet did agree to postpone the mission for 
two weeks. 
 At the same time, there was also increased pressure for renewed diplomatic efforts to deal 
with the situation.  Such calls were coming primarily from the opposition Labor Party.  On May 
10, 1981, Peres sent a letter to Begin asking him to reconsider striking the reactor.  In the letter, 
Peres wrote  
I feel this morning that it is my supreme civic duty to advise you, after serious 
consideration and in weighing the national interest, to desist from this thing.  I speak as a 
man of experience.  The deadlines reported by us (and I well understand our people’s 
anxiety) are not the realistic deadlines.  Materials can be changed for [other] materials.  
And what is intended to prevent can become a catalyst. 
 
On the other hand Israel would be like a tree in the desert—and we also have that to be 
concerned about.55  
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Peres explicitly addressed the potential consequences of the strike, both strategic, i.e., 
encouraging the program instead of preventing it, as well as political, i.e., the inevitable isolation 
and condemnation by the international community that would come after the strike.  Begin and 
other members of the cabinet were not persuaded and remained committed to removing the threat 
by force.  In fact, according to Perlmutter, et al., Sharon even threatened to resign if the operation 
were canceled.56  The attack was carried out on June 7, 1981.57 
Deciding to Strike: Opportunities and Constraints 
 The Israeli strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor resulted from a variety of different factors.  
The first element is the extent to which the reactor was perceived to be a threat.  The ICB dataset 
codes the threat level in this crisis as a “threat to existence” to Israel.  Clearly, this is the way that 
the Israeli decision-makers viewed the situation.  According to Rak, “Israeli officials believed 
that their national security required a preventive strike on Iraq’s nuclear program as a necessary 
mission to protect their sovereignty.”58  
At the same time, the attack was taken only after a prolonged period of diplomacy aimed 
at halting the program.  Furthermore, the timing of the attack was such that diplomacy was given 
as long as possible to work, but, the operation was carried out before the reactor became 
operational.   Donnelly notes that “Begin maintained that peaceful measures had failed and that 
                                                 
56 Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad, xlv. 
57 According to testimony given on June 18, 1981 by acting Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., the 
United States did not have advance warning of the Israeli strike against the Iraqi reactor.  Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Ninety-Seventh Congress The Israeli Air Strike, (First Session on The Israeli Air 
Strike and Related Issues Sess. Comm. Print 1981), 7.  This is in marked contrast to the cases discussed in 
the previous chapter where there was extensive consultation between Israel and the United States prior to 
any action being taken, in the case of the Six Day War, or even before the decision not to take action in 
the case of the October-Yom Kippur War of 1973. 
58 Claire Rak, The Role of Preventive Strikes in Counterproliferation Strategy: Two Case Studies, 
Strategic Insight (Monterey, CA: Center for Contemporary Conflict, National Security Affairs 
Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 
www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/Oct03/wmd.pdf. 
 240
the attack could not further be delayed because the reactor was soon to be made operational; an 
attack subsequent to that event would expose the residents of Baghdad to radiation hazard.”59  
The official Israeli report issued after the strike offered the following explanation as to 
why the operation was undertaken: 
Israel’s action against Osiraq constituted a legitimate act of self defence, based on the 
principles of international law.  The exercise of this right resulted from a specific 
constellation of factual circumstances which posed an intolerable threat to Israel.  These 
circumstances included the imminent realization by Iraq of its plans to acquire a military 
nuclear capability, Iraq’s declared maintenance of a state of war with Israel and its 
persistent denial of Israel’s right to exist, and the failure of Israel’s diplomatic efforts to 
prevent the extension of foreign assistance to Iraq in the implementation of its nuclear 
programme. 
 
Moreover, in addressing itself to this threat, Israel was faced with a situation in which the 
reactor was about to become operational, after which any Israeli action limited to material 
objectives only could have resulted in the release of lethal radioactive pollution causing 
injury to civilians.  In these circumstances, the time factor became a crucial element in 
Israel’s decision.60  
 
Although these “official” reasons seem to indicate that the legal and normative elements did play 
a role in the decision to use an anticipatory military action, i.e., the legal state of war and the fact 
that the use of force was a last resort, some observers have been somewhat skeptical as to the 
extent to which this was actually the case.    
Donnelly notes that there is a difference between a “technical” state of war and an 
“active” state of war.  This distinction becomes important with respect to the Israeli claims of 
self-defense.  While Iraq and Israel were (and still are) “technically” in a state of war, they were 
not actively engaged in a war, and therefore the claims that the Israeli actions taken in response 
to the hostile actions of an adversary.61  From this perspective, the Israeli action would not be 
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considered a “legitimate” act of self-defense, since the action was taken outside of an actual 
conflict and no armed attack had taken place. 
 The Israeli position, however, relied on the notion of anticipatory self-defense and was 
justified using the definition of self-defense found in customary international law as well as 
instances of opinio juris that call for a reevaluation of the “armed attack” clause of Article 51 of 
the UN Charter in light of the advent of the nuclear and ballistic missile age.  The official 
government report issued after the attack specifically referenced the positions of numerous legal 
scholars buttressing this argument.  It is not clear, however, how much these arguments 
influenced the decision-makers during their deliberations, or to what extent these positions were 
offered as justifications after the fact.  Additionally, it is important to note that the strike was 
uniformly condemned by the international community, including the United Nations Security 
Council. 
Feldman argues that maintenance, or even furtherance, of Israel’s deterrent capability 
was one of the main motivations for the attack.62  According to this perspective, Israel’s only 
surefire military advantage was its nuclear monopoly, and this needed to be maintained, as its 
conventional dominance might be eclipsed at some point in the future.63   
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The destruction of the Iraqi nuclear facility became a cornerstone of Israeli defense 
policy.  According to Feldman, 
In its June 9, 1981 announcement of Osiraq’s destruction, Israel’s government articulated 
its belief that, had Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein acquired nuclear bombs, “[h]e would 
not have hesitated to drop them on Israel’s cities and population centers.”  Yet, the 
assessment was viewed as also applicable to other leaders among Israel’s opponents.  
Hence, the general preventive doctrine: “under no circumstances would we allow the 
enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our nation; we will defend Israel’s 
citizens, in time, with all means at our disposal.”64  
 
In this respect, the strategic aspects of the threat—and the importance of the message that the 
response sent to other adversaries—were very important to Israeli leaders.65 
These strategic reasons coupled with the failure of years of diplomatic efforts to stop the 
reactor project seem to have been sufficient to convince Begin and other leaders that the first-
strike advantages were greater than the first-strike disadvantages, i.e., the political costs that they 
knew were coming as a result of the attack.  Perlmutter notes that during the Cabinet meeting 
where the decision to strike was made, Begin told Sharon “All the responsibility of doing this 
will be ours.  The problem is not France or the United States but the very existence of Israel.”66  
At the same time, however, many scholars have raised the issue that Begin’s primary 
motivation for the strike was related to domestic politics rather than strategic necessity.67  
Fearing that the Likud might lose the next election and that the Labor party might not act against 
the reactor—as well as the possibility for a “bounce” in the polls from a successful strike on the 
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reactor—the looming Knesset elections probably had some influence on the timing of the 
strike.68  While this element cannot be discounted, it was not a major factor in determining how 
Israel would respond to the crisis in general.  
Instead, the specific timing of the raid was based on a number of factors.  According to 
the June 8, 1981 statement of the Israeli government announcing the attack,  
we learned of two dates when the reactor would be completed and put into operation.  
One: the beginning of July 1981; Two: the beginning of September 1981.  In other words, 
within a short period of time, the Iraqi reactor would have been operational and “hot”.  
Under such circumstances no government of Israel could contemplate bombing the 
reactor.  Such an attack would have brought about a massive radioactive lethal fallout 
over the city of Baghdad and tens of thousands of its innocent residents would have been 
hurt.  We would thus have been compelled to passively observe the process of the 
production of atomic bombs in Iraq, whose ruling tyrant would not hesitate to launch 
them against Israeli cities, the centers of its population.  Therefore, the government of 
Israel decided to act without further delay to ensure our people’s existence.  The planning 
was exact.  The operation was timed for Sunday on the assumption that the 100-150 
foreign experts employed at the reactor would be absent on the Christian day of rest.  
This assumption proved to have been correct.  No foreign experts were hurt.69  
 
This statement clearly shows the influence of the normative elements consistent with the just war 
tradition.    
Additional support for the influence of the normative elements can be found in the fact 
the Israelis pursued the diplomatic route for an extended period of time before taking military 
action.  Shoham notes  
There can be no doubt as to the concerted diplomatic efforts and other peaceful activities 
which Israel undertook from 1975 onward to prevent the aid to the Iraqi military nuclear 
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program.  Only after thoroughly but unsuccessfully exhausting those diplomatic channels 
did Israel resort to military force against the Iraqi reactor.70  
 
In this respect, the action would seem to at least partially satisfy the requirements of last resort.   
While Israel was at least partially influenced by the normative elements, it is less clear to 
what extent, if any, the legal prohibitions against anticipatory action were operative.  One of the 
difficulties in assessing the role of the legal elements lies in the nature of the case.  The Israelis 
claimed that the action was taken in self-defense, and that the state of belligerency and the 
hostile rhetoric of Iraq coupled with the fact that the type of reactor under development seemed 
designed for the development of weapons, provided all the legal justification needed.  From this 
perspective, the legal elements would not constrain Israel from using an anticipatory military 
action, since such an action was consistent with international law (or at least some interpretations 
of international law).71  
Quarantine in Cuba 
 On October 16, 1962, President John F. Kennedy was presented with photographic 
evidence, captured by U-2 spy planes, indicating the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.  
According to the ICB case summary, this event triggered a crisis for the United States.  The 
major response taken by the US was the imposition of a naval quarantine on military material 
destined for Cuba.  It is important to note that this was a military response, in that the quarantine 
was carried out by the US Navy—i.e., the quarantine was imposed by US military ships who 
were given orders to fire upon ships that tried to evade the quarantine.  However, the quarantine 
was not violated and force was not used during the crisis. 
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 The US-imposed quarantine of Cuba in 1962 is often described as an example of 
anticipatory self-defense or a preemptive/preventive action.  The United States took military 
action against a third party in order to prevent a developing threat from becoming an actuality.  
In an address to the American people on October 22, 1962, President Kennedy discussed the 
situation and the policy adopted.  The following are excerpts from that speech: 
This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet 
Military buildup on the island of Cuba.  Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has 
established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that 
imprisoned island.  The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a 
nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. 
… 
The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations.  
Several of them include medium range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear 
warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles.  Each of these missiles, in 
short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, 
Mexico city, or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central 
America, or in the Caribbean area. 
 
Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic 
missiles—capable of traveling more than twice as far—and thus capable of striking most 
of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, 
Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru.  In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying 
nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air 
bases are being prepared. 
 
This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base—by the presence of 
these large, long range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction—
constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and 
deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and hemisphere, 
the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own 
public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13.  This action also contradicts the 
repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the 
arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet 
Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other 
nation. 
… 
Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate 
deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small.  We no 
longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient 
challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril.  Nuclear weapons are so 
destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility 
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of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite 
threat to peace. 
… 
But this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles—in an area well 
known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of 
the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American 
and hemispheric policy—this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons 
for the first time outside of Soviet soil—is a deliberately provocative and unjustified 
change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our 
commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe. 
 
The 1930’s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and 
unchallenged ultimately leads to war.  This nation is opposed to war.  We are also true to 
our word.  Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these 
missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination 
from the Western Hemisphere. 
 
Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful 
nation, which leads a worldwide alliance.  We have been determined not to be diverted 
from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics.  But now further action is 
required—and it is underway; and these actions may only be the beginning.  We not 
prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the 
fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth—but neither will we shrink from that risk at 
any time it must be faced. 
 
Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western 
Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by 
the resolution of the Congress, I have declared that the following initial steps be taken 
immediately: 
 
First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military 
equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated.  All ships of any kind bound for 
Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive 
weapons, be turned back.  This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of 
cargo and carriers.  We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as 
the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948. 
… 
This nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own 
proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum—in the OAS, in the United 
Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful—without limiting our freedom of 
action.  We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear 
weapons…. 
 
But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these problems in an atmosphere of 
intimidation.  That is why this latest Soviet threat—or any other threat which is made 
either independently or in response to our actions this week—must and will be met with 
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determination.  Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom 
of peoples to whom we are committed…will be met by whatever action is needed. 
… 
The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are—but it is the 
one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments 
around the world.  The cost of freedom is always high—and Americans have always paid 
it.  And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission. 
 
Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right—not peace at the 
expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope, 
around the world.  God willing, that goal will be achieved.72  
 
Kennedy’s statement clearly reflects elements from international security, international law, and 
the just war tradition.  The primary question of interest in this context, however, is the extent to 
which the different elements influenced the specific policy adopted.  In other words, was the 
decision to implement the “quarantine” based on strategic considerations, legal considerations, 
normative considerations, or some combination of them?   
In this respect, it is essential to be clear what this case study will not explore.  This case 
study will not examine events that took place within the Cuban Missile Crisis after the decision 
to adopt the quarantine was made.  Additionally, the following discussion will not address the 
legal status of the quarantine itself.  The purpose is not to determine if the quarantine was 
congruent with international law, but rather if international law and elements of the just war 
tradition played a role in determining what type of response was adopted in response to the crisis 
trigger. 
Missiles in Cuba: Options and Alternatives 
 After the President was informed of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba on October 
16, 1962, a select group of officials met in secret to begin discussions on how the United States 
should respond.  This group would become known as the Executive Committee of the National 
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Security Council, or ExCom.73 The members of the ExCom included Vice President Lyndon 
Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Attorney-
General Robert Kennedy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor, 
C.I.A. Director John McCone, Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, U.N. Ambassador 
Adlai Stevenson, Undersecretary of State for economic affairs George Ball, Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul H. Nitze, and advisors McGeorge Bundy, Ted 
Sorensen, Roswell Gilpatric, Llewellyn Thompson, Alexis Johnson and Edwin Martin.  Other 
individuals and advisors would attend some of the meetings, including Former Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson, Robert Lovett, and Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach. During the 
first meeting of the ExCom, the key decisions made were to increase surveillance of Cuba and to 
keep the knowledge of the missiles a secret.  According to Abel, President Kennedy wanted a 
simultaneous disclosure of both the presence of the missiles and the steps that the United States 
was undertaking in response.74  
 In a private meeting on the same day, President Kennedy also informed US Ambassador 
to the United Nations Stevenson of the missiles in Cuba.  Abel gives the following account of the 
meeting: 
“We’ll have to do something quickly,” the President said. “I suppose the alternatives are 
to go in by air and wipe them out, or to take other steps to render the weapons 
inoperable.”  Stevenson replied: “Let’s not go to an air strike until we have explored the 
possibilities of a peaceful solution.”75  
 
From the outset of the crisis some members of the administration were cautioning against taking 
military action prematurely, i.e., before all other routes were explored.  Stevenson would not be 
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alone in this cautionary position, as would soon become evident in the discussions and debates 
held within the confines of the ExCom meetings. 
 At the same time, however, there was another group of officials who mirrored President 
Kennedy’s initial response: the missiles represented a change in the strategic balance and should 
be dealt with accordingly.  For this group, force should be met with force.  They felt that the 
proper response to the deployment of the missiles in Cuba would be an air strike or another form 
of “direct armed action.”76   
 According to Sorensen, on Wednesday October 16, Rusk presented a summary of the 
available options for dealing with the missiles in Cuba.  Six alternatives were presented: 
1. Do nothing. 
2. Bring diplomatic pressures and warnings to bear upon the Soviets.  Possible forms 
included an appeal to the UN or OAS for an inspection team, or a direct approach to 
Khrushchev, possibly at a summit conference.  The removal of our missile bases in 
Turkey in exchange for the removal of the Cuban missiles was also listed in our later 
discussions as a possibility which Khrushchev was likely to suggest if we didn’t. 
3. Undertake a secret approach to Castro, to use this means of splitting him off from the 
Soviets, to warn him that the alternative was his island’s downfall and that the Soviets 
were selling him out. 
4. Initiate indirect military action by means of a blockade, possibly accompanied by 
increased aerial surveillance and warnings.  Many types of blockades were 
considered. 
5. Conduct an air strike—pinpointed against the missiles only or against other military 
targets, with or without advance warning.  (Other military means of directly removing 
the missiles were raised—bombarding them with pellets that would cause their 
malfunctioning without fatalities, or suddenly landing paratroopers or guerrillas—but 
none of these was deemed feasible). 
6. Launch an invasion—or, as one chief advocate of this course put it: “Go in there and 
take Cuba away from Castro.”77  
 
Of all the alternatives presented, only two were seriously considered: the air strike and the 
blockade.  In a memo recorded after the October 17 morning meeting, McCone notes that the 
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President seemed inclined to act promptly if at all, without warning, targeting on 
MRBM’s and possibly airfields.  Stated Congressional Resolution gave him all authority 
he needed and this was confirmed by Bundy, and therefore seemed inclined to act.78  
 
Although the President seemed to support the idea of an air strike, there was a heated debate 
among the participants at the meeting over this option. 
 Two primary concerns were voiced with respect to the use of air strikes.  One was the 
notion of a “surprise” American attack on the missile sites.  The other included the possibility 
that it would lead to escalation. 
 There were, however, supporters of the air strike proposal.  In a memorandum addressed 
to the President, Treasury Secretary Dillon expressed support of the air strike option: 
It is my view that the Soviet Union has now deliberately initiated a public test of our 
intentions that can determine the future course of world events for many years to come. 
 
If we allow the offensive capabilities presently in Cuba to remain there, I am convinced 
that sooner or later and probably sooner we will lose all Latin America to Communism 
because all credibility or our willingness to effectively resist Soviet military power will 
have been removed in the eyes of the Latins.  We can also expect similar relations 
elsewhere, for instance in Iran, Thailand, and Pakistan. 
 
I, therefore, believe that the survival of our nation demands the prompt elimination of the 
offensive weapons now in Cuba.  This cannot be negotiated and any course of action 
leading to negotiation on this issue, which inevitably would be prolonged, would have the 
results outlined above. 
 
The question remains how best to achieve the prompt elimination of these weapons from 
Cuba.  I recognize fully the public opinion difficulties involved in a surprise attack but 
believe that, if no other effective course is available, they must be accepted rather than 
run the grave risk to our national security involved in allowing the weapons to remain in 
Cuba. 
 
Accordingly, I would reject the blockade course insofar as it is designed to lead to 
negotiations either in the UN or direct with Khrushchev. 
 
If militarily acceptable, I would prefer to initiate action with a blockade and intensive 
low-level surveillance, coupled with a demand on Cuba to immediately remove the 
weapons and to accept international inspection beginning within 24 hours.  In the event 
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of Cuban refusal, the air strike would follow immediately, no later than 72 hours after the 
initial public statement. 
 
If this is not militarily acceptable only if such delay would involve inacceptable risks of 
the use of nuclear weapons from Cuba against the US, I would favor an early strike in 
accordance with the air strike course of action. 
  
In such a situation, I believe that, in the interests of the survival of the entire free world 
fabric, we must be prepared to accept the public opinion results of a surprise strike, 
placing the full blame on Cuba for ignoring our clear and repeated warnings as well as 
the strong views of the other American states.79  
 
Dillon based his support for the air strike option on the strategic elements, while not fully 
discounting the relevance or importance of the legal or normative elements.  Instead, he rather 
explicitly stated that the strategic requirements of the situation outweighed the first-strike 
disadvantages inherent in the use of a surprise attack. 
At the same time, others were also making arguments against the use of air strikes that 
explicitly drew upon the legal and normative elements as well as for strategic reasoning.  Ball, 
for example, not only argued against the use of air strikes for strategic reasons, but also for legal 
and normative reasons.  In a written position statement dated October 18, 1962, Ball stated, 
I am persuaded that the disadvantages of an air strike are to great for us to undertake.  I 
have, therefore, concluded that the blockade plan—while by no means wholly 
satisfactory—is the course we should follow. 
 
In reaching this conclusion I have begun with the assumption that the Soviet nuclear 
build-up in Cuba does not add up appreciably to the Soviet ability to impose destruction 
on the United States…. 
 
If this assumption be valid – and I have heard no compelling arguments against it – then 
the menace we face is not the addition of new Soviet military capabilities so much as 
their moral and propaganda advantage.  As I understand it, the proponents of the strike 
plan insist that what we are facing is a test of will that will be witnessed by all the world.  
Unless the United States is prepared to use decisive military power, the world will lose 
confidence in our strength and determination. 
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But I think that – far from establishing our moral strength – we would, in fact, alienate a 
great part of the civilized world by behaving in a manner wholly contrary to our 
traditions, by pursuing a course of action that would cut directly athwart everything we 
have stood for during our national history, and condemn us as hypocrites in the opinion 
of the world. 
 
We tried Japanese as war criminals because of the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.  We 
condemned the Soviet action in Hungary.  We took a strong moral line against the use of 
force by the French and British at Suez when they felt their vital interests were 
threatened.  We have taken a strong line in the United Nations and in other world 
councils against the dangers of a surprise attack with nuclear weapons.   
 
It is my strongly held view that we cannot launch a surprise attack against Cuba without 
destroying our moral position and alienating our friends and allies.  If we were to do so 
we would wake up the following morning to find that we had brought down in ruins the 
structure of alliances and arrangements and that our whole post-war effort of trying to 
organize the combined strength of the Free World was in shreds and tatters. 
 
I find the blockade plans unsatisfactory – primarily because it does not provide a way to 
prevent the Soviet missiles from becoming operational.  But, on the assumption I have 
stated above, I do not believe that this is a [?] argument against it.  While the blockade 
may [?] some [?] with other Free World nations, it will be generally accepted as a legal 
act and consistent with our traditions….80 
 
Similar arguments were made by other participants in the discussions.   
Rusk, for example, argued that the outcomes of any particular course of action must be 
carefully weighed against the costs such action would entail.   At the 11 a.m. meeting of the 
ExCom on October 18, Rusk makes it very clear that the United States should respond, but that 
the type of response should be chosen with great care.  In this respect, Rusk argued, 
Now, I think that, as far as I’m concerned, all I have to say to you would be: If we enter 
upon this path of challenging the Soviets, the Soviets themselves embarking on this 
fantastically dangerous course, that no one can surely foresee the outcome. 
… 
Now, there’s another part of this situation that bothers me considerably.  I think the 
American people will willingly undertake great danger if necessary to go do something, if 
they have the deep feeling that we’ve done everything that was reasonably possible to 
determine whether this risk was necessary.  Also that they have a clear conscience and a 
good theory of the case. 
… 
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The Rio Pact is, I think, clearly our strongest legal basis for action we can take.  The 
other possibility is a straight, straight declaration of war, which carries with it many legal 
privileges that are useful to have….But I suppose the only way we have of [using that is] 
getting [a] two-thirds vote to take necessary action.  But if we made an effort and failed 
to get the two-thirds vote [unclear], then at least we have tried as far as the American 
people are concerned.  We’ll have done that.81  
 
In a similar vein, a statement written by Bohlen was also read at the same meeting.  In this 
statement, Bohlen clearly stresses the necessity of exploring non-violent means before the use of 
an air strike: 
The existence of Soviet MRBM bases in Cuba cannot be tolerated.  The objective 
therefore is their elimination by whatever means may be necessary. 
… 
No one can guarantee that this can be achieved by diplomatic action, but it seems to me 
essential that this channel should be tested out before military action is employed.  If our 
decision is firm (and it must be) I can see no danger in communication with Khrushchev 
privately, worded in such a way that he realizes that we mean business. 
 
This I consider an essential first step no matter what military course we determine on if 
the reply is unsatisfactory…. 
 
My chief concern about a strike without any diplomatic effort is that it will immediately 
lead to war with Cuba and would not be the neat quick disposal of their bases, as was 
suggested.  Furthermore, I am reasonably certain that the Allied reaction would be dead 
against us, especially if the [Soviets] retaliated locally (in Turkey or Italy or in Berlin). 
 
A communication with Khrushchev would be very useful for the record in establishing 
our case for action. 
 
In general I fell that a declaration of war would be valuable since it would open up every 
avenue of military action, air strikes, invasion or blockade.  But we would have to make a 
case before our allies to justify such a declaration of war.  If we acted first and sought to 
justify it later we would be in a spat of great consequence. 
 
Finally, I feel very strongly that any belief in a limited quick action is an illusion and 
would lead us into a full war with Cuba on a step-by-step basis which would greatly 
increase the probably of a general war.82  
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As the above statements show, even in the early stages of the crisis different individuals 
advocated different courses of action based on different rationales.  Those in favor of a direct 
military response relied on the strategic elements.  Others seemed to be influenced by the 
constraints contained in the legal and normative elements against taking military action as a first 
step.   
 In a memo dated October 19, McCone wrote, “A discussion among the principals on 
October 18 indicated a probable decision, if any action is taken against Cuba to initiate a limited 
blockade to prevent the importation into Cuba of additional arms.”83  McCone went on to argue 
that “The argument in favor of the blockade was principally that it initiated a positive action 
which could be intensified at our will or could be relaxed depending upon evolving 
circumstances.”  At the same time, “The obvious disadvantages are the protracted nature of the 
operation, the difficulties of sustaining our position in world opinion because of our own 
complex of foreign bases and our deployment of offensive missiles and nuclear weapons and 
finally, the action does not reverse the present trend of building an offensive capability within 
Cuba nor does it dispose of the existing missiles, planes, and nuclear weapons if the latter now 
exist there.”  McCone also discussed the air strike option, stating “Positive military action 
initiated now appeared undesirable because of the impact of current and future world opinion, 
the spectacle of a powerful nation attacking by surprise attack a weak and insignificant neighbor, 
engagement by the United States in a ‘surprise attack’ thus giving license to others to do the 
same, the indefendable position we would be in with our allies, and finally, the price to us of 
extreme actions of which the Soviets appear capable of executing.”84   
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 During an ExCom meeting held in the morning of October 19, President Kennedy 
summarized the problems inherent in both the air strike and blockade options: 
If we attack Cuban missies, or Cuba, in any way, it gives [the Russians] a clear line to go 
ahead and take Berlin, as they were able to do in Hungary under the Anglo war in Egypt.  
We will have been regarded as [unclear].  We would be regarded as the trigger-happy 
Americans who lost Berlin.  We would have no support among our allies.  We would 
affect the West Germans’ attitude toward us.  And [people would believe] that we let 
Berlin go because we didn’t have the guts to endure a situation in Cuba….They don’t 
give a damn about Cuba.  But they do care about Berlin and about their own security.  So 
they would say we endangered their interests and security.  And the implication [would 
be] that all the rest [happened] because of the end reaction that we took in Cuba. 
 
So I think they’ve got…I must say I think it’s a very satisfactory position from their point 
of view.  If you take the view that what really…And clearly, if we do nothing then they’ll 
have these missiles and they’ll be able to say any time we ever try to do anything about 
Cuba, they’ll fire these missiles.  So that I think it’s dangerous, but rather satisfactory, 
from their point of view. 
… 
Now that’s what makes our problem so difficult.  If we go in and take them out on a 
quick air strike, we neutralize the chance of danger to the United States of these missiles 
being used, and we prevent a situation from arising, at least within Cuba, where the 
Cubans themselves have the means of exercising some degree of authority in this 
hemisphere. 
 
On the other hand, we increase the chance greatly, as I think—there’s bound to be a 
reprisal from the Soviet Union, there always is—[of] their just going in and taking Berlin 
by force.  Which leaves me only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons—
which is a hell of an alternative—and begin a nuclear exchange, with all this happening. 
 
On the other hand, if we begin the blockade that we’re talking about, the chances are they 
will begin a blockade and say that we started it.  And there’ll be some question about the 
attitude of the Europeans.  So that once again they will say that there will be this feeling 
in Europe that the Berlin blockade has been commence by our blockade. 
 
So I don’t think we’ve got any satisfactory alternatives.  Whether we balance off that, our 
problem is not merely Cuba but it is also Berlin.  And when we recognize the importance 
of Berlin to Europe, and recognize the importance of our allies to us, that’s what has 
made this thing be a dilemma for 3 days.  Otherwise, our answer would be quite easy.85  
 
                                                 
85 May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis, 175-
76. 
 256
The remainder of the meeting again focused on debate and discussion on the various courses of 
action, but again no decision was reached on what type of response would be adopted.  After a 
brief meeting, Kennedy left the ExCom group to attend to previous scheduled commitments.   
A second meeting of the group shortly after the President left.  Among the topics 
discussed were the legal implications of the various responses.  According to the minutes of the 
meeting, recorded by the State Department’s legal adviser Meeker, the following arguments were 
made: 
Mr. Katzenbach said he believed the President had ample constitutional and statutory 
authority to take any needed military measures.  He considered a declaration of war 
unnecessary.  From the standpoint of international law, Mr. Katzenbach thought the 
United States action could be justified on the principle of self-defense. 
 
I said that my analysis ran along much the same lines.  I did not think a declaration of war 
would improve our position, but indeed would impair it.  I said that a defensive 
quarantine of Cuba would involve a use of force, and this had to be considered in relation 
to the United Nations Charter.  The Charter contained a general prohibition against the 
use of force except in certain limited kinds of situation.  One of these was “armed attack”, 
but the situation in Cuba did not constitute armed attack on any country.  Another 
exception was collective action voted on by the competent United Nations organ to deal 
with a situation under Chapter VII of the Charter.  Obviously, no resolution could be 
obtained from the Security Council.  And it seemed quite problematical whether we could 
obtain a recommendation from the [U.N.] General Assembly. 
 
The Charter also contained Chapter VII on regional arrangements.  Article 52 provided 
that regional arrangements could deal with “such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action”.  Thus a case 
could be made under the Charter for the use of force if it were sanctioned by the 
American Republics acting under the Rio Treaty.  The Organ of Consultation, pursuant to 
Article 6 and 8 of that Treaty, could recommend measures, including the use of armed 
force, to meet a situation endangering the peace of America…. 
 
If the contention were advanced that a defensive quarantine voted under the Rio Treaty 
constituted “enforcement action” under Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, and 
therefore required the authorization of the Security Council, we would be able to make a 
reasonably good argument to the contrary….86 
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Meeker also records the following exchange vis-à-vis the alternative response alternatives from 
the same meeting: 
There seemed to be three main possibilities as the Attorney General analyzed the 
situation: one was to do nothing, and that would be unthinkable; another was an air strike; 
the third was a blockade.  He thought it would be very, very difficult for the President if 
the decision were to be for an air strike, with all the memory of Pearl Harbor and with all 
the implications this would have for us in whatever world there would be afterward.  For 
175 years we had not been that kind of country.  He favored action, to make known 
unmistakably the seriousness of United States determination to get the missiles out of 
Cuba, but he thought the action should allow the Soviets some room for maneuver to pull 
back from their over-extended position in Cuba. 
 
Mr. Bundy, addressing himself to the Attorney General, said this was very well but a 
blockade would not eliminate the bases; an air strike would.87  
 
At the end of the meeting, it was determined that both alternatives should be explored more, and 
that more discussions should be held with the President, since the ultimate decision would be his. 
 On October 20, Sorensen presented a summary of both the problems with the air-strike 
option as well as the advantages of the blockade option.  There were two main problems with the 
air-strike proposal, which Sorensen notes “have never been answered:” 
1) Inasmuch as no one has been able to devise a satisfactory message to Khrushchev to 
which his reply could not outmaneuver us, an air strike means an U.S.-initiated “Pearl 
Harbor” on a small nation which history could neither understand nor forget. 
2) Inasmuch as the concept of a clean, swift strike has been abandoned as militarily 
impractical, it is generally agreed that the more widespread air attack will inevitably 
lead to an invasion with all of its consequences. 
 
At the same time, Sorensen also noted that there were two “fundamental advantages to a 
blockade which have never been answered:” 
1) It is a more prudent and flexible step which enables us to move to an air strike, 
invasion or any other step at any time it proves necessary, without the “Pearl Harbor” 
posture. 
2) It is the step least likely to precipitate general war while still causing the Soviets – 
unwilling to engage our Navy in our waters – to back down and abandon Castro.88   
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 Coupled with the legal and normative elements that seemed to bolster the blockade/quarantine 
option discussed above, it appeared that the scales were clearly tipped in favor of the second 
option.   
 At the October 20 afternoon meeting of the ExCom, the decision was made to implement 
the blockade, and to prepare for air strikes against the missile sites if they were deemed 
necessary.  On October 22, President Kennedy announced to the American public the existence 
of the Soviet missiles and the planned response to deal with them.   
 The United States also brought the issue of the quarantine before the international 
organizations designed to deal with such issues.  On October 22, the United States requested a 
meeting of the United Nations Security Council to deal with the issue of Soviet missiles in Cuba.  
Additionally, on October 23, the Organization of American States adopted a resolution that 
supported the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles through the use of all measures necessary.89    
Air Strike vs. Quarantine: The Legal Elements 
 Chayes, who served as Legal Advisor to the State Department during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, cautions that “We cannot ask for a demonstration that legal considerations dictated 
decision.”90 The same can also be said for the normative elements of the just war tradition, which 
will be discussed below. This sentiment is important to keep in mind for all the cases studied, 
and is particularly relevant vis-à-vis the Cuban Missile Crisis.  With respect to the Cuban Missile 
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Crisis, the primary question for this study is if the decision to implement the quarantine, as 
opposed to the air strike option, was influenced by the constraints against the use of anticipatory 
military force found in international law and the just war tradition.   
 It is important to recall the fundamental element of the crisis.  The triggering event of the 
crisis was the delivery/deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba, i.e., a threat that was not 
immediate or imminent.  This element has important implications with respect to the legitimacy 
and permissibility of anticipatory military activities within the legal and normative traditions.  As 
was discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, there is minimal, if any, support within the legal and 
normative traditions for the use anticipatory military activities against threats that are not 
imminent in nature.   
 There are, however, some exceptions, or at least possible exceptions, to these prohibitions 
that are applicable to this case.  The first concerns the role of regional security organizations and 
their relationship with the United Nations.  Chapter 8 of the UN Charter explicitly deals with the 
role of regional security organizations.   
Article 52(1) of the UN Charter states 
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or 
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or 
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations. 
 
Article 52(2) of the UN Charter goes on to add that 
The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such 
agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through 
such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the 
Security Council.91  
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The United States and the other Latin American countries, including Cuba, were members of a 
regional security organization—the Organization of American States. Of primary importance 
here is the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Pact.  
According to Oliver, 
The Rio Pact fixes the principles that are to govern the inter-American community when 
its security is threatened.  It does not provide new organs of action or for an 
infrastructure.  It does specify that the Organ of Consultation shall be the foreign 
ministers of the members, that a consultative meeting may be called by a simple majority 
of members, that decisions of the Organ shall be the same number required for a vote.  
There is no veto and no provision for the expulsion or suspension of a member.  The 
Agreement is replete almost to the point of redundancy with assertions requiring 
congruity with the United Nations Charter.92  
 
There is, however, one important difference between the Rio Pact and the UN Charter.  While 
the UN Charter links self-defense with armed attack,93 the Rio Pact adopts a more expansive 
definition of aggression.  Under the Rio Treaty, aggression is not limited to armed attack: 
 Article 6. If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the political independence 
of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack 
or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation 
that might endanger the peace of America…94 
 
In such a situation, the Organ of Consultation would be activated to determine what the 
appropriate course of action should be to deal with the situation.  The Rio Pact, therefore, does 
give support for the use of anticipatory military activities. 
 This element of the OAS was known to the participants of the ExCom meetings, and was 
one of the reasons why the decision was made to bring the matter of the quarantine before the 
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Organ of Consultation.  Once the Organ of Consultation approved the quarantine, there would be 
“legal” justification and support for the action.  In this regard, Robert Kennedy notes 
It was the vote of the Organization of American States that gave a legal basis for the 
quarantine.  Their willingness to follow the leadership of the United States was a heavy 
and unexpected blow to Khurshchev.  It had a major psychological and practical effect on 
the Russians and changed our position from that of an outlaw acting in violation of 
international law into a country acting in accordance with twenty allies legally protecting 
their position.95  
 
Additionally, the United States was also aware of the need for UN sanction of any use, or 
potential use, of armed force.  In this respect, the matter was also brought before the United 
Nations Security Council.  However, with the ability of both the United States and the Soviet 
Union to veto any action in the Security Council, the UN was effectively powerless to take any 
action in this case. 
 The fact that the United States used international security organizations to justify the 
action taken—after the decision on which course of action to use had already been made—does 
not necessarily indicate that the initial decision was influenced by the requirements of 
international law.  Instead, it could be that these actions were use to rationalize policies that were 
going to be implemented regardless of the legal status of the actions.  As Scott and Withana note, 
“According to realists, law is at best a disguise for interests based on calculations of power; 
foreign policy the manifestation of a rational assessment as to what will enhance the power of the 
state.”96   
Gerberding argues that this was exactly the case with the United States and the quarantine 
decision in the Cuban Missile Crisis.  He states, “The United States, not unexpectedly, was 
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conspicuously concerned with wrapping its policies in the mantle of legal rectitude and with 
demonstrating the illegality of its adversaries’ activities.”97  He goes on, adding that, “Whatever 
its legal status might be, there is little room for doubt that the United States decision to convene 
the Council of the OAS, acting as the Organ of Consultation under the Rio Pact, and to delay 
proclaiming the blockade officially until after the Latin ambassadors had sanctioned it, were 
politically prudent.”98   
 Some scholars note that the decision to respond to the crisis with the quarantine was at 
least partially influenced by legal elements.  For Scott and Withana, while the decision to 
implement the quarantine was not based entirely upon legal considerations, the legal element 
cannot be dismissed.  They make the following arguments: 
Perhaps most clear, is the inadequacy of the realist assumption that international law did 
not have a role to play in US decision-making or implementation.  An examination of the 
historical evidence has revealed that what can be broadly classified as realist writers are 
missing an important consideration in virtually ignoring international law; decision-
makers did take legal factors into consideration alongside questions of realpolitik and 
public opinion.  Excomm members were not prepared to do anything that were 
categorically illegal but were prepared to take a strategically less decisive action for 
which some relatively plausible legal justification could be found.99  
 
Meeker notes that US decision makers “were concerned that any action taken by the United 
States should rest on the soundest foundation in law and should appear in that light to all the 
world, including the Government of the Soviet Union.”100  According to Fisher, “There can be 
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little doubt that one of the considerations which restrained the United States from an immediate 
air strike against the missile sites in Cuba was the gross illegality of such action.”101  
 Others, however, place the decision in a wholly different context, completely removed 
from the legal elements altogether.  George, for example, describes the decision to adopt the 
quarantine option in the following manner: 
Although leaning toward an air strike at first, Kennedy soon saw the merits of limiting 
not only his objective but also the means to achieve it.  The president’s interest in the 
blockade option was caught by the possibility that it might rescue him from the policy 
dilemma confronting him: how to get the missiles out without possibly triggering 
escalation of the crisis to war.102  
 
George goes on to add that “In the end, Kennedy chose the blockade option because it enabled 
him to postpone and control the risk of a major war better than an air strike would have.”103   
Haas explains the quarantine decision in a similar manner, arguing that “Threatening the 
Soviets to force the removal of the missiles allowed the Kennedy administration to demonstrate 
its resolve (thereby alleviating the principal hazard of simply accepting a change in the status 
quo), while also giving Khrushchev more room to back down, as compared to the option of 
employing a military strike without warning.”104  Haas also notes that “Kennedy’s decision to 
couple the blockade of Cuba with an ultimatum to Khrushchev to remove the missiles or face 
military hostilities thus seems to be a value-maximizing choice, and therefore seems to be 
sufficiently explained by expected-utility theory.”105  
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Based on the transcripts of the ExCom meetings, and the associated memoranda 
generated by the participants in these meetings, it appears that the legal elements did play some 
role in the decision to adopt the quarantine.106  To be sure, it is impossible to determine the exact 
extent to which the legal aspects influenced the eventual policy adopted.  At the same time, 
however, the impact of the legal aspect cannot be fully dismissed.  Chayes traces the ExCom 
deliberations and asks, 
whether law operated as a constraint on the choice of the quarantine as the United States’ 
response in the Cuban missile crisis.  One can conclude that it did, and substantially, but 
not decisively, and not directly in the sense that the President, or anyone else, turned to 
his lawyer and said, ‘I am disposed to do thus-and-so, which I think would be in the best 
interests of the country, but if you tell me it would be illegal, I won’t do it.’107  
 
In this respect, it appears as if the United States was at least partially constrained by the legal 
prohibitions against the use of anticipatory military actions.   
Air Strike vs. Quarantine: The Normative Elements 
 The legal constraints represent only one aspect of interest in this study.  The other 
element is the normative constraints found in the just war tradition.  The Cuban Missile Crisis 
highlights two different aspects of the normative side of the question.  The first concerns the 
issue of “last resort” and imminence in the age of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.  It is 
worth recalling part of President Kennedy’s statement announcing the quarantine.  During this 
address, he noted,  
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We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a 
sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril.  Nuclear weapons 
are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased 
possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as 
a definite threat to peace.108  
 
In this respect, Kennedy is challenging the traditional notions of imminence and aggressive 
action on which much of the just war tradition is based.  In this new world, a state can not wait 
for the missile to be fired to take action.109  However, since the Kennedy Administration believed 
that the Soviets had deployed the missiles in Cuba for offensive purposes,110 any action taken by 
the United States was in response to an aggressive act by the Soviet Union.  While this aspect 
was clear to the members of the ExCom, it was important to them that the American people see 
the situation the same way. 
The normative and moral aspects of the air strike option versus the quarantine were also 
discussed at length by the participants in the ExCom meetings.  Robert Kennedy recalls that 
during these meetings, 
With some trepidation, I argued that, whatever validity the military and political 
arguments were for an attack in preference to a blockade, America’s traditions and 
history would not permit such a course of action.  Whatever military reasons he and 
others could marshal, they were nevertheless, in the last analysis, advocating a surprise 
attack by a very large nation against a very small one.  This, I said, could not be 
undertaken by the U.S. if we were to maintain our moral position at home and around the 
globe.  Our struggle against Communism throughout the world was far more than 
physical survival—it had as its essence our heritage and our ideals, and these we must not 
destroy.111  
 
Robert Kennedy also notes that “The strongest argument against the all-out military attack, and 
one no one could answer to [the President’s] satisfaction, was that a surprise attack would erode 
                                                 
108 Chang and Kornbluh, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents 
Reader, 161. 
109 See Chapters 4 and 5 for more on this element. 
110 As reported in the “Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba, 19 October 1962” Central 
Intelligence Agency, The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Documents, 203-08. 
111 Kennedy, Thirteen Days: Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 38-39. 
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if not destroy the moral position of the United States throughout the world.”112  Similar 
sentiments were expressed throughout the debates of the ExCom meetings, as discussed above.   
 It was not that the members of the Kennedy Administration refused to take military 
action, or were unwilling to strike at the missile sites.  Rather, it appears that a consensus 
developed that other means should be tried first—i.e., force should be used as a last resort.  In 
this sense, the “moral traditions” of the United States, which are similar to those found in the just 
war tradition, were clearly influential in the decision making process. 
Was Kennedy Constrained? 
 It is impossible to determine exactly what caused Kennedy to make the decision to 
implement the quarantine.  It does appear, however, that, at least to a certain extent, Kennedy 
was influenced by both the legal and normative traditions against taking direct military action as 
an immediate and first response to the delivery of Soviet missiles to Cuba. 
 The first-strike disadvantages that would accompany the air strike option appeared to be 
far more substantial than the shortcomings of the quarantine option.  On the other hand, the 
quarantine option, which had more strategic shortcomings, did not have as many legal and 
normative liabilities.  The fact that Kennedy chose the latter option lends support to the idea that 
the legal and normative elements were at least somewhat influential. 
Additionally, the hypothesis that the influence of the legal and normative elements will 
fluctuate according to the level of threat a state faces is also supported by a statement made by 
President Kennedy in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis.  On November 20, 1962, in 
response to a question about the relationship between the United States and the United Nations, 
President Kennedy stated, 
                                                 
112 Kennedy, Thirteen Days: Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 49. 
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Obviously, the United States has the means as a sovereign power to defend itself, and of 
course exercises that power.  It has in the past and would in the future.  We would hope 
to exercise it in a way consistent with our treaty obligations, including the United Nations 
Charter.  But we of course keep to ourselves and hold to ourselves under the United 
States Constitution and under the laws of international law, the right to defend our 
security, on our own, if necessary, though we hope to always move in concert with our 
allies, but on our own if that situation was necessary to protect our survival or integrity, 
or other vital interests.113  
 
In other words, President Kennedy was arguing that the United States will act within the 
framework of international law, but only up to a certain point.  If the threat is grave enough, and 
if the United States feels that the law is too constricting, the United States will act unilaterally, 
i.e., outside of the legal framework established by the UN.  In this respect, the legal constraints 
are not absolute, but rather more situational.   
Cienfuegos Submarine Base: The Crisis that Never Was 
 On September 16, 1970, President Nixon was informed by National Security Advisor 
Henry Kissinger that the Soviets were building a submarine base in Cuba.  According to the ICB 
case information, this triggered a crisis for the United States.  The major response by the United 
States was diplomatic in nature, and took the form of reaffirmation of the 1962 agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union that no offensive weapons would be deployed in 
Cuba.  No military action was taken by either side during this crisis. 
 The fact that the development of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba would drastically alter 
the strategic landscape was not lost on United States.  According to Kissinger,   
The intelligence analysis that I received later in the day [September 18] concluded that 
the Soviets were “establishing a support facility [in Cienfuegos] for naval operations in 
the Caribbean and the Atlantic.”  It added ominously that “Soviet naval units, including 
nuclear powered submarines, may soon be operating regularly out of the Cuban port of 
Cienfuegos.”  Our naval experts pointed out that a permanent facility in Cuba would 
                                                 
113 John F. Kennedy, News Conference Number 45. November 20 1962, March 3, 2005 
<www.jfklibrary.org/jfk_press_conference_621120.html>.  It is interesting to note how similar this 
statement is to statements made by President George W. Bush between 2002-2005. 
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sharply reduce the time Soviet submarines lost in making long transits to operating areas 
in the Atlantic.  The result would be to increase by approximately one-third the time that 
Soviet ballistic missile submarines could be on station in range of the United States, or to 
increase, also by approximately one-third, the number of submarines on station at any 
one time.  This would be a quantum leap in the strategic capability of the Soviet Union 
against the United States.114  
 
In one of the few works that examines the incident, Hirschbein argues that, 
Given this situation, surely Nixon could have convinced himself that Soviet actions 
undermined both his presidency and national security; the case was strong indeed.  It 
could have been argued that just as Khrushchev was testing Kennedy in 1962, so 
Brezhnev was testing Nixon’s courage and credibility in 1970—a bold, decisive response 
was essential.  And, placing the challenge in broader perspective, it could have been 
maintained that if Nixon could not uphold the Monroe Doctrine and the informal 
understanding that resolved the 1962 episode, no friend or foe would take American 
leadership seriously.115  
 
Thus, the situation seemed ripe for some sort of anticipatory military action to deal with a clear, 
albeit not yet imminent, threat. 
 No such response was forthcoming, however.  Nixon notes in his memoirs, “In view of 
what happened in the 1962 crisis, I decided that I would not force a public confrontation unless I 
had no other choice, and I would not deal with the Soviets from anything less than a position of 
unyielding strength.”116  Accordingly, Nixon argues that he gave the Soviets an opportunity—
through private diplomatic channels—to dismantle the base and resolve the crisis peacefully.   
 Kissinger discusses the crisis in more depth than Nixon, detailing discussions held by the 
Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) on the base issue.  The WSAG was instructed to 
develop alternative courses of action to deal with the crisis, but the group was also told that 
                                                 
114 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 638-39. 
115 Ron Hirschbein, What If They Gave a Crisis and Nobody Came? Interpreting International Crises 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 152. 
116 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 486. 
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Nixon preferred to delay action until after the upcoming November elections.117  According to 
Hirschbein, Nixon “was adamant—there would be no crisis.”118  
 In the end, the crisis was resolved through the use of diplomatic pressure on the Soviet 
Union to halt construction of the submarine base.  Specifically, the major resolution of the crisis 
was a reaffirmation, and further solidification, of the understanding that had resolved the 1962 
crisis over the Soviet missiles in Cuba, in which both the Soviet Union and the United States 
agreed not to deploy “offensive weapons” in Cuba.  
 A variety of reasons have been posited as to why the Cienfuegos crisis never became a 
“crisis,” ranging from a shift towards détente in US-Soviet relations119 to specific elements of the 
individual personalities involved.120  What is important in this context, however, is that it seems 
clear legal and normative elements do not appear to have played a role in the response chosen to 
deal with the crisis—Nixon was not constrained by the legal and normative elements when he 
decided how to respond to the Cienfuegos crisis.  Unlike the Israelis in the October-Yom Kippur 
War crisis, the legal and normative elements did not play a role in Nixon’s decision not to use an 
anticipatory military action.  Instead, it remains unclear as to why the crisis never fully 
developed.  According to Hirschbein,  
There is little difficulty understanding why Nixon virtually ignored a Soviet nuclear 
submarine base.  His liminal crises of meaning and identity were venal and personal: they 
were sparked by rejection and humiliation—situations that rubbed his face in the 
realization that he was not “well-liked.”121  
 
From this perspective, it is the individual characteristics of the particular leader that were a 
deciding factor in how the crisis was (or was not) handled.   
 
117 Kissinger, White House Years, 642. 
118 Hirschbein, What If They Gave a Crisis and Nobody Came? Interpreting International Crises, 152. 
119 Raymond L. Garthoff, "Handling the Cienfuegos Crisis," International Security 8, no. 1 (Summer 
1983): 46-66. 
120 Hirschbein, What If They Gave a Crisis and Nobody Came? Interpreting International Crises. 
121 Ibid., 154. 
According to Garthoff, the actions of the United States in this “crisis” were indicative of 
the new limits vis-à-vis what kinds of actions both the United States and the Soviet Union they 
could take in the light of “emerging parity” between the two states.122  For Dominguez, the crisis 
represented a new stage in the bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
one that was characterized by restraint, and served to enhance the security of all parties 
involved.123 In this respect, there were strategic/security reasons for dealing with the crisis in the 
manner that was ultimately chosen. At the same time, however, these are only the opinions of a 
very few analysts.  Without more information on the crisis, it is hard to draw any firm 
conclusions. 
Distant Threats, International Law, and Just War: Are Leaders Constrained? 
 The three case studies discussed above offer mixed results as to the constraining role of 
international law and the just war tradition with respect to distant threats and the use of 
anticipatory military activities.  To varying extents, both cases where some form of anticipatory 
action was used (Osiraq and the Cuban Missile Crisis) showed some evidence of the 
constraining, or at least influencing, effects of legal and normative elements.  At the same time, 
however, the states involved still found ways to take anticipatory action—even though the threats 
faced were not imminent in nature.   Furthermore, not only did Israel and the United States take 
anticipatory action, but they were also able to place these actions within the frameworks of both 
international law and the just war tradition. 
 In the Osiraq case, the Israeli government was clearly influenced by the normative 
elements.  This is shown by the protracted diplomatic campaign to halt the reactor that was 
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employed before the use of force: force was used as a last resort.  The legal element is a bit 
trickier in the Osiraq case, since Israel felt that it was acting in self-defense against a threat 
emanating from an adversary still technically engaged in a state of war.  It seems clear, however, 
that the Israeli decision-makers did not feel that they were acting in a manner that was 
incongruent with international law, or if they were, they were more concerned with the 
consequences of inaction rather than the consequences of the action.  In this respect, they were 
not constrained by international law. 
 In the Cuban Missile Crisis, the members of the ExCom were influenced, again at least to 
some extent, by both legal and normative traditions.  Evidence of this can be seen in the 
transcripts of the ExCom meetings and the associated documents, stories, and memoirs that were 
generated with respect to these meetings.  Whether or not these traditions were decisive in 
determining what policy would eventually be adopted can never be known, but the fact that they 
did exert some influence cannot be dismissed altogether. 
 Perhaps the most interesting outcome from the case studies in this chapter is the one case 
where no anticipatory action was taken is also the one case where legal and normative elements 
appeared to play no role at all.  It is interesting that neither Kissinger nor Nixon mentioned these 
considerations when discussing possible ways to deal with the crisis.   
 It is also important to note that it is precisely the types of threats addressed in these cases 
that are the most difficult to justify within the frameworks of international law or the just war 
tradition.  At the same time, the fact that leaders were able to take action against these threats, 
yet were still cognizant of—and influenced by—the constraints contained within international 
law and the just war tradition indicates that the two are not mutually exclusive. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 In the newly released National Military Strategy of the United States of America and 
National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, the United States has further codified 
its military doctrine around the use of anticipatory military activities.1  The National Military 
Strategy states, “The potentially catastrophic impact of an attack against the United States, its 
allies and its interests may necessitate actions in self-defense to preempt adversaries before they 
can attack.”2  The same document also states “Deterring aggression and coercion must be 
anticipatory in nature to prevent the catastrophic impact of attacks using biological, chemical or 
nuclear weapons on civilian population centers in the United States or in partner nations.”3  
According to the National Defense Strategy, among the panoply of options currently available to 
“defeat adversaries” are “preventive actions to deny an opponent the strategic initiative or 
preempt a devastating attack…”4 These documents represent a further codification of the broad-
based policy based on the use of anticipatory military activities laid out in the 2002 National 
Security Strategy.   
 The findings presented in the previous chapters, however, raise questions as to whether or 
not this policy will, or can, be implemented.  Specifically, since this policy appears to be 
designed to deal with distant, as opposed to imminent, threats, it is unclear how congruent this 
policy is with the requirements of both international law or the just war tradition.  The traditional 
positions within both international law and the just war tradition hold that anticipatory action is 
only permitted in response to imminent threats.  According to the position advanced by the Bush 
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Administration, as well as numerous scholars, however, today’s world is markedly different, and 
the boundaries of “permissibility” within international law and the just war tradition must shift to 
accommodate this new reality. 
 After a brief review of the findings presented in the previous chapters, the implications of 
these findings, as well as the Bush Doctrine will be discussed.  Additionally, the limitations and 
constraints of the current study will be explored.  Finally, directions for future study will be 
presented. 
Summary of Findings 
Anticipatory military activities occupy a gray area within international law, the just war 
tradition, and the international security literature.  In each of these realms, questions about the 
legality, legitimacy, or utility of these activities are usually answered in an equivocal manner.  
For example, in the international law and just war literatures, there is consensus that these 
actions are permitted in certain instances; or in other words, the answer is “yes, but…”  Maxon 
provides a “checklist” that can serve as a rough guide as to when force may be used in self-
defense, or in anticipatory self-defense.  However, even his guidelines are open to debate and 
interpretation. 
Within the international security literature, the same type of phenomenon is also evident.  
There are numerous explanations as to why states would engage in anticipatory military 
activities, yet at the same time, there is also a caveat attached to much of this literature: there are 
“costs” attached to these actions that may make states less likely to engage in them, or the 
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statistical analysis finds no relationship between the causal variable under investigation and the 
use of anticipatory military activities.5  
The previous chapters of this study also presented mixed results.  The quantitative results 
were disappointing in that they failed to provide any conclusive evidence one way or the other.  
The fact that there was very little statistical significance in the models creates a situation where 
the quantitative findings are, for all intents and purposes, null.  In other words, according to the 
statistical analysis, the variables in the model do not make it more or less likely that a state will 
respond to the particular crisis trigger with an anticipatory military activity.   
Additionally, the predicted probabilities do not shed much insight into the factors that 
might make the use of anticipatory military activities more or less likely.  The most interesting 
finding is the fact that the only variable to consistently achieve statistical significance is if the 
triggering event is classified as a “threat to existence.”  In all of the models created, this variable 
is always significant, and the coefficient is always positive.  In other words, if a state is faced 
with a triggering event that is classified as a “threat to its existence,” it is more likely to take 
anticipatory action. While these results do tend to support the hypothesis that states will be less 
constrained by the legal and normative elements if they are faced with a threat to their existence, 
the fact that the majority of the variables in the model did not reach statistical significance, it is 
difficult to argue that there is robust support for this conclusion.   Possible reasons—and 
potential alternatives—for the statistical “non-findings” are discussed in more depth below.  
With respect to the case studies, the situation is more interesting.  One of the key 
objectives of the case studies was to try to ascertain if the leaders were constrained by the legal 
and normative elements.  It is useful to remember Chayes’s cautionary note: “We cannot ask for 
                                                 
5 Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International 
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a demonstration that legal considerations dictated decision.”6  At the same time, however, 
Chayes goes on to argue evidence can be found that the legal, and by extrapolation, the 
normative, elements influenced decision-makers:  
One important piece of evidence for constraint would be to examine the conduct in terms 
of the asserted prohibition.  If the conduct complies, there is at least a prima facie 
argument that the norm operated in its intended sense.  The converse is even more 
compelling: if the conduct violates the norm, it would seem to be very strong evidence 
that the law did not constrain.7  
 
In this respect, there was evidence within the cases for a constraining impact of the legal and 
normative elements.  Within the cases examined, for the most part the actors did work within the 
requirements of international law and the just war tradition. 
 In the cases where anticipatory action was taken, except for the Punjab case,8 Chayes’s 
standard for “constraint” is met.  To be sure, there is a potential problem here.  Since the cases 
examined all take place within the framework of international crises, and all of the actions were 
taken by states responding to crises triggered by other actors, there is the problem that each of 
the responses could potentially be justified as “self-defense.”  However, since none of the cases 
were triggered by direct violent military acts—i.e., none of the crises were triggered by an actual 
attack—the armed attack threshold set forth in the UN Charter was not met in any of the cases.  
In this respect, the “self-defense” claim that was advanced in these cases was of a more 
contentious nature in that it was of an “anticipatory” nature.  This of course, raises a much larger, 
and potentially more important question: are states that trigger international crises constrained or 
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influenced by international law and the just war tradition?   This question was not addressed in 
the current study, but would be an interesting one to address in a future project. 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, there is debate amongst legal scholars as to the legality of 
“anticipatory self-defense.”  The general consensus appears to be that although the right to 
anticipatory self-defense is not explicitly spelled out, the customary right to take action in self-
defense against imminent threats, regardless of whether or not an actual armed attack has already 
taken place, remains.  The situation is somewhat parallel with respect to the just war tradition.  
Assuming that the threat is imminent, and that certain other conditions are met, such as pursuing 
other avenues to resolve the crisis first, states may respond to such threats with an anticipatory 
military activity.   
 At the same time, it is important to stress that states appear hesitant, at least in the cases 
presented, to take action based on a claim of anticipatory self-defense.  Instead, states found 
other, more traditional, i.e., accepted, justifications upon which to base their actions.  In the 
period leading up to the Six Day War, numerous events combined to create a situation that 
compelled Israel to act.  Among these was the expulsion of UNEF forces from the Sinai, and the 
blockade of the Straits of Tiran, both of which were considered to be violations of international 
law, as well as clear indications that Egypt and Syria were preparing for war.  Israel did not 
frame its action in terms of anticipatory self-defense, but rather as action taken in self-defense as 
a last resort to counter what it believed to be a truly imminent threat, and after all other means to 
solve the crisis non-militarily had been exhausted.   
With respect to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kennedy Administration was very careful 
not to frame the crisis in terms of self-defense—nor was the action taken based on a claim of 
“anticipatory self-defense” by the United States.  Rather, the missiles were described as “threats 
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to the peace,” or a destabilizing element in the region.  In fact, as Roberts notes, it was not the 
mere presence of the missiles that constituted a threat.  Instead, it was the underlying intentions 
behind their deployment that constituted the true threat.9  In this respect, the US action was 
predicated upon the notion of collective self-defense for the region, as opposed to American self-
defense.  The primary reason for this was the knowledge that such an argument would not be 
supported.  Rather, there was legal support for acting in collective self-defense, i.e., for the 
entirety of the Rio Pact, rather than just for the United States—and the anticipatory action was 
approved and sanction by the OAS. 
 Furthermore, in the one case where the anticipatory self-defense justification was most 
explicitly used, the Israeli strike on the Osiraq reactor, the argument was universally rejected by 
the international community at the time.10  Begin and the Israeli government believed that Iraqi 
possession of a nuclear program constituted a clear danger and that the action taken against this 
program constituted a legitimate act of self-defense—even though this action was taken before 
the program came to fruition.  While the Israelis believed that the nature of the threat compelled 
them to act sooner as opposed to later, in order to avoid harmful collateral damage from 
attacking a “hot” reactor, the international community was not persuaded that the threat was truly 
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imminent.  In this respect, the Osiraq case highlights what many see as the need for a 
reevaluation of “imminence” and related ideas in the light of modern weapons technology.  This 
aspect will be discussed in more depth below. 
With respect to the just war tradition, the case studies show, for the most part, that the 
actors were influenced by the normative elements.  The “last resort” requirement appears to have 
been particularly salient, playing a role in virtually all of the cases examined.  Two elements of 
“last resort” were of primary importance: a) that other non-military means of conflict resolution 
be employed first and b) that the military response be taken when the threat was seen as 
imminent.  In the cases examined, it appears as if the leaders were influenced by these 
constraints, and acted in a manner consistent with these requirements.  
Contemporary Challenges to International Law and the Just War Tradition 
 Many scholars have argued that the contemporary world is so fundamentally different 
from that within which the just war tradition and international law developed that it is now time 
to for them to adjust and adapt.  Unlike yesteryear, when the primary threats to states came from 
the conventional mobilization and conventional attacks of conventional militaries, today’s states 
are faced with different threats.  According to Roberts,  
Regrettably, the prevailing patterns of statecraft and the fundamental change of 
circumstances in the past fifty years have created a radically different world from the one 
of the Cold War, so that the current legal constructs so optimistically and idealistically 
enshrined in the 1945 UN Charter are unworkable.  A new paradigm is essential if we are 
to successfully meet the challenge of the WMD threat….A new legal regime or paradigm 
is necessary to reflect the new political environment in which national survival, regional 
security and world peace can, dictate the preventive or preemptive use of force to either 
deter acquisition plans, eliminate acquisition programs or destroy illicit WMD sites at 
any stage in the proliferator’s acquisition efforts.  
 
This new counterproliferation self-help paradigm is not business-as-usual power politics 
validated by a legal construct but rather a common sense recognition that the law is not a 
suicide pact and that it is a process, more than just rules, that reflect and at the same 
controls state behavior.  This new “counterproliferation self-help” paradigm is fully 
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consistent with the purposes of the Charter, since illicit WMD programs threaten 
international peace and security.  The current legal paradigm is not responsive.  So, if the 
law is to have any relevance, a paradigm shift is both necessary and possible.11  
 
Taylor addresses the need for international law and the just war tradition to adopt to meet the 
new challenges of not only WMD, but also international terrorism and rogue states: 
Unlike international law on the conduct of war…which has been adapted repeatedly to 
new weapons technology and types of warfare throughout the twentieth century, jus ad 
bellum, the justification for going to war in the first place, now confronts such 
evolutionary pressure in an unprecedented way, with the rise of international terrorism in 
2001 and the proliferation of state and nonstate capacities to develop and use nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons.  International law, by its inherent reactive nature, risks 
evolving too slowly to define the proper response to this already apparent challenge.  
There is a danger that the increasing uncertainty and existing disagreement on the use of 
force in anticipatory self-defense could be exploited by states and nonstate actors alike to 
sharpen the divisions among liberal democracies and exploit the resulting vulnerability.12  
 
International terrorism, WMD, and “rogue states” are but a few of the issues that are now on the 
international agenda—and that many scholars feel international law and the just war tradition are 
ill-equipped to deal with in their present state.  In fact, much of the current scholarship in the 
fields of both international law and the just war tradition are focusing on these issues and how 
the respective elements can (or, if they even should) evolve in order to take into account these 
new developments. 
What makes these issues particularly relevant for this work is the fact that each of them 
could compel states to use anticipatory military activities.  Rather than discuss each, and the 
challenges they pose with respect to international law and the just war tradition, individually 
(which could constitute a dissertation in and of itself), they will be examined within the context 
of a contemporary example of a policy designed to deal with such issues: the Bush Doctrine. 
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Anticipatory Military Activities Today: The Bush Doctrine 
One of the most important implications of the findings that international law and the just 
war tradition have constrained states against taking anticipatory action, at least to some extent, 
concerns the potential application of the Bush Doctrine and associated policy pronouncements.  
While these constraints did not appear to have an impact on the decision to launch the 2003 Iraq 
War, they could play a role in future applications of the Bush Doctrine other policy 
pronouncements.  While a full examination of the Bush Doctrine is outside the scope and focus 
of this work, it is instructive to briefly examine it, particularly in light of the case studies 
presented above and within the framework of international law and the just war tradition.   
Additionally, the Bush Doctrine is helpful in illustrating many of the challenges currently facing 
both international law and the just war tradition. 
In the cover letter introducing the 2002 National Security Strategy for the United States 
(NSS), President Bush outlined the fundamental elements of what would become known as the 
Bush Doctrine: 
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.  
Our enemies openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and 
evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.  The United States will not 
allow these efforts to succeed.  We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other 
means of delivery.  We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our 
enemies’ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies.  And, as a matter of common sense 
and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully 
formed.  We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best.  So we must 
be prepared to defeat our enemies’ plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with 
deliberation.  History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to 
act.  In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of 
action.13 
  
                                                 
13 George W. Bush, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat. Remarks by the President on Iraq, October 7 
2002, Office of the Press Secretary, November 7, 2002 
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/print/20021007-8.html>. (emphasis added) 
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Within the text of the NSS, a direct connection is drawn between rogue states, terrorism, and 
WMD: “We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able 
to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and 
friends.”14  Later parts of the NSS also made explicit reference to both the use of anticipatory 
military action and its standing in international law, as well as clearly linking it with elements of 
the just war tradition. 
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before 
they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an 
imminent danger of attack.  Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the 
legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible 
mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. 
 
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of 
today’s adversaries.  Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using 
conventional means.  They know such attacks would fail.  Instead, they rely on acts of 
terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be 
easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning. 
… 
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a 
sufficient threat to our national security.  The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of 
inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.  To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if 
necessary, act preemptively. 
 
The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should 
nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression.  Yet in an age where the enemies of 
civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the 
United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.  
… 
The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United 
States or our allies and friends.  The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force 
measured, and the cause just.15  
 
The Bush Doctrine, at least as formally articulated, seems to be cognizant of the constraints on 
anticipatory action inherent in both international law and the just war tradition.  In fact, the text 
                                                 
14 Bush, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat," 14. 
15 Ibid., 15-16. 
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is careful to make explicit reference to the customary legal elements that permitted anticipatory 
self-defense, while at the same time ignoring the statutory limitations on this right. 
There is much debate within the scholarly literature as to whether the Bush Doctrine16 
lies outside the boundaries of international law and the just war tradition, pushes the accepted 
margins of permissibility with respect to international law and the just war tradition, or is 
consistent with the requirements of international law and the just war tradition.  By and large, the 
divide amongst these scholars is roughly analogous to the divide with respect to the 
interpretation of the standing of self-defense in the UN Charter discussed in Chapter 4 and the 
standing of anticipatory action within the just war tradition discussed in Chapter 5.  Specifically, 
the key element is the notion of imminence.   
The idea of imminence underlies not only the legal aspects, but also the jus ad bellum 
criteria as well.  One of the main arguments in favor of a revision of both international law and 
the just war tradition today is that the traditional conceptualization of imminence is no longer 
sufficient to deal with today’s threats.  With the advent of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic 
missiles, and international terrorism, states are now faced with a different threat environment 
than was previously the case.  According to Greenwood, 
In assessing what constitutes an imminent armed attack, however, it is necessary to take 
into account two factors that did not exist at the time of the Caroline incident.  The first is 
the gravity of the threat.  The threat posed by a nuclear weapon, or a biological or 
chemical weapon, if used against a city, is so horrific that it is in a different league from 
the threats posed (as in the Caroline) by cross-border raids conducted by men armed only 
with rifles.  Where the threat is an attack by weapons of mass destruction, the risk 
imposed upon a State by waiting until that attack actually takes place compounded by the 
impossibility for that State to afford its population any effective protection once the 
attack has been launched, mean that such an attack can reasonably be treated as imminent 
in circumstances where an attack by conventional means would not be so regarded.  The 
second consideration is the method of delivery of the threat.  It is far more difficult to 
determine the time scale within which a threat of attack by terrorist means would 
materialize than it is with threats posed by, for example, regular armed forces.  These 
                                                 
16 As spelled out in the 2002 National Security Strategy, not necessarily as applied in specific instances. 
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would be material considerations in assessing whether, in any particular case, an attack 
should be treated as imminent. 
 
Nevertheless, the requirement that an attack be imminent cannot be ignored or rendered 
meaningless. Even when taking into account [these] issues…the right of self-defense will 
justify action only where there is sufficient evidence that the threat of attack exists.  That 
will require evidence not only of the possession of weapons but also of an intention to use 
them.17  
 
The Bush Doctrine explicitly echoes this argument.  Specifically, the Bush Doctrine and the 
Bush Administration argues that the situation today is different in kind from that of the past, and 
as such, it must be dealt with differently.  In this respect, the underlying foundations of the 
current international legal system are no longer fully applicable. 
At the same time, however, as the case studies indicated, states are hesitant to take 
anticipatory military action unless the threat is imminent, or is at least perceived by the leaders to 
be imminent.  For the three cases where the threat was not classified as imminent, in one case, 
the anticipatory action was non-violent, in another no action was taken, and in the third, violent 
action was taken—but in that case Israel felt that it could not wait any longer, and the action was 
unanimously condemned by the international community.  With respect to the Bush Doctrine, 
however, it is unclear to what extent the “imminence test” will influence its application in 
specific instances.  In fact, much of the criticism and many of the critiques of the Bush Doctrine 
have focused not on the NSS per se, but rather on its application vis-à-vis Iraq, where the threat 
was not universally viewed as being “imminent.” 
What is more interesting in this context, however, is the standing of the concepts in the 
Bush Doctrine itself.  Specifically, are the elements at the doctrinal level consistent with the 
requirements of international law and the just war tradition?  If not, will this constrain the United 
States from implementing the doctrine, will the United States ignore the constraints, or will the 
                                                 
17 Christopher Greenwood, "International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force, Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, 
and Iraq," San Diego International Law Journal 4 (2003): 16. 
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United States try to shift the rules to fit the policy when applying the Bush Doctrine to particular 
cases? 
The Bush Doctrine addresses at least three specific types of threats that could be dealt 
with in an anticipatory manner: terrorism, WMD, and rogue states.  Specifically, according to the 
Bush Doctrine, the real threat is the potential for all three to combine and act together.18  With 
respect to international law and the just war tradition, however, each presents its own challenge. 
Much like the concepts of self-defense and imminence, there are problems pinning down 
an authoritative definition of “terrorism.”  According to Higgins, 
Terrorism is a term without any legal significance.  It is merely a convenient way of 
alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved of and in 
which either the methods used are unlawful, or the targets protected, or both.19  
 
At the same time, however, Greenwood notes that  
In recent years, the Security Council has had no hesitation in treating acts of international 
terrorism, whether or not ‘State-sponsored,’ as threats to the peace for the purposes of 
Chapter VII of the Charter….In addition, the Council adopted a number of resolutions 
condemning international terrorism in general as a threat to international peace.20  
 
In other words, the use of force can be taken in response to an actual terrorist attack.  And, by 
extrapolation, if there is evidence of an imminent terrorist attack, there could be support for 
anticipatory action taken to forestall the attack.  This aspect is discussed in more depth below.  
Yet the use of force in response to terrorism also raises several questions, for both international 
law and the just war tradition.   
                                                 
18 This was the initial rationale given by the Bush Administration to justify the 2003 Iraq War.  It has 
since come to light that Iraq did not have any weapons of mass destruction, and it appears as if Saddam 
Hussein did not have any real ties to Al Qaeda. 
19 As reported in Gilbert Guillaume, "Terrorism and International Law," International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 53, no. 3 (July 2004): 541. 
20 Greenwood, "International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force, Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq," 
19-20. 
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Is there a specific threshold of intensity that must be reached before the terrorist act 
becomes an “armed attack?”  Terrorist groups are often highly dispersed and often notoriously 
hard to trace—against whom, and where, would the response be carried out?  According to 
Paust, “unless the state is organizing, fomenting, directing, or otherwise directly participating in 
armed attacks by non-state terrorists, the use of military force against the state, as opposed to 
only the non-state terrorists, would be impermissible.”21  Additionally, this aspect raises 
questions about the need to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants.  Even if the 
response action is taken against a state that is supporting the terrorists, there are still questions 
about the issue of discrimination.  When engaging in counter-terrorist operations, it is often very 
difficult to distinguish “combatants” from “non-combatants,” and terrorists often choose to 
operate out of “immune targets” such as hospitals, thereby causing complications with respect to 
the requirements of jus in bello.22   
Can states take anticipatory action against terrorists?  The Bush Doctrine argues that it 
will act preemptively to forestall future terrorist attacks.  Biggio argues that anticipatory action 
can be taken against terrorist groups once they start to arm.  Unlike state actors that can have 
legitimate reasons for acquiring arms, terrorists are not afforded this same right: 
The fact that terrorist organizations are amassing weapons and other tools of destruction 
should be reason enough for striking against them, even before they specify a 
target….The simple attempt by terrorists to acquire weapons should be a prima facie 
indication of their hostile intent and should be responded to swiftly and violently.  
Allowing for a pre-emptive right of self-defense will send the message to terrorists that 
they have no safe havens and that they will be held culpable for the acts they have 
committed or are contemplating.23  
                                                 
21 Jordan J. Paust, "Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond," Cornell 
International Law Journal 35 (Winter 2002): 540. 
22 Anthony Clark Arend, "Terrorism and Just War Doctrine," in Close Calls: Intervention, Terrorism, 
Missile Defense, and 'Just War' Today, Elliott Abrams (ed.), (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy 
Center, 1998), 232. 
23 Frank A. Biggio, "Neutralizing the Threat: Reconsidering Existing Doctrines in the Emerging War on 
Terrorism," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 34, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 35-36. 
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 To be sure, this is a somewhat extreme position.  But the underlying logic is the same as with 
threats presented by state actors: states should not have to wait until they are attacked before 
acting in self-defense.  The difference here, however, is that Biggio appears to be arguing that 
terrorists automatically become a tangible threat once they start arming.  This raises several 
concerns, not the least of which is the fact that if the terrorists have not “specified a target,” it is 
unclear which state is supposed to be taking anticipatory action.  Additionally, until specific 
information is collected to indicate that an attack is imminent, it is always possible that the 
“threat” from the terrorist group is not as real as it appears.   
Biggio’s position is at odds with both the just war tradition and international law, 
particularly since the action is not addressed at any specific threat or overt act.  While there is 
room in international law and the just war tradition for anticipatory action, to fit Biggio’s 
position in the fold would require expanding both concepts so much that they would lose 
virtually all meaning.  According to Gross, 
A preemptive strike should not be carried out if other means are available to prevent the 
occurrence of the anticipated terrorist activity.  In other words, a preemptive strike is 
allowed only when other measures which may prevent the terrorists from carrying out 
their plans are not available, including, for example, placing the terrorists on trial—in 
short, when no other means to prevent the terrorists from carrying out their intentions in 
practice.24  
  
As with conventional threats, the use of force should be taken as a last resort.  It is not entirely 
clear which position the Bush Doctrine advocates. 
What about the issue of proportionality?  According to Bonafede, there are three different 
ways to assess the proportionality of a response to a terrorist attack: “(1) the ‘tit-for-tat,’ or ‘eye-
for-an-eye’ approach, (2) the ‘cumulative proportionality’ approach, and (3) the ‘eye-for-a-tooth’ 
                                                 
24 Emanuel Gross, "The Laws of War Waged Between Democratic States and Terrorist Organizations: 
Real or Illusive?" Florida Journal of International Law 15 (Summer 2003): 464-65. 
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or ‘deterrent proportionality’ approach.”25  While the first approach is the most congruent with 
the requirements of both international law and the just war tradition—in that the response is of an 
analogous magnitude to the attack received—it appears as if the Bush Doctrine proposes a 
response based on the last type of response.  In other words, the Bush Doctrine seeks an 
expanded view of proportionality, in order to send a clear message, i.e., use one response as a 
deterrent to prevent future attacks.  This position, however, is the furthest from the traditional 
conceptualizations of proportionality in both the just war tradition and international law.  
The other contemporary challenges explicitly addressed in the Bush Doctrine, weapons of 
mass destruction and rogue states, are closely linked within the Doctrine.  Unlike terrorism, there 
is an elaborate legal framework established to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.  At the same time, however, as was illustrated in the Osiraq case, many states and 
scholars have argued that this system actually does little to prevent the proliferation of weapons 
to dangerous regimes or actors (i.e., rogue states and terrorists).  According to Newcomb, 
At the outset, the Non-Proliferation Treaty suffered from two significant weaknesses.  
First, the Treaty was not ratified by all states possessing nuclear weapons.  The failure to 
encompass all nuclear weapons states within the non-proliferation regime seriously 
weakened its effect, providing a source of fissionable nuclear materials and technologies 
to non-signatory states without nuclear weapons.  Second, the Treaty did not provide the 
Agency with any positive mechanisms for enforcing safeguards agreements.  Compliance 
with safeguards agreements is dependent upon the good will of signatory states, and 
sanctions for non-compliance are severely limited by diplomatic maneuvers and 
alliances.  Nonetheless, in spite of its weaknesses, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has 
proven to be a reasonable and relatively effective counter to the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons technology26  
 
According to the Bush Administration, however, one of the problems with the NPT is that it  
                                                 
25 Michael C. Bonafede, "Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine and U.S. 
Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the September 11 Attacks," Cornell Law Review 88 (2002): 
183. 
26 Mark E. Newcomb, "Non-Proliferation, Self-Defense, and the Korean Crisis," Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 27 (October 1994): 608-09. 
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is only effective between states that deal with one another in good faith.  The treaty is not 
equipped to handle rogue states that cheat on their obligations, outlaw scientists who sell 
nuclear secrets to the highest bidder or terrorists trying to buy bombs on the black 
market.27  
 
In this respect, it is in terms of exactly those states that pose a threat, or are least posited as 
posing a threat, i.e., “rouge states” that the NPT fails to work.   
It is also important to note that as with “terrorism,” there is no one agreed upon definition 
of “rogue state.”  According to Litwak, “The term ‘rogue state’ is an American political rubric 
without standing in international law that has gained currency since the end of the Cold War.”28  
George notes that “Outlaw states and their rogue leaders refuse to accept and abide by some of 
the most important norms and practices of the international system.”29 Which states are 
designated as “rogue” shifts with time, as well as with respect to who is making the 
determination.  This element has important consequences vis-à-vis the use of anticipatory 
military activity in that it becomes difficult to prove that there is an imminent threat from a 
“rogue state” if it is not clear that the state in question is “rogue” or if it really poses a threat to 
any other state. 
 As discussed above and in Chapters 4 and 5, the nature of WMD and the possibility that 
“rogue states” may acquire these weapons has caused numerous scholars to call for a 
reevaluation of the criteria that must be met before force can be used in “self-defense.”  
Additionally, many of the same issues that were discussed with respect to terrorism—such as 
proportionality and discrimination—are also relevant with respect to WMD.   Unlike terrorism, 
                                                 
27 Mitchell B. Reiss, Revisiting Waltz's Man, the State and War: New Images for a New Century. Remarks 
to the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, October 6 2004, March 15, 2005 
<www.state.gov/s/p/rem/36915.htm>. 
28 Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War (Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 3. 
29 Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 49. 
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however, these issues are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 and do not need to be explored again.  
The general consensus appears to again rest on the idea of the centrality of the imminence factor.  
While the time element may shift somewhat, it still appears that there must be knowledge of both 
capability and intent in order for an anticipatory action to be justified.  At the same time, 
however, there is no standardization with respect to these criteria. 
According to Taylor, one of primary reasons why there is no clear standard with respect 
to the legality or permissibility of anticipatory self-defense is the fact that it has been invoked so 
rarely, and, therefore, there have not been very many instances for international jurists to 
“develop a comprehensive framework elucidating the strategic factors that must characterize a 
threat for it to qualify as imminent and, therefore, as a legitimate justification for anticipatory 
self-defense.”30  In fact, in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ stated,  
In view of the circumstances in which the dispute has arisen, reliance is placed by the 
Parties only on the right of self-defence in the case of an armed attack which has already 
occurred, and the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of armed 
attack has not been raised.  Accordingly Court expresses no view on that issue.31  
 
In the one case where the ICJ did consider the issues of armed attack and self-defense, it 
remained agnostic about the issue of anticipatory self-defense. 
The Bush Doctrine has placed the issue on the center stage.  There is considerable debate 
about the “legality” of the Bush Doctrine, as well as the extent to which the Bush Administration 
is influenced by international law.  According to Byers,  
the approach taken by the United States does provide some support for international law.  
By investing considerable intellectual resources in efforts to change the rules it is tacitly 
acknowledging that the rules matter, even to it and even though these rules on the use of 
force constitute the most highly politicized area of international law.  It is also 
noteworthy that those who seek to change the rules on behalf of the United States are 
deliberately working within existing processes of legal change.  They are taking account 
                                                 
30 Taylor, "The End of Imminence?" 58. 
31 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua  (International Court 
of Justice June 27 1986) , 93. 
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of reasonableness and reciprocity, promoting gradual rather than radical change, seeking 
the consent of other states and steering clear of deeply entrenched principles such as 
sovereign equality.  As a result, there is nothing unusual or necessarily wrong about the 
approach taken by the United States: international law has always been a developing 
system that gradually grows and bends in response to changing political stimuli.32  
 
In this respect, the Bush Doctrine, and its concrete application in Iraq and possibly elsewhere, 
could play an important role in the solidification of the legal and normative “rules of the game.”  
Challenges and Future Directions 
 The current study focused on the actions taken by one state in the context of an 
international crisis.  Future research should be conducted to expand this framework in a variety 
of ways.  First, additional data is now available from the ICB project.  The dataset has recently 
been updated, and now includes data covering the recent (2003) Iraq War and the nuclear crisis 
with North Korea.  This new data was added too late in the project to be included in this analysis.  
The statistical analysis should be reconstructed to include this new information.   
Additionally, the case studies should also be expanded with respect to adding additional 
cases as well as expanding the breadth and scope under examination.  A full examination of the 
Bush Doctrine and its applications should be undertaken.  Additionally, it would be interesting to 
investigate why the triggering entity initiated the crisis.  However, since the primary research 
question for this work concerned the use of anticipatory military activities in response to a crisis 
trigger, such an investigation was outside of the primary scope of the project. 
While it is impossible to pinpoint the underlying cause for the lack of statistically 
significant findings, there are several possibilities.  First, there may be specification problems 
with the models.  Several potentially important conceptual variables were not included in the 
models, primarily due to data constraints.  For example, a “compliance” measure for 
                                                 
32 Michael Byers, "Preemptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal Change," The 
Journal of Political Philosophy 11, no. 2 (June 2003): 189. 
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international law was not included in the model.  This type of variable could be very important in 
determining how influential international law is for certain states. Such a measure does not exist 
at the moment.  One plan for a future project is to create such a measure.   
Additionally, the international security concepts of power transitions and decline were 
not included in the full models due to problems integrating the different sources of data.  
Variables measuring the risk propensity of leaders were also excluded due to integration 
problems.  Creating an integrated dataset is another project that should be embarked upon in 
order to fully test the models.  The variable dealing the nuclear capability of both the 
triggering/target and anticipator states should also be expanded to determine if the stage in 
development has a distinct effect or if it is merely the presence of nuclear weapons that has an 
impact.  The nuclear capability of the triggering/target state is one of the few variables that 
achieved statistical significance in all the “any anticipatory activity” models and it would be 
interesting to explore this variable in more depth. 
At the same time, it is important to remember that at least one of the variables studied is 
considered a “rare event.”  This creates particular challenges with respect to the statistical 
analysis.  Rare events tend to be underestimated in most statistical analyses.  However, even the 
rare events logit, which is supposed to correct for this bias, failed to increase the statistical 
significance of the models.  Regardless the culprit for the lack of robust statistical results, the 
creation of additional measures is worth pursuing to determine if the models can be strengthened 
and then retested.  
Concluding Thoughts 
Although anticipatory military activities have always been a part of the panoply of policy 
options available, they have not been employed very frequently.  Perhaps this is due to the legal 
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and normative constraints against their use.  The case studies presented in this study seem to 
suggest that there is some support for this idea.  It remains to be seen if these elements will have 
a constraining effect on the Bush Administration.  At the same time, it will be interesting to 
observe how—or if—international law and the just war tradition change and adapt with respect 
to the new challenges presented by today’s world.    
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL STATISTICAL INFORMATION 
 
Model 1: Reduced Model 
Table A1.1: Logit Coefficients for Responses to Triggers Classified as “Military Threats” 
Any Anticipatory 
Activity (AMA) 
Including Force 
(AMF) 
Without Force 
(ANTNVIOL)  Logit 
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Logit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Logit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Military Threat -0.352        -0.67 -1.316         -1.24  0.066          0.10 
Last Resort  0.140         0.22 -2.082*       -1.94  1.290        0.26 
Nuclear Status of 
Actor  0.545***   2.74  0.635**       2.30  0.524**      2.06 
Power Discrepancy -0.010        -0.46  0.005           0.16 -0.017         -0.74 
Military/Security Issue -0.027        -0.05 -0.209          -0.30  0.069          0.11 
Threat of Grave 
Danger -0.450        -0.61  1.648*         1.68   
Threat to Existence  2.504***   3.49  3.453***     2.68  1.988**      2.42 
Regime Type of Actor  0.171         0.34  0.343           0.33  1.020*        1.85 
Regime Type of 
Triggering State  0.174         0.29 -0.657         -0.60  0.519          0.83 
Protracted Conflict -1.131**    -2.51 -0.979         -0.86 -0.869*       -1.78 
Nuclear Status of 
Triggering State -0.566**    -2.23 -0.518          -1.06 -0.647**     -2.25 
Membership in 
International 
Organizations 
 0.007         0.12  0.057           0.46 -0.011         -0.18 
Risk Score -0.202        -0.55 -0.531          -0.66  0.108          0.22 
Capabilities Score 69.419      1.40 197.746***  2.86 -52.437   -0.98 
Constant -1.543*       0.09 -.189           -1.56 -3.328**   -2.46 
       
Pseudo R2 0.148  0.375  0.106  
Wald χ2 36.27***  30.64***  17.62  
Log pseudo-likelihood -89.99  -26.59  -71.638  
N 264  264  239  
*p <0.10       
**p <0.05       
***p <0.01       
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Table A1.2: Logit Coefficients Responses to Triggers Classified as “External Change” 
Any Anticipatory 
Activity (AMA) 
Including Force 
(AMF) 
Without Force 
(ANTNVIOL)  Logit 
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Logit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Logit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
External Change  0.146         0.21 -0.878          -0.76  0.380           0.42 
Last Resort  .0229         0.38 -1.869*          -1.91  1.519         1.36 
Nuclear Status of 
Actor  0.527***   2.66 0.580*           1.93  0.414*         1.67 
Power Discrepancy -0.008        -0.36 0.203             0.52 -0.170          -0.66 
Military/Security Issue -0.140        -0.27 -0.470            -0.56 -0.232          -0.04 
Threat of Grave 
Danger -0.341        -0.44  1.887*          1.81   
Threat to Existence 2.594***    3.60  3.834***      3.01  1.822**       2.24 
Regime Type of Actor  0.184         0.37 0.670             0.71 -0.124          -0.22 
Regime Type of 
Triggering State  0.275         0.48 -0.384           -0.35  0.481           0.81 
Protracted Conflict -1.179***  -2.61 -1.257           -1.17 -0.936**      -1.98 
Nuclear Status of 
Triggering State -0.595**    -2.34 -0.529            -1.11 -0.570*        -1.94 
Membership in 
International 
Organizations 
 0.008         0.12 0.049             0.36 -0.004          -0.06 
Risk Score -0.208        -0.58 -0.522            -0.75 -0.058          -0.14 
Capabilities Score  63.823   1.27 204.169***  2.57 -63.330    -1.13 
Constant -1.744**    -2.14 -2.661***     -2.56 -3.085**   -2.38 
       
Pseudo R2 0.146  0.356  0.087  
Wald χ2 36.19***  28.06**  17.11  
Log pseudo-likelihood -88.266  -27.419  -73.102  
N 264  264  239  
*p <0.10       
**p <0.05       
***p <0.01       
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Table A1.3: Logit Coefficients for Responses to Triggers classified as “Non-violent Military” 
Any Anticipatory 
Activity (AMA) 
Including Force 
(AMF) 
Without Force 
(ANTNVIOL)  Logit 
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Logit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Logit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Non-Violent Military  2.141***     4.70 0.305             0.37  2.388***     4.73 
Last Resort  0.125           0.19 -1.705*          -1.88  1.480         1.16 
Nuclear Status of 
Actor  0.595***     2.64 0.560**         1.96  0.500          1.58 
Power Discrepancy -0.010         -0.40 0.020             0.49 -0.024         -0.74 
Military/Security Issue -0.631         -0.68 -0.480            -0.60 -0.315         -0.53 
Threat of Grave 
Danger -0.108         -0.13  1.953*          1.84   
Threat to Existence  3.183***   4.10  3.787***      2.93  2.371**     2.27 
Regime Type of Actor -0.104         -0.18 0.550             0.56 -0.637         -0.98 
Regime Type of 
Triggering State  0.159          0.26 -0.305           -0.29  0.395          0.61 
Protracted Conflict -1.227**     -2.55 -1.353           -1.24 -1.024*       -1.94 
Nuclear Status of 
Triggering State -0.821***   -2.75 -0.544            -1.04 -0.845**     -2.49 
Membership in 
International 
Organizations 
 0.037          0.52 0.060             0.42  0.029          0.39 
Risk Score -0.461         -1.19 -0.523           -0.76 -0.373         -0.80 
Capabilities Score  68.334     1.46 185.787*** 2.56 -69.338   -0.93 
Constant -2.024**     -2.37 -2.809***      -2.95 -3.428**   -2.37 
       
Pseudo R2 0.251  0.353  0.232  
Wald χ2 53.70***  31.99***  33.52***  
Log pseudo-likelihood -77.386  -27.537  -61.522  
N 264  264  239  
*p <0.10       
**p <0.05       
***p <0.01       
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Model 2: Rare Events Logit (RELOGIT) 
 
Table A2.1 RELOGIT Coefficients 
Including Force 
(AMF) 
Including Force 
(AMF) 
Including Force 
(AMF)  Relogit 
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Relogit 
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Relogit  
Coefficient 
T-
Statistic 
Military Threat -0.943*       -1.670     
External Change   -.337            -0.386   
Non-Violent Military     -0.278         -0.330 
Last Resort -1.876***   -2.691 -1.879***    -2.750 -1.747***   -2.713 
Nuclear Status of 
Actor  0.335          1.193  0.310           1.163  0.293         1.097 
Power Discrepancy -0.007         -0.928 -0.007          -0.843 -0.008          0.356 
Military/Security Issue  0.296          0.484 -0.055          -0.082  0.089          0.136 
Threat of Grave 
Danger  0.652          0.819  0.789           0.903  0.823          0.988 
Threat to Existence  1.810**       2.148  1.913**       2.348  1.881**      2.280 
Regime Type of Actor  0.779          1.171  0.856           1.417  0.875          1.363 
Regime Type of 
Triggering State -0.414         -0.476 -0.296          -0.359 -0.228         -0.273 
Protracted Conflict -0.256         -0.443 -0.311          -0.521 -0.344         -0.598 
Nuclear Status of 
Triggering State -0.333         -1.218 -0.326          -1.161 -0.318         -1.177 
Membership in 
International 
Organizations 
-0.024         -0.261 -0.228          -0.259 -0.022         -0.243 
Constant -1.565       -1.538 -1.916*      -1.817 -2.055**     -2.185 
       
N 504  504  504  
*p <0.10       
**p <0.05       
***p <0.01       
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table A3.1: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
 Mean Mode Std. Dev. Min Max 
Military Threat 0.241 0 0.428 0 1 
External Change 0.045 0 0.207 0 1 
Non-Violent Military 0.196 0 0.397 0 1 
Last Resort 0.908 1 0.290 0 1 
Nuclear Status of Actor 1.680  1.122 1 4 
Power Discrepancy 5.839  30.342 -179 179 
Military/Security Issue 0.606 1 0.489 0 1 
Threat of Grave Danger 0.102 0 0.303 0 1 
Threat to Existence 0.033 0 0.180 0 1 
Democracy 0.404 0 0.491 0 1 
Regime Type of Triggering State 0.261 0 0.439 0 1 
Protracted Conflict 0.559 1 0.497 0 1 
Nuclear Status of Triggering State 1.302  1.160 0 4 
Membership in International 
Organizations 5.792  4.062 0 16 
Interaction: Membership & Regime Type 
of Actor 3.284  4.927 0 16 
Interaction: External Change & Regime 
Type of Actor 0.002 0 0.124 0 1 
Interaction: Non-Violent Military & 
Regime Type of Actor 0.008 0 0.266 0 1 
Interaction: External Change & 
Membership 0.257  1.426 0 14 
Interaction: Non-Violent Military & 
Membership 0.945  2.352 0 15 
Anticipatory Action (AMA) 0.133 0 0.340 0 1 
Anticipatory Action Including Force 
(AMF) 0.031 0 0.174 0 1 
Anticipatory Action Without Force 
(ANTNVIOL) 0.102 0 0.303 0 1 
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APPENDIX B: OPERATIONALIZATIONS 
 
Dependent Variable  
The use of anticipatory military force: 
MAJRES Crisis Management I: Major Response to Crisis Trigger 
Identifies the primary technique used to manage the crisis 
 
1: Negotiation 
formal, informal, bilateral, multilateral, international, diplomatic exchange 
2: Adjudication or arbitration 
3: Mediation 
by global or regional organization, ally, or alliance personnel 
4: Multiple not including violence 
5: Non-military pressure 
6: Non-violent military 
physical acts (maneuvers, redisposition of forces); verbal acts (oral and written 
statements by authorized leaders threatening to use violence) 
7: Multiple including violence 
8: Violence 
Recoded* 
AMA 
 
 
 
AMF 
 
Anticipatory Military Activities Used (includes violent and non-violent military acts) 
0: No 
1: Yes (based on case descriptions) 
 
Anticipatory Military Force Used (includes only violent military acts) 
0: No 
1: Yes (based on case descriptions) 
 
ANTNVIOL Anticipatory Military Activities Used (includes only non-violent military acts) 
0: No 
1: Yes (based on case descriptions) 
 
 
Independent variables 
A. International Law  
 
1. Self-defense  
TRIGGR  
Trigger to Foreign 
Policy Crisis 
 
 
Types of triggers: 
The breakpoint to an international crisis is that event, act or situational change which 
catalyzes a crisis for the earliest actor, that is, which leads decision makers to 
perceive a threat to basic values, time pressure for response and heightened 
probability of involvement in military hostilities. 
 
1: Verbal act 
protest, threat, accusation, demand, etc. 
2: Political act 
subversion, alliance formation by adversaries, diplomatic sanctions, 
severance of diplomatic relation, violation of treaties 
3: Economic act 
                                                 
* See Appendix C, Table 1 for information on how the variable was recoded. 
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embargo, dumping, nationalization of property, withholding of economic aid 
4: External change 
intelligence report, change in specific weapon, weapon system, offensive 
capability, change in global system or regional subsystem, challenge to 
legitimacy by international organization 
5: Other non-violent act 
example: pre-election referendum in Poland showing the Peasant Party to be 
strongest triggered a crisis for the USSR on 30 June 1946, catalyzing the 
Communism in Poland Crisis 
6: Internal verbal or physical challenge to regime or elite 
incitement by media, proclamation of new regime, fall of government, coup 
d’etat, sabotage act, terrorism, assassination, riot, demonstration, strike, 
arrest, martial law, execution, mutiny, revolt  
7: Non-violent military act 
show of force, war game or maneuvers, mobilization, movement of forces, 
change of force posture to offensive 
8: Indirect violent act 
revolt in another country, violent act directed at ally, friendly state, or client 
state 
9: Violent act 
border clash, border crossing by limited forces, invasion of air space, sinking 
of ship, sea-air incident, bombing of large target, large-scale military attack, 
war 
  
Recodes  
MILTHRT 0: No military threat (values 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9) 
1: Military threat (values 4 & 7)  
  
EXTCHANG 0: Not “external change” trigger (all values except 4) 
1: “External change” trigger (value 4 only) 
  
NONVMIL 0: Not “non-violent military” trigger (all values except 7) 
1: “Non-violent military” trigger (value 7 only) 
  
INDIRVIO 0: Not “indirect violent” trigger (all values except 8) 
1: “Indirect violent” trigger (value 8 only)  
  
VIOLACT 0: Not “violent act” trigger (all values except 9) 
1: “Violent act” trigger (value 9 only) 
 
2. Membership in Treaties & Organizations that Provide for the Peaceful Resolution of Conflict  
 
MEMBER Count of number of treaties/organizations state is signatory member 
 
 
B. Just War Tradition  
 
1. Proportionality  
GRAVTY 
Gravity 
This variable identifies the object of gravest threat at any time during the crisis, as 
perceived by the principle decision makers of the crisis actor.  When two or more 
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Values & 
Illustrations: 
values were threatened, the most severe was coded 
 
 
0: Economic threat 
A crisis for Egypt was triggered in January 1992 when Sudan granted a 
Canadian oil company a concession to explore for oil in Halaib, in the 
Egypt/Sudan Border II Crisis 
1: Limited military threat 
Israel’s raid on the airport in Entebbe on 3 July 1976 constituted a limited 
military threat for Uganda, in the Entebbe Raid Crisis 
2: Political threat 
Threat of overthrow of regime, change of institutions, replacement of elite, 
intervention in domestic politics, subversion 
3: Territorial threat 
Threat of integration, annexation of part of a state’s territory, separatism 
4: Threat to influence in the international system or regional subsystem 
Threat of declining power in the global system and/or regional subsystem, 
diplomatic isolation, cessation of patron aid  
(Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 was a threat to the global 
and regional influence of the US and USSR in the Suez Nationalization/War 
Crisis) 
5: Threat of grave danger 
Threat of large casualties in war, mass bombings 
(The PRC build-up of forces in the coastal areas around Quemoy and Matsu 
was perceived by Taiwan as a threat of grave danger in the 1958 Taiwan 
Straits II Crisis) 
6: Threat to existence 
Threat to survival of population, of genocide, threat to existence of entity, of 
total annexation, colonial rule, occupation 
  
Recode  
ECONTHRT 0: Not economic threat (all values except 0) 
1: Economic threat (value 0 only)  
  
LTMIL 0: Not limited military threat (all values except 1) 
1: Limited military threat (value 1 only)  
  
POLTHRT 0: Not political threat (all values except 2) 
1: Political threat (value 2 only) 
  
TERRTHRT 0: Not territorial threat (all values except 3) 
1: Territorial threat (value 3 only)  
  
INFLTHRT 0: Not threat to influence (all values except 4) 
1: Threat to influence (value 4 only) 
  
GRVDNGR 0: Not threat of grave danger (all values except 5) 
1: Threat of grave danger (value 5 only) 
  
EXISTTHR 0: Not threat to existence (all values except 6) 
1: Threat to existence (value 6 only) 
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2. Last Resort  
LSTRST* 
Was the military 
action taken after 
other types of 
activities? 
This variable determines if military activities were employed before of after other 
conflict resolution mechanisms.  Coding was based upon an analysis of the case 
descriptions. 
 
 
0: Not consistent with requirements of last resort 
1: Consistent with requirements of last resort 
 
C. International Security elements 
 
1. Protracted conflict  
PC 
Conflict Setting 
 
Values & 
Illustrations: 
This variable identifies the conflict setting of the crisis for the crisis actor 
 
 
1: Non-protracted conflict 
a setting in which an external crisis for an individual state is unburdened by 
long-term hostility with one or more adversary states 
2: Protracted conflict 
an environment of ongoing disputes among adversaries, with fluctuating 
interaction ranging from violence to near-tranquility, multiple issues and 
spillover effects on all aspects of their relations, and the absence of 
mutually-recognized or anticipated termination 
3: Long-war protracted conflict 
a setting of protracted conflict in which war is pervasive and continuous 
Recode  
pc1 0: Not protracted conflict (value 1) 
1: Protracted conflict (values 2 and 3) 
 
2. Capabilities  
CAP_1 Time series (difference) of difference in capabilities (CINC score) between the actor 
and the triggering entity.  
 
 
3. Nuclear capability  
NUCLER 
Nuclear Capability of 
potential anticipator 
 
Values & Illustrations 
Did the crisis actor possess nuclear weapons or access to them at the time the crisis 
began? 
 
 
1: No (foreseeable) nuclear capability 
the actor did not possess a nuclear capability with any operational military 
significance when the crisis began, moreover, the international consensus at 
the time was that it could not develop or acquire such capability within five 
years (sub-Saharan African states) 
2: Foreseeable nuclear capability 
the actor could develop or acquire operational nuclear military capability 
                                                 
* See Appendix C, Table 2 for information on how variable was recoded. 
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within five years of the beginning of the crisis (India 1971, at the time of the 
Bangladesh crisis) 
3: Possession of nuclear capability 
the actor had nuclear military capability (weapons) and delivery means but 
no second-strike capability (PRC at the time of the Ussuri River Crisis, 
1969) 
4: Developed nuclear capability, with second strike capability 
superpower or great power with ability to absorb a first strike and retaliate 
(U.S., USSR at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962) 
  
TRGNUCLR 
Nuclear status of 
triggering entity 
Same values as NUCLER, but for the triggering entity 
 
5. Regime type  
REGIME 
Political Regime of 
Crisis Actor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Values 
This variable distinguishes between authoritarian and democratic regimes, as well as 
between civil and military regimes, at the time of the crisis.  Criteria for identifying 
democratic regimes are: competitive elections; pluralist representation in the 
legislature; several autonomous centers of authority in the political system; 
competitive parties; and a free press.  If three or more of these criteria were missing 
or severely limited, and there was no military component whatsoever, the state was 
coded as a civil authoritarian regime.  A military regime was said to exist when 
government control was in the hands of the armed forces or when it acted entirely or 
predominantly at their command.  Coding judgments were made in terms of actual 
practices, rather than constitutional or other formal legal provisions, since the formal 
constitutional structure gives no guidance as to how a regime works.  The following 
definitions were used as a guide: 
 
Direct military rule: The armed forces exercise direct political control (Pakistan 
1958-71, 1977-88; Syria 1949-51; Turkey 1980-) 
 
Indirect military rule: The armed forces determine policy but act through a 
subordinate civilian government (Argentina 1959-62; Cuba 1933-40) 
 
Dual authority: The regime rests on the armed forces and a civilian party, 
organization, or group, with the ruler as leader of both pillars of authority (Peron’s 
Argentina 1945-55; Franco’s Spain 1939-76) 
 
1: Democratic regime 
2: Civil authoritarian regime 
3: Military-direct rule 
4: Military-indirect rule 
5: Military dual authority 
Recode  
DEMOCRA 
Regime type of 
potential anticipator 
 
0: Non-democratic regime (all values except 1) 
1: Democratic regime (value 1 only) 
TRGREGIM 
Regime type of 
0: Non-democratic regime (all values except 1) 
1: Democratic regime (value 1 only) 
 327
triggering entity 
  
REGIME2 Interaction variable for DEMOCRA and TRGREGIM 
 
6. Risk Propensity  
RISK1 Dyadic risk score for the actor, as generated by EUGene 
 
7. Type of issue involved in the crisis  
ISSUE 
Issue of Crisis 
 
 
Values & Illustrations 
This variable identifies the most important initial issue area of the crisis as perceived 
by the crisis actor.  In cases of multiple issue-areas, the value closest to (1) was 
coded 
 
1: Military-security 
territory, borders, access to the sea, free navigation, irredentism, change in 
the military balance, military incidents, war 
(The UK and Ethiopia in the 1934-36 Ethiopia War Crisis) 
2: Political-diplomatic 
sovereignty, hegemony, international status, change in international system, 
colonialism, cold war 
(Venezuela in its crisis with Cuba in 1963) 
3: Economic-developmental 
treatment of property, raw material resources, oil, economic recession, 
economic pressure, currency problems 
(Jordan in the 1964 Jordan Water Crisis) 
4: Cultural-status 
ideology, threat to non-material values, internal problems, state of regime, 
population problems  
(Germany in the 1938 Anschluss Crisis) 
5: Other 
Recode  
MILSEC 0: Not military-security issue (all values except 1) 
1: Military-security issue (value 1 only) 
  
POLDIP 0: Not political-diplomatic issue (all values except 2) 
1: Political-diplomatic issue (value 2 only) 
  
ECONDEV 0: Not economic-development issue (all values except 3) 
1: Economic-development issue (value 3 only) 
  
CULTSTAT 0: Not cultural-status issue (all values except 4) 
1: Cultural-status issue (value 4 only) 
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APPENDIX C: CODING RULES 
Table 1: Coding rules for Anticipatory Military Activities/Anticipatory Military Force 
1. Filter intra-war crises 
a. Removed from the dataset since actions taken during the course of an ongoing 
war are by nature not anticipatory 
2. Filter internal triggers 
a. Excluded from the dataset since the focus is on interstate conflict 
3. Was military action taken  
a. If no, exclude case 
b. If yes, continue through steps 4-9 
4. Was military action taken in the belief that an attack was likely? 
5. Was military action taken in response to an actual attack/invasion 
a. If yes, not anticipatory but reactionary and exclude case 
6. Was the action the use of armed force or troop movement? 
a. Use of armed force coded as anticipatory military force (AMF) 
b. Movement coded as anticipatory military action (ANTNVIOL) 
c. Both added together into composite variable including both types of activities 
(AMA) 
7. Was the action taken in order to forestall a (non-military) event that would have a 
negative impact on the attacker? 
a. If included the use of force coded as anticipatory military force 
b. If included troop movement coded as anticipatory military action 
8. Was the military activity in response to a request for aid from an ally or third state? 
a. If yes, not anticipatory and exclude case 
9. Was the army put on alert or deployed 
a. If alert only, not anticipatory and exclude case 
b. If deployed but force was not used, coded as anticipatory military action 
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Table 2: Coding rules for Last Resort 
1. Start with filtered dataset. 
2. Was military activity undertaken? 
a. If no, actions consistent with requirement of last resort, since other conflict 
resolution techniques were used (and were successful) before force was 
employed. 
3. Was force used before non-violent political strategies? 
a. If yes, not congruent with last resort 
4. Was force used after non-violent strategies were applied? 
a. If yes, congruent with last resort 
5. Was action limited to military activities but did not include the use of force? 
a. If yes, the conflict was resolved through other means and was congruent with last 
resort 
6.  Was force used in response to a violent attack? 
a. If yes, consistent with last resort since the action was in response to a direct attack 
7. Did both sides accuse the other of initiating the conflict? 
a. If yes, not consistent with last resort, since at least one of the sides (and it is not 
possible to determine which one) could have tried other conflict resolution 
mechanisms first. 
8. Was force used in response to an act that was in response to an act by the first state (in 
other words, did state A trigger a crisis that caused state B to react violently which 
triggered a crisis for state A that caused state A to respond violently)? 
a. If yes, not consistent with last resort since it was the initial act by the state that 
started the crisis 
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